INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS

Devoted to the Advancement of Ethical Knowledge and Practice

ISSUED QUARTERLY

Managing Editor, JAMES H. TUFTS

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

FELIX ADLER, Ph. D., New York
CHARLES M. BAKEWELL, Ph. D., New Haven
C. DELISLE BURNS, London
JOHN DEWEY, LL. D., New York
G. C. FIELD, Liverpool
L. T. HOBHOUSE, London
HAROLD HÖFFDING, Ph. D., Copenhagen
M. JOURDAIN, London, Eng.
J. S. MACKENZIE, Litt. D., London, Eng.
J. H. MUIRHEAD, LL. D., Birmingham
ROSCOE POUND, LL. D., Cambridge, Mass.
FRANK THILLY, Ph. D., Ithaca
JOHN H. WIGMORE, LL. D., Chicago

VOL. XXXIII

OCTOBER, 1922, JANUARY, APRIL, AND JULY, 1923

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, Rumford Press, Concord, N. H.
James H. Tufts, The University of Chicago
London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.

1923

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

Gen.
Mahr.

CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXXIII

ARTICLES

	PAGE
BOARDMAN, NORMAN. The Rôle of the Fundamental	202
BOUCKE, O. FRED. The Relation of Ethics to Social Science	66
BOYER, C. V. Self-Expression and Happiness	263
BROGAN, A. P. A Study in Statistical Ethics	119
FREEMAN, R. AUSTIN. Some Ethical Consequences of the Industrial Revolution	347
HANKIN, GREGORY. Ethics and Law	416
HARRISON, MILTON. The Problem of War	307
HETHERINGTON, H. J. W. Sir Henry Jones	169
HOERNLÉ, R. F. A. Recent Philosophy of Religion	135
KANTOR, J. R. The Psychology of the Ethically Rational	316
LODGE, RUPERT C. The Genesis of the Moral Judgment in Plato	34
MACKENZIE, J. S. Spiritual Values	248
MEAD, GEORGE H. Scientific Method and the Moral Sciences	229
PEMBERTON, R. KINGSDOWN. The Commensurability of Values	23
RADHAKRISHNAN, S. The Hindu Dharma	1
REID, GILBERT. Revolution as Taught by Confucianism	188
REID, LOUIS ARNAUD. The Nature of the Knowledge that Conditions Goodness	158
TAEUSCH, C. F. Sanctioning International Peace	55
WEINBERG, ALBERT K. The Disassociability of Morality and Conduct	388
WILDE, NORMAN. The Problem of Liberty	291
WILLIAMSON, CLAUDE C. H. Hamlet	85
WOLFE, A. B. Individualism and Democracy	398
YARROS, VICTOR S. Democracy or What?	369

DISCUSSIONS

DATTA, DHIRENDRA MOHON. "Objective Freedom"	101

BOOK REVIEWS

BOGARDUS, EMERY S. *A History of Social Thought.* By G. P. Wyckoff	106
BUTLER, D. C. *Western Mysticism.* By C. Delisle Burns	331
COX, G. C. *The Public Conscience.* By A. P. Brogan	328
DE TOURTOULON, PIERRE. *Philosophy in the Development of Law.* By Floyd R. Mechem	212
FREEMAN, R. AUSTIN. *Social Decay and Regeneration.* By W. J. Roberts	218
GENTILE, GIOVANNA. *The Theory of Mind as Pure Act.* By John Laird	213

Digitized by Google

INGE, W. R. *Outspoken Essays.* By M. Jourdain..... 330
JONES, SIR HENRY and MUIRHEAD, JOHN HENRY. *The Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird.* By A. D. Lindsay..... 103
LIPPMANN, WALTER. *Public Opinion.* By Charles E. Merriam..... 210
REYBURN, HUGH A. *The Ethical Theory of Hegel: A Study of the Philosophy of Right.* By H. Barker..... 216
ROGERS, ARTHUR KENYON. *The Theory of Ethics.* By J. F. Crawford 436
WOODS, ROBERT A. and KENNEDY, ALBERT J. *The Settlement Horizon: A National Estimate.* By James H. Tufts..... 221

NOTES

CARR, H. WILDON. In Memoriam: Bernard Bosanquet..... 443
MACKENZIE, J. S. The Late Miss E. E. Constance Jones..... 228

Digitized by Google

OCT 5 1922

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

A Quarterly Devoted to the Advancement of Ethical Knowledge and Practice

VOL. XXXIII OCTOBER, 1922 NO. 1

LEADING CONTENTS

THE HINDU DHARMA S. Radhakrishnan

THE COMMENSURABILITY OF VALUES R. Kingsdown Pemberton

THE GENESIS OF THE MORAL JUDGMENT IN PLATO Rupert C. Lodge

SANCTIONING INTERNATIONAL PEACE C. F. Taeusch

THE RELATION OF ETHICS TO SOCIAL SCIENCE O. Fred Boucke

HAMLET Claude C. H. Williamson

For full Contents see inside page

Published for the Editors by THE RUMFORD PRESS, Concord, N. H.

Chicago: JAMES H. TUFTS, University of Chicago, Manager

London: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN, Ltd., 40 Museum Street, W. C.

Yearly Subscription, $3.00 Single Numbers, 75 cents

Entered as second-class matter October 16, 1914, at the post-office at Concord, New Hampshire, under the Act of March 3, 1879

Digitized by Google

EUGENICS REVIEW

"Eugenics is the study of agencies under social control that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations either physically or mentally."

THE contents of the *Eugenics Review* include articles by leading men of science dealing with all problems relating to racial improvement or racial deterioration, including such subjects as the laws of heredity, the effects of environment, infant mortality, disease and degeneracy, marriage of the unfit, legislation affecting marriage and population, etc., etc.

It also publishes reviews by well-known critics of all noteworthy books on these and kindred subjects and of important papers in English, American, French, Italian and German periodicals.

Subscription 4/8 p. a. post free

Address: 11 Lincolns Inn Fields London, W. C. 2.

SARGENT'S

Handbook of American Private Schools

An Annual Survey and Review critically describing Private Schools of all classifications and Summer Camps.
A Compendium for Educators and all interested in Education.
A Guide Book for Parents, supplying intimate information, which makes possible a discriminating choice.
Comparative Tables give the relative cost, size, age, special features, etc.
Introductory Chapters review interesting developments of the year in education.
Educational Service Bureau will be glad to advise and write you intimately about any school or class of schools in which you are interested. Write for full particulars. Consultation by appointment.

Circulars and sample pages on request

PORTER E. SARGENT, 14 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass.

Digitized by Google

THE INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF ETHICS

OCTOBER, 1922

THE HINDU DHARMA.

S. RADHAKRISHNAN.

FROM the time the history of the Aryans in India commenced up till to-day, it has been the privilege or the misfortune of India to be faced with serious racial and religious crises. In a special sense, India has been a small edition of the world, serving as a laboratory where experiments of racial and religious syntheses relevant to the problems of the world are undertaken and worked out. If it be true that every people has its own distinctive note and brings out one particular aspect of the divine manifestation, India seems to have been selected, in the economy of things, for the purpose of offering solutions for racial and religious conflicts.

In the long history of the Hindu religion with all its cross currents and backwaters, with the windings of the stream and the barren expanses of sand, it is possible to discern a general tendency, a spiritual direction which has continued the same in spite of varying expressions. The central principles of the ancient Hindu *dharma* are not dead shells, but living powers full of strength and suggestiveness. Even if it be not so, it is not altogether without interest to understand the principles of the Hindu faith which has more than two hundred million followers to-day.

The term "*dharma*" is one of complex significance. It stands for all those ideals and purposes, influences and institutions that shape the character of man both as an indi-

Digitized by Google

vidual and as a member of society. It is the law of right living, the observance of which secures the double object of happiness on earth and salvation.[1] It is ethics and religion combined. The life of a Hindu is regulated, to a very detailed extent, by the laws of *dharma*. His fasts and feasts, his social and family ties, his personal habits and tastes are all considered by it.

Moksha or spiritual freedom is the aim of all human life. It is the destiny of man to reach the summits of spirit and attain immortality. We are the children of God, *Amritasya putrāh*. The eternal dream of the human heart, the aspiration of the soul to come to its own is the basis of the Hindu *dharma*. It assumes that the fundamental reality is the soul of man. All desires of the heart, all discussions of logic presuppose the reality of the *Ātman*. It is something unprovable by reason, though no proof is possible without it. Nor is it a mere matter of faith, since it is the faith which underlies all reason. If the self of man is open to doubt, then nothing on earth is free from it. If anything can be, then the soul *is*. It is the ultimate truth which is above all change, the unseen reality which is the basis of all life and logic. It is the mystery which silently affirms itself. What our minds think is not of much importance beside the truth that we are. The fears of man are due to the imperfections which shut him from his destiny, the darkness which hides the light within. If we take refuge in the self, the only fixed point of our being, we shall know that we are not alone in the apparently endless road of life or *saṁsāra* and that we can overcome the world and defy death. "Greater is he that is within you than he that is in the world."[2]

While the spiritual perfection of man is the aim of all endeavor, the Hindu *dharma* does not insist on any religious belief or form of worship. The utmost latitude is allowed in the matter of addressing and approaching the supreme. The Hindu thinkers were good students of philosophy and

[1] *Abhyudaya* and *Niḥśreyasa*.
[2] I, John, V, 21.

Digitized by Google

sociology and never felt called upon to enforce religious belief. Misunderstandings and antagonisms in religious matters arise, when we put forward excessive claims on behalf of our own views of God. Besides, religion implies freedom and it is the greatest injury that we can inflict on man to compel him to accept what he cannot understand. Again, it is difficult to classify the ways of man to God. The heart of man has written, in its blood, its pathway to God. A Sanskrit verse says, "As the birds float in the air and the fish swim in the sea leaving no traces behind, even so are the paths traversed by the spiritual." Christ spoke of the mystery of the divine life revealing itself in the finite soul, "The wind bloweth where it listeth; thou hearest the sound thereof, and canst not tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth, so is every one that is born of the spirit." God reveals himself now by a flash of lightning, now by a tremor in the soul. To a Hindu who has understood the spirit of his religion all faiths are sacred. In Rabindranath's school at Bolpur, where the one Invisible God is worshipped, abuse of others' faiths is disallowed. Gandhi is most tolerant in his religious views. Regarding the attitude of the Brahman thinkers to other religions, Wilson writes, "The Brahmans who compiled a code of Hindu law, by command of Warren Hastings, preface their performance by affirming the equal merit of every form of religious worship. Contrarieties of belief, and diversities of religion, they say, are in fact part of the scheme of providence; for as a painter gives beauty to a picture by a variety of colors, or as a gardener embellishes his garden with flowers of every hue, so God appointed to every tribe its own religion that man might glorify him in diverse modes, all having the same end and being equally acceptable in his sight."[1]

This does not, however, mean that the Hindu thinkers have no right ideas of God and consider all beliefs to be equally true. They have a sure perception of the highest truth, though they do not insist on a universal acceptance

[1] H. H. Wilson: *Essays and Lectures*, Vol. II, p. 8.

Digitized by Google

of it. They believe that if the mind is enlightened the truth will be spontaneously perceived. Every religion is an expression of the mental and social evolution of the people who adopt it. It is therefore mischievous to attempt any sudden supplanting of existing beliefs by new ones. The cruder conceptions will give way before the rising rational reflection and the true reformer tries to improve the mental and moral nature of men. Truth is not so much the result of theological faith as the experience of a deeper moral life. So the Hindu thinkers pay more attention to the discipline than to the doctrine. The religion of the Hindus is not a theology as a scheme of life. Whether one is an orthodox Hindu or not depends, not on whether one believes this or that view of God, but on whether one accepts or rejects the *dharma*.[4]

The highest life enjoined by the *dharma* is what follows naturally from vital faith in the reality of God. If the indwelling of God in man is the highest truth, conduct which translates it into practice is ideal conduct. The several virtues are forms of the truth, *satyākāras*.[5] Truth, beauty and goodness are a part of the life stuff of the ideal man. He will be an embodiment of the virtues of self-denial, humility, fraternal love and purity. By the mastery of soul over sense, clouds of hate and mists of passion dissolve and he will be filled with *śānti* or serenity and will remain absolutely calm in moments of great peril, personal loss or public calamity. With tranquility of soul, a steady pulse and a clear eye he will do the right thing at the right moment. He does not belong to this country or that, but is in a true sense the citizen of the world. The quality of *sattva* with its ideals of joy and love predominates over those of *rajas* with its craving for power and pride and *tamas*, with its dulness and inertia. For the perfect men, the *dharma* is an inspiration from within; for others it is an external command, what custom and public opinion demand.

The ideal which requires us to refrain from anger and

[4] See Manu II, 11.

[5] See *Mahabharata*. *Anuśasana parva* 162 and *Śanti parva* 33.

Digitized by Google

covetousness, to be pure and loving in thought, word and deed is much too high for those passing through the storm and stress of a life of sin and suffering. It seems to demand of life what it possibly cannot give. It kills all the constituent conditions of life. If renunciation of all were necessary for salvation, many may not care to be saved. The world is so organized that those who practice the Divine rule do not have much chance of success or survival. We are familiar with the way in which the Sermon on the Mount is dismissed as impossible idealism. We cannot be turning cheeks to smiters to receive blows when it is so tempting to give blows on both the cheeks. It may be divine to rejoice in suffering, but the flesh is weak for all that. Christendom consoles itself in the belief that even Jesus nodded once or twice. "O, my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me." "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" Those who pride themselves on their practical spirit reduce the ideals to the level of ordinary human nature, subject to the temptations of power and profit, the flesh and the devil. The modern wordly reformer says, "Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, 'Thou shalt not kill,' but I say unto you, 'Thou shalt not kill except animals for food, birds for sport and men in battle.' It hath been said, 'Thou shalt not covet.' But I say unto you, 'Thou shalt not covet except on a large scale as in trade and imperialism.' Again, ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old time, 'Thou shalt not hate,' but I say unto you, 'Thou shalt not hate except the backward races, the enemy nations and the weak of the world.'" Alarmed at the sacrifices exacted by a religious life which tells us that happiness does not depend on power or wealth but on love and peace, our advanced reformers make so many reservations to the divine law that they completely destroy the force of the latter and justify our modern practice that violence, abundance of possessions and armaments are the final end of man's life. They conveniently forget the story of that friend of ours who planned to build great storehouses to provide an abundance for many years but

Digitized by Google

was cheated of his chance by the blow of death, which came overnight.

The Hindu thinkers are conscious of the great gulf that separates the actual nature of man which is bad from the ideal which seems to be well-nigh impossible. The consciousness of the great distance between the actual and the ideal does not tempt them to distort the ideal itself. It would be a blasphemy against the spirit in us that shall not be forgiven. They therefore attempt to develop the infinitely precious ideal from out of the apparently refractory stuff of life. The nature of man and his habits of judgment change rather slowly. We must have patience in the striving after perfection. The law of Karma tells us that millions of lives are consumed before one perfect life is produced. For thought to reach the highest plane we must plan, toil and agonize a lot. For our heart to pulse with joy, countless hearts must be burned out by suffering. Many strivings and sacrifices are needed to generate a holy character. Most men climb up the ladder to the spiritual heights only rung by rung. Few can fly from the bottom to the top at one bound. The *varnāśrama dharma* or the discipline of the classes and stages of life is the Hindu's device for the gradual improvement of human nature. It is intended to make all the Lord's people prophets. Its principles are those of a kingdom of spirit, not a civil commonwealth, of a universal institution, not a national organization. If morality is that which conscience imposes, and law that which state commands, the *dharma* is neither the one nor the other. It is the tradition sustained by the conviction of countless generations of men, which helps to build the soul of truth in us. It corresponds to the *Sittlichkeit* of the Germans and is independent of both the individual conscience and the laws of the state. That is why dynastic feuds and imperialist aggressions have not touched the life of India which has continued the same for nearly fifty centuries. Successive storms of conquest have passed over the changeless millions as wind over reeds.

Moksha or liberation is the ideal towards which humanity

Digitized by Google

has to move. All life is set to the music of this ideal. All men are equal in that they are born of God. They are equal since they are to rise to the same divine destiny. But men differ with regard to their actual equipment for the ideal. They have varying amounts of darkness and evil to eliminate and have to put forth varying efforts to illumine their life with light and love. The education of the individual spirit is arranged through the scheme of *āśramas* or stages of life and *varnas* or classes of men. It takes into account the different sides of human nature. The life of man is rooted in desires or *kāma*. Man is a bundle of desires. Manu says, "It is not good that the soul should be enslaved by desire, yet nowhere is to be found desirelessness (*akāmatá*)."[6] Since our activities are impelled by our desires, the right regulation of our desires is also a part of *dharma*. So *kāma* or enjoyment is recognized as a valid pursuit. It is not mere satisfaction of animal impulses but is the expression of the freedom of the self. This is not possible, until we escape from the tyranny of the senses. The life of man is not a mere succession of sensations but is the manifestation of an eternal idea developing itself through temporary forms. The desires of men are directed into the channels of family life and public duty. The emotional or artistic life of man is also a part of life's integral good. But art cannot flourish in an atmosphere of asceticism. We must have wealth or *artha*. The economic needs of the community should be satisfied, if the creative impulses of men are to be liberated for the higher cultural life. Rules are laid down regarding the interests of the community in the matter of the wealth earned by individual members. The liberty of each is restricted by the needs of all. Self-denial is the only way to gain wealth and enjoyment. *Dharma* or duty controls the pursuit of both pleasure and profit, *kāma* and *artha*. Those in whom *dharma* predominates are of *sattvik* nature, while the seekers of wealth are mere *rājasik* and those of pleasure *tamasik*.[7] The indi-

[6] II, 2-3.
[7] Manu. XII, 38.

Digitized by Google

vidual who observes the laws of *dharma* automatically attains *moksha*, and so is it said that, *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *moksha* form the ends of life.

Whoever may have made the world or not, whatever be the truth about the origin of life and the universe, the supremacy of the moral end is admitted by all. In Hindu thought, man is said to come into being for a divine purpose. The unextinguished passions of our vanished lives bring about our birth on earth. It is through suffering that our weakness can be converted into strength, our ignorance into illumination. The evil of existence is expiated only by the suffering and self-restraint of life. The word "*āśrama*" comes from a root which means "to suffer." Without suffering, there is no progress; without death, no resurrection. Our life from beginning to end is a kind of death which means a larger life. The more we die to ourselves, the more do we live to God. Living and dying are inextricably blended and the perfect life is the crown of a complete death. Four stages are distinguished in the life of every Hindu, of which the first two are those of *Brahmachari* or student, *Grihastha* or householder. The last two stages deal with the retirement from life when the individual becomes a servant of God and of humanity.[8]

The first period opens with the sacramental symbol of initiation into a spiritual birth. It is intended to build up the psychophysical constitution of man. The building of the body and the training of the mind are the principal aims of this stage. The student is taught the habits of cleanliness, chastity, good manners and godliness.[9] Social sympathies are cultivated by the insistence on poverty for all students whether they are sons of princes or of peasants. Every student is required to beg for his food and this training in poverty impresses on the mind of the student that wealth is not an essential condition of a good life. The students are not allowed to become laws unto themselves; nor are they delivered into the hands of an ignorant and blind

[8] Manu VI, 87.
[9] Manu II. 69.

Digitized by Google

fanaticism. They are not allowed to build altars and idols in their own imagination or fall a prey to superstitions and creeds. Loyalty to truth and respect for tradition are insisted on. The kind of education depends on the needs and capacities of the boys. The task was not so complex as it is to-day since the future vocations of boys were roughly settled. In the programme of education, secular as well as religious, no distinction is made between boys and girls. Only coeducation was not encouraged.

When the stage of apprenticeship is over, the student becomes responsible for a family: "The man is not man alone, but his wife and children also."[10] He becomes the bread-winner of the family and thus the mainstay of the community. Family life and social duty help towards the ultimate goal and presuppose self-restraint. Every man is expected to do his work for the world. He should not, out of mere selfish pleasure, abstain from social service.[11] We are pledged to one another and should live for one another, the individual for the family, the family for the community, the community for the nation and the nation for the world. The caste system, valid in the second stage of the householder, assumes the unity and the interdependence of humanity. It takes into account the needs of the society as well as the interests of the individual. It sustains personality in that it helps the individual to transcend himself by giving his devotion to something beyond himself. By focusing his energies at a particular point in the environment, he tries to actualize his potentialities. It is an illustration of Hegel's harmony of opposites, a point of view which reconciles the apparently conflicting claims of the individual and the society. Not the good of self as a thing apart, or the good of society by itself, but a higher good to promote which constant self-renewal and social service are means is the governing principle of the caste system. Taking into account the variety of human nature, it lays down ways and means by which each man can attain full self-

[10] Manu IX, 45.
[11] *The Bhagavadgīta* III, 16.

Digitized by Google

expression. It works up to the ideal of equality by recognizing the actual differences. It is an attempt to co-operate with the forces of nature and not flout them. Those who criticize the institution from the platform of modern knowledge do not remember that in no other country were peoples belonging to stocks of very unequal value thrown together. The prevedic peoples with whom the Aryans had to mingle were of a lower grade of civilization and culture. They were constituted into the fourth estate of the unregenerate, the once-born, the *ekajāti*, in whom no quality of intellect, emotion, or will is particularly developed. The twice-born or the regenerate are divided into three classes according as their intellect, emotion or will is more dominant than the others. Those who are strongly endowed with the powers of thought and reflection are the *Brahmans;* those gifted with heroism and love are the *Kshatriyas* or the warriors; those strongly inclined towards the practical business of life are the *Vaiśyas* or the traders. The four classes correspond to the intellectual, the militant, the industrial and the unskilled workers. All of them serve God's creation, by their own capacities, the *Brahmans* by their spirituality, the *Kshatriyas* by their heroism, the *Vaiśyas* by their skill and the *Śūdras* by their service.[12] All of them place the common good above that of their party or class. Claims of egoism and ambition are subordinated to those of conscience and justice, the enduring values that are confided to our keeping. When the different classes fulfil their respective functions, the society is considered to be just or in accordance with *dharma.*

The true interests of the unskilled workers were not neglected. The *Vaiśyas* pursue trade and love wealth and comfort though they are required to interpret them in terms of life and welfare. This caste is an association of men united by an economic nexus. Commercialism, however, was checked since the members of this class were called upon to hold the goods of life in the bonds of love. The *Ksha-*

[12] *Śukranīti* I, 38–42.

Digitized by Google

triyas were the defenders of society from external aggression and internal disorder. The military organisation of the state was entrusted to them. They were in charge of the political arrangements. It was not the intention of the Hindu *dharma* to make the body of the people act as a general militia. Efficiency is everywhere gained through specialisation. Those whose business it is to make war and resist wrong by force must possess the proper aptitude for it and get the necessary training. The art of government cannot be practised by all. It is increasingly felt that amateur politicians keen on satisfying their constituencies and with no other training than what could be got from the hurly-burly of popular elections are incapable of doing justice to the task of administration. One particular class was devoted to the military and the administrative purposes, and the people as a whole were not possessed by a passion for government, for domination and power. To-day, the great wars are fought for the government of the world and for the possession of its markets and not for the moral elevation of the people or the pursuit of good. The political obsession is the cause for the drifting of the world in deep confusion to unseen issues. It may be said that when there is a professional ruling class, there is no guarantee that the rule will be unselfish. The training to which they are subjected is a sufficient security for the right discharge of their functions. Besides, the rulers are not allowed to annul or alter *dharma*, but are only to administer it. The changes in the *dharma* are introduced by the Brahman thinkers, who possess no vested interests, but lead a life of spirit in compulsory poverty. They interpret the *dharma* in cases of doubt and difficulty.

The organisation of the society is essentially aristocratic in the best sense of the term, since only the philosophically minded men with detachment of view lay down the laws. The priests were the lawgivers even among the Jews, the Iranians and the Celts. The qualifications of the true Brahmans, wisdom, self-control and disinterestedness, made selfish legislation difficult. The Brahmans engaged in the

Digitized by Google

pursuit of knowledge and the beautifying of life were regarded as superior to the officers and administrators, and were not obliged to do what is congenial to the latter. They were freed from all material cares and subordination in spiritual matters to earthly authorities.[13] The institution recognises that all good reforms start in the mind of one man and at first repel the world at large. Society cannot progress if all forward steps should first obtain the sanction of the majority. Absolute freedom for the creative thinkers is the first condition of culture and progress. Mr. Bertrand Russell, in a brilliant article in the *Century*, observes "without freedom, the man who is ahead of his age is rendered impotent." The considered conviction of one wise man is more worthy than the opinions of a myriad fools, according to Manu.[14]

The moral codes are adapted to the different stages of the unfolding of the life of spirit. The trader hoards up life zealously for material ends; the warrior flings it away for order and organisation and resists evil by the employment of force. The Brahman lives the life of *ahiṁsā* or nonviolence with zeal and determination. His nonviolence is not a sign of weakness or cowardice, but the natural expression of spiritual strength and divine love. He has passed through the stage of a warrior and has found it unworthy of a true believer in God. Centuries of hereditary training and the influence of environment have made the Hindu a mild passive meditative being, a worshipper of the ideal of the Brahmin *sannyāsi*. Even to-day he is willing to pay his profound admiration to an emaciated saint like Gandhi.

The existence of orders lower than the Brahman, the dedication of one class to the business of war, have misled many students of Hinduism into thinking that the Hindu *dharma* is not based on the principle of nonviolence. The simple explanation that we have to pass through the lower stages in order to transcend them is forgotten. The higher we rise, the more austere should our life be. The legend of

[13] Manu IV, 11.
[14] XII, 113.

Digitized by Google

St. Christopher, who undertook to carry the Christ-child on his shoulders across a stream, is applicable to us all. The deeper he entered into the water, the heavier became the burden. By a slow conquest of the passions, by a rising knowledge of the spiritual basis of the world, all men who are born *śūdras* gradually rise in the scale till they became Brahmans. The load becomes heavier the higher we rise, and our strength will have to increase in proportion to the rise in the weight of the load. While the *Kshatriya* in view of his limitations may employ force, though without hatred and with a clean conscience, the Brahman should refrain altogether from the use of force and the cherishing of hatred or ill feeling for any.

The relativity of the stages leading up to the absolute ideal may also be illustrated from another case. Modern evolution is confirming the Hindu theory of the continuity of the animal and the human worlds. The Hindu *dharma* inculcates respect for life and tenderness towards all forms of animal creation. "Thou shalt not kill" applies to the animals as well. It is also believed that animal diet clogs the finer sensibilities of human life. More than what it adds to the physical it takes away from the psychical. Jesus himself is quite clear that even animals are objects of sacredness, and that not a sparrow falls to the ground without the notice of God. Yet the peoples of India were accustomed to animal diet, and so regulations were laid down restricting the use of animal diet for the fourth class and prohibiting it as a rule for the other classes, with the result that the Hindus as a whole are tending to give it up more and more.

Caste has economic implications. Many of the modern castes are only occupational divisions. Every man is not fit for all things and does not feel that he can begin any trade as he pleases. Nor do individuals go about in search of work, but they serve society by filling the station in which they happen to be placed. Unlimited competition and selfish individualism are checked. A religious character is impressed on every kind of work and form of indus-

Digitized by Google

try. The bricklayer and the carpenter, the blacksmith and the milkman believe that they glorify God by the right performance of their work. In these days of large-scale production and factory labor, we tend to forget that when a man is cut off from his family and made to work in a large factory, the work becomes joyless and mechanical. The caste on the other hand puts all men working the same profession in their natural surroundings, instead of tearing them away from their homes and working them for long hours and small wages. The fulness of communal life with its living associations of beauty, love and social obligations helps to make the worker happy. The members of his family who share in his work introduce sweetness and humanity into it. If women and children are to be worked, it is better that they work in the atmosphere of a home where it is possible to embody their creative impulses in what they turn out. There is a finer stimulus to right action than mere success in competition or satisfaction of customers can supply. Those who practice the same craft develop corporate feeling and professional honour. The young acquire from the plastic influences of the environment the right kind of vocational training. They absorb unconsciously the tradition of the trade and the economic pursuit happens to be the free self-expression of their soul. It is true that modern conditions are working against cottage industries and small-scale production. But it is not everywhere the case. Fine arts, decorative industries, even spinning and weaving as supplementary interests of the agriculturists may be confined to homes and we can have small factories worked by electricity or oil engines. Caste as trade guilds is not yet out of date. While the suggestion of a definite programme of life at the very beginning is not undesirable, still its stereotyping without the least regard to the natural endowment and special aptitudes is likely to result in an enslavement of life which finds it difficult to adjust itself to the complex conditions of the modern world.

Strictly speaking, the caste of a man is determined by the predominance of reason, emotion or will in him which corre-

Digitized by Google

spond roughly to the three *gunas* or qualities of *saltva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.[15] Manu mentions three principles as governing the caste of a man which are *tapas* or individual effort, *śrutam* or the cultural environment and *yoni* or heredity. The first is a vague test and is not available for objective use. The second depends on the home influences, which in their turn depend on the third consideration of birth. The only practicable test is birth, and this view is in consonance with the principles of rebirth and *Karma* accepted by the Hindus. "The soul that rises with our life's star hath had elsewhere its setting and cometh from afar." Peoples with different racial heritages can live together in amity and fellowship only on the basis of caste. The formulators of the institution felt that though birth was the only available test, spiritual character was the real basis of the divisions of the society. Manu allows that if an individual practices the ways of the good and leads a pure life, he overcomes the effects of heredity.[16] According to the *Mahābhārata*, the test of regeneracy is "not birth, not learning, but only conduct."[17] We have ignored all factors other than birth, with the result that the system has rigidly confined people for all time to particular compartments, enslaved successive generations of men and proved well nigh fatal to the free growth of social polity. The natural plasticity and fluidity of life are not taken into account by the unflexible moulds and barriers of the system. We have reached a condition of society where the disorganisation of social life is so great that the principle of birth should be subordinated. Referring to a similar state of affairs, the *Mahābhārata* says, "There has been so much mixture in marriages that the test of *jāti* or birth is no good. The governing consideration should be *śīla* or conduct, and the first Manu has declared that there is no point in distinctions of caste, if character is not considered."[18]

---

[15] See *Bhavishya Purāna* III, IV, 23.

[16] See also *Mahābhārata*. *Vanaparva*, Ch. 216.

[17] *Vrittam eva*, M. B. *Vanaparva*, Ch. 314.

[18] *Vanaparva*, Ch. 182. See Manu IV, 224 and 225.

Digitized by Google

Since the distinction of functions among the different classes is likely to generate pride and exclusiveness, in spite of the training during the student period, the general laws of the equal treatment of all are insisted on. Highest virtue consists in doing to others as we would be done by. *Vishnu Purāna* says, "Everywhere ye should perceive the equal; for the realisation of equality or *samatva* is the worship of God."[19] There are duties which men of all castes are required to obey, such as non-injury to life, truth, integrity, cleanliness and self-control.[20] After all, the caste divisions are incidental to our imperfections and should not therefore constitute a source of pride. The one Eternal has no caste. The rules of caste are applicable only in the stage of the householder. Even here, they are not superior to the claims of humanity. What is necessary at the present day is an acceptance of the aims of caste and the cultivation of a more truly social spirit. The blighting bigotries and the rigid restrictions about the amenities of life are inconsistent with humanity and fellowship and therefore are to be given up. Manu does not encourage them. "The ploughman, the friend of the family, the cowherd, the servant, the barber and the poor stranger offering his service—from the hands of such *śūdras* may food be taken."[21]

The caste rules were not rigid until the advent of the Mohammedans into India. The social laws were fluid and elastic and the mutability of growth was not sacrificed to the strait waistcoat of a legal formula. We read in the *Purānas* stories of individuals and of families who changed from lower to higher castes. Manu admits the possibility of ascent and descent.[22] Rules for change of caste by gradual purification are also mentioned.[23] The higher strata were accessible to merit from below. When Hindu India lost political freedom and the new rulers adopted a policy of

---

[19] XVII.
[20] Manu X, 63; VI, 91-92.
[21] Manu IV, 253.
[22] See X, 42; IX, 335.
[23] Manu X, 57-65.

Digitized by Google

proselytism, social initiative disappeared and law and custom became fetishes, with disastrous results for national solidarity. We have to recover the original spirit of the *dharma*, which was not limited to particular forms, but manifested itself in fresh ones, changing the old and developing the new. The exaggerated value given to caste in times of political insecurity is no more necessary. Caste has a future only if it is confined to social matters. In every society, people enter into marriage relations only with those who are near to them in habits of mind and action. Since a common cultural tradition is better developed among those who pursue the same vocation, marriages among members of the same profession become the order of the day. Even in ancient India, intermarriages among members of different castes were not forbidden, though they were not encouraged. *Anulona* and *pratiloma* mariages are not usual, though they are not invalid according to Hindu law.[24] If such marriages are not common, it is because they tend to disturb the intimate industrial, social and spiritual life of the community. Caste as a basis of intimate social relations does not interfere with the larger life of the nation. As the emperor Asoka said to his Hindu minister, "Caste may be considered when it is a question of marriage or invitation, but not of the *dharma;* for the *dharma* is concerned with virtues and virtues have nothing to do with caste."[25]

It is a bold affirmation of an untruth to argue that social service is unknown to the Hindus. Much capital is made out of the treatment of the untouchables. It is not remembered that a free India rendered them much greater service than what other free countries even in recent times have done for their backward classes. How have the superior nations civilized the Tasmanian and the Australian aborigines, certain Maori peoples and North American Indian tribes? We generally refine them into extinction and where that is not possible, we sink them into the slough

[24] See *Bombay Law Reporter*. Bai Gulab *vs.* Jivanlal Harilal vol. XXIV.
[25] *Indian Social Reformer*, June 4, 1922.

Digitized by Google

of vice and crime worse than any normal expressions of savage life. If the Kaffir has multiplied under the British protection and the Javanese under the Dutch, if the populations of Straits Settlements and British India have not vanished before their civilizers, it is because a good God has put in a climate unfavourable to the civilizers. The tropics can never become their habitat. They can be held but not peopled by the Europeans. But for the limits set by nature, the history of the tropical regions would have been different. From the time the Aryans met the peoples of a lower grade of civilization, they devised ways and means by which the different portions of the population could develop in social, spiritual directions. The Aryans even accepted a non-Aryan representative of the "black" peoples and made him deliver the message of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. *Krishna's* conduct scandalised society and provoked the Vedic gods of *Indra* and *Brahma*. To-day the Aryan worshippers of these gods look upon *Krishna* as an avatar of God. *Krishna*, however, had great respect for the Aryan thinkers, and it is said that he washed the feet of the Brahman guests at the *Rajasūyayāga* of king *Yudhisthira*. The Aryans took to the non-Aryan gods very kindly, improved them where possible, subordinated them where necessary. The worshippers of *Mahisha* (buffalo-demon) were told that the Cosmic Spirit was greater than the *Mahisha*. The worshippers of serpents were instructed that there was a greater than the serpents, the Lord of serpents, *Nāgeśwara* or *Krishna*, who danced over the head of *Kāliya*. The marks of the gradual civilizing of the lower classes are visible throughout the cultural history of India. Whenever there was a tendency to overlook the common humanity of men, a *Buddha* or a *Śankara* arose, emphasising the common doom of all high and low. The extent of the country 2,000 miles long and 1,500 miles broad is not similar to that from Dan to Beersheeba. The means of communication that we have at the present day were not available till recently. If the work of civilising the backward classes had not been undertaken and carried on with zeal and suc-

Digitized by Google

cess by the ancient Indians, we would have had not merely fifty millions of these "depressed" classes, but a much larger number. When the outside invaders came into the country, the Hindu felt nervous and as a sheer act of self-preservation stereotyped the existing divisions, and some were left outside the pale of the caste order. Though Manu says that "there is no fifth class anywhere,"[26] the tribes who were not influenced by the *dharma* formed themselves into the fifth class. "He who has abandoned his duties is cruel and pitiless, and oppresses others who is passionate and full of destructiveness is a *mleccha*."[27] No words are too strong for the deplorable condition of these people. To disregard the claims of man simply because he happens to be low or belongs to another race is against the religious spirit of Hinduism. Now that things are in a more settled condition, the Hindu leaders are reiterating the central truth that the least of all men has a soul and need not be considered past all power to save.

The last two stages of *Vanaprastha* and *Sannyāsa*, which may be taken as one for our purposes, treat of those who have retired from the competitive struggle for life. The *Sannyāsi* represents the highest type of Indian manhood. From selfishness, the individual has progressed to self-annihilation through the extinction of all prejudice, hatred and ambition. He has passed through all institutions and is now above them. His emotional life expresses itself in the love of the divine or *bhakti* and not in animal lusts or personal likes. He perceives the oneness and wholeness of humanity, and his mind is freed from all superstition and unreason. His active energies are devoted to the service of humanity, knowing as he does that God is in all beings and is all of them.[28] He who has the vision of all in one, in whom the impersonal predominates over the personal, cannot sin.[29] He is the superman of the *Bhagavadgīta*, the

---

[26] X, 4.
[27] *Śukranīti* I, 44.
[28] *Sarva bhutamayam harim. Vishnu Purāna* I, 19, 9.
[29] Manu XII, 118.

Digitized by Google

awakened of Buddhism, the true Brahman who glories in his poverty, rejoices in suffering, and is finely balanced in mind, with peace and joy at heart. He loves all, men, birds and beasts, and resists not evil but overcomes it by love. In him the soul of man is at its highest stretch. The ideal of the *Sannyāsi* has dominated the life of India from the time of the *Rishis* of the *Upanishads*. To follow this ideal, kings lay down their crowns and sceptres and assume the garb of poverty, fighting heroes forget the pride of victory and break their weapons, and skilled traders and workmen pursue their toil with steadfast mind surrendering to God the fruits thereof.

These *sannyāsis* as a rule are the helpers of humanity. The greatest of them, like Śankara and Rāmānuja, Rananda and Kabir, have entered into the lifeblood of the nation and laid the foundations of its religion. It is, however, true, that in India, as in Mediæval Europe, many ascetics made the mistake of escaping into the wilderness from the worries of the world. These hermits of the cloister and monks of the desert are voices astray in the dark. Their perpetual consciousness of incitement to sin, their preoccupation with their selfish salvation show that they have lost their lives in their anxiety to save them. As the tide of monasticism which swept over Europe in the middle ages is not true to the teaching of Jesus, who asks us to look upon ourselves as servants trusted by the master, porters bidden to watch, stewards to whom much is committed, sons to whom the father confides his affairs, so the deserters from the battle of life are not the true *sannyāsis* who rage to suffer for mankind, with intense humility, glowing faith, sincere love and sober joy.

To reach the highest state, it is not always necessary to adhere literally to the rules of *dharma*. There are cases of sudden conversion, uprushes of the spirit from seemingly commonplace souls, astonishing moral elevations among men who have not learned the highest lesson of existence. The rules of *dharma*, however, represent the normal growth of spirit. The freed souls sometimes smile at the irrele-

Digitized by Google

vance of the painful scrupulosities and anxious questionings about ceremonial propriety which worry those in the lower stages of life. The order of *sannyāsis* is open to men of all castes. No man, however, should desire liberation without paying his three debts,[30] to the gods by means of hymns and prayers, to the *pitris* or the fathers by gifts and charity, help and service to men and rearing up of progeny, and to the *Rishis* by passing on to others the instruction received by himself.

The Hindu *dharma* has room for all kinds of men, the dispassionate old who have retired from the business of life and the eager pushful young keen on worldly success. The four castes and orders are not intended to be special moulds into which the Indian people are thrown, but forms capable of embracing the whole of humanity. Without the employment of force or eagerness for exploitation, Hinduism has been able to civilize a large part of Asia. What has attracted it is not imperialist expansion, but the cultural conquest, the peaceful penetration of the thought and mind of the peoples to which it comes by its own spirituality. From the kingdom of Khotan in Central Asia to the island of Java, which lies on the way between India and Australia, the creative urge of the Hindu genius found its expression in life and art. Java had Hindu settlers in as far back as the second century A.D. and she has remained since then predominantly Hindu and Buddhist. To-day, Japan, China and Burma look to India as their spiritual home even as Christians look to Palestine. Wherever we go from Russia to China, at Samarkand, at Tibet, we can trace the influence of the Indian civilization. All these pale into insignificance when we remember that there are records of Indian culture in Western Asia, in the plains of Mesopotamia, in the regions watered by the rivers Tigris and Euphrates. Inscribed tablets discovered at Boghaz-koi, assigned by competent scholars to 1400 B.C., speak to us of people who were worshipping the Hindu gods. This influence of India

[30] See Manu VI, 35.

Digitized by Google

is not because her religion is old or her empires are great, not because she developed weapons of destruction or exercised force on a large scale, but because she had an intelligent understanding of the deeper unity in the midst of all diversity. Wherever she went, the deep and silent influence of her vision of the unity of all things in God pervaded. All the mighty impulses that entered into India were synthesized on the same plan. All religions she welcomed since she realized from the cloudy heights of contemplation that the spiritual landscape at the hilltop is the same though the pathways from the valley are different. To those who were wandering at random in the plains without suspecting that all roads lead to the same top, she says: Raise your eyes. Things in the valley separate us. Up yonder, high above us, we are all one. The variety of ways has meaning at the foot of the hill, but if we understand what they signify on the snowy summits, we shall know that all are reaching out for God. It may be that India with her assimilative genius may yet succeed in harmonising the mighty currents of the world's great religions that have met on her soil.

S. RADHAKRISHNAN.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY.

Digitized by Google

THE COMMENSURABILITY OF VALUES.

R. KINGSDOWN PEMBERTON.

AMONG those aspects of the theory of value which relate especially to ethical problems, not the least important is the question whether all values are commensurable. This problem, moreover, has an added interest for those who are unable to accept any monistic theory of the ultimate good; who hold, for example, that neither pleasure nor self-realisation—to take two of the more prominent candidates—represents all that a rational being can aim at as intrinsically valuable. If, then, the Summum Bonum is a complex of various elements, it becomes an urgent task for the ethical theorist to discover the interrelations of these various elements, and the way in which, in any given circumstances, due consideration can be given to each in the schematising of conduct.

The object of this paper is to examine that solution of these problems which is offered by Dr. Rashdall in *The Theory of Good and Evil.* It is there held that the Good is a complex of various elements, of which the chief are Virtue, Culture, and Pleasure; that each of these has an intrinsic value of its own;[1] and that the highest of these values is that of Virtue. The problem of conduct, then, is: "Is it possible to compare heterogeneous *goods*—say Virtue, Culture and Pleasure, and say which is *best* . . . is it possible to aim at the production of a greatest quantum of good?" (II, 36). On what principle are we to choose between different kinds of good? The solution advanced is as follows: When every element in the good cannot be realised by any given course of action "we can surely distinguish between the various elements in a human life and form a judgment as to which of them seems more important —a *large amount* of this or a *small amount* of that" (II, 40).

[1] Dr. Rashdall's doctrine seems at times to waver on the question of the intrinsic value of Pleasure: see further below.

Digitized by Google

"In that estimate we do take into consideration *the amount* of the two kinds of good as well as the quality" (II, 49).

Terminology is here very important; and unfortunately Dr. Rashdall does not always mean the same thing by the word "commensurable." At the commencement of his discussion he gives two definitions of the term. These are as follows: (1) "That a certain amount of one good can be regarded as a sufficient and satisfactory substitute for the other, however much greater be the intrinsic superiority of the latter"; and (2) "when we have to choose between a higher and a lower good—when we cannot have both—we can compare them, and pronounce that one possesses more value than the other" (II, 39). And he explicitly lays it down that values are not commensurable in the first sense, while they are in the second.

It is impossible to regard these distinctions as satisfactory. In the first place, the "commensurability" described in (2) is not commensurability at all, but comparability. The essential differentia of commensurability is its implication, that the "commensurable" terms are reducible to a common measure; or, in a somewhat wider sense, that they are measurable by the same standard. And it is the commensurability of all values, in this sense, that Dr. Rashdall is in reality attempting to prove. Comparability makes no such implication. Now it is perfectly true that values may be referred to a single standard, to a "single primordial value," as Höffding says, "which determines the value of single instants, periods of life, abilities, and impulses"; and determines their value, necessarily, in a quasi-mathematical manner. But such a theory of the good is monistic, and, strictly interpreted, denies all intrinsic value to the single instants, periods, etc. Every element in life, according to this view, has value only in so far as it realizes, or contributes to the increase of "the single primordial value" which alone has intrinsic value. All values may be distinguished as either intrinsic or "economic"; and if there is only one intrinsic value, all the rest have merely economic value. Dr. Rashdall, however, rightly insists that those values

Digitized by Google

which are elements in the good are "intrinsic." But if so, they are all ultimate values,[2] and in no way referable to any more ultimate standard of value. Terms such as "quantity," "degree," "amount," etc., are meaningless, when applied to them *with reference to their relations with each other.*

The same intrinsic quality of these values is again illustrated by such expressions as "a particular kind of value" (I, 138). Now even if we admitted the impossible, and held that all intrinsic values, all the different "kinds" of values, were commensurate to some element present in all of them, that element can only be the good; and—apart from the difficulty here presented by Dr. Rashdall's doctrine of the indefinableness of the Good—this involves us in a tautology, or a logical circle, since we have been told (I, 135, n.) that Value and Good are synonymous terms. If, on the other hand, all values are qualitatively identical, the only standard by which they are commensurable is one of simple quantity. And if so, there can be no ground for saying that "the value of a good character is the greatest of all values" (I, 138). It can be greatest only if, and because, it is greatest in amount; and its amount can always be conceived as liable to be exceeded by an enormous quantity of some other value, or at least by the combined amounts of a plurality of other values.

The phrase, "when we cannot have both," which Dr. Rashdall italicises in his definition of the second sense of "commensurable," is not in point. Few people will be found to deny that intrinsic values are comparable. We can compare virtue with culture, or culture with pleasure, and say that the first term in each comparison has a value intrinsically higher than the second. We can, that is, construct a single scale of intrinsic values. But our ability to do so does not presuppose our ability to secure all of them. The scale can be constructed without any reference to the limitations of our powers of choice in any given situation.

[2] This does not mean, of course, that all intrinsic values are equally valuable.

Digitized by Google

Having constructed the scale, however, we must regard it as representing our final judgment as to the relative place of the various goods compared. We accept a definite hierarchy of intrinsic values, in which each occupies a determinate and permanent position. These values are intrinsic—if this were not so there would be no point in constructing the scale—and the most obvious inference that is deducible for the guidance of conduct is that, when it is impossible by any one course of action to realise all, or any two, of them, the highest must always claim allegiance.

This, however, is precisely the inference which Dr. Rashdall does *not draw*. His whole argument is directed to show that "it is right in some cases to prefer a larger amount of a lower good to a smaller amount of a higher good" (II, 44). In other words—since different intrinsic values cannot be referred to any single standard of *measurement*—what he is really trying to prove is that heterogeneous goods are commensurable in precisely that sense of the word which we have found to be its only true sense; in the sense, that is, in which he started by denying their commensurability. It is quite true that "no amount of one kind of good can compensate for the absence or deficiency of the other" (II, 39). As Urban says: "The characteristic of all such acts of preference is sacrifice."[3] Such a statement, however, is out of place in any discussion of values as commensurable. If values are commensurable, they must be reducible to a single standard, which alone has ultimate value; and if in our conduct we realise that single value, there is no more to be said, and no ground for any feeling of loss. Plainly, however, such is not the verdict of the moral consciousness. When we have to choose between different values, be our conviction that we have chosen the higher never so assured, we feel that those values were, in the circumstances, mutually exclusive, and that the loss of the lower good is real and ultimate. We have here further evidence that while values are comparable they are not commensurable.

---

[3] *Valuation: Its Nature and Laws*, p. 367.

Digitized by Google

It is to be observed that, in the case of any particular value, we can distinguish degrees of approximation to what may be called our ideal of that value. We can say that one action is more virtuous than another, that a particular book, or play, has more "culture-value" than another, and so on. All such distinctions are "quantitative" distinctions within the sphere of the particular value in question. There is no question here of "quantitative" comparison between different intrinsic values. The quality of the value sought for or found in each object, action, feeling, etc., is identical; and, this being the case, we are enabled to pronounce that one is more virtuous, or more pleasurable, than another. In this case, the values possessed by these objects, feelings, and actions, *are* commensurable. It is also possible, within the limits which such a "mathematics of value" will allow, to say that a particular of any kind has so much "pleasure-value," so much "virtue-value," and so on with all the other values recognised. And we may choose between any two or more alternatives on the ground that one has more "virtue-value," etc., than the others. But it is impossible, as we have seen, to go on and say that different intrinsic values are commensurable. If we hold that there is only one intrinsic value, all the other values are commensurable by the standard which it provides; if, on the other hand, we hold that there is a plurality of intrinsic values, all that can be done is to *compare* them as higher or lower in quality; and in that case the greatest conceivable amount of any lower good will all be inferior in value to the smallest amount of any value which ranks higher than it in the scale. We cannot weigh qualities against one another.

It follows from what has been said that the further distinction which Dr. Rashdall proceeds to make—that, namely, between "pleasure-value" and "value in general" (II, 50–7)—is untenable. In another connection, Dr. Rashdall has given us the true view: "There can be only one scale of ultimate values, however heterogeneous the objects which we appraise by that scale" (I, 174). This distinction seems to be due (i) to a lingering doubt as to the

Digitized by Google

intrinsic value of pleasure—it is clear, however, that its intrinsic value is an integral part of his doctrine[4]—(ii) to a confusion between the two possible scales of value—the comparative scale of values qualitatively different, and such "commensurate" scales as have been already described, and of which the typical example is the Hedonistic Calculus. There is also the implied assumption, not merely that pleasure is an element in every state of consciousness to which we attach value (so much is explicitly stated), but that it is the *only* element common to all valuable states of consciousness. Now, even if these assumptions were correct, it would not follow that there are two ultimate scales of values. That they are, is however, open to grave doubt. It may be that realized virtue is always accompanied by a feeling of pleasure; but this is beside the point. We are concerned with the facts of choice of, or between, values; and it is merely a psychological truism that we often contrast two foreseen states of consciousness as being, the one good, but unpleasant, the other less good, or evil, but pleasant. And even in the case of realised virtue, introspection often fails to reveal any element of pleasure in experiences of moral or religious exaltation; and this is true, however strictly we dissociate the term "pleasure" from its disreputable connections.

It is difficult, notwithstanding what has been said, to see why "value in general" is set over against "pleasure-value" in this uncompromising way. For, whatever "value in general" may mean, it cannot mean any specific kind of value. At least two kinds of value are consistently recognised in the whole of Dr. Rashdall's great work—those, namely, of Virtue and Culture. And he allows that there may be others. Now, since these values are intrinsic, since

[4] I am unable to quote any passage in which pleasure is stated in so many words to have intrinsic value. In the sentence, however, previous to that already quoted (I, 174), pleasure is stated to be a "kind of value" differing from virtue only as being at the bottom, instead of at the top, of the same scale; in another passage above quoted (II, 35) it is placed on the same value-scale as virtue; it is also called an "end" (I, 219). Cf. also I, 73, 138.

Digitized by Google

each has a special character of its own, it is clear that—assuming that the complex which they form is what is denoted by "value in general"—they can be distinguished from "pleasure-value" only as different points—higher or lower—in the one scale of ultimate values. This conclusion is rendered inevitable by the fact that pleasure—in Dr. Rashdall's view no less than my own—has an intrinsic value which cannot be reduced to the "economic value" which is possessed by all things which are valuable merely as means.

It may appear, after all, that the above criticism of this distinction has been misdirected; that it has resulted in a conclusion which, though rather more detailed—since it separates "pleasure-value" not from "value in general" but from the several values of virtue, culture, etc.—is still essentially the same as that of Dr. Rashdall. This, however, is not the case. The basis of Dr. Rashdall's distinction is an antithesis between the idea of value and the idea of pleasure (II, 55), the effect of which is to impugn the claim of pleasure to be a real value at all. He contrasts "pleasure-value" with "value in general" in a way in which he would not contrast "virtue-value" with "value in general." Whereas, on the view of the relation outlined above, "value in general" can be contrasted with "pleasure-value" only in the same sense as that in which it may be contrasted with virtue,—or any other, value. In other words, "value in general," *as contrasted with any specific value*, can only be a general term denoting all the remaining particular values on that single comparative scale on which *both* the terms of the antithesis are represented. It is quite true that we may "compare states of consciousness as pleasures, and then override that judgment by a second valuation as goods"; but that fact does not justify Dr. Rashdall's distinction; for we can, as already shown, compare states of consciousness in respect, not only of "pleasure-value," but of "virtue-value," "culture-value" and so forth, and override that judgment in a similar fashion. We may hold, for example, that *Jude the Obscure* has more "culture-value" than *Rienzi*, and yet prefer to

Digitized by Google

read the latter, on the ground of what we may—some of us—regard as the lower "virtue-value" of the former.

According to Dr. Rashdall, the denial of this distinction "between value and pleasure" (II, 55) involves either (i) analyzing all value into pleasure-value; or (ii) merging pleasure-value into value in general; or (iii) the denial that we are sometimes driven to compare pleasure with some higher kind of value. Enough has perhaps been said to show that no one of these conclusions can be deduced from the nature and relations of the values as here understood. In particular, nothing has been said which "involves the refusal to distinguish different elements in the supremely valuable kind of conscious life which the moral consciousness undoubtedly does distinguish." I am tempted to think that it is just the *refusal* "to merge the idea of pleasure in that of value"—understanding that expression to mean the inclusion of pleasure as a distinct value in the one scale of ultimate values—which would lead us to lose sight of these distinctions. If pleasure is the one element which is found in all states of consciousness to which we attach value, we will inevitably tend to make it the standard by which to decide our choice between any given alternatives.

Reverting to the general question, we may note that indications are not wanting in *The Theory of Good and Evil* itself, that the commensurability of values, even were it assumed to be a fact, would be hostile to the doctrine of intrinsic values therein developed. Two examples will serve to justify this statement. In the discussion of Justice we find the following principles laid down: "Each element in life should receive the weight that is due to its intrinsic quality, and not merely to its amount measured by a hedonistic or any other merely quantitative standard" (I, 262). "The superior man's good is worth more than the inferior man's (whatever the nature of his superiority)—how much more must be decided by our judgment of value in each particular case of moral choice. The superior man's good has more value than that of the inferior man, simply because it is a greater good" (I, 264). I, for one,

Digitized by Google

find it impossible to reconcile these pronouncements with the statement already mentioned, that "it is right in some cases to prefer a larger amount of lower good to a smaller amount of higher good."

The second example is furnished by the chapter on "Punishment and Forgiveness." In the course of his criticism of Mr. Bradley's theory of punishment, Dr. Rashdall says that the idea of expressing moral guilt in terms of physical pain "seems to be essentially and intrinsically unmeaning. There is absolutely no commensurability between the two things" (I, 289). As to the justice of this criticism there cannot be two opinions. But Dr. Rashdall apparently does not see that it is as fatal to his own doctrine as it is to Mr. Bradley's. If sin and pain are not commensurable, how can we claim commensurability for virtue and pleasure, or for virtue and culture? Sin and pain are values, intrinsic values, no less than are virtue, culture, and pleasure. No theory of value can afford to neglect the negative values; and what is true of the negative values in respect of comparability and commensurability must be true also of the positive values.

There is one final objection, which, from a general ethical point of view, must be raised against the doctrine of the commensurability of all values. I have attempted to show that that doctrine, so far as it has any theoretical justification at all, is applicable only where there is a single standard of value, to which all goods may be referred for measurement; and the value of each particular good will, and must, be measured in a quasi-mathematical manner. The ultimate good being, in such a case, agreed upon, the only questions that can arise are those of quantity. Now, it is obvious that, measured quantitatively, any two or more goods which come up for comparison may prove to be equally valuable. And whenever this happens in a case of moral choice, we shall be faced by a conflict of duties which does not, on these premises, admit of theoretical solution. It is right for a man always to choose the greatest good; but if the possible courses of action are equally good, and yet

Digitized by Google

mutually exclusive, or even—as may well be the case—mutually destructive, it will be right for him to choose any one of them. But the moral consciousness will not acquiesce in this verdict. It holds, and is bound to hold, that in any given circumstances, one course, and one only, is the right one for any one individual; and that his preference of that good cannot, in the nature of the case, involve his sacrificing any good of equal value. This is also the view of Dr. Rashdall. The difficulty here pointed out is inherent in all teleological theories which take a monistic view of the end. It does not affect a theory, such as Dr. Rashdall's, which regards the good as a complex of intrinsic values. It does not do so precisely because intrinsic values are not commensurable. But the principle on which choice between such intrinsic values is to be decided, is still to seek. Until it is clearly set forth, such a system is not complete.

A great part of Dr. Rashdall's argument is based upon an appeal to the common moral judgments of mankind. It is, to my mind, very doubtful whether there is ever any conscious weighing of goods against each other, in the way described by Dr. Rashdall. The least deliberation would suffice to reveal the impossibility of reaching any satisfactory decision on such principles. But in any case, I am not concerned to combat this appeal. I have been throughout dealing with the theoretical problem; and this, after all, is the main interest of the matter. No doctrine can stand which defies the best-established philosophical distinctions. The gulf between quality and quantity cannot be bridged by any attempted reduction of one to the other.

The whole problem is one for which I do not see any satisfactory theoretical solution. The difficulties inherent in subjectivist or formalistic ethics are incontestable; on the other hand, teleological systems all seem to labour under the defect that the calculation of consequences must always take a quasi-mathematical form; and wherever this is the case we are liable to be arrested by a conflict of duties. Yet the unity and rationality of moral action is a fundamental postulate of the ethical consciousness; and it is true,

Digitized by Google

as Urban says, that "the logical presupposition of all valuation must be a single incontestable or unconditional value."[5] His further contention, that we cannot pass from the "logical unity of the subject" to the "empirical unity of *conscious* ends and felt values," reveals the crux of the whole problem. If ethics are to be rationalised at all, we must hold that value is a category of *thought*, and that our moral judgments are "determined by the logical relations of subordination to ultimate ends."[6] What these relations are seems to be the fundamental problem of ethics, but the limitations of my subject forbid me to do more than attempt to state it.

R. KINGSDOWN PEMBERTON.

OXFORD.

[5] Urban, *op. cit.* p. 381.

[6] Urban, *op. cit.* p. 383 (who denies that this is the case).

Digitized by Google

THE GENESIS OF THE MORAL JUDGMENT IN PLATO.

RUPERT CLENDON LODGE.

THE aim of the present paper is to discover, by means of an unprejudiced[1] study of the *Dialogues*, precisely what elements, in Plato's opinion, are, as a matter of psychological fact, involved in the moral judgment. With this aim, we shall trace the genesis of the moral judgment, the stages by which it is developed, in the case of the philosopher-king, who represents the recognized authority on moral questions. It is necessary to take the ideally perfect judge as the object of this investigation, because the character of the average man, who falls short of the ideal, contains only some of the elements which are found in the character of the man who has gone through the complete process of moral evolution, and also tends to contain certain extraneous elements which distort and warp the judgment. Finally, in virtue of these positive and negative deficiencies, the elements which go to make up the character of the average man are likely to exhibit some form and arrangement which is different from the organization which is characteristic of the moral judge *par excellence*. But it is this organization and these elements which we wish to discover.

We begin, then, following as far as possible the actual treatment in the *Republic*, with the birth and childhood of the future judge. The general aim of the regulations which surround the process of conception is the perfection of the coming generation, not as an end in itself, but as a means to

[1] The usual method of interpreting the moral value-judgment in Plato consists in rejecting sharply all empirical elements, and in referring to the conception of *anamnesis* (Meno, Phædrus) as supplying the necessary key (cf. Adam's notes to Rep. 476 A, C). The reference to *anamnesis* is, no doubt, important, but it would seem to be a mistake in method to omit from consideration the wealth of empirical material contained in the *Dialogues*.

Digitized by Google

the continuance of the ethical community, as a means to its preservation and maintenance in a condition approximating to human perfection. The coming generation is to be, if possible, not only more excellent from a moral standpoint, but also more useful, of greater general value to the community, than the preceding generation. With this aim, only adults who excel both morally and physically will be especially encouraged towards partaking for the state the service of parentage. The first element, then, which at birth itself enters the nature of the future moral judge, is physical strength and excellence, with a corresponding tendency towards that natural good temper which depends upon health and strength (Laws 792 E), *plus* a certain moral background, consisting partly in the general moral atmosphere which is the natural consequence of a good civic constitution (Menex. 238 C), partly in the more special atmosphere of service towards the community which surrounds the whole business of parentage, and partly in a direct tendency to inherit the moral as well as the physical characteristics of the parents.

Once born, the first three years of the child's life are to be devoted primarily to physical development, *i.e.*, to nutrition, physical growth, and mastery of the simpler movements and physical adjustments to the environment. The nutrition is provided for, partly by the mothers, partly by especially suitable nurses, who relieve the actual mothers of much of the trouble which, in less well regulated communities, too often falls to their lot in dealing with very young children. The education during this period is not, however, exclusively physical. Not only is the general moral atmosphere and the attitude towards social service much the same after birth as before, but certain special tendencies which begin to show themselves at this time require moral direction. Young children, like the rest of mankind, seek satisfaction and avoid dissatisfaction. With them, this general tendency expresses itself in a desire for simple sense-pleasures and an avoidance of pain. During the first three years they tend to express these wants by crying, so as to

Digitized by Google

attract the notice and assistance of parents and attendants. This tendency to cry whenever the child is afraid, or wants anything, may easily, if unchecked, lay the physical foundations for dispositions which, if further developed, will become the vicious habits of excessive timidity, querulousness, and bad temper (Rep. 605 C f., Laws 792 A–B). The task of parent and nurse, during this period, is to prevent the formation of such habits. They must endeavor to develop in their charges a feeling not directed wholly towards the attainment of pleasure, nor wholly towards the avoidance of pain, but rather a general attitude towards attaining the "mean," *i.e.*, moderation, in the realm of pleasure-pain experiences, and especially to foster such positive habits of feeling and action as tend towards the acquisition of manliness, self-control, and serene good temper (Laws 792 C f.). The elements contributed by this stage towards the building-up of character in the future moral judge are thus, in addition to the more vague and undefined attitude towards social service, physical strength and dexterity, *plus* a strong disposition towards overcoming obstacles and acquiring the rudiments of manliness and good temper.

The next stage is somewhat indefinite in extent, beginning, presumably, with the third or fourth year, and continuing without absolute limit. It is characterized especially by the beginnings of education proper, still at first at the hands of mother or nurse, but later at the hands of professional teachers (Rep. 377 C, 383 C). At this stage, education through the medium of literature and music is introduced. The literature consists chiefly of such poetry and prose as embodies the history and nobler traditions of the race; the music consists mainly of very simple accompaniments, upon such instruments as the lyre or guitar, to be used in connection with the songs and dances taught to the children. The immense influence of music and literature upon the habits and dispositions of the growing child is fully recognized, and the consequence is strictly drawn that only such art is to be permitted and encouraged for educational purposes as is calculated, in the opinion of the best

Digitized by Google

judges, to develop and strengthen such natural dispositions as friendliness, religious sense, dignity, self-mastery, manliness, regard for others, singleness of aim, love of the beautiful in every shape and form, and also certain tendencies which prepare the mind for the gradual development of reason. What is contributed towards the formation of the moral value-judgment by this training, is thus love of the beautiful, the good, and the true, a sense of acceptance and of familiarity with all that is of permanent value in life, a basis in the habits of feeling and willing for a lofty type of idealism.

Starting a little later than the education in literature and music, but, like it, beginning in early childhood and continuing indefinitely, comes physical training, including hygiene. This aims, first and foremost, at developing a sound bodily constitution and at strengthening its powers of resistance to disease by prescribing a very simple and moderate diet and mode of living generally. The special moral aim to be kept in view throughout this process of physical training is to develop manliness and self-confidence in the growing child, taking care to correct any tendency towards roughness by the counterbalancing influence of music. The more general contribution towards the formation of a perfect moral judgment is stated to be the reserves of health and strength which are a useful, and indeed indispensable, basis for the arduous mental studies which come later. The physical training is thus surrounded from first to last by a general atmosphere of preparation for future social service (Rep. 498 B).

Starting a little later than physical culture, but still beginning in childhood and continuing indefinitely throughout life, with especial emphasis at the entrance upon physical maturity, comes intellectual education proper, the definite and continuous endeavor, by means of special studies, to liberate the intellect from a too narrow preoccupation with the sense-perceivable world, and to direct its powers gradually towards their own peculiar province, towards the apprehension of the intelligible world, the world of Ideas. This

Digitized by Google

education falls into two parts. The preparatory portion, which constitutes a sort of prelude to the final hymn of dialectic, is a matter partly of moral, partly of specifically intellectual training. On the moral side, it is necessary to liberate the whole conative system, the system of action-tendencies which originate in instinct and are cradled in habit, from their natural propensity towards excessive pre-occupation with the world of sense-perception, with its inevitable interest in sensual satisfactions, the "leaden weights" which prevent the soul from soaring into the upper regions. This liberation is accomplished, to a slight extent, by the moral influences which we have already considered, but to a greater extent by the deliberate application of a policy of strict selection, only those who show unusual proficiency in moral development, in the control of instinctive and habitual action-tendencies by ideas—at this stage, of course, the ideas inculcated by their parents and teachers —as well as in such intellectual qualities as love of study, intellectual acumen, and sound memory, being permitted to enter upon the specifically intellectual portion of this period of training (Rep. 535 B ff.). This testing of character as well as intelligence, and the steady elimination of the morally, as well as of the intellectually, unfit, ensures that intellectual and moral qualities shall develop hand in hand in the select group of students who are being trained for leadership.

The intellectual training which belongs to this period of preparation proceeds by means of a peculiar study of arithmetic, geometry (plane and solid), astronomy, and harmonics. These different subjects are studied contemporaneously, though harmonics is not commenced until the student has made some progress in astronomy, astronomy is not commenced until the student has made some progress in solid geometry, solid geometry similarly presupposes a certain acquaintance with plane geometry, and this again presupposes a certain acquaintance with arithmetic. Up to the age of twenty, these subjects are studied separately, so as to give the student a certain grounding in each. After

Digitized by Google

that age, they are studied more in their interrelations, and with an explicit and avowed interest in their epistemological and ontological significance (Rep. 537 B f.).

The peculiar element in this study is due to the object with which these sciences are cultivated. The aim of the moral educator is not to turn out mathematicians or astronomers as such, but rather to use these disciplines as a means for effecting a certain revolution in the intellectual outlook of the students, as well as to develop their general intellectual ability. The usual interest in science is practical. It is with the aim of solving some practical difficulty in the actual world revealed by sense-perception, that the average student enters upon theoretical studies. The military commander requires a sure grasp of the elements of arithmetic and geometry, if he is to solve the problems of military organization which are certain to arise. The naval officer requires a certain knowledge of mathematics and astronomy, if he is to keep on his course during the night. The musician who is to be more than the merest empiric must have some grasp of the principles of harmonics, and so with the other professions also. Theoretical investigation thus arises in connection with practical difficulties, and is directed mainly if not entirely to the removal of those difficulties. The problem once solved, the theoretical interest quickly subsides (Rep. 498 A–B, 531 E). In the new system of education advocated by Plato, while the same general relation between theory and practice is present, the "revolution" consists in a very much greater interest in theory, and in the postponement of the more important practical problems until a much later period, when the theoretical training is, at least in principle, complete. This involves using practical difficulties in the world of sense-perception mainly as intellectual irritants, as concrete situations especially adapted for the awakening and continuous stimulation of intellectual activity, an activity which does not culminate in the first practical solution of the problem, but is itself fruitful in arousing still further intellectual interest, until the scientific habit of mind is fully formed, and the

Digitized by Google

intelligence of the youthful inquirer begins to feel genuinely at home in the world of laws and relations which can be apprehended only by the trained intelligence (Rep. 523 B ff., 533 C ff.). This preparatory stage terminates in a sustained investigation of the interrelations of the various sciences which have been studied, and is followed by a further stage of severe and sustained reflection upon the principles which underlie the moral and religious life also, as a final step preceding entrance upon the highest stage of dialectic (Rep. 531 C ff., 537 C).

We must further note, during this preparatory period, the important social influence exercised by the students upon one another. The members of this leadership class constitute always a highly select group. The basis of selection is always physical, moral, and intellectual excellence, with the physical element dropping more and more into the background, as a constant presupposition, and the emphasis passing more and more to moral and intellectual characteristics. The members of this group thus enjoy all the advantages which attach to continued association and friendship with what we should call super-normal children, and to absence of association and familiarity with average and sub-normal children. In the ideal community they have no narrow home-ties, but associate always with one another and with older members of the same special group, consecrated to the same special task, the development of the qualities requisite for leadership. On the negative side, just as they are kept apart from anything imperfect and defective in their curriculum, so they are kept separate from the masses, with their pitifully dwarfed and stunted souls and bodies, their vices and their tricky cleverness, their unreasoning hatred for things intellectual, their aimless wallowings in sensual pleasures, and their meaningless ambitions and reachings after mis-called "power." On the positive side, the whole of their social life, with its common meals, common exercises, common studies, common dangers, and common joys, is concentrated upon the growth and development of a special morale or community spirit, a spirit appropriate to the "golden" class, with its ideal of

Digitized by Google

service rather than ambition, and its sincere and flawless love of truth, goodness, and beauty (Rep. 462 ff.). The effect of this comparative seclusion from the world, during their carefully sheltered childhood and youth, is to keep them a little child-like and unsuspicious on the one hand, somewhat easily deceived by an unscrupulous artist in lying; but on the other hand, this openness of spirit fits them for that higher insight into values which is denied to those who have played with pitch and drunk life to the dregs. Their social life thus confirms them in their habits of manliness, self-mastery,[2] and social considerateness, and also in their sheer joy in the keen play of intellect, in learning, and in all spiritual excellence.

One further element which is of great importance during this period of preparation is especially noteworthy. This is the element of practical experience. Plato has no intention to permit his select group to degenerate into seminarists, idealists who are ignorant of the practical things of life and *gauche*, unable to mix easily with their fellow-men and to act as real leaders. On the contrary, he makes especial provision, while always retaining their organization as a separate class, for practical, as well as theoretical training. In childhood and early youth, they are trained in field-sports, such as hunting, racing, and military manœuvers, at first in play and as spectators, but with the avowed aim of fitting them in later life to defend their country and its institutions in earnest, if necessary. The years from seventeen to twenty are given over almost wholly to these exercises, and certain practical military duties are performed, as need arises, until the age of thirty. Then, after an interval of five years devoted to continuous reflection upon moral and religious problems, they are, at the age of thirty-five, again "sent down into the cave" and compelled to hold such offices as befit men of their age—*e.g.*, certain magistracies and positions of military command—until

[2] Their sex-life is not a matter of repression, but of expression in a spirit of social service and of reverence for the deeper values of life. Its expression is always closely connected with moral and intellectual excellence, and does not stand apart from their interests and activities as something foreign and peculiar.

Digitized by Google

they are fifty years old. The explicit aim of this performance of civic and military duty is that they may keep up with their neighbors in practical address (Rep. 539 E), and may fit themselves adequately for what is to follow. Finally, after the age of fifty, when their training is complete, they accept, when their turn comes, the hard duties of the highest public office in the commonwealth, and devote themselves to the work of administration, regulating their country, their fellow-citizens, and themselves, after the pattern of the Idea of Good, and supervising the education of the rising generation of leaders, so as to leave trained successors to fill their place when they are called away. What this element contributes towards forming the final character and personality of the moral judge, is experience in leadership, in administration, in handling men as well as in solving practical problems, complete freedom from any awkwardness and hesitation, and, on the moral side, the complete permeation of their action systems with the spirit of social service, until this becomes their second nature.

It now remains to consider the final intellectual training, the training which raises the student out of the class of auxiliaries or junior guardians, who, while holding various positions as magistrates, are still at the level of "opinion," into the class of full guardians, whose actions are based upon the insight and knowledge which comes upon complete achievement of the philosophic quest. This last stage of training is undertaken at the age of fifty, and only by an exceedingly small group, whose moral and intellectual equipment is of the very highest, and all of whose experiences, including the intensive study of moral and religious questions from the age of thirty to the age of thirty-five, have fitted them to take this final step (Rep. 537 C–540 A).

What has been accomplished during this period of preparation is the gradual making over of the whole nature of the students, so that their characters have come to be based, so far as this is possible at the level of opinion, upon the Ideas, and are thus already representative of the universe of values. The Ideas of manliness, self-mastery, and justice

Digitized by Google

have become, by long habituation and moral practice, constituent elements in their nature, and the Idea of wisdom has similarly, by means of their scientific training and philosophical reflection, become a central element in their personality (Rep. 518 E. f., 521 C ff.). Furthermore, these Ideas do not remain isolated from one another, enclosed in morally water-tight compartments, but have been associated together since early childhood, and so have become inseparable. So much for the influence of habit. On the side of reflection, the leaders have already become accustomed to think over the interrelation of the sciences as pathways to reality, and have spent some years of intensive study also in the consideration of moral and religious problems, so that not only has their whole nature become an earthly habitation for the Ideas which together constitute reality, but there has also been some attempt at feeling after some integration of the Ideas, in their embodiment in human nature, so as to convert the human copy into the reflex of reality, assimilating, not only its elements, but also its organization, a feeling after some principle which shall transcend the limitations and oppositions of Ideas embodied at the level of habit and opinion, and from its new standpoint unify them and bring them into perfect harmony with one another. And this feeling has begun to rise towards the level of reflection and of persistent, conscious search for such a principle. Only men who have developed a character and personality which already *is* the Ideas in their interconnection and, at least to some extent, also in their relation to the Idea of Good, can really take this last and greatest step from their slumbering and quasi-twilight vision to full self-consciousness, so as to apprehend in a final way the inner meaning of reality, the principle which makes all their life clear and meaningful and one with the essence of value.[3]

[3] The preparation is, in fact, so complete, that Plato can regard the age of fifty as the age at which they begin to make the final ascent, and also the age at which, the ascent completed, they can enter upon their final task of administration with full consciousness of all that is involved in the vision which they have beheld.

Digitized by Google

While the preparation is thus largely a matter of development of personality, of moral as well as intellectual training, consisting in the unconscious or semi-unconscious assimilation of character to the structure of ultimate reality, this last and final step which leads to the vision of the Ideas as forms of the Idea of Good, is severely intellectual, without direct assistance either from bodily habit or from an apprehension depending directly upon the activities of the bodily sense-organs. It is necessary to use as starting-points the masses of organized experience which constitute the departmental sciences, and perhaps also the moral and religious institutions developed in the course of human evolution (Rep. 510 B f.), which have already been studied in some relation to one another, and endeavor, after ascertaining the presuppositions, the accepted principles on which each science, as a separate department of action or investigation, rests, to transcend them, to convert what has hitherto been accepted, into matter of inquiry, to seek further for its ground in a higher and yet more rational principle, a principle resting, not upon sense-perceivable fact, but upon intellectually apprehensible Ideas. Hitherto the Ideas have been apprehended as empirical generalizations, as laws which bring together large masses of sensory experience and are verified by reference to that experience (Rep. 531 E, 533 C). The aim is now, to rise above this empirical basis, and to endeavor to apprehend the Ideas in their full nature as Ideas, set free from the narrowing limitations of sensory experience, of the accidents of the here and now and of the personal equation, and to apprehend them as true universals, as Ideals which can be appreciated only when considered as members of an ideal and purely rational realm, to which any embodiment in a merely physical nature, a nature apprehensible by animal and human sense-organs, is and can be only a faint approximation (Phædr. 250 B, Rep. 527 B f.).

Human concepts are dual in nature. On the one hand, they are matters of sensory and associational experience (Polit. 277 E f., 285 B); on the other, they participate in an

Digitized by Google

ideal nature, in some principle which, at least partly, converts them into Ideas proper, members of the Ideal realm. When we abstract from the conditions of sensory experience, and set out upon the dialectical quest, the only path of investigation which remains is to consider what this principle is, upon which their nature as Ideas depends, the principle of ideality as such. For this alone is what is common to all Ideas, whatever the department of inquiry in which they have been discovered, and this alone can suffice to give them, considered as a systematic group in relation to its own law or principle, an absolute grounding, a grounding which does not point beyond itself to something yet higher, but transcends the questionings which attach to the merely bodily and human conditions of inquiry, and gives a final, ideally sufficient answer to the dialectical question, an answer which will satisfy, not merely the intellect with its feeling for logical values, but also the moral, æsthetical, and religious aspirations of humanity, and furnish an absolute basis for the whole spiritual life of man (Rep. 534 B–535 A).

That some such answer would fully satisfy the deepest spiritual needs of man, may perhaps be admitted. And further, that the principle of ideality and value can be adequately realized, if at all, only when the complete experience of the individual has been trained and developed somewhat as Plato prescribes, may perhaps also be admitted. But we could all wish that the inquiry should proceed further and enable us, at least to some extent, to enter into the completed experience of the dialectician. And this wish can be, at least in part, satisfied. The matter does not necessarily remain vague and incomplete, hanging in mid-air (Rep. 506 B f., 533 A f.). Certain things which the philosophical investigator will discover about the Idea of Good can be stated in a way which is at least formally correct, even though the full concrete realization of their truth and meaning may have to be left for the man whose whole life has prepared him to experience this final vision.

Thus, in the first place, the dialectician will assuredly

Digitized by Google

discover that this principle is of assistance to him in his search after knowledge. There is a certain correspondence, as we have seen, between the mental structure of the junior guardian and the laws of the ideally real world, and it is in virtue of this correspondence—admittedly imperfect—that the guardian, at this level of opinion and with the help of merely human concepts, of ideas which represent only the reorganization of large masses of an experience shot through with elements which satisfy sensation rather than the uncompromising demands of reason, has been able to build up any semblance of genuine knowledge. The ground for this inadequacy is the imperfect nature of the correspondence in question. There is a gap between the system of Ideas on the one hand, and the distorted reflection of this system which gradually emerges, through the medium of human sensation, in our own minds. The resulting structure, which we dignify by the name of empirical science, is, as Plato puts it, more clear than mere opinion, but more obscure, less completely permeable to intelligence, than a true or ideal knowing would be (Rep. 533 D). If, then, by concentrating upon the strictly intellectual and formal element in knowledge, it becomes possible to perfect the form, to withdraw for a season from further sensory experience, and to think out in abstraction the formal ideal of systematic consistency which would completely satisfy the intellect, it will be possible to use this ideal as a standard, by reference to which the previous cognitive experiences of the individual can be re-arranged, in spite of their frequent omissions and inadequacies, so as to correspond, in their main lines, to the main lines of the new pattern, and can thus be made to yield their utmost of knowledge-value. The ideal once clearly grasped, and the nature of the gap between sense and intellect once clearly understood, the dialectician can set out, with a mental structure which has been re-formed so as to be now identical in principle with the structure of the ideal world, to make over and reorganize his sensory experiences, to extract from them everything which in any way measures up to the ideal, and to arrange

Digitized by Google

the elements thus extracted, in accordance with the arrangement of the ideal pattern, so that his labors will gradually reveal to him in detail, as well as in principle, the nature of the laws which constitute reality. From this point of view, the principle of ideality may be described as the *ratio cognoscentis*, the principle which makes knowledge possible for the individual knower.[4]

In the second place, the dialectician will discover that this highest principle is of immense assistance for the conduct of life. The psychological springs of action are furnished by the large instinctive needs for such "goods" as food, protection, companionship, and sex-satisfaction, as well as by innumerable minor impulses (Rep. 558 E ff., Laws 782 B f., etc.). Under the pressure of ordinary social living, these originally somewhat diverse and chaotic impulses have become hammered into some conventional semblance of principle and orderliness. But the semblance is a mere veneer, and beneath the surface there is a fierce riot of seething passions, each waiting for a chance to satisfy itself without much regard for the rest or for social conventions. This lawless, wild-beast element in our nature can be kept under, to some extent, by the force of law and of social opinion, in the case of the average citizen, if not in the case of the successful despot (Rep. 571 ff.). But suppression of a problem by force is no adequate solution of the very real and very pressing difficulty. The difficulty arises from the fact that both individual impulse and social convention oppose one another as rivals for the same position: each claims to represent "reality," to be actual and genuine, the other being regarded as "mere appearance." The partisan of lawless living and the complete release of desire believes with a whole-hearted faith in Pan. For him, the instincts are alone real and according to the order of nature, while social and political norms are of merely "conventional" significance, a shameless and unnatural imposi-

[4] Rep. 508 B f. The principle is also the *ratio cognoscendi* and the *ratio essendi* (Rep. 508 D f.).

Digitized by Google

tion upon the imperious and self-justified needs of powerful individuals (Gorg. 491 D f., Rep. 343 C ff., 365 B ff.). On the other hand, the champion of law and order is profoundly convinced that these are of a higher, more ideal nature, and that they have a more rational claim to satisfaction than the brute instincts and "unnecessary" appetites. For him the state is more significant, more truly representative of reality, than the isolated individual, even when the individual is successful as a superman, and his will to power rises superior to all human checks (Gorg. 470 E ff., 517 B ff.). Finally, he believes that, the universe being essentially and ultimately rational, a genuine, harmonious, and permanent satisfaction, not only of the social and gregarious instincts, but of the whole instinctive and emotional side of human life, is possible only when the ruling force in life is reason, with its powers of organization on the one hand, and its kinship with ultimate reality on the other (Rep. 583 ff.).

Both sides thus claim for themselves the authority of nature and reality; and that there is some degree of truth in both claims, no candid inquirer can altogether deny. There is thus, so long as the level of opinion remains untranscended, no way of solving the deadlock. Each side is convinced that it is in the right, and neither will give way, whether in the case of the individual man, or in the case of the state, which is but the individual writ large. If the conflict is to be decided at all, some higher court is needed than that of instinct, passion, and convention. And a higher court can be reached. Both sides have something in common, *viz.*, the straining after an ideal of human life which shall be, not superficial and futile, but truly in contact with reality, the genuine, final, ultimate, highest reality. The only possible pathway towards a solution of the conflict, towards the attainment of a point of view which shall be perfectly just to the complete facts of the situation on both sides, is to be found by abstracting, for the time being, from the fierce passions and instinctive impulses aroused on both sides, including the passionate conviction of rightness, of being already in touch with truth

Digitized by Google

and reality, which each partisan possesses, and in investigating, dispassionately and humbly, the element which both possess in common, in order to determine by an appeal to strictly rational standards, the full nature of the ideal of social living, the ideal or principle which shall reconcile the opposing elements and make them friends (Rep. 582 f., Laws 627 E), a higher principle at which both were fundamentally aiming, though by different paths, a principle expressive of the true and ultimate nature of reality in a form which can be used as a standard for social living, a standard which every rational being, as such, can accept openly and without qualification. By withdrawing from the immediate pressure of practical needs, and by reflecting continuously and by an abstract method upon the nature of this social ideal, the seeker comes to realize that community of aim, community of final, underlying purpose, is the only principle which can unite and harmonize the diverse instincts in the individual, and the diverse individuals in the commonwealth. Co-operation, each element, whether in the individual or in the community, doing all that it can for the service of the whole—*i.e.*, for the service of others as well as of itself, considered all as members of one and the same organism—is the only possible way of constructing a harmony which will work, which will bring into effective functioning all the diverse elements, and will thus build up a totality, whether in the case of the individual personality or in the case of the commonwealth, which will express and bring out whatever of positive content, whatever of reality, is to be found in the impulses and sources which push towards effective action (Rep. 498 E, 500 D, etc.).

This ideal is based upon a conception of reality as a totality of elements which are all positive, though not devoid of "othernesses," *i.e.*, differences and diversities which, unless all are properly organized with reference to this one possible principle of satisfying all harmoniously in relation to the totality as such, would negate one another (Soph. 256 D–259 B). This conception of the real universe

Digitized by Google

as a complex organism, wherein every element has its own function, contributing somehow to the life of the whole, and finding therein its own deepest and most abiding satisfaction, can be applied in a very direct and concrete way as a standard for the reorganization of our social living, as well as for the solution of our own more individual problem of attaining a united and vigorous personality (Rep. 588 C ff., Laws 903 B f.). Upon this conception depends immediately the ideal of a state which shall be a genuine organism, every element therein contributing all it can to the service of the state as a whole; and this ideal contains the two important principles of (1) social service as the true spirit of the citizen, and (2) every citizen doing his own work, realizing his own potentialities, fulfilling completely his own natural and proper function, and finding, in loyal service of the ideal community which includes himself as one of its members, serenity of spirit and perfect satisfaction. Diverse functions involving specialization, united by the common spirit of service to a common ideal, the elimination of waste and useless conflict, and the development of the full resources of every member of the community—principles such as these bring out the full value, the utmost positive contribution to the enrichment of life, the closest approximation to the ideal reality of things, which we can conceive. It is in this sense that the principle of ideality is declared to be the pattern by which the philosopher-king will guide, not only himself, but also the community, in the complex business of social living (Rep. 540, 590 D ff.).

It is not only in solving his own personal problem, in his search after a unified, concentrated life which shall develop in a vigorous, consistent, and useful way all the elements of power and value contained in his organism, that the dialectician will find the principle of ideality and value to be of supreme assistance. Not only does it furnish him with a standard for the improvement of social living and the advancement of scientific truth. It is also of the utmost help to him in art and religion. In art—not in artistic creation as such, for that is a matter of inspiration, of surging emo-

Digitized by Google

tion and uncritical frenzy (Euthyphr. 3 C, Phædr. 244 A ff.)—but in artistic criticism and appreciation, in estimating the value of art-works. The conception of the ideal universe as a vision which realizes the utmost possible of positive beauty, the "science of beauty everywhere," becomes a standard by which he can estimate the greatness of artistic creations. The senseless embellishment of elements which are superficial and devoid of real significance, is put in its place (Rep. 395 D f., 372 E f.), the claim of the artist who is merely a bold and skilful player upon human feelings, to be accepted as the interpreter of life, is roughly rejected (Gorg. 462 B ff., Rep. 595 E ff.), and great art is recognized as the representation, in its own medium of rhythmic movements, whether free, as in the dance, or arrested, as when embodied in colors, tones, or words, etc., of the interplay of elements which together constitute the highest reality, the world of Ideas united under the Idea of Good. In this form it is the natural ally of science and morality, and elevates those who are susceptible to its fascination and wizardry, out of the fragmentariness and littleness of the common places of life to an appreciation of their genuine and underlying unity with the depths, with the perennial sources of freshness and inspiration, the true beauty and reality of things (Symp. 212 A–B, Laws 858 D ff., etc.).

So, too, in religion. The withdrawal for a space from the warring creeds and from the unworthy promises too often held out to the believer who will surrender himself wholly, and the sustained philosophical reflection upon the idea of the God and Father of all, gradually leads to the development of the conception of a Spirit who is the living counterpart of the principle of ideality, who is in very sooth the universe in which we live and move, but is no mere concept or bloodless category, but a living Spirit, the Spirit of goodness, beauty, truth, knowledge, and power, the Spirit who is reality in its own living (Phileb. 30 C–D). This conception once attained, the dialectician will be able to set about the reform of received creeds, which worship the Father of all in forms and ceremonies into which supersti-

Digitized by Google

tion, self-seeking, and folly have gradually found their way, and will regard as the essence of true religious worship and self-surrender, the yearning after assimilation to God, the sustained attempt to live a Godlike life here on earth, and the hope of hereafter living a more perfect, more real and Godlike life in Heaven (Phædo 84 A–B, Theæt. 176 A f., etc.).

Such, then, is the nature of the Idea of Good, and such are some of the principles which the trained seeker after the wisdom which comes from a knowledge of ultimate reality will discover. But the discovery is no tenuous abstraction, no withdrawal from life to monastic seclusion. It is the living completion of the years of preparation through which the student has passed, the culmination of his living, the continuation, with complete self-consciousness, of the life which he has been living already in the lower phase of incomplete awareness. It is in his life, in every pulse and throb of his blood, in his brain, heart, and hand, in his planning, his feeling, and his acting, that the Idea of Good has come to have its local habitation, and, through him, in the community also which has trained him to lead it into the right way. The final principle which he discovers is thus the true life of the community itself, the human copy of that higher, complete, and absolute life which is reality itself, the life of God.

This vision realized, we may now ask what this final stage of training has added to the elements which go to make up the moral judgment. In the first place, it has taken away the blindness, the groping, the baffled feeling inseparable from the stage of opinion, and has substituted for it a clearness of outlook, a sureness of grasp upon moral criteria, a breadth and depth of insight, which are illuminating to the highest degree and bring with them a measured calmness of spirit, a peace and certainty with regard to the issues of life, which make the philosopher finally at home in a universe to which he now not only feels, but knows, himself to be spiritually akin. In the second place, the new experience is a deepening of self-consciousness, an awareness of his own

Digitized by Google

deepest self, an understanding of what has been slowly developing within him through the long years of preparation, a recognition of his great powers and an acceptance of the great responsibilities which these powers entail, a full comprehension of his place and function in the scheme of things, including not only his relation to his fellow-men, but also his relation to God and the unseen world of Ideas. What is new, then, is this deeper and clearer knowledge of self and of the universe, and, in the light of this new knowledge, a more profound understanding of life, and a key by the help of which he can solve the problems of conduct, not only for himself but also for the community, and can thus enter, with others, into the higher reaches of life, into the peace and joy (*eudaimonia*) which come to those who walk steadfastly in the pathway which they know, with every fibre of their being, to be right.

His training is now complete, and the guardian can proceed to make moral judgments in the full sense. Just what elements enter into his judgment? What is it in him which does the judging? The first and simplest answer is, that he does the judging himself, and that the elements which enter into his judgment are the elements which have truly entered into his self. These are the physical, moral, and mental elements already considered, the instincts, habits, and intelligence, so trained and ripened by social and educational influences as to have taken on the form and pattern of the ideal world, and to have become, so far as this is possible in an organism which retains to the end something of its animal origin, the human habitation and embodiment of the Ideas of manliness, temperance, justice, and wisdom, in the full harmony and unity which comes with attaining also the Idea of Good. What "does the judging" is thus the whole nature of the individual man, together with all the influences which have entered into that nature and have made it what it has come to be, the influences of literature, art, science, and religion, the history, traditions and aspirations of the community, the whole welded together and transmuted into an adequate reflex of that Experience

Digitized by Google

which we designate as Absolute. The judgment of such a man represents, then, not a chance reaction to a chance stimulation, but the rich experience of the whole race, sublimated and idealized until it represents, so far as this is humanly possible, the complete experience which is the life and thought of God. What does the judging is thus the Absolute Experience itself, so far as the human organism can become a channel for Its expression, and what is judged is the human problem. The judging consists in analyzing the human situation which provides the problem, in comparing it with the Divine standard so as (1) to make clear its deficiencies, its falling short of that standard, and also (2) to point out the remedy and the solution, the steps which will re-form its elements and bring our human actions into closer approximation to that Experience which furnishes the Absolute Pattern for human living.

Our synthetic examination is now finished, and shows, perhaps with sufficient clearness, that for Plato moral judgment is not solely a matter of transcendental *anamnesis*, but that it contains also empirical elements. It is the total experience of the individual which is concerned in passing judgment, the physical and instinctive basis, the social training and habituation to community ideals, the rational insight which forms the keystone of the arch and makes clear to consciousness the kinship of humanity to Divinity. These empirical elements are worked over, sublimated and transmuted, but not discarded, and the Divine Experience, which ultimately passes judgment, does so through the medium of the empirical human organism, when this has been so trained under Divine favor as to become expressive of the whole experience of humanity in its responsiveness to and reflection of the Ideal Experience which is God.

RUPERT CLENDON LODGE.

UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA.

Digitized by Google

SANCTIONING INTERNATIONAL PEACE.

C. F. TAEUSCH.

CENTRAL to the problem of arriving at some understanding among the nations of the world is the difficulty of apportioning, delineating, and making effective those sanctions which would determine the precise meaning of "sovereignty." In this respect the present international situation bears a striking resemblance to what has been called "the critical period of American history." Analogies are always dangerous, and there is reason to believe that the projection of our scheme of government into a plan for a world-order is a bit narrow, if not conceited. But if Mr. Wells[1] can see in our federal organization principles which ought to be incorporated into an international polity, we may be forgiven if we also indulge in this analogical method. Indeed, Mr. Wells' position is Chestertonian: it isn't that we have gone too far in this project of a league, but that we haven't gone far enough; he proposes a super-state, and in this respect follows more closely the changes wrought by the Constitution than does the Covenant of the League of Nations itself. Consequently we should find certain provisions for the distribution of sovereignty in the federal state to be quite pertinent to the present problem.

The changes which gave efficacy to the federal government included the new constitutional capacity to operate on individuals directly instead of through the instrumentality of the several states.[2] Consequently any agreement or association among the nations of the world, whether for purposes of disarmament or other relations, is confronted with this dilemma: on the one hand it can be effective largely as it is independent of the intermediation of the constituent nations, while on the other hand it must seek this function

[1] *The Salvaging of Civilization.*

[2] John Marshall: Cohens *vs.* Virginia.

Digitized by Google

as a dispensation of grace from the "obstinate conservatism of established authority . . . whose accustomed importance is now threatened,"[3] an attitude recognized by Madison as most characteristic of the opponents of the Constitution.[4] These alternatives have become formulated by following a familiar psychological process: selected out of a very complex, perhaps paradoxical situation, the contradictory derivatives, generalized and abstracted into such meaningless terms as "Internationalism" and "100 per cent Americanism," have come to possess an intense emotional charge. The only outcome of such an impasse, we in America have been led to believe, is a decision in favor of the one side or the other, root and branch; practically this has consisted in the rejection by the representatives of America of any super-government which might interfere in the least with our national sovereignty.

Any such solution or interpretation fails, however, to take account of the fact that although man "lives by catch phrases," especially such as are surcharged with emotion, he cannot live by them very long. Whatever the surface phenomena of political movements and arrangements, sooner or later these must give expression to the underlying economic and social currents. As a recent writer has said, "The political organization rests upon, and is conditioned by, various factors or forces of a non-political nature, . . . and only by a scientific knowledge of these forces and a scientific control of their operation is it possible to solve the problem of sovereignty in the sense of a problem concerning the relation between a state and subordinate organizations."[5] The solution of any paradoxical social problem can be discovered only through the practical description of the underlying nexus of concrete elements and detailed relations, from which are to be selected such as are most important in reference to the situation. And it is finally these latter

[3] Wells, *op. cit.*

[4] Madison: *Notes on the Constitutional Convention.*

[5] Laing: "Aspects of the Problem of Sovereignty," *International Journal of Ethics*, Oct. 1921.

Digitized by Google

which are, not resultant from, but constituent to the general term which is to designate the solution.

The problem of sovereignty in the present international situation is to be resolved only in the detailed analysis of the social welter in which it has had its rise. Much of it has already become practically, if not nominally, formulated in the industrial arrangements necessary to save the world from economic bankruptcy. Any such analysis, of course, becomes exceedingly difficult because of the complexity of the constituent social factors, and this difficulty is accentuated when we begin to deal with intellectual, moral and spiritual forces. It is the virtue of political and legal activity, however, to organize such concrete agencies as will give effective sanction even to the ineffable desires of mankind. Alexander Hamilton was fond of pointing out that there is no statement in the Constitution describing or defining the general nature of the government, that the general plan was to be construed in and through the detailed items. Mr. Dicey [6] has made a similar observation regarding the "rules" of the British Constitution. And he has cited the American Constitution as particularly representative of a method which vests each significant political situation with an appropriate sanction. Without resorting to voluntary compliance or public opinion, this sanction has sufficient explicitness and effectiveness to limit the necessity of its frequent use.

It is a matter of common agreement that any attempt to control the causes of war must afford some means of regulating commercial and military rivalry. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the general economic relations which eventually will effect diplomatic agreements. Commerce and War are problems which carry intrinsic administrative difficulties with which we are not here concerned. Rather would we emphasize the point that the financial factor, especially as manifest in the method of taxation, is fundamental to the main administrative activities which a

[6] *The Law of the Constitution.*

Digitized by Google

concert of powers would be called upon to perform. In this connection it will be recalled that commerce affords one of the best sources of revenue in point of distribution and collection; and that, on the other hand, the maintenance of armed forces is the object toward which taxation has in the past been largely directed.

Politically the power of taxation is a materialized exhibition of the relation of a government to its component parts: the pursuit of governmental policies depends on a sufficient income and the ability to operate upon appropriate objects, while the degree of execution of this function represents the relative sovereign strength of the nation. In the following quotation from John Marshall, he means specifically the situation between the states of America and the federal government, but his words have a general significance: "The power of taxation is an incident of sovereignty; it is a mode, although not the only mode, in which sovereignty is displayed. The power of taxing the people and their property is essential to the very existence of government, and may be legitimately exercised on the objects to which it is applicable to the utmost extent to which the government may choose to carry it. If we measure the power of taxation residing in a state by the extent of sovereignty which the people of a state possess and can confer on its government, we have an intelligible standard, applicable to every case to which the power can be applied."[7] The greatest weakness of the Articles of Confederation was that the taxing powers of the general government were permitted to reach the final objects only through the state governments. When the Constitution was drawn up, provision was made for the general government to perform its taxing functions directly upon the objects to be taxed. The full significance of this measure appeared when Washington called out the federal militia to suppress the Whiskey Rebellion and forced the distillers individually to comply with the demands of the government. At the beginning of the Civil War,

[7] McCulloch *vs.* Maryland.

Digitized by Google

Lincoln's first call for troops was technically justified in that the national government had been divested of its property in stores and impost stations. The separate title to goods and an independent source of income, together with the direct control over both, seem to be the necessary and sufficient guarantees of sovereignty.

In his discussion of the taxing power of the proposed national government, Alexander Hamilton insisted that "a complete power to procure a regular and adequate supply of revenue, so far as the resources of the community permit, is an indispensable ingredient of every constitution."[8] Elaborating this idea he points out certain axioms, among which is one stating that there ought to be no limitation of a power destined to effect a purpose which is in itself incapable of limitation. "To superintend the national defense and secure the public peace involve a provision to which no possible limits can be assigned; hence the power of making that provision ought to know no other bounds than the exigencies of the nation and the resources of the community."[9] These views show to what extent the functions of taxation may be applied: in addition to the negative purpose of control, common to all licensing provisions, there is the positive objective of securing effective instruments to enforce the purposes of government, including such as are pertinent to the subject of this paper, the control of war and the securing of international peace. The practical problem would resolve itself to the discovery of such limitations as would allocate to a consortium of powers no more jurisdiction than is necessary to the purposes we have in view.

That an international government would be tempted by the facility with which a tax may be levied on commerce is evident. Such a tax can be laid at well-defined geographic locations, the objects are tangible and manifest, and the burden can be shifted to a degree which makes its weight

[8] *Federalist Papers*, XXX.
[9] *Federalist Papers*, XXXV.

Digitized by Google

negligible. The presence, in that case, of international officials in harbors or along national boundaries would be a part of the concrete implications we should have to settle. To restrict the tax to water-borne traffic might prove the more feasible plan, in view of the simplicity of execution and the relief afforded maritime nations in regard to the expense of maintaining their present naval strength. This situation becomes important in view of the fact, as will be mentioned later, that the most definite approach to a limitation of armaments has been that which deals with naval equipment. There is the more complicated regulative feature of taxation which must also be taken into account, the resultant social legislation including not only the working conditions of seamen, but perhaps also the conditions under which the articles constituting the cargoes are produced and their use as well. The extent to which we care to involve ourselves in the regulation of such matters is for legislative policy to determine, and will be indicated in the fiscal rules administering them. Each of the many specific provisions is seen to bristle with all sorts of possible implications and interpretations, and it is in just this sense that the resultant apportionment of sovereignty is to be qualified and decided.

There is one extraordinary function which taxation might be called upon to perform, namely to provide a military force relatively superior to any possible combination of recalcitrant powers. In most discussions on this point there is a confused notion similar to that held at the time of the discussions over the Constitution: the constituent parties to the proposed organization are undecided whether the thing to be feared is the super-position of a federal state or the dominance of the stronger elements within that federation. The only legitimate position which a nation might take on this matter, aside from that of a fear for its own peculiar interests, is that any such association should guard against the subversion of its legislative and judicial administration by a minority which temporarily has gotten sufficient control over the effective agencies of government within a certain territorial area. A practical guarantee

Digitized by Google

against this is, of course, to provide the association or superstate with a superiority of armament. Now voluntary limitations on the part of the constituent states are as little feasible, if we are to keep clear of the charge of being too idealistic, as would be voluntary contributions to the central authority. A tax on armaments sufficient to provide the international association with a safe margin of control over combinations of states that might form this rebellious minority, would seem to be the logical implication of the situation. Such a tax would automatically provide a sufficient force at the same time that it would avoid burdening the association with an excess of armaments. For just as any increase in the armament of a nation would afford the basis for an increase in the armed strength of the association, so there would on the other hand be both a decrease in revenues and a lessened need of international armament according as the individual nations could be induced or forced by taxation to reduce theirs. Any such tax would be characterized by the directness of its incidence, the adequacy of its income to effect the purposes in view; and more particularly in that it would avoid a difficulty which arises in our federal state, concurrent taxation.

The world was startled by the explicit nature of Mr. Hughes' opening speech at the Conference for the Limitation of Armaments. Sober opinion has recognized, however, that this practical and concrete method of dealing with the problem is peculiarly adaptable to the field to which Mr. Hughes confined himself. Expensive material equipment represents a much more important factor in naval warfare than is the case with land operations; the strength of the latter being determined relatively more by morale, flexibility of movement of units, the use of gas and other chemicals, and the extent of civilian participation. Furthermore, at least according to American experts, the capital ship affords a most convenient unit in estimating the relative material strengths of the combatants. What we may conservatively say is that Azan's proposition applies particularly to naval armaments: Although the outcome may be delayed, there

Digitized by Google

can be no doubt of victory finally resting with the side possessed of the better equipment.[10] Even so, aircraft, armed merchantmen, and the submarine present especially difficult problems in that their military effectiveness is not to be measured accurately by the relative expense. Therefore there has been a tempering of the optimism which greeted the opening of the Washington Conference, implying as it did an expectation that this definite mode of treatment would continue for all matters pertaining even to naval disarmament. On the other hand, although definiteness is to be expected only in reference to this field, it may be adequate provided this partial control effected by naval strength is sufficiently important to the whole problem of international security. And so those would be inclined to think who agree with Mahan's thesis, that naval supremacy has determined the course of history. Thus it would seem to be a fortunate coincidence that the most vital part of the armament situation—naval equipment—should be most effectively subject to limitation and control.

The logical conclusion, however, of Mr. Hughes' explicit proposals is a no less explicit provision for effectively carrying them out. It would ill become the critics of idealism in international affairs to discover this sanction in the mere promises of nations and their expressions of good will. Good will is as important in international as in private relations, and there will be opportunity for the exercise of an abundance of it no matter how concretely the plans for material enforcement are worked out. But public opinion is not exhaustive of the security necessary to the performance of obligation. Indeed, the assumption implied in this proposal for international morality in the form of an effective and durable peace, is that moral forces function best when practical sanctions have covered sufficient ground to relieve the former of all but the ineffable activities. A case in point is the organization of charities, leaving a residue which is at once ample for anyone who might feel the need of exercising

[10] *The War of Positions.*

Digitized by Google

his individual activities at the same time that this residue is becoming sufficiently limited so as to make individual charity patently effective. The definite control of armaments by material sanctions will increase the effectiveness of international morality, not only directly through limiting the scope of application of public opinion, but also indirectly and intensively through the encouragement derived from an observation of the more manifest results achieved by the economy of effort.

Practically the international situation calls for a regulation, by taxation, of the available and directly utilizable war materials, together with such industrial plants as are easily convertible into munitions factories. The precise description of the limits of international taxation would suffice to restrict the sovereignty of any association or league of nations to such matters as are recognized in principle to belong to its exclusive jurisdiction. As for the method of administering this tax, there is as much opportunity for defining sovereignty as in the specific provisions included in legislation. Not only are there all degrees of laxity in law enforcement, but the skill with which these provisions are handled will have much to do with the adherence and loyalty of the individuals constituting the membership of the association. Mr. Root during the Versailles Conference suggested the necessity and advisability of an international commission vested with the power of inquiring into the actual compliance of each individual nation with the regulations agreed upon in any international conference, and a similar course was suggested in the recent conference. Such activities are ultimately to manifest the intent of organized opinion.

The point we wish to emphasize, however, is that although the proposed tax would help materially, as a licensing provision, to regulate military activities, a mere limitation scheme is inadequate to cope with the armament problem because it fails to take account of the motives and methods involved in military activity. It is not here intended that there be any derogation of Marshall's dictum that the power to tax implies

Digitized by Google

the power to destroy. It must be remembered, however, that expenditures for future military purposes form but a small part of the whole burden of taxation for wars. Furthermore, nations in the past have mortgaged their future in order to gain an immediate end, and have often succeeded where failure would have brought economic ruin. Therefore the much emphasized economic pressure is not absolutely deterrent to the pursuit of ambitious naval policies. "Nations build navies because they are a grim necessity," says a recent writer. "It is untrue that fighting navies derive from merchant navies or that naval strength is proportionate to a country's wealth. . . . There is no conceivable sacrifice that would limit" naval expenditures if the exigency should arise.[11] In this sense not even a monetary penalty, in the form of a tax, is a sufficient guarantee of international control. But just as in the common law the sheriff and his posse are regarded as the practical and concrete expression of the ultimate legal sanction, so there must be provided, through the agency of such a tax as is here proposed, armaments and forces under the direct control of an association of nations in order to secure international peace. Such a result can be achieved only through the actual or potential administrative efficacy of officials who can rely finally on a superior counter force, automatically maintained. Unless we establish this effective sanction, any talk of partial or total disarmament is meaningless and idle.

There are many questions to be raised before we can discover to ourselves whether we sincerely desire to establish an effective means of obtaining world peace. Is international harmony paramount to all other considerations? Is this exigency serious enough and this purpose sufficiently important at least to outweigh the transition from absolute to relative national sovereignty? If patriotism requires that we always preserve the individual rights of nations to resort to arms, then there is no need of attempting any such

[11] A. H. Pollard, *Atlantic Monthly*, Dec. 1921.

Digitized by Google

automatic sanctions as are here proposed. If, however, the issue is decided affirmatively, and if sanction is to be discovered in the explicit nature of the powers that are granted to the league or association, then taxation affords one of the most tangible means for attaining the end in view. The degree to which we are willing to accommodate our national sovereignties to this value will be discovered in the specific provisions we incorporate into any international agreement.

C. F. TAEUSCH.

TULANE UNIVERSITY.

Digitized by Google

THE RELATION OF ETHICS TO SOCIAL SCIENCE.

O. FRED BOUCKE.

ETHICISTS may not consider the relation between their subject and the social sciences an important problem, and certainly it is not a new one; but of recent years interest in it has again been revived to a quite marked degree. It is not difficult to see that the war, for one thing, has awakened in many people a keen desire to know exactly what is most worth while and how it may be attained. The political disaster that has befallen some nations, and the social upheaval accompanying it, has robbed large classes of men of their faith in certain norms and institutions. A crisis nearly always stimulates doubt and inquiry which lead to a revaluation of old values. Hence the Great War has probably something to do with current hopes for a scientific system of ethics.

Apart from it, however, there are still other reasons why a definite solution of the familiar problem would be welcome to many. For in the first place it bears directly upon our modern ideals of democracy and universal enlightenment, it being absolutely essential that the average individual know what is right and wrong, and possess the requisite powers of self-direction. In the second place we live in an age which is rapidly turning its back on religious dogmatism of any persuasion, so that the stress on ethical norms grows as the erstwhile adherence to a formal creed disappears. The more powerful the priesthood, the more widespread a faith in theological concepts, and the less vital a concern for purely worldly affairs. Each factor influences and reenforces the other, if no obstacles intervene. But if life here on earth gains in significance, either because theism and a belief in an immortal soul are waning, or because religion is dedicated especially to the highest possible development of personality and prosperity, then the search for ways and means will gradually be reflected in ethics. The desire

Digitized by Google

for a scientific basis of conduct will be strengthened. Transcendentalism at least in this one field will give way to empiricism, and thus prepare men for a socialization of norms.

But in the third place there is no doubt that social scientists themselves have been eager to connect their labors closely with the moral issues of the day. It has been felt increasingly that morality is of primary import, and that sociology or economics leave much to be desired if they can furnish no hints as to the best way of harmonizing the divergent interests of individuals. The complexity of relations has become so great, and the need of a moral code for their regulation has grown so rapidly, that scholars feel obliged to substantiate their ethical theories by a reference to palpable facts. There is a noticeable tendency to-day toward a popular treatment of moral problems, toward one which shall rid us of absolutes and prove the relativity of all truths. Ethics as a discipline is becoming steadily less formal, and more factual.

This circumstance indeed is the chief reason why in the eyes of the present writer the relation of ethics to social science deserves careful consideration. As long as people seek transcendent truths, or sources of knowledge, of good and evil, that are not empirically verifiable, so long science can have no place in ethics. If we reduce all moral precepts to a categorical imperative such as Kant made famous, it cannot be difficult to separate science rigidly from a study of morality. The two then will be worlds apart, and the question of a relation be disposed of forever. If a sense of duty, or virtue for its own sake, or purity of motive constitute the whole of ethics, scientific approaches will be unnecessary. We shall postulate a voice of God, or an inborn conscience, or some such occult power, and forthwith leave men to their designs. Those who err will be punished by their own better knowledge, if not otherwise, and the virtuous will thrive on a sweet peace of mind. Social scientists will be automatically debarred from a discussion of ethics. They cannot then trace its roots, nor resolve it into

Digitized by Google

principles. Nor will they have anything to say about the supposed or real morality of an applied social science.

But it is exactly because many of us realize the pre-eminence of a content in ethics that the relation between it and social inquiries becomes a matter for speculation. If an absolute good does not exist, or at least does not spring entirely from an innate Ought, then questions of a what and whence become logical. In proportion to our espousing the cause of a content-ethics we are likely to hold that scientists have counsel to give to ethicists, or not. The degree of authority of each over the other, their points of contact and of difference, the possibility of reconciling *de*scription with *pre*scription, or of proving the moral nature of applied social sciences—all these topics gain in interest once we devote ourselves to a strictly empirical and factual ethics.

For the purposes of this paper it is of course indifferent whether the utilitarian view of good and bad is the correct one, or not. Reasons will presently be submitted why it does seem to many thinkers the only adequate one. But that is a detail rather than a major point. What matters chiefly is our appreciation of the need of a statement on the relation of ethics to social science, if the factual basis of ethics is granted. *If* results mainly count, if the prevailing systems of eudæmonism or utilitarianism are well grounded, or in so far as we preach them, science and ethics cannot be sundered entirely. A differentiation between the two must then follow lines other than those laid down by the a priori ethicists and philosophers. We should then be willing to consider the possibility of reducing our Ought to an Is, until evidence had abundantly proven it impracticable. This is what we owe to social scientists, and what common sense suggests.

The factual or content view of ethics seems the only admissible one to most students for several reasons. Attempts, for instance, at an exclusively formal treatment of the subject have rarely succeeded, because sooner or later results were invoked for a definition of the Supreme Good. And this amounts certainly to a recantation. As thorough

Digitized by Google

a thinker as Kant could not make his discourse on ethics altogether self-consistent. As has been shown a number of times, he blundered into a petitio principii in proclaiming his cardinal rule for conduct. Moreover, as might just as well have been pointed out, Kant's later and fuller exposition does not quite agree with his earlier and briefer one. It is symptomatic probably that the most formal ethics in philosophical literature is also one of the most fragmentary, while complete treatises from other hands have almost without exception dwelled on circumstances and consequences.

But however this may be, the importance of a content for the Ought is admitted by the great majority of people. Not only are relativity and utility central concepts, but in addition our norms must refer back to objective tests. The old-time subjective virtues have ceased to command respect because they can neither be measured, nor even be verified. To say that faith is the highest good, or that wisdom, or justice, or mercy are supreme virtues, is effectually to prevent a testing of virtue. For there is no way of proving a man evil by these definitions. We cannot get at states of mind or feeling. By subjective norms we must exculpate a man even though we are convinced of his guilt.

But, of course, most of us do not find moral perfection in such bare assurances of goodness. We are no longer given over to a cult which lets creed take the place of conduct or conditions. On the contrary, we are learning to think less of creeds, and more of conduct. We associate the good in everyday life with behavior in concrete situations, with the facts and interrelations constituting our physical and socio-economic environment. In other words, our moral norms have not only been given a content; they have also been linked with measurable tests. To know whether morality obtains, or whether men are saints or sinners, we consult results, not mere protestations of belief and motive. Results in the long run count most. Though the spirit is still a real factor, though under special circumstances a motive may outweigh consequences, and the wrongdoer be forgiven

Digitized by Google

accordingly, the average of results is nevertheless decisive. Deeds are judged more or less independently of intentions; while the tangible conditions surrounding us have become an index of the general prevalence of a moral spirit.

Human nature is so constituted that a disregard of objective facts in moral appraisals can hardly be tolerated. Men have needs that must be catered to. The laws of chemistry, biology and psychology impose upon us certain duties such as the creation of goods and services and the maintenance of amicable relations, without which society could not flourish. So much is indisputable. Whether we should aim at the continuation of life in any style, or whether such a goal may rightly be considered an Ultimate Good, is a question of no moment here. We know only that as a matter of record ethical systems always *have* sought to preserve existing lives, or else permitted the destruction of some of them solely because other lives amidst conditions esteemed more highly were held to be jeopardized. A war thus is fought (so far as the ethical argument enters into it at all), because the enemy's conduct is adjudged morally reprehensible. Again, individuals in time of peace court death voluntarily so other lives may be saved. Barring religious fanatics, however, men always have framed ethical codes with a view to safeguarding the largest possible number of people, it being apparently understood that in the overwhelming majority of cases life is morally desirable. No large group has seriously proposed the destruction of life as a deliverance from evil. Mankind has regularly believed in the goodness of human nature, and more especially in its powers for good under suitable conditions. Even Christianity preached salvation through the sacrifice of One, on the basis of potentialities inherent in men by the grace of God.

Thus the ultimate mission of ethics has inevitably been the development of sound traits, habits, achievements, and objective surroundings. Results are decisive. Knowledge is virtue only if personality is enhanced by it, or when it acts as a leverage for bettering our fellow men. To be true to one's self may seem fine. Poets have appealed to us

Digitized by Google

in that tenor. But actually, what makes loyalty to self laudable is its consequence for others. If nothing else, a war should convince us of this fact. And so with all moral norms. They get their rating in conduct and conditions. They aim at the continuation of social life. Self-defence has always been justified morally for this reason. As long as the individual is no menace to others, his life is recognized to be a supreme good.

Since, then, products weigh more than noble intentions or efforts, it follows naturally that moral norms are relative, not absolute. If a Supreme Good exists, it can only be something better than all other good things, but all of them must connect with specific situations and interests. To be sure, the good need not be a pleasure or self-realization in any shape. It need not pander to animalistic instincts or to our anti-social proclivities. Certainly not. An acceptance of a content-ethics does not involve a subscription to hedonism or to any other one system of morality. It merely compels us to become empirical, to acknowledge the possibility (offhand) of a definite relation between social science and ethics. More cannot be claimed. We do well, however, to speak of the Good before defining the Good Man. First *what* is good, then *who* is good; this should be our order. The former represents the type of things or traits or deeds held moral or immoral; the latter is the instance judged by that type. Class and individual are thus co-ordinated. Each contributes something toward the understanding of the other.

What does the individual contribute toward the formulation of a moral code, of the good in various degrees? That indeed is a question we must now consider as of primary significance. The problem before us, be it remembered, is the relation of ethics to social science. We are asking: Can social science prescribe morals because it may uncover the roots of existing morals? May it help to promote moral advancement because it deals partly with the same facts that concern the ethicist? Can an Ought be derived from an Is? How must we explain the standardization of moral

Digitized by Google

concepts, and what means toward their general observance may social science devise?

Such questions are not easily answered, chiefly because of the many-sidedness of all valuations. Students of psychology and epistemology are familiar with the axiological literature of the last forty years, and are here reminded of the great diversity of opinions on this topic. Values have been treated in many different ways, and proven less easy to analyze than was at first expected. Some have emphasized the feeling, others the cognitive, and still others the volitional, elements involved. The difference between economic and ethical, or between scientific and either moral or esthetic values has also received attention, while from a different standpoint sociologists have examined the nature of valuation. In short, what seemed to be a narrow and well-defined field of investigation turned out to be a very extensive one, and one whose bounds could not be marked by a single stroke.

Now, since a statement of the relation of ethics to social science must be preceded by a proper regard for the sources of moral norms, it behooves us first of all to note the dual nature of all values, viz., their basis in both judgments and conative attitudes. Nearly every Ought, whether self-imposed or due to outside pressure, is a union of these two states of consciousness. There is usually an envisaging of facts as well as a will or desire. The cognitive basis is the more common and obvious; but the volitional must not, therefore, be underrated.

One side of ethical norms brings us face to face with a process of judgment which is as matter-of-fact as that of either science or philosophy. This should be mentioned at the outset, since one may easily overlook it. If for instance I pronounce a war to be an evil, and education a boon, or wisdom a praiseworthy trait and envy a bad one, I am judging data in two different ways. I am interrelating facts *as such*, and I am also interpreting them relative to my own personal interests or to those of other people. The first kind of judgment is purely factual; the second constitutes a

Digitized by Google

valuation which in its very nature is ethical and goes back to a will, latent or straining for expression.

The first, furthermore, concerns not simply an individual fact, but a group of them; and this likewise merits our attention. The mere mentioning of a war, *e.g.*, involves a large number of events correlated somehow in my mind. I do not hear the speech-sound only. I do not picture war as a single thing or attribute. Every cognitive act of that sort means a coupling of many data, a correlation and valuation in such a manner that their causal nature is felt. As sequences and co-existences they are reviewed or directly experienced. We may even think of them as types of recurrences, that is as natural or social laws. That is quite possible, and logically reconcilable with their being used for moral ratings. But let us bear in mind just now merely the necessity of *facts* for such judgments. Let us detach the top-layer of ethical valuation from the substratum of sheer intellectual apprehension. Barring a formal Kantian ethics, contents must figure in our criteria and in our analysis of them. Because objective tests and measurable results are admittedly an integral part of ethical preachments, therefore the cognitive aspects call for prior consideration. We repeat: If I call wisdom a virtue, I must refer to definite facts. Let us forget for the moment that a moral value is attached to them. Let us keep our eye only on the data that are before us or rehearsed by way of remembrance. These data represent interdependent parts and functions. They make up a complex whose members are variously sensed and imaged by different people. To speak, for example, of a cultured gentleman, or of a deed of mercy, or of a good habit means necessarily to establish a functional relation among the several factors involved. The data of science and ethics are so far identical. Both work with experiential matter. Both see things or events as bundles of relations, not as entities isolated in time and space. Both must treat them as systems, though science alone need care about recurrences and subsumption.

Apart from this last mentioned difference, however, moral

Digitized by Google

cognition no less than its underlying will-element has an individualistic character that is most important. Complete agreement even on the bare facts is seldom possible, and that mainly because of the nature of the materials under review. In natural science these data are few in number or in kind. They may readily be classified and compared. Instruments for observation and measurement have been highly perfected and are constantly used. Even when passing from physics to biology or geology we still have relatively definite units to deal with. As we pass over, however, to the raw materials of morals, differences of opinion loom up strikingly. They must arise, because ethics treats of inter-human relations or of relations between humans and other sentient beings, all of which are enormously complex.

To be sure, a standardization of judgments takes place to some extent. It is true that the whole learning process is a dialectic of give and take, and that most of us learn by imitation, by absorption and repetition. Thus a great many people will see the very same facts (*as* facts) when speaking of the evils of a war. In goodly measure all of us agree on what war comprises, on its typical happenings and their relative significance. Men have in the course of millions of years developed like organs of sensation and perception, and these provide the first ground for common concepts and associations. In the second place our experiences are largely the same, even as to external features. And in the third place social control tends strongly in the direction of uniformity. This is so because men differ in natural endowments and tastes, in temperament and physical constitution. There are the weak and the strong in a hundred different respects. Personal differentials thus are the first foundation of the control of the many by the few; but eventually, as we reach the civilization of historical times, impersonal factors prove equally important. Economic status, government and its laws, traditions fostered in symbols and professions—these create broad levels of thinking and behavior. Thus, strange as it must seem, differentials give rise to uniformities; the inferior being passes on to others

Digitized by Google

what he has received from the superior. Our ways of looking at facts and correlating them are to a large extent standardized. Millions of people will analyze a factual complex in pretty much the same manner. So much we must grant.

Yet this similarity in seeing and recognizing social facts does not approach that regarding events of a purely physical make-up. The complexity of relations is so great, their number so vast, their nature so unstable, that some differences of analysis after all remain, especially when the data for judgment are not directly presented to the senses. The congenital and acquired inequalities among men will prevent whole-hearted agreement. Not all people are exposed to the same stimuli, whether physical or psychical; nor do they select them on like principles or work with like memory-associations. Instead, their responses and neural equipments will differ, and correspondingly they will be possessed of different percepts and ideas, imputing different meanings to the same set of circumstances. Hence there is room for dissension among all classes of men. Hence also it is virtually impossible to obtain a consensus of opinion from social scientists. Controversy forms notoriously an appreciable part of their writings. Moot points are almost as common as accepted doctrines. Many theorems can be proven only by unverifiable premises, while in other cases proof consists of references to authority taken on faith.

By the same token, then, the factual analysis of the moralist will also remain in part an individual construct. There are limits beyond which the principles of socialization and control cannot standardize views. But, of course, moral norms are further individualized by the volitional basis which supplements the cognitive, and gives them their peculiar quality. Or to state this thought more concisely: Though in one aspect a moral judgment involves mere facts, it does not really become *moral* until the facts have also been colored by the interests of a willing being, of an organism fighting for life. This second basis of moral valuations is usually the decisive one for the regulation of social affairs,

Digitized by Google

and accentuates their highly individual character. Ethical rules refer to will and needs, as well as to reason and cognitive processes.

What will means to the psychologist, whether it is something distinct from either cognition or affection, or a compound of feeling and judgment viewed from a particular standpoint—these are questions that may and have been answered variously. We may here waive them. There is widespread agreement, however, on one item, viz., on the existence of two kinds of willing, one being purely conative, and the other overlaid with ideas and images. The more primitive form of willing is regularly expressed in our instincts. Here the laws of growth and of evolution have provided organs and functions that engender definite modes of striving. The basic condition of life is metabolism, that is a series of chemical changes which alternate in a building up and tearing down of tissue and energy. Replacement, growth and decay are continually going on. Without food and shelter life is impossible. The scarcity of sustenance and the surplus of seed have ever demanded a struggle for existence, but even without scarcity the diversification of species would entail a mutual interdependence whose net result must be conflict and decimation. Thus the maintenance of an individual life involves more or less clearly perceived interests, *i.e.*, needs and cravings, fears and hopes, preferences and prejudices.

Our wants have by degrees multiplied so as to be largely remote from the scale of living found among aboriginals. The changes form a chapter in the book of human development that does not concern directly our theme. What we need to bear in mind rather is the intimate relation between a civilized man's ideas and his desires or will-for-action. Undoubtedly, though not all actions rest on images centrally aroused, though impulses seek an outlet without the aid of reasoning, yet ethical norms would be meaningless among creatures not gifted somewhat like *homo sapiens*. If moral precepts are focused upon human relations, the explanation is on the one hand the volitional root of the Ought,

Digitized by Google

and on the other hand the presupposition of a rational being. Creatures are held morally responsible in the degree that they are capable of judgment. Inert things or plants are out of the reckoning altogether. The higher species of beasts are often treated as if morally keyed, but we cannot be sure of it. Savages display a real sense of obligation, but have not reached the plane of evaluation discernible in civilized people. Thus the more evident our mental powers, and the more educated or socially disciplined we are, the more severely do we judge ourselves and others by a moral standard. The principles of learning and of achievement leave us no choice in the matter. Ideas usually give direction to an impetus or to a will slowly maturing.

It deserves repeating, however, that will does not necessarily spring from consciously analyzed wants, and that will-elements differ qualitatively from purely cognitive states. When we will something we refer either to wants in the absence of the gratifying object, or to wants meeting with obstacles, or to emotions coupled with a need, or to projects rehearsed in imagination before being put into execution. All Oughts, we might argue, rest on desires, although not all desires are accompanied by a moral judgment. To say that I do not wish the Good to be realized is not far from contradicting myself, for every Good holds a prospect. Or in other words, though the Ought may represent simply a judgment regarding rules in effect, yet when these rules are violated or not already given recognition, this circumstance must arouse our will for action, for averting further violation and forcing recognition by others. In this sense most moral norms relate at least to a potential will. Ethicists indeed start out with a concept of sovereignty. They speak of men as captains of their fate. They treat of propositions that cannot be proven wrong, but may only be granted or resisted. They broach a problem of values which cannot be demonstrated scientifically. In a moral sense everything or nothing may have value. It depends upon what we want, upon the source of authorization, and upon our definition of means and ends.

Digitized by Google

Will, therefore, has also been viewed as a power of choice or variation. For psychologists it signifies a degree and form of variation inherent in organisms and especially in man. The range of fluctuations is so wide, the network of interactions so intricate, that the course of specific events cannot be foretold. Philosophers have even distinguished between the causality of physics and the non-causality of psychics. Mind to them seems defiant of the laws of quantity and causation. Freedom of the will is contrasted with mechanism in nature, and correspondingly a line drawn between natural and social sciences. Now, whether this is the best way of describing the volitional aspect or not, it is certainly useful to think of it as a high degree of plasticity and variability based on material facts. Physiologists have their own reasons for favoring this construction, and in a study of the relation between ethics and social science it is likewise convenient. For in this variability we find the key to the immense diversity of human wants and endeavors. It helps us to understand the lack of harmony among men, the continual ebb and flow of the battle for supremacy, the individualistic drift of all moral norms regardless of restraint and standardization through the process of sociation.

The social aspects of will, in any case, should not be rated lightly. We must admit a partial socialization of interests and desires for the same reason that we give prior consideration to the cognitive basis of moral judgments. In historic times the individual has never been wholly independent. He has always bowed to others, or compromised so as to forfeit part of his coveted rights. Precisely because of this fact a reduction of moral norms to will need not mean the teaching of one particular system of ethics. Hedonism is not a necessary sequel to the fusion of cognition and volition in our standards. We may desire pain, poverty and persecution as well as pleasure of the sense or self-aggrandizement. That has long ago been shown, and is quite compatible with the points here brought out. But the development of social levels of abstract thinking also suggests why instinctive leanings have been largely supplanted by deliberate policies,

Digitized by Google

and how individual will becomes, in many instances, part of a larger will embodied in social groups.

The group may be a numerical majority or a minority. It may be one nation lording it over another, or a league of nations laying down laws for its members, if not for outsiders. The absolute or even the relative size of the will-unit, that is of the dominant body of people, varies with time, place, and circumstance. But in every case the individual is for certain purposes subject to a greater self, to an invisible tribunal which bids him obey even though he may remonstrate secretly. Sociologists are acquainted with the principles of social control, with the radiating centers of prestige, and with the mechanism by which a standardization of many norms is effected. The modus operandi of this influence is not here a question. We must grant merely the existence of a will outranking that of any one person. We must stress the need of reserve forces in an emergency. We must look for assent or abject submission or habitual imitation, if we wish to comprehend the ease with which ethical precepts are transformed into mores and unwritten laws. As individuals we help to create norms, but we also conform to others submitted by leaders in various fields of endeavor. If important precepts are ignored, amendments are in order. If imperative, coercion is resorted to. Agencies are devised for the protection of ethical standards, and thus again the will-element manifests itself.

What is willed to be good, that is necessarily good, provided our will is taken collectively. If all people, for instance, approved of theft, it would become a moral act. If wealth were desired by everybody (or by a ruling class) in preference to all other things, it would thereby rank as the highest good. To-day it might appear as if all of us longed for wealth chiefly; but it is not really so. Other norms are actually esteemed more highly. The supreme good, as the masses see it, is not affluence or fame or power of office. But whatever trait or act is properly endorsed as a virtue, that we must accept as such or face opposition. As remarked before, a will cannot be refuted logically. It can

Digitized by Google

only be resisted and conquered. If sovereignty is gone, norms are also at an end. That is a daily experience which will repeat itself, the mockery of formalists notwithstanding.

True, however, that among modern nations some rights are accorded even to the vanquished, and that moral judgments are usually passed relative to norms already prevalent and conceded to be valid. Hence wars do not lead to the extermination of the foe, nor does a court of justice settle a suit by applying ethics in the abstract. Existing ideals of government, religion, and levels of living form a sort of constant, as viewed by any one generation. They are assumed to be good and lend the character of justice to decisions that would otherwise perhaps puzzle us. Thus homicide becomes in a civil war a deed of valor, of virtue. Hence norms vary with place and time. Hence conditions do affect creed, even though history must be treated as an emanation of human will, and not as an adaptation chiefly of beliefs to physical facts, or say to an economic environment. In fine, since ethics has a content, the *direction* of will changes. Different objects are aimed at in different periods. People may disagree on what is good and evil. They will come to an agreement only by modifying their demands, by sacrificing interests, or by changing their views on the facts themselves. Or perhaps a struggle ensues, after which the victor may be able to impose some of his standards on the defeated. All this is amply illustrated in the annals of every nation, from earliest times on.

But what becomes of the relation between ethics and science, if it is so? What can the social scientist do to guide people morally, if judgments of good or bad hark back to conative dispositions, if they depend for their execution upon a sovereign will which asserts itself on provocation? What follows if all norms are relative, and creeds and conditions change forever?

A striking way, and a familiar one too, of showing the difference between science and ethics is to contrast mechanism with vitalism, or causation with choice, or nomothetic inquiries with the ideographic. It has often been said that ethics turns on questions of purpose, and science on those

Digitized by Google

of necessary connections. The one *de*scribes, the other *pre*scribes. The first treats events as happening subject to a Uniformity of Nature, or to a law of quantitative equivalents. The second knows no such uniformities, and asks about the whither of a free will which apparently has no affinity with physical causes. On the one hand we have a study of types, that is of regularities of recurrence of events grouped together more or less definitely. On the other hand we find the individual all-important, and an exact repetition of a situation well nigh incredible. The personal equation gets a new value. Thus everything is objective to the scientist, while our moral notions are plainly anchored in feelings and longings. The tests of a moral good, to be sure, may be objective, but the norm itself must be personal. Unquestionably it is of human origin, and focused upon inter-individual relations. In science the chief task is the discovery of laws or probabilities. Predictions are based on a necessary interdependence of events. For the moral being, however, prediction must remain a personal hope or design, an index of plans and efforts that cannot be predicated of others. Science values universals; ethics the individual will. Surely, the difference of viewpoint in the two fields of labor is patent enough.

So we may agree. It *is* real, provided only we qualify the traditional comparison as follows, namely: We should say, not that ethics and science as professional studies differ in the manner described, but that the enunciator of moral rules on the one side, and a scientist on the other side, differ as stated. For clearly the ethicist as such is a scientist exactly like the astronomer or chemist. Or, if we do not care to call him a scientist, at any rate he is a student of facts like the chemist or astronomer. Our whole treatment of the relation between ethics and social science up to this point has been carried out (let us hope) in the spirit of an investigator of facts. The entire literature on ethics, most certainly, represents an exposition of opinions, things, and relations handled as facts. Historical surveys and the analysis of norms are customarily combined, but always the treatment is descriptive, not admonitory. *The ethicist as*

Digitized by Google

such does not lay down rules. That is not his function, however strange it may seem. What he does is to show how morals have arisen, what determines the drift of norms, what is their rôle in private and public life, and to what extent similarities obtain for different nations and ages. Yes, these are his topics. But if we wish to make a contrast as outlined above, we must apply it to a reformer or preacher here, and to ethicists or scientists there. The student of ethics does not prescribe remedies for evils. He merely discloses the true nature of moral norms by treating them as facts, as facts with a dual meaning, viz., with a cognitive and a volitional aspect.

Is this, then, the whole connection between ethics and social science? Or should we still derive the contents of our standards from scientific data? And once more, is an application of science necessarily moral?

Part of the answer to these questions was forecast in our discussion of the cognitive element in moral values. No doubt, we can learn from science how ethics arises, and what it leads to. We may furthermore use our knowledge of socio-economic or of bio-psychological processes for the fostering of ends *recognized* as meritorious. How can we deny that an insight into such relations and principles will prove advantageous, after a particular goal has been determined upon ethically? As far as science sheds light on any situation, it may also illumine the path of the would-be reformer. If the Ultimate Good, if any virtue, is defined for us somehow, then we may ask for the surest and most expeditious manner of building it into conduct, and then scientists may possibly help out. Thus it is not inconceivable that the increase of wealth or its equal distribution be proclaimed a cardinal good. Such a moral ideal can be imagined. Well then, this being our norm, economics should have worthwhile advice to offer. It will act as an auxiliary to moralists because it studies the principles governing the production, exchange, and control of goods and services.

But again let us keep in mind the limitations. For in the first place science can never *control* manifestations of the

Digitized by Google

will. The two are mutually exclusive. Science does not guide the will; it explains it. Moral judgments may be analyzed, but interests and endeavors are not altered thereby. Indirectly, perhaps, in the sense that all knowledge may react upon conduct in some way; but not directly. Needs and hopes and desires and differentials of personality, control and technical means for the realization of moral progress—all these are so mutable, so utterly beyond the ken of scientific abstraction, that they cannot be connected quantitatively. Our understanding of one moral code and its underlying socio-economic motives or conditions will never ensure us a mastery over future ones. If deduction and statistical inference in social science is attended with some risk, then generalizations as to morals will also be inappropriate. If any guidance is at all demanded, the moralist may offer it more logically than the economist or sociologist. For as a scientist I acknowledge myself to be an object for study; as preacher I declare man to be the creator of all truths and values, with the possible implication that scientific assertions are anyhow only the products of a synthetic mind.

In the second place, we must reckon with the difficulty of making sure of the most economical road to our chosen destination. As scientists know, causal relations in socio-economic fields are hard to trace. Plurality of causes and effects plays havoc with our calculations and inductions. We shall rarely be certain of having discovered the real means essential to (that is, constituting the cause of) a consequent which we call the moral good. Hence social science will not after all render moralists as much assistance as might have been hoped on first thought. Even when the norm is decided upon, the analysis and utilization of ways and means may prove futile. No definite quantitative ratios of facts to moral values can exist, for that matter. We must not put the two on one plane, as if they were strictly comparable. That would be a mistake. The wisdom of scientists is always a doubtful asset in the eyes of the moralist. The professional student of ethics will be glad of

Digitized by Google

such information, but the dictator and champion of rules of conduct may flaunt the counsel of all erudites. What has virtue to do with knowledge? Ah, here we return to the heart of our problem!

To conclude, then, what an examination of the facts leads us to believe is something like this: First, the question of the relation between ethics and social science has meaning only if we assume a contents-ethics, that is an ethics which turns on results as well as motives. Second, there is good reason for rejecting all absolute norms, a priori categories, and all purely formal treatments of moral problems. Norms must inevitably be connected with conduct and conditions, so that objective tests may assist us in passing moral judgments. Third, for *social* scientists causality and purpose are merely two different ways of sensing or valuating identical data. Fourth, the ethicist must differentiate between the cognitive, factual elements in a moral judgment, and the volitional aspects which give to these elements their moral or immoral quality. Fifth, ethics as such is a description of facts, but the moralist in another capacity may declare his purposes and rules to be moral in one degree or another. Sixth, the ultimate source of ethical norms is a personal interest or a striving for satisfaction of wants. Want and will in this sense, however, are not individual but social, and hence standardized in an appreciable measure. Seventh, though ethics turns on wants and satisfactions, these need not be hedonistic; nor will they always reconcile personal and social interests. Eighth, the contents of the good changes with time and place, with conditions and creeds mutually interacting. Ninth, social science may help us to realize moral norms *as* submitted, but owing to causal problems such attempts can scarcely ever be completely successful. Tenth, and finally, scientists or statesmen, in applying the conclusions of social science, are probably actuated by moral ideals. But this does not prove their ends, their standards, to be moral. These latter cannot be established by science.

O. FRED BOUCKE.

PENNSYLVANIA STATE COLLEGE.

Digitized by Google

HAMLET.

CLAUDE C. H. WILLIAMSON.

EVERY work is either a unity or a nullity; every work is itself and nothing else. Agreed. But the problem for criticism is to discover, in presence of a certain complex of sensations x, whether there is unity or no, and, if there is, what is its nature. *Othello* has been styled the tragedy of jealousy, *Macbeth* that of fear; *Hamlet* is in process of becoming the tragedy of time wasted. The critics are remorseless; they will not leave each other's interpretations alone. Uncreative themselves, they seek in the play a pivot of manœuvre from which they attempt to recreate the great master in their own image. The lawyers are determined to wrench Shakespeare into the semblance of a jurisconsult; doctors, other than alienists, would like to discern in Hamlet a psycho-physiological study of fatty degeneration of the heart; professors are resolute in finding the playwright in the image of a professor. There is no harm in thinking that Shakespeare is too difficult, and that he ought to have made the play easier for us. But to impugn the psychology of the play, that is unpardonable! Surely, surely, *Hamlet* is recognized as supreme, and its supremacy consists in nothing else but the truth to life of its complex and perplexing characterization.

The study of Hamlet continually reveals new details of interest—poetic, philosophic, dramatic. It is the complaint of each new writer that his predecessors have not understood elementary points, or (as Mr. Trench says) first principles. The keynote seems to be the gradual proof of the revelation made by the ghost of Hamlet's father: doubts are thrown in the way, but one by one they are overthrown, and in the end we are convinced that the assertions of the ghost were accurate.

Few critics have even admitted that *Hamlet* the play is the primary problem, and Hamlet the character has had a

Digitized by Google

special temptation for that most dangerous type of critic: the critic with a mind which is naturally of the creative order, but which through some weakness in creative power exercises itself in criticism instead. These minds often find in Hamlet a vicarious existence for their own artistic realization. Such a mind had Goethe, who made of Hamlet a Werther; and such had Coleridge, who made of Hamlet a Coleridge; and probably neither of these men in writing about Hamlet remembered that his first business was to study a work of art. The kind of criticism that Goethe and Coleridge produced, in writing of Hamlet, is the most misleading kind possible. For they both possessed unquestionable critical insight, and both make their critical aberrations the more plausible by the substitution—of their own Hamlet for Shakespeare's—which their creative gift effects. We should be thankful that Walter Pater did not fix his attention on this play.

Qua work of art, the work of art cannot be interpreted; there is nothing to interpret; we can only criticise it according to standards, in comparison to other works of art; and for "interpretation" the chief task is the presentation of relevant historical facts which the reader is not assumed to know. Mr. Robertson points out, very pertinently, how critics have failed in their "interpretation" of *Hamlet* by ignoring what ought to be very obvious: that *Hamlet* is a stratification, that it represents the efforts of a series of men, each making what he could out of the work of his predecessors. The *Hamlet* of Shakespeare will appear to us very differently if, instead of treating the whole action of the play as due to Shakespeare's design, we perceive his *Hamlet* to be superposed upon much cruder material which persists even in the final form.

Among all the warring professors and jarring opinions, Mr. J. M. Robertson intervenes usefully with the proviso, which all the members of the controversial chorus invariably lay down but as infallibly forget in the heat of the argument —namely, that our royal Hamlet was not a Danish prince, but a *dramatis persona*, no more, no less. He makes the

Digitized by Google

important deduction that to concentrate upon the psychology and the problem of *Hamlet*, as so many superlatively able critics have done, is to use the wrong end of the telescope. It is needful to begin with a study of the genesis of the play. The essential fact is that *Hamlet* is an adaptation of an older play. It may be, possibly, that Hamlet is the victim of an excess of the reflective faculty. You can have it that his mind is a porcelain vase, suitable for mignonette, but not for acorns. You can hold with Voltaire that he was mad out of compliment to his mother, that he was a chameleon, that he was Shakespeare, *tout complet*, a receptacle into which the poet had poured parlous stuff out of his own mental life (hence he was compelled to make him a "slacker" and hence the tragical ending); you can expatiate over a whole volume of catalogue upon the views of Herder and Werder, and the impersonations of Fechter and Sarah Bernhardt. All this might be well, very well indeed. But, after all, and as a matter of fact, the tragic ending was postulated quite simply. The theme or legend or saga upon which it was based, and upon which Shakespeare felt bound to work, was a tragic story of revenge. It was bound to finish as a tragedy—that much at any rate was implied in the unspoken contract with his audience, to which in any wise purview of the matter so much of the peculiar quality of Shakespeare's plays must always be referable. The commentators, good plodding professors, literary persons, conscious of their own consummate fitness for killing a guilty uncle (with a bodyguard) at a moment's notice, are all indignant, asking why Hamlet, having discovered his uncle's crimes, did not make an end of him at once. Their wrath and the refined extenuations of counter-professors may easily extend over many reams and perches of paper.

What is the character of the hero, to construct on the basis of what the dramatist gives us a presentable portrait of a real man. For there is this inner contradiction in Hamlet's personality—that he sensitively shrinks from carrying out the revenge indicated by the Ghost, and yet will do all sorts of bloody deeds on his own account. He spits the

Digitized by Google

wretched Polonius on his sword-point; he is strongly inclined to stab his uncle in the back while he is engaged in prayer; he sends his college friends quite mercilessly to their death; and is all for a struggle with Laertes on the very grave of Ophelia. Then, principally in his soliloquies, he reveals himself to us as diffident, nervous, procrastinating, "a rogue and peasant slave," according to his own account, playing with the thoughts of suicide and death, and pessimistic as to the existence of truth and love and honour. He suggests the man who is too intellectual to be practical; he thinks too much and does too little. And so we are accustomed to say of him that he is the type of those refined and meditative characters who are, after all, dilettanti, who have fretted away the impulse to action by too keen and vivid an imagination, who argue with themselves and weight alternatives until their very will is paralysed. What prevents him from executing the mission with which he has been entrusted? Material obstacles? No. Psychological scruples? Some of us would answer yes. But not Mr. Robertson. He has a different interpretation. According to him the fault lies with Shakespeare. If we cannot understand Hamlet, it is not because we are stupid, but because the dramatist has blundered.

Charles Lamb, in the well-known *Essay on the Acting of Shakespeare's Tragedies*, speaks of "the silent meditations with which Hamlet's bosom is bursting, reduced to *words* for the sake of the reader, who else must remain ignorant of what is passing there. These profound sorrows, these light-and-noise-abhorring ruminations, which the tongue scarce dares utter to deaf walls and chambers, how can they be represented by a gesticulating actor, who comes and mouths them out before an audience. . . . And this is the way to represent the shy, negligent, retiring Hamlet. . . . I am not arguing," Charles Lamb adds, "that *Hamlet* should not be acted, but how much *Hamlet* is made another thing by being acted. . . . Those who tell me of the actor Garrick, and his wonders, in this part, speak of his eye and of the magic of his eye, and of his commanding voice.

Digitized by Google

. . . But what have they to do with Hamlet? What have they to do with intellect? In fact, the things arrived at in theatrical representation are to arrest the spectator's eye upon the form and the gesture, and so to gain a more favourable hearing to what is spoken; it is not what the character is, but how he looks; not what he says, but how he speaks it." You remember the strong words of the *Imitation*, in quietness and confidence: "Mark not who spoke this or that, but mark what is spoken."

The character of Hamlet attracts the reader with the fascination of a mystery that forever invites discovery and forever precludes the possibility of being laid wholly bare. The precipitation of the dramatic method has little to recommend it to many who adore the deliberation of the sermon in discussing these fine traits of character. "Now what took Hamlet into that cemetery to meditate, my brethren?" To some the hero is the incarnation of dilly and dally. To others he is blindly precipitate in the face of obstacles the most overpowering. Some hold that the delay, which he seems so fully to avow, is justified by his desire to do his duty in a more effective and workmanlike fashion. Others applaud his scrupulosity. Dowden's *questionnaire* and compromise is still one of the happiest efforts at reconciling the hundred and fifty varying hues of the spectator's heckle.

It may indeed be called the tragedy of thought, for there is as much reflection as action in it; but the reflection itself is made dramatic, and hurries the breathless audience along, with an interest which knows no pause. Strange it is to notice in this work the indissoluble union of refinement with horrors, of reflection with tumult, of high and delicate poetry with broad, palpable, theatrical effects. The machinery is a machinery of horrors, physical and mental; ghostly apparitions—hideous revelations of incestuous adultery and murder—madness—Polonius killed like a rat while listening behind the arras—grave-diggers casting skulls upon the stage and desecrating the churchyard with their mirth—these and other horrors form the machinery

Digitized by Google

by which moves the highest, the grandest, and the most philosophic of tragedies.

Hamlet comes before us as a work of art, and we must try to judge it as a work of art. But precisely because we delight in it as a work of art, we are deeply interested to discover, if we can, any of the conditions and impulses under which it was created. So long as we remember that we are dealing with a work of art we may safely and honourably venture into historical inquiry, if once we are satisfied that there is a chance of its being fruitful. Even so, we can hardly help being prejudiced against it. Historical fact has an awkward trick of running counter to the artistic fact. There is, for instance, good evidence that *Richard II* was supposed by Shakespeare's contemporaries to have a plain political implication. It was believed to favour the interest of the Essex conspiracy against Elizabeth, who is said to have remarked: "Know ye not that I am Richard II?" Yet a modern reader of the play can only conclude that Elizabeth was morbidly sensitive (as, indeed, she probably was) and Essex's friends, who subsidized the repeated performance of the play, uncommonly simple; for our sympathies go wholly to the deposed king, upon whom Shakespeare lavished his understanding and his art. Whatever interpretations eager politicians may have put upon his play, it is fairly certain that Shakespeare did not intend them. And if this is the case with one of the two plays on which we know that a political construction was placed, there is good reason to look somewhat sceptically upon an attempt to prove a political background for *Hamlet*, a play which, so far as tradition goes, was always held to be quite innocuous. Theorizing about Hamlet has a fatal fascination for some minds, because it is always interesting to make a new study, and very difficult to bring hypotheses to a decisive test.

Hamlet is undoubtedly the most subtle and the least obviously dramatic of Shakespeare's great dramas, yet it was one of the most popular. We know that there was an earlier *Hamlet*, and that it also was popular. Shakespeare's

Digitized by Google

tragedy was not a wholly new construction. It owes a good deal to the 1589 drama by the author of *The Spanish Tragedy*. We know that the motive of this play was "Hamlet, Revenge!" There was a ghost in it who said "Remember," and a play within a play, as there was in *The Spanish Tragedy*. Something of this no-longer-extant play can be divined by a double process, first by means of our knowledge of Kyd, and secondly by reading between the lines of the First Quarto of *Hamlet*, in which it is assumed that a portion of the pre-Shakespearian play must lie imbedded. This point has, however, been warmly and ably contested by James D. Fitzgerald in his *First Quarto of Hamlet: A Literary Fraud*, a brochure printed for the Royal Philosophical Society of Glasgow in 1910. The earlier *Hamlet* was almost certainly a crude and bloody drama of the primitive Elizabethan kind—chiefly madness, murder and ghost. In so far as the Shakespearian *Hamlet* was a rewriting of this lost original, it would lose, rather than retain, the old popularity. This new Prince of Denmark, the least bloody-minded of men, must have been a sad disappointment to the patrons of the old *Hamlet*. His hesitations, his philosophizing, his utter incapacity to do any of the things a proper tragedy hero should do, and then his pointed gibes at that very "tearing of a passion to tatters" which must have been the chief attraction of the old *Hamlet*, suggest that the popularity of Shakespeare's play was due to quite different causes.

Of its intractability there can be no doubt. In several ways the play is puzzling, and disquieting as is none of the others. Of all the plays it is the longest and is possibly the one on which Shakespeare spent most pains; and yet he has left in it superfluous and inconsistent scenes which even hasty revision should have noticed. The versification is variable. Both workmanship and thought are in an unstable condition. We are surely justified in attributing the play, with that other profoundly interesting play of "intractable" material and astonishing versification, *Measure for Measure*, to a period of crisis, after which follow the

Digitized by Google

tragic successes which culminate in *Coriolanus*. *Coriolanus* may be not as "interesting" as *Hamlet*, but it is, with *Antony and Cleopatra*, Shakespeare's most assured artistic success. And probably more people have thought *Hamlet* a work of art because they found it interesting, than have found it interesting because it is a work of art. It is the "Mona Lisa" of literature.

One can have an artistic blunder, as when a man gets unnecessary detail into his picture, or misses the right atmosphere, or is faulty in the composition of his subject. His "values" may be wrong or his drawing out of focus, or he may miss the right road owing to certain peculiarities of his temperament. Now when a dramatic artist, with his characters and his situations ready to his hand, produces an ambiguous effect by making his personages do the wrong thing or manifest traits and characteristics which are inconsistent and incongruous, then we say that he has mistaken his task, that he has not clearly marked out his dramatis personæ and insufficiently analyzed them—or if we like to use strong terms we say that he has blundered. Now, what is it that Shakespeare is supposed to have done in *Hamlet*? He has—as usual—adopted a good deal of existing material, and especially made use of an old piece, containing a ghost, a mock-madness, and a play within a play. He has taken over bodily a good deal of antique saga-like material, including a vigorous hero who does valiant deeds, as any hero of a saga ought to do. But then, in order to make his piece interesting to an Elizabethan audience, he has rewritten the character of his hero, by means of soliloquies and occasional utterances, so that there emerges from his hands a Hamlet who is moody, pessimistic, self-analytical, incapable of energetic action—and knowing that he is incapable—a prey to suicidal thoughts, and continually postponing his revenge. It is this transformation of a character which causes all the difficulty, because Shakespeare has retained the barbaric action of an old plot—murders behind the arras and the rest of it—and attributed such action to a hero who is no longer barbaric, but a super-subtle Elizabethan.

Digitized by Google

Hamlet is never mad: the poet's treatment is so clear on this point that I can only express astonishment that any different view should have crept into criticism. At the beginning of the story, even before the excitement of the Ghost Scene, the hero appears as a man of bitter irony, veiling a tone of feeling with an opposite tone of expression.

Horatio. My lord, I came to see your father's funeral.
Hamlet. I pray thee, do not mock me, fellow-student;
I think it was to see my mother's wedding.
Horatio. Indeed, my lord, it follow'd close upon.
Hamlet. Thrift, thrift, Horatio! the funeral baked-meats
Did coldly furnish forth the marriage tables.[1]

When suddenly has come the shock of a revelation—a revelation of horror taking the dubious form of a communication from the supernatural world—it is small wonder that a man of this temperament should be driven for a moment to hysteric irony.

O villain, villain, smiling, damned villain!
My tables,—meet it is I set it down,
That one may smile, and smile, and be a villain.[2]

In this mood Hamlet is rejoined by his comrades;[3] when he sees the astonishment on their faces at his own wild irony, his quick mind catches the thought of using this hysteric mockery as a stalking-horse behind which he may watch the dreadful situation until he can see how to act. He not only so resolves, but he takes his comrades into his confidence. For to define true madness what is it but to be nothing else but mad?

Dr. Bucknill on Hamlet's "madness" reads: "Hamlet is morbidly melancholiac." "He is a reasoning melancholiac." "Yet, like the melancholiacs described by Burton, he is 'of profound judgment in some things, excellent apprehension, judicious, wise, and witty; for, melancholy advanceth men's conceit more than any humour whatever.'

[1] *Hamlet* I, ii, 176.
[2] I, v, 106.
[3] I, v, from III.

Digitized by Google

He is in a state," adds the doctor, "which thousands pass through without becoming truly insane, but which in hundreds does pass into actual madness." Burton, further: "Humorous they (melancholiacs) are, beyond measure, sometimes profusely laughing, extraordinary merry, and then again weeping without a cause; groaning, sighing, pensive, sad, almost distracted, restless in their thoughts and actions, continually meditating."

Perhaps one might leave the matter there. Highly-strung, nervous, well-bred in all senses, sensitive, irritable, wildly passionate, yet loving and longing; distraught, then; still, keeping all his varied powers; though unhappy beyond measure, and not knowing what to do, maddened with it all. If that is mad, so was Hamlet; the heart-broken, the naturally open-hearted, trustful, and generous; a man made to be loved and honoured.

Some have represented Hamlet as an incredibly depressed individual, entirely bereft of vitality and initiative, and expressing himself not, as one might have hoped, in the tones of everyday conversation, but in an affected, drawling singsong, which eventually degenerated into a perpetual and lachrymose miaowing. The great advantage of *Hamlet*, from the actor's point of view, lies in its extreme length, which gives him every excuse for suppressing anything contradictory to his own conception of the play. If you choose to regard Hamlet as a strong silent man of action, you can cut out all the more talkative and undecided parts of the play and yet have enough left to keep you going (with incidental music and tableaux) for at least three and a half hours.

This madness of Hamlet then, assumed for a specific purpose in the movement of the story, serves also as relief: the hysterical incoherence of the supposed madman is used to mock king and courtier, and to mock even Ophelia herself, whom in the general hollowness of all appearances Hamlet has come to doubt. With this is combined, as in *Lear*, another form of relief, the real madness of Ophelia, so piteous in its incoherences.

Digitized by Google

The "madness" of Hamlet lay to Shakespeare's hand; in the earlier play a simple ruse, and to the end, we may presume, understood as a ruse by the audience. For Shakespeare it is less than madness and more than feigned. The levity of Hamlet, his repetition of phrase, his puns, are not part of a deliberate plan of dissimulation, but a form of emotional relief. In the character Hamlet it is the buffoonery of an emotion which can find no outlet in action; in the dramatist it is the buffoonery of an emotion which he cannot express in art. The intense feeling, ecstatic or terrible, without an object or exceeding its object, is something which every person of sensibility has known; it is doubtless a study to pathologists. It often occurs in adolescence: the ordinary person puts these feelings to sleep, or trims down his feeling to fit the business world; the artist keeps it alive by his ability to intensify the world to his emotions. The Hamlet of Laforgue is an adolescent; the Hamlet of Shakespeare is not, he has not that explanation and excuse. We must simply admit that here Shakespeare tackled a problem which proved too much for him. Why he attempted it at all is an insoluble puzzle; under compulsion of what experience he attempted to express the inexpressibly horrible, we cannot ever know.

It must be remembered that the essential idea of relief in tragedy is not necessarily the mingling of comic with serious; any other variation of emotional tone may serve, if it is used to break the sustained sense of movement towards a tragic climax. In the fifth act we have the regular agency of relief, the clown, varied into the form of grave-diggers, and professional jesting is turned upon the most gruesome of topics. If this analysis be correct, we seem in the play *Hamlet* to have an underplot of relief matter, appearing successively in five varied forms; the supernatural awe of the Ghost Scenes, the hysteric mockery of Hamlet, the histrionic passion of the players, the pathetic madness of Ophelia, and the weird humour of the grave-diggers.

The grounds of Hamlet's failure are not immediately obvious. Mr. Robertson is undoubtedly correct in concluding

Digitized by Google

that the essential emotion of the play is the feeling of a son towards a guilty mother: (Hamlet's) "tone is that of one who has suffered tortures on the score of his mother's degradation. . . . The guilt of a mother is an almost intolerable motive for drama, but it had to be maintained and emphasized to supply a psychological solution, or rather a hint of one." This, however, is by no means the whole story. It is not merely the "guilt of a mother" that cannot be handled as Shakespeare handled the suspicion of Othello, the infatuation of Antony, or the pride of Coriolanus. The subject might conceivably have expanded into a tragedy like these, intelligible, self-complete, in the sunlight. *Hamlet*, like the sonnets, is full of some stuff that the writer could not drag to light, contemplate, or manipulate into art. And when we search for this feeling, we find it, as in the sonnets, very difficult to localize. We find Shakespeare's *Hamlet* not in the action, not in any quotations that we might select, so much as in an unmistakable tone which is unmistakably not in the earlier play. One thing we do know—that Shakespeare had obtained a thorough comprehension of Hamlet's malady.

Truly, variety without end seems near many a life less extraordinary than Hamlet's. And it is absurdly unnecessary to declare that there are in the play two Hamlets; one early and barbarous; one later and a philosopher. How unlike we all are to our other selves: happy, and then morose because of greater selfishness than Hamlet's; elated, and then all the more depressed; singing, like Sir Hugh Evans, because we are in a funk, and, mercy on us! have a great disposition to cry; disgusted with life, because we are disgusted with some human beings; yet no misanthropes, it may be, at heart. Things in their actual, phenomenal aspect flit before Hamlet as transitory, accidental and unreal.

If you examine any of Shakespeare's more successful tragedies, you will find this exact equivalence; you will find that the state of mind of Lady Macbeth walking in her sleep has been communicated to you by a skilful accumula-

Digitized by Google

tion of imagined sensory impressions; the words of Macbeth on hearing of his wife's death strike us as if, given the sequence of events, these words were automatically released by the last event in the series. The artistic "inevitability" lies in this complete adequacy of the external to the emotion; and this is precisely what is deficient in *Hamlet*. Hamlet (the man) is dominated by an emotion which is inexpressible, because it is in *excess* of the facts as they appear. And the supposed identity of Hamlet with his author is genuine to this point: that Hamlet's bafflement at the absence of objective equivalent to his feelings is a prolongation of the bafflement of his creator in the face of his artistic problem. Hamlet is up against the difficulty that his disgust is occasioned by his mother, but that his mother is not an adequate equivalent for it; his disgust envelops and exceeds her. It is thus a feeling which he cannot understand; he cannot objectify it, and it therefore remains to poison life and obstruct action. None of the possible actions can satisfy it; and nothing that Shakespeare can do with the plot can express Hamlet for him. And it must be noticed that the very nature of the *données* of the problem precludes objective equivalence. To have heightened the criminality of Gertrude would have been to provide the formula for a totally different emotion in Hamlet; it is just *because* her character is so negative and insignificant that she arouses in Hamlet the feeling which she is incapable of representing.

We are all interested in psychological theories nowadays, and we talk glibly of "complexes" and the analyses of Freud. There is a part of our mind which we call the conscious mind, and there is another and more mysterious part which we call the unconscious mind, or, to give it its more honourific title, the subliminal consciousness. The first is easy enough to understand. It deals with the sphere of intelligence and thought. The other is a more mysterious region, for the unconscious mind plays a great part in all our lives and often baffles us by producing results exactly the contrary to what we anticipated. M. Coué refers to its effect on the unconscious mind when he bids us repeat his

Digitized by Google

well-known formula. For in his theory the mainspring of action is derived, not from reason or from the will, but from the dim realm of emotion and feeling which exists behind, as it were, all our open life.

Shakespeare's business was not to explain Hamlet's irresolution, not even necessarily to understand it, but merely to make us accept it as real. The world has been more interested in this than in any other play, and in Hamlet than in any other figure of drama for three centuries; and it is in consequence of the strength and universality of that interest that the desire to find a psychological explanation arises. To put the question is natural and legitimate; to answer it may even be useful, in so far as it removes an obstacle to the fullness of our æsthetic experience of the play. But we must not give it any higher value than that.

When Hamlet was implored by his father's ghost to avenge his murder, and in particular to put an end to the incestuous marriage between his mother and the murderer, his conscious resolve, made with all the force of his will, was to obey his father.[4] But the shock which he suffered on hearing of the murder and on realising the full horror of his mother's action made, as it were, a wound in his mind, which hurt whenever he thought of his uncle or of his mother's connection with that uncle.

---

[4] Sir J. G. Frazer in *The Golden Bough*, part 1. "The Magic Art," vol. 11, pages 280, et seq., 1917 edition. He states:

It would seem that among some Aryan peoples, at a certain stage of their social evolution, it has been customary to regard women and not men as the channels in which royal blood flows, and to bestow the kingdom in each successive generation on a man of another family, and often of another country, who marries one of the princesses and reigns over his wife's people. . . . Where usages and ideas of this sort prevail, it is obvious that the kingship is merely an appanage of marriage with a woman of the blood royal. . . . Wherever a custom of this sort is observed a man may clearly acquire the kingdom just as well by marrying the widow as the daughter of his predecessor. This is what Ægisthus did at Mycenæ, and what Hamlet's uncle Feng and Hamlet's successor, Wiglet, did in Denmark; all three slew their predecessors, married their widows, and then sat peacefully on the throne. The tame submission of the people to their rule would be intelligible, if they regarded the assassins, in spite of their crime, as the lawful occupants of the throne by reason of their marriage with the widowed queens.

Digitized by Google

The pain was apparently so sharp that unconsciously he flinched from it, and seized every pretext to forget it. He would will to remember it as he willed to take vengeance. But here the law of "reversed action" worked within him. The more he tried to force himself into action, the more his unconscious self invented pretexts of delay. Here is the Hamlet case presented to us exactly as though it were one of the ordinary experiments of M. Coué. Here is the conscious intelligence frustrated by the unconscious self—a phenomenon which occurs over and over again in our experience. Hamlet's unconscious was always preventing him from doing what his conscious self designed. Shakespeare was not a psychologist in the modern sense, but his intuitive knowledge of human character made him draw a figure in which we can discern many modern analogies. Hamlet has, indeed, had a picturesque career; and the cause of his delay in killing the King has been canvassed for 200 years, since a man called Hanmer started the inquiry in 1736. It has, however, been left for a modern Georgian critic to convert the "moody Dane" into a Freudian hero. To this principle Mr. Clutton-Brock is faithful in forming his own explanation. Some find the clue to the secret of Hamlet's conduct in the change in his manner after he has seen his father's ghost for the first time. In his mental disturbance he is at the mercy of the chance suggestions of words. It is upon the nature of that disturbance of mind that the whole of the action depends. He is to be regarded not as a man whose reason has been shaken, but as one who has been so profoundly hurt that he cannot endure to look at what is in his mind. It is his unconscious shrinking from the pain of that wound which holds him back from action and makes him snatch at every excuse for delay, even though his conscious mind rages at his own indecision.

Hamlet is an enigmatical character; he represents a problem which is very hard to solve. In this case the explanation may be that he is not actual but ideal, a coinage of Shakespeare's brain, invented by the dramatist and containing contradictions and inconsistencies, directly we confront

Digitized by Google

him with human flesh and blood. But, on the other hand, there is the intense sympathy he creates from his very first entrance on the stage; we seem to understand him even in his wildest flights; our heart goes out to him, to use the common phrase. Moreover, it is not otherwise than significant that no actor fails in Hamlet. At all events, that is the current doctrine of the theatre, and the mere fact that such a belief prevails on the boards would apparently show that Hamlet is by no means an impossible, but a very personable hero. He may be ideal, but he is not unreal. You understand him, perhaps, better on the stage than in your study. Our scepticism is increased when we discover that one of the reasons for suspecting a political intention in *Hamlet* is that there are profound inconsistencies in the play, which cannot be otherwise explained. Here the naïvety of Miss Winstanley is very apparent; from the fact that critics have taken irreconcilable views of the play she concludes that the elements of the play itself are irreconcilable. It is true that a few critics have pronounced *Hamlet* an artistic failure, lacking in real dramatic unity, but they have been few, and they have not been the best. Neither Coleridge nor Goethe found any insuperable difficulties in the play; and, even though we may think they set Shakespeare on an inaccessible pinnacle, they carry more weight than all the rest of the critics put together; for they had the advantage of being great poets. The simple explanation of the disagreement of the critics is that *Hamlet* is a masterpiece; and a masterpiece is, almost by definition, a work from which very different men can derive a satisfaction which is complete and peculiar to themselves.

CLAUDE C. H. WILLIAMSON.

LONDON.

Digitized by Google

DISCUSSION.

"Objective Freedom."

This is the title of an instructive article by Professor Prabhu Dute Sastri, in the April, 1921, number of The International Journal of Ethics. The article brings out one of the most important points of Hindu Life and Ethics—namely *Jīvanmukti*. As the learned writer very pertinently observes, the realisation of life by raising it to a non-moral plane is against "the general trend of Western thought" and we may add that it is quite opposed to all theistic metaphysics. Consequently the conception of *Jīvanmukti* is peculiarly Indian and Sankarite.

But the exact idea of a *Jīvanmukti*, as sought to be given by the writer, is not altogether unexceptionable. It betrays much of the popular misconceptions that so often hang around the monism of the Sankarites. Speaking of the state of a real *Yogī* or Jīvanmukta, the writer says that the Yogī "leads a life of complete indifferentism, like that of an inert block of stone, as it were" (p. 304, u. 10–12). Surely, this sentence is typical of a certain section of critics who smell nihilism in the Suddha-advaita philosophy. But, as a careful consideration of the teachings of Sankara will show, *Moksha* is not really steeling and deadening life against the world and making it indifferent and impervious to all the good and bad things in it. It is really re-valuation of the world after the correct conception of the Universe. In our ignorance, as the writer himself admits, we falsely differentiate the unity of reality into the self and the not-self. This primitive ignorance puts into motion the wheel of moral existence—an existence of struggle for pleasure and avoidance of pain. Thus life is driven forward by thirst and desire and is alternately lightened by the joy of success and darkened by the dejection of sorrow. But when knowledge or *samyag-gnara* dawns upon man, he realises the foolishness of the self in differentiating itself into a self and a not-self and in setting the latter as an external goal for the meaningless pursuit of life. He then finds himself full and one with the Absolute and sees nothing outside him that is yet to be achieved; there the moral struggle ends. He is then all bliss. But he is not *indifferent*. Only what he previously thought to be outside him is now within him. He works in the

Digitized by Google

fulness of his heart, so *vāsanā*, which really binds man to the whirling eddy of individuality, leaves him for good. That a *Jībanmukta* is not to remain indifferent and inactive, but has to work for *loka-Samgraha* (world-synthesis) has been very clearly taught in the *Geeta*, particularly in slokas 20–26 of the third Chapter. Sankara in commenting on these and quite independently in his comm. on the Geeta 4.15 emphatically subscribes to this teaching. Again, in his introduction to the Geeta, also, Sankara says that an action, in which the motive of individual interest has been supplanted by an idea of pleasing the Lord (*Iavara-prīti*) does not at all cause any bondage. So in the case of a *Jībanmukta* who has identified his *self* with the *Absolute Self*, action is not at all inconsistent with his freedom from bondage. In the Brahma-sutras also certain actions (*e.g.* the *nitya-karmas*) are enjoined even on the *Jībanmuktas*. So it is sufficiently clear that *Jībanmukti* does not at all mean indifferentism and far less inactivity.

The likening of a Jībanmukta to an "inert block of stone" is even more inaccurate and unjustifiable. Because from the empirical standpoint (*Vyāvahāvik drsti*) a block is inert and not-self (*Jada* and *anātmā*) whereas the *Jībanmukta* is just the opposite of that as it is consciousness itself (*atmasvarūpa*). Neither does the parallelism hold good from the standpoint of the Absolute (*para-mārtha drsti*), from which all the universe is one consciousness and there is no reason why a block should be selected for this comparison. Thus the parallelism is quite unhappy.

It is only to be added that as the writer speaks from the standpoint of Sankara, *i.e.* pure monism, the criticism also has been confined to it. Misconceptions regarding *moksha* especially from this standpoint have been too long allowed to act as pleas for much vagrancy and inactivity in Hindu life, and it is time that a serious attempt be made to show that there is no warrant for such a view of life in the teachings of the masters whom these misguided people pretend to follow.

DHIRENDRA MOHON DATTA, B.A.,
Prāchya-bidya-baridhi.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY, INDIA.

Digitized by Google

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY OF EDWARD CAIRD, LL.D., D.C.L., F.B.A., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow and Master of Balliol College, Oxford. By Sir Henry Jones, LL.D., and John Henry Muirhead, LL.D. Glasgow: Maclehose, Jackson and Co. Pp. xi, 381. Price, 25s. net.

It is impossible to begin a review of this long-expected memorial of Caird without some words on the first of its two authors. It was the long and heroically borne illness of Sir Henry Jones which delayed the publication of the book. It had barely appeared when there came the news of his death. The two men were in some ways very different. In a letter of Caird's to Jones printed in this volume he says: "Can't you philosophise without 'fechtin'? Is Donnybrook essential to the beatific vision?" and the passage aptly expresses their differences. But in their central inspiration, in their profound sense of the vital issues with which philosophy is concerned, in their possession of a philosophy which extended its application to all fields, science, art, politics and religion, and gave them their greatness as teachers, the men were alike. No one could have been better fitted than Jones to describe the nature and sources of Caird's influence at Glasgow.

The book consists of a life, of which the first part has been written by Sir Henry Jones and the Oxford part by Professor Muirhead; some letters, which show, as nothing else could have done, the all-pervading wisdom of the man, and finally an appreciation of his philosophy. To this last Sir Henry Jones contributed the first chapter; the rest is the work of Professor Muirhead.

The combination makes a fitting memorial of Caird. His life was outwardly uneventful, but it was one of untiring mental energy and the influence of that life of the mind went through his writings, and above all through his pupils, all over the world. Yet just because his philosophy was based on an intense belief in the reality and the worth of the life of the spirit, in the rationality of all sides of human experience, it could be the better appreciated by those who could see from his life how it raised him above perplexities and contradictions. He had that "simplicity which is so large an element in a noble nature" and a wonderful courage and wisdom in dealing with both academic and national politics.

Digitized by Google

One cannot read the account of his work at Glasgow and Balliol or the letters in this volume without seeing how all that he was bore the mark of the consistency which his thought had achieved. As Sir Henry Jones well says, "No one who knew him, either directly or through his books, would separate his philosophy from his religion or either from his practical life and personal character."

The quotation continues: "It was no novice either in Philosophy or in the Art of Literature who characterised his thought as 'imaginative'—the thought which takes fire from its own movement and attains, though not in a poetic way, something like the effect of poetry." The chapter develops admirably the view that philosophy is essentially more akin to poetry than it is to science. For like Art it expresses truth by being the expression of a personality. "A philosophical system, like a poem, may be all the truer for bearing the marks of a veined humanity, and for being specifically the exponent of an age or the expression of a stage or type of civilisation."

There seem to be two kinds of things which philosophy does. It criticises categories. So Kant conceived its task. It examines the assumptions of the several branches of human enquiry and seeks to understand their relations with each other. In this work it is critical, patient, abstract, scientific. But the great philosophers have always added to their survey of these several fields some attempt to "say what it all comes to," or, to put it in philosophical language, to express the ultimate nature of reality. The temptation of the philosopher, or perhaps especially of the philosopher's disciples, is to think that this can be done by some manipulation of the formulæ or principles which the first kind of philosophical task has disentangled. Really it is, like poetry, a work of high imagination, and, like poetry, not the less, but the more illuminating for that; but the great weight of patient disciplined thinking which philosophy has acquired in its critical task gives the work of the philosophic imagination a quality which is all its own. It is impossible to read Kant without recognising in him two strands of thought, one which says that we cannot know things in themselves because we only know phenomena, which are a different kind of things from things in themselves; the other which says that things in themselves are more rather than other than phenomena, from which it follows that we cannot have a priori knowledge of things in themselves but not that we are

Digitized by Google

not in contact with reality or cannot in some sense be said to know it. As Caird is continually pointing out in his great work on Kant, the last two critiques and many passages in the first point beyond the negative standpoint which dominates the first. The faith of the practical reason is something to which (though Kant does so) it is very hard to deny the name of knowledge. The principle of the teleological judgment, though regulative, is not therefore just subjective. Hegelianism, especially Caird's version of it, claims to be a development of this more positive strand in Kant's thought. Caird put it by saying that the intelligibility of the whole or the unity of consciousness is implied in all judgment and is therefore a principle of the possibility of experience just as much as the regular Kantian categories. The Kantian argument that the mathematical categories are incommensurable with the demand of reason for totality is admitted, but it is claimed that there are other categories, such as are derived from practical and æsthetic experience which are more adequate to this demand. Now there is a method of developing this line of argument which does really escape the Kantian criticism: it is to insist that experience is found increasingly rational through and through when considered in all its aspects. The real inspiration of Hegel's work is surely not his mere insistence that the real is the rational, but his detailed exposition of rationality in historical development and in all aspects of human experience. The dissatisfaction which is so often felt with Hegelianism comes from the fact that Hegel and his followers seem often in their reaction against Kant's negative attitude towards metaphysics to have forgotten the truth which that attitude embodies. Instead of treating the principle of the rationality of the real as in Kant's sense regulative, they treat it as constructive and give to formulæ the power which on their own showing belongs only to the living reason. It is when Hegel and his followers do this that they produce the impression that they have somehow looked up the answer at the end of the book and therefore stand in a position of annoying superiority to the rest of the world. When they maintain that there are no questions which cannot be answered, they seem sometimes to mean that there are no questions which they cannot answer, a very different matter.

When Hegelianism acts in this way, its nature is transformed. Instead of founding metaphysics on ethics, it begins to found ethics on metaphysics. It began by saying, Let us be true to the

Digitized by Google

implications of Kant's doctrine of the practical reason, and we shall find that it is precisely in the profoundest of our moral experiences that we shall come nearest to finding reality intelligible, it sometimes seems to end by offering us a "ballet of bloodless categories" as a guide to the moral life.

Caird's teaching was singularly free from this barren formalism and for the simple reason that moral problems and moral experience were never likely to be neglected or explained away by him. As Professor Muirhead says, "It may seem surprising that though engaged during a long life in teaching Moral Philosophy, Caird left no systematic work upon Ethics." Part of the reason was that moral experience was his starting point, his key by which he interpreted the rest of experience. The interest of philosophy for him always began with the moral problem, which was produced by the conflict between the assumptions of science and of religion. It was this which made him always preoccupied with Plato or with Kant, the two great philosophers in whom the consciousness of that conflict is particularly acute. His pupils learnt from that that it was a moral urgency which produced great philosophy. Whatever else they got from Caird, they got a sense that philosophy mattered, that there were certain questions to which honest answers had to be found, and that something could be done by patient disciplined effort towards finding such answers. Those who know Caird only from his writings miss much of this. It is the peculiar value of this memorial that in its happy combination of biography, letters and exposition it does more than anything else could have done to make clear what Caird's teaching was.

A. D. LINDSAY.

OXFORD.

A HISTORY OF SOCIAL THOUGHT. By Emory S. Bogardus. University of Southern California Press, 1922. Pp. 510.

It may seem strange, since many American universities have been offering courses in the history of social thought, that a treatise under that title has not previously appeared. Probably, however, only those who have attempted it will fully realize the difficulty of producing such a book. It is a genuine task to select from the world's literature the expressions of thought which relate most directly to human relations, to classify these thoughts

Digitized by Google

significantly and to present them attractively. It is well known that some who have attempted it have been unwilling to print the results of their efforts.

This book will not satisfy all critics. Historians may regard the title as too ambitious to be applied to a one-volume sketch. Philosophers will probably be disappointed with the selection from the complete systems of great thinkers of those views which are limited to social relations. Adherents of special schools of thought will not be satisfied with the emphasis given their peculiar doctrines.

The reviewer is, however, of the opinion that Professor Bogardus has produced a work well adapted to the accomplishment of his purpose. It is intended for students and, as such, to be introductory to further reading in its field. The title of each of the twenty-eight chapters suggests some definite line of study. The first fourth of the book reviews the development of social thought among different peoples down to modern times. The second fourth presents the essentials of the social philosophy of prominent modern writers including Malthus, Comte, Marx, Spencer and Ward. The last half of the book considers more recent developments of sociological theory under such titles as Anthropological Sociology, Conflict Theories in Sociology, Psycho-Sociological Thought, The Rise of Educational Sociology, The Sociology of Modern Christianity, and the Dissemination of Sociological Thought.

Teachers and writers in the field of sociological theory will be interested in this book as a convenient means of testing their own summaries and characterizations of the social teachings of their predecessors. The student will find it a convenient source from which to develop the background for his special sociological studies. The world will be fortunate if some of those actively engaged in the management of human affairs will take time to read this clear presentation of the views of human relations expressed by the great thinkers of the past and present.

G. P. Wyckoff.

Tulane University.

Digitized by Google

SHORTER NOTICES.

THE TRAGIC SENSE OF LIFE IN MEN AND IN PEOPLES. By Miguel de Unamuno. Translated by J. E. Crawford Flitch, M.A.; with an introductory essay by Salvador de Madariaga. London: Macmillan & Co., 1921. Pp. xxxv, 332. Price, 17s. net.

Del Sentimento Tragico de la Vida is the best known work of Spain's greatest literary figure, Senor Miguel de Unamuno, poet, critic, novelist, publicist and Professor of Greek at the University of Salamanca. The book which is widely read in Spain is characteristic of the relentlessness of Spanish mysticism. Its driving force is its personal *cri de coeur*, a sustained passion for personal immortality. In an early page he tells us that "as a youth, even as a child, I remained unmoved when shown even the most moving pictures of hell, for even then nothing appeared to me quite so horrible as nothingness itself. It was a furious hunger for being that possessed me, an appetite for divinity, as one of our ascetics has put it." It is as heartfelt as Mæcenas' well-known lines. The "Spanish Man" is defined as the "man of flesh and bones" and the immortality desired is a real concrete "flesh and bones" immortality.

The sense of the futility of human existence unless crowned and summed up by eternal life is what Unamuno terms "the tragic sense of life" in men and in peoples. The last words are significant, for he insists that his own needs and desires are those of the race; and that he is but the spokesman of a wide-felt craving. He believes that the discovery of death caused men to postulate God, and that reason can only issue in scepticism and a critical attitude towards personal survival. But in this abyss, the scepticism of the reason encounters the despair of the heart and from this conflict is born a new life and the creation of the concept of God and its deliberate enthronement in the mind. "So long," says Unamuno, "as I pilgrimaged through the fields of reason in search of God I could not find Him, for I was not deluded by the idea of God, neither could I take an idea for God, and it was then, as I wandered among the wastes of rationalism that I told myself that we ought to seek no other consolation than the truth, meaning thereby reason, and yet for all that I was not comforted. But as I sank deeper and deeper into rational scepticism on the one hand, and into heart's despair on the other, the hunger for God awoke within me, and the suffocation of spirit made me feel the want of God, and with the want of Him, His reality. And I wished that there might be a God, that God might exist. And God does not exist but rather super-exists, and He is sustaining our existence, *existing* us."

The translation is excellent and authoritative, for it was corrected by Senor Unamuno himself; it may even be regarded as an advance upon the original Spanish text in which the author admits, as an incorrigible Spaniard, to being naturally given to a kind of extemporisation and to neglectfulness of a filed niceness in words. For readers of other than Spanish nationality the translation serves as a simplification and revision of a difficult author.

HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT. By John Dewey. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1922. Pp. 336. Price, $2.25.

It is difficult to see how the author, once having gotten himself tied up in the behavioristic view developed in the first two parts of his book—dealing respectively with the place of habit and of impulse in conduct—can discover any solution for the main problem of the third part of the book,

Digitized by Google

The Place of Intelligence in Conduct. If "the primary fact is that man is a being who responds in action to the stimuli of the environment," and that "this fact is complicated in deliberation, but certainly is not abolished," "the matter of directness and indirectness concerning the way the stimulus is reached, not the way it operates"; then we shall be surprised indeed if Dewey can discover what he claims to have found, that "deliberation and choice are determining and stabilizing factors" and that they "weight the chances of an alternative in the struggle for future existence." To say that intelligence "functions as an instrument" in human behavior does not eliminate the possibility of regarding intelligence as a refined mechanism. For deliberation may be regarded as "imaginative rehearsal" in the same sense that Bagehot regarded political discussion: vicariously anticipating social behavior, both intellectual operations may be the resultants of the same situation that later will give rise also to the behavior; neither may effect or affect behavior any more than the modern monkey contributes to the heritage of his sapient relative.

Not only are the following statements difficult to reconcile with the mechanistic admissions in the earlier part of the book: "it is our business to watch the course of our action . . . to guide the tendency of our acts . . . to use judgment in directing what we do . . . by fostering impulses and habits"; but the author is bordering dangerously near a faculty psychology. To avoid this, Dewey, like Hobhouse, endows 'every little impulse with a freedom all its own'; but the problem has not been clarified, it has merely been resolved to a 'small little one.' If even in this situation "ends arise and function within action," then "function" means for Dewey not "control" but "integral participation"; otherwise intelligence can differ in kind from impulse or habit only by becoming a resultant experience or a separate faculty. Purpose would thus become either integrated behavior or a force analogous to the transcendent religious beings of medieval theology. Inasmuch as the latter alternative is out of the question—even to discover that the ends of human action are immediate and occasional, rather than remote or absolute, does not avoid the major fallacy of confusing a sublimated resultant of behavior with its driving force—Dewey is confronted with the problem of showing us how knowledge "enables us to employ facts—as a matter of choice—in connection with desires and aims." For analysis and description can account for two of the three elements into which he resolves "freedom," efficiency in action and the capacity to experience novelty, especially when freedom is objectified into the "possibilities open in the world, not in the will." The third factor, choice, remains essentially what it has hitherto been, the name rather than the solution of a problem.

The significance of this book for philosophy is that the pragmatic movement here seems practically to have exhausted itself in its struggle against the realistic schools. The difficulty confronting Dewey is that what to him remains an issue of major importance, the problem of freedom, is for his adversaries a subordinate problem and one in which they can very easily hold their own. As soon as the attention of philosophy shifts to the realist's main problem, the epistemological, not only will the discussion become more general and intense, but the analytical fruitfulness of the behaviorist and pragmatic movements will then first become apparent. Whether this implies a de-socializing of philosophy, and whether any such limitation of philosophical inquiry is desirable, are matters beyond the scope of this review.

C. F. T.

Digitized by Google

INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Ellery C. Stowell. Washington: John Byrne and Co. Pp. 558. Price, $4.

"The purpose of this book," says the author, "is to set forth the occasions when a state is justified in employing force or the menace of force to influence the conduct of another state." In the second chapter, which constitutes one-half the bulk of the book, the author, discussing International Police, states that until an organized constabulary is established, international law must "depend mainly upon the action of the separate states to secure redress for their own injuries," although there is some measure of co-operative vindication of the law of nations. The author proceeds then to define the law within this field, especially in order to enlighten public opinion, by which ultimately is determined the grounds of intervention. Violation of sovereignty, support of revolution, and self-preservation are among the concepts legally analyzed; while a number of questions particularly applying to the rôle of America in world affairs are definitely discussed. The success of Political Action is discovered largely in allowing some degree of administrative elasticity to the several states in fulfilling their obligations. The author lays down the rule—"of transcending practical importance for the preservation of a just peace among nations"—"that no state shall unreasonably insist upon its rights or pursue its interests to the detriment of the opposing rights and interests of other states." Although this is regarded by Mr. Stowell himself as a distinct contribution, there is a surprising absence of method or sanction for making this rule effective, especially in a book written from the legal point of view. Many who desire more light on future developments will welcome even more a succeeding volume in which the author promises to discuss "the means or machinery which exists . . . to secure the enforcement of the correct principles" underlying international relations.

PENOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES. By Louis N. Robinson. Philadelphia: The John C. Winston Company, 1921. Pp. ix, 344. Price, $3.

Ten years of experience as teacher and investigator in the field of social science, supplemented by three years of service as chief probation officer of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia, have helped prepare Mr. Robinson for the writing of this book, which is certainly the most valuable now available in its field.

The author has chosen to restrict his discussion to penology,—the treatment of the convicted criminal,—rather than to attempt to cover in one treatise the whole subject of criminology. The result is a readable volume of convenient size giving the most essential information about, and an instructive criticism of, each of the various methods and agencies of our penal system. Dr. Robinson is neither cynical nor visionary. His treatment of each subject is sympathetic and constructive. The fairness of his presentation of both merits and defects is especially noticeable in the discussion of probation,—the latest and most promising development in penal practice.

The author expresses the hope that his book may be useful to students of social institutions in colleges and universities, that it may facilitate the introduction into law schools of the study of punishment as it actually works out in practice, and that it may assist the general public to become better acquainted with a definite part of our social machinery so that it may participate more intelligently in the orderly development of society. It is to be hoped that a companion volume, dealing with the causes of delinquency and the treatment by police and courts of those charged with crime, may soon appear. G. P. WYCKOFF.

Digitized by Google

STUDIES IN HUMAN NATURE. By J. B. Baillie, Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Aberdeen. London: G. Bell & Sons, 1921. Pp. xii, 296. Price, 15s. net.

The aspects of human nature chiefly considered in this book are those connected with consciousness of the individual. The problems of knowledge are given a clear exposition from the point of view of one who is concerned to show that the knowing process forms only a part, and not necessarily a predominant part, in the life of the human being. The introduction attempts to show that there is a want of continuity in the history of philosophy; but it is difficult to understand precisely what the author means in regard, for example, to the position of Spinoza with regard to Descartes or Kant with regard to Hume. When we turn to the main thesis as to the nature of knowledge, it is of course clear that the consciousness of objects is only a part of the whole psychic energy: but the author does not make very clear his position in regard to what he calls "conception." He says of the "conceptions of the intellect" that "their universality is ultimately derivable from and is determined by the extent to which they reflect the single unity of the individual mind" (p. 24). The author does not work out this traditional idealism; but he says (p. 76): "The truth is not the whole of reality but a conscious realisation of a whole individuality." Elsewhere he speaks of the intellect giving unity to the variety of experience. On this two questions arise: Are not the "unities" of the objective world just as objective as the varieties? and again, Is abstraction illegitimate because in it we take one thing at a time? To treat conceptions (apparently meaning "concepts") as objects is said to be a "revival of mediæval realism"; and the author says that conceptions really "refer" to objects. Apparently, therefore, "object" means for him the composite presentation of which the elements, taken singly, are not objective. But perhaps he does not mean anything so definite, but only that life is one process including many psychic energies of which knowing is one, and that is true enough.

C. D. BURNS.

LONDON.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIETY. By Morris Ginsberg, M.A. London: Methuen & Co., 1921. Pp. xvi, 174. Price, 6s. net.

Social Psychology has advanced far enough to have its main conclusions stated in a summary form. Mr. Ginsberg has, therefore, performed a task which is useful scientifically in putting together in one small volume the significant doctrines of different schools. It is useful also to the general reader, who nowadays must be abreast of the advances in psychology which have recently occurred. At certain stages in the history of every science it is necessary to make an assessment of results and, if possible, a synthesis of conclusions and their proofs. Social psychology, as Mr. Ginsberg shows, has reached such a stage. The short introduction to the volume under review gives a very valuable summary of the growth of the science which, in a sense, is an explanation of the position taken by the author himself. We are then plunged into the theory of instincts, with which McDougall's name is associated; but the anti-intellectualism, recently current, is then corrected in a following chapter. The Group Mind is accepted as a working hypothesis, but not in the meaning it sometimes bears as a superior reality different from the minds of the members of a group.

We are then given a clear and illuminating discussion of the conception of a General Will, and the book ends with analysis of such current ideas as

Digitized by Google

those of racial characteristics, the crowd and public opinion. The aim of the author is successfully achieved and the book should be of great use to students in economics and political science as well as to historians. But the situation of the science of social psychology which is revealed in this book is interesting. The doctrines and conclusions of the science are still strangely personal. They are attached to the names of McDougall, Hobhouse, Tarde and others. It may, of course, be necessary in a book which is a summary to bring into prominence the additional literature of the subject; but probably the reason for these references to individual investigators lies deeper. Social psychology indeed has hardly advanced beyond the stage at which "schools" dispute about "doctrines." The evidence is accumulating; but it has not been classified in such a way as to meet with general agreement: and in some cases the personal idiosyncrasies of the scientist peep through the impersonal manner of his statements. For example, Mr. Ginsberg gently suggests that McDougall suffers as a scientist from "general political assumptions and predilections" (p. 164). Certainly McDougall's view of the British Parliament is amusingly simple-minded: and it is to be suspected that the conclusions of many other social psychologists are vitiated by the operation of some of those instincts and emotions which they are attempting to study objectively.

C. D. BURNS.

LONDON.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMANISM AND OTHER SUBJECTS. By Viscount Haldane. London: John Murray, 1922. Pp. xiv, 302. Price, 12s. net.

The title of this book may prove misleading. The term "humanism" in philosophy is now generally associated with the name of Dr. Schiller, who has used it to describe a modified form of Pragmatism. To that Lord Haldane makes no reference. He means by Humanism, in its philosophical reference, little more than what is commonly called Idealism. Probably he avoids the latter term on account of its misleading associations, and also because he is not so much concerned with the foundations of philosophy as with its general applications to human life and thought. The book is further characterised as a companion volume to "The Reign of Relativity," which is an attempt to expound the views of Einstein in the light of Hegelianism. The present work may be regarded as a continuation of that process of interpretation in a less systematic form and with less definite reference either to Einstein or Hegel. The first three chapters contain a general statement of the philosophical position which is summed up in the saying that "Reality is indissolubly one with knowledge, but is neither a construction by merely abstract thinking, on the one hand, nor, on the other hand, has it meaning or existence apart from the setting which thought gives to the particularism implied in all knowledge." Chapters IV, V, and VI, are concerned with Mathematical Physics, Chapters VII and VIII with Biology and Psychology, and the concluding chapter contains some discussion of Mr. Russell's "Analysis of Mind." Most of this has but little bearing on Ethics. Perhaps one of the most interesting parts for readers of this JOURNAL is the account which is given in Chapter III of the new Humanistic movement in the German Universities. "The purpose of the movement," he says, "is nominally the establishment of a Humanistic Faculty. But in this connection 'faculty' does not mean a separate faculty of humanistic studies. With the existing distribution of subjects in the universities of Germany it is not sought to interfere. The real object is to bring these subjects into organic relation to one another,

Digitized by Google

choice resulted from the feeling that the "deluge" could be postponed at least to the next generation. The problem is that of our own federal protection of labor writ large; unfortunately America has little to offer as precedent in regard to the essentials: vital statistics, precise labor law, and efficient inspection.

The latter half of the book is given over to invaluable appendices, including items of Labor Law Internationally Adopted, and Labor Resolutions Internationally Subscribed. A voluminous Bibliography is followed by a supplement, The International Labor Organization of the League of Nations.

THE SHANTUNG QUESTION. By Ge-Zay Wood. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1922. Pp. 372. Price, $5.

Mr. Wood, a member of the Chinese delegation to the Washington Conference, has written a number of other books which form the context for this particular problem. After several chapters of historical introduction, there follows a discussion of the Shantung Question at the Versailles Peace Conference. Here America, especially Woodrow Wilson, is held accountable for the treatment of China: "In order to secure Japan's adherence to a League of Nations Mr. Wilson had thought it necessary to accept a solution that was insisted on by Japan." The English delegates are absolved, because "the sense of honor and obligation was fostered at the sacrifice of international justice and morality." The issue between China and Japan boiled down to the economic interests involved, especially the railway and mining concessions in Shantung. The Washington Conference gave China another opportunity of presenting her case; only, however, after she had given up her historical arguments and accepted "the position of a supplicant, that of trying to get back from Japan as much as possible, after granting that everything in Shantung was lost to her." Happily, however, not only was the agreement there made "favorably received at home" so far as China was concerned, but the terms are "much better than hoped for" even as outlined in the tentative draft presented at Versailles. The book is lucid and exhaustive. Mr. Wood at times, however, loses his judicial poise by drawing inferences of a controversial nature; a better effect could have been gained by giving the reader's judgment an opportunity to react to the facts. The American public is fortunate in having this additional evidence for understanding the problems of the Pacific and the Orient.

THE METAPHYSICAL THEORY OF THE STATE. By Professor L. T. Hobhouse, LL.D. London: Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1922.

This interesting work, which has already attracted a good deal of attention, is probably the most trenchant criticism of the Hegelian theory of the State that has yet appeared. Even those who attach a high value to Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie*, Green's *Lectures on Political Obligation*, and Bosanquet's *Philosophical Theory of the State* may profit by Professor Hobhouse's comments and enjoy some of the points that he makes. Taken in conjunction with his books on *The Rational Good* and *The Elements of Social Justice*, which have already been noticed in this JOURNAL, it will enable readers to gain a pretty thorough insight into the ethical, social and political opinions of the author, who is now generally recognised as one of the foremost writers on these subjects.

It is perhaps not unfair to add, however, that he appears to be a good deal stronger in criticism than in systematic construction.

LONDON. J. S. MACKENZIE.

Digitized by Google

those of racial characteristics, the crowd and public opinion. The aim of the author is successfully achieved and the book should be of great use to students in economics and political science as well as to historians. But the situation of the science of social psychology which is revealed in this book is interesting. The doctrines and conclusions of the science are still strangely personal. They are attached to the names of McDougall, Hobhouse, Tarde and others. It may, of course, be necessary in a book which is a summary to bring into prominence the additional literature of the subject; but probably the reason for these references to individual investigators lies deeper. Social psychology indeed has hardly advanced beyond the stage at which "schools" dispute about "doctrines." The evidence is accumulating; but it has not been classified in such a way as to meet with general agreement: and in some cases the personal idiosyncrasies of the scientist peep through the impersonal manner of his statements. For example, Mr. Ginsberg gently suggests that McDougall suffers as a scientist from "general political assumptions and predilections" (p. 164). Certainly McDougall's view of the British Parliament is amusingly simple-minded: and it is to be suspected that the conclusions of many other social psychologists are vitiated by the operation of some of those instincts and emotions which they are attempting to study objectively.

C. D. BURNS.

LONDON.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMANISM AND OTHER SUBJECTS. By Viscount Haldane. London: John Murray, 1922. Pp. xiv, 302. Price, 12s. net.

The title of this book may prove misleading. The term "humanism" in philosophy is now generally associated with the name of Dr. Schiller, who has used it to describe a modified form of Pragmatism. To that Lord Haldane makes no reference. He means by Humanism, in its philosophical reference, little more than what is commonly called Idealism. Probably he avoids the latter term on account of its misleading associations, and also because he is not so much concerned with the foundations of philosophy as with its general applications to human life and thought. The book is further characterised as a companion volume to "The Reign of Relativity," which is an attempt to expound the views of Einstein in the light of Hegelianism. The present work may be regarded as a continuation of that process of interpretation in a less systematic form and with less definite reference either to Einstein or Hegel. The first three chapters contain a general statement of the philosophical position which is summed up in the saying that "Reality is indissolubly one with knowledge, but is neither a construction by merely abstract thinking, on the one hand, nor, on the other hand, has it meaning or existence apart from the setting which thought gives to the particularism implied in all knowledge." Chapters IV, V, and VI, are concerned with Mathematical Physics, Chapters VII and VIII with Biology and Psychology, and the concluding chapter contains some discussion of Mr. Russell's "Analysis of Mind." Most of this has but little bearing on Ethics. Perhaps one of the most interesting parts for readers of this JOURNAL is the account which is given in Chapter III of the new Humanistic movement in the German Universities. "The purpose of the movement," he says, "is nominally the establishment of a Humanistic Faculty. But in this connection 'faculty' does not mean a separate faculty of humanistic studies. With the existing distribution of subjects in the universities of Germany it is not sought to interfere. The real object is to bring these subjects into organic relation to one another,

Digitized by Google

choice resulted from the feeling that the "deluge" could be postponed at least to the next generation. The problem is that of our own federal protection of labor writ large; unfortunately America has little to offer as precedent in regard to the essentials: vital statistics, precise labor law, and efficient inspection.

The latter half of the book is given over to invaluable appendices, including items of Labor Law Internationally Adopted, and Labor Resolutions Internationally Subscribed. A voluminous Bibliography is followed by a supplement, The International Labor Organization of the League of Nations.

THE SHANTUNG QUESTION. By Ge-Zay Wood. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1922. Pp. 372. Price, $5.

Mr. Wood, a member of the Chinese delegation to the Washington Conference, has written a number of other books which form the context for this particular problem. After several chapters of historical introduction, there follows a discussion of the Shantung Question at the Versailles Peace Conference. Here America, especially Woodrow Wilson, is held accountable for the treatment of China: "In order to secure Japan's adherence to a League of Nations Mr. Wilson had thought it necessary to accept a solution that was insisted on by Japan." The English delegates are absolved, because "the sense of honor and obligation was fostered at the sacrifice of international justice and morality." The issue between China and Japan boiled down to the economic interests involved, especially the railway and mining concessions in Shantung. The Washington Conference gave China another opportunity of presenting her case; only, however, after she had given up her historical arguments and accepted "the position of a supplicant, that of trying to get back from Japan as much as possible, after granting that everything in Shantung was lost to her." Happily, however, not only was the agreement there made "favorably received at home" so far as China was concerned, but the terms are "much better than hoped for" even as outlined in the tentative draft presented at Versailles. The book is lucid and exhaustive. Mr. Wood at times, however, loses his judicial poise by drawing inferences of a controversial nature; a better effect could have been gained by giving the reader's judgment an opportunity to react to the facts. The American public is fortunate in having this additional evidence for understanding the problems of the Pacific and the Orient.

THE METAPHYSICAL THEORY OF THE STATE. By Professor L. T. Hobhouse, LL.D. London: Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1922.

This interesting work, which has already attracted a good deal of attention, is probably the most trenchant criticism of the Hegelian theory of the State that has yet appeared. Even those who attach a high value to Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie*, Green's *Lectures on Political Obligation*, and Bosanquet's *Philosophical Theory of the State* may profit by Professor Hobhouse's comments and enjoy some of the points that he makes. Taken in conjunction with his books on *The Rational Good* and *The Elements of Social Justice*, which have already been noticed in this JOURNAL, it will enable readers to gain a pretty thorough insight into the ethical, social and political opinions of the author, who is now generally recognised as one of the foremost writers on these subjects.

It is perhaps not unfair to add, however, that he appears to be a good deal stronger in criticism than in systematic construction.

LONDON. J. S. MACKENZIE.

Digitized by Google

DIVINE IMAGINING: an essay on the First Principles of Philosophy. By Douglas Fawcett. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1921. Pp. xxviii, 249.

This book has no very direct bearing upon Ethics; but it may be commended to the attention of our readers, especially those who are already acquainted with the previous writings of its author. It contains a shorter statement of the general view set forth in his book on *The World as Imagination*. His contention is that Imagination yields a more secure basis for an idealistic philosophy than Reason, Feeling or Intuition. The theory that he develops bears a considerable resemblance to that of Advaita Vedantism, with the substitution of Imagination for Mâya. This change has some ethical importance; for it is certainly easier to connect moral purpose with Imagination than with the Oriental ideas of Mâya or Avidya.

Mr. Fawcett supports his thesis with a great deal of vigour, and his speculations can hardly fail to have a great fascination for any one whose heart is in the highlands of metaphysical adventure.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

LONDON.

THE LAW IN BUSINESS PROBLEMS. By Lincoln Frederick Schaub and Nathan Isaacs. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1921. Pp. 821.

A product of the authors' experience in the teaching of commercial law in collegiate schools of business, differing in point of view and methods from most books in this subject. This book aims, by the case system, to give some understanding of the legal rules governing the more familiar business transactions and relations, especially with reference to Contracts. Its principal concern is to show the legal system in its relation to the problems and policies of business organization and administration. It is a study of the part played by the law in the "anatomy of business." Intended for mature readers whose chief interest lies in business, whether or not they have any special knowledge of law.

THE VOICE OF JERUSALEM. By Israel Zangwill. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1921. Pp. 368. Price, $3.00.

"Christianity, *qua* its ethic of love and pity and self-sacrifice, is at bottom a question of psychology: it is the evolution of the human spirit to a plane as much transcending the natural man's as the species *homo* transcends the animal." So Zangwill writes in "The Voice of Jerusalem," and adds that "the Jews . . . reached this phase of evolution centuries before the rest of the world." The rest of the world has in the main not reached it at all: "In the recent war . . . the Berserker psychology has been the dominating influence."

With the memory of the war still vivid and the hatred and reaction which it engendered only too manifest, few can dissent from Zangwill's conclusion that the Jews are more Christian than the Christians and that the hope of the world, if there is any such, is in the voice of Jerusalem, the age-long hope and vision of Judaism of a world united in a true federation of brotherhood and acknowledging a common God. Zangwill does not assert that all the prophets of the millennium have been Jews; he pays tribute to General Smuts and other idealists. But he is proud of his race and of their devotion to an ideal through two thousand years of persecution.

The book is a collection of essays and papers printed in magazines over a

Digitized by Google

period of years. A good deal of space is devoted to the Zionist movement upon which Zangwill holds sensible opinions.

Only one nation in our time has endured so much as the Jew. Zangwill concludes his book thus: "One people is suffering more. That people, whose ancient realm held the legendary Eden, has now for a hiding place the pit of Hell. I bow before this higher majesty of sorrow. I take the crown of thorns from Israel's head and I place it upon Armenia's."

C. H. G.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

CARR, H. WILDON. A Theory of Monads: outlines of the philosophy of the principle of relativity. London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd. 1922. Pp. viii, 350. Price, 15s. net.

CLOW, W. M. The Quest of Industrial Peace. New York: George H. Doran Co. 1922. Pp. 300. Price, $1.75 net.

COX, GEORGE CLARK. The Public Conscience: A case book in ethics. New York: Henry Holt and Co. 1922. Pp. 483. Price, $3.00

DENSMORE, FRANCES. Northern Ute Music. Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 75. 1922. Pp. 213.

GALLOWAY, T. W. Biology of Sex. New York: D. C. Heath and Co. Revised Edition, 1922. Pp. 149.

GENTILE, GIOVANNI. The Reform of Education. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1922. Pp. 250.

GOLDENWEISER, ALEXANDER A. Early Civilization. An introduction to anthropology. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1922. Pp. 428. Price, $5.00 net.

HALDANE, VISCOUNT. The Philosophy of Humanism, and of Other Subjects. London: John Murray. 1922. Pp. xiv, 302. Price, 12s. net.

HETHERINGTON, H. J. W., and MUIRHEAD, J. H. Social Purpose: a contribution to a philosophy of civil society. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1922. Pp. 317. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

JACOBS, LEO. Three Types of Practical Ethical Movements of the Last Half Century. New York: Macmillan. 1922. Pp. 183. Price, $1.50.

LYNCH, ARTHUR. Ethics. London: Cassell and Co., Ltd. 1922. Pp. xii, 324. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

MACKENZIE, J. S. Arrows of Desire: Essays on our national character and outlook. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1921. Pp. 260. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

MAETRA, SHISIR KUMAR. The Neoromantic Movement in Contemporary Philosophy. Calcutta: The Book Company. 1922. Pp. vi, 268. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

MOORE, G. E. Philosophical Studies. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd. 1922. Pp. viii, 342. Price, 15s. net.

RALSTON, JACKSON H. Democracy's International Law. Washington, D. C.: John Byrne and Co. 1922. Pp. 165. Price, $1.50.

RIVERS, W. H. R. Instinct and the Unconscious. Cambridge: University Press. 1922. Pp. viii, 277. Price, 12s. net.

ROBINSON, NORMAN L. Christian Justice. New York: George H. Doran Co. 1922. Pp. 256. Price, $2.00 net.

RUSSELL, BERTRAND. Free Thought and Official Propaganda. London: Watts and Co. 1914. Pp. 48. Price, 1s. net.

STEPHEN, KAREN. The Misuse of Mind. Preface by Henri Bergson. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd. 1922. Pp. 108. Price, 6s. 6d. net.

Digitized by Google

SWANTON, JOHN R. Early History of the Greek Indians and their Neighbors. Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 73. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1922. Pp. 492.

VIVANTE, LEONE. Della Intelligenz a nell' cofremone. Roma: P. Maglione e C. Streni. 1922. Pp. 228. Price, 12 lire.

WILLIAMS, HORACE BLAKE. Fundamentals of Faith in the Light of Modern Thought. New York: The Abingdon Press. 1922. Pp. 181.

WILLIAMS, JAMES MICKEL. Principles of Social Psychology. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1922. Pp. 459. Price, $5.00 net.

WOOD, GE-ZAY. The Shantung Question. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1922. Pp. 372. Price, $5.00.

WORLD METRIC STANDARDIZATION COUNCIL. World Metric Standardization. San Francisco: World Metric Standardization Council. 1922. Pp. 524. Price, $5.00.

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION.

At its Annual Meeting, December 30, 1921, the American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division) appropriated a considerable part of its available funds for literary aid to European universities and scholars. The vote on the resolution was unanimous. The great need for books and periodicals on the part of scholars impoverished by the war and its consequences impressed the Association when it was brought to the attention of the Meeting. From the editors among its membership it learned also of the many requests from abroad for gifts of current journals—requests which the several reviews have often met, but which as a whole their resources do not allow them to satisfy. Finally, it was felt that this was a form of international co-operation which all could approve.

The Association appropriated two hundred dollars—one third of its balance— for this purpose. In the discussion of the motion, the hope was also expressed that additional gifts of money or books might be received from individuals. The management of the fund was entrusted to the Committee on International Co-operation, which met immediately and appointed Professors Woodbridge and Cohen a Sub-Committee to take direct charge of the work. Arrangements have now been perfected for the forwarding and distribution, without charge, of whatever we may be able to give. It is very desirable that any of our members who feel able to contribute, or to spare books or journals from their libraries, should communicate with the Sub-Committee so soon as may be convenient. In particular, it is desired to collect works representing the more recent phases of American thought. In case of doubt, the Sub-Committee will be glad to answer concerning the suitableness of any list suggested for donation. Checks may be drawn, and books forwarded, to Professor Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.

Digitized by Google

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

A Quarterly Devoted to the Advancement of Ethical Knowledge and Practice

VOL. XXXIII JANUARY, 1923 NO. 2

LEADING CONTENTS

A STUDY IN STATISTICAL ETHICS — A. P. Brogan

RECENT PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION — R. F. A. Hoernlé

THE NATURE OF THE KNOWLEDGE THAT CONDITIONS GOODNESS — Louis Arnaud Reid

SIR HENRY JONES — H. J. W. Hetherington

REVOLUTION AS TAUGHT BY CONFUCIANISM — Gilbert Reid

THE RÔLE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL — Norman Boardman

For full Contents see inside page

Published for the Editors by THE RUMFORD PRESS, Concord, N. H.

Chicago: JAMES H. TUFTS, University of Chicago, Manager

London: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN, Ltd., 40 Museum Street, W. C.

Yearly Subscription, $3.00 Single Numbers, 75 cents

Entered as second-class matter October 16, 1914, at the post-office at Concord, New Hampshire, under the Act of March 3, 1879

Digitized by Google

The JOURNAL *of* SOCIAL FORCES

Published Bi-Monthly at the University of North Carolina
CHAPEL HILL, N. C.

Departmental Contributions:
- Teaching and Research in the Social Sciences
- Public Welfare and Social Work
- Conferences for Social Work
- The Church and Social Service
- Inter-Racial Coöperation
- County and Country Life Programs
- Progress in Town and City Programs
- The Work of Women's Organizations
- The Library and Workshop

Editorial Notes

Contributed Articles:

Franklin H. Giddings, Owen R. Lovejoy, Robert W. Kelso, Frank D. Watson, Burr Blackburn, J. L. Gillin, Jesse F. Steiner, Morris Knowles and many others.

THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL FORCES,
Chapel Hill, N. C.

Gentlemen: For the enclosed $2.50 please send me THE JOURNAL for one year, beginning January 1, and sending the November number *free*.

Name .....

Address .....

Or for the enclosed $4.00 please send me THE JOURNAL for one year and also a year's subscription with my Christmas and New Year wishes to

Name .....

Address .....

SARGENT'S
Handbook of American Private Schools

An Annual Survey and Review critically describing Private Schools of all classifications and Summer Camps.

A Compendium for Educators and all interested in Education.

A Guide Book for Parents, supplying intimate information, which makes possible a discriminating choice.

Comparative Tables give the relative cost, size, age, special features, etc.

Introductory Chapters review interesting developments of the year in education.

Educational Service Bureau will be glad to advise and write you intimately about any school or class of schools in which you are interested. Write for particulars. Consultation by appointment.

Circulars and sample pages on request

PORTER E. SARGENT, 14 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass.

Digitized by Google

THE INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF ETHICS

JANUARY, 1923

A STUDY IN STATISTICAL ETHICS.

A. P. BROGAN.

I.

IN recent years the study of ethics has gained much, both in breadth and in reliability, from the development of what has been called "comparative ethics." This may be defined as the study of the actual moral attitudes of different peoples at different times or places. It ascertains these moral attitudes by studying actions, feelings and beliefs, as recorded in arts and religions, customs and laws. Previous work in comparative ethics has been primarily historical, and has used what is called the genetic or evolutionary method. This method has given very interesting results in the writings of L. T. Hobhouse and many other writers.[1] But it has tended to lay undue emphasis on the study of the past. This study of the past has helped to explain the present, but cannot be a substitute for a description of the present. Present facts are more important to us than are past facts, and they are more easily known by us in most cases. About one half of comparative ethics should be a study of contemporary morality. It is the contention of the present writer that this part of comparative ethics should be mainly statistical. This statistical ethics should

[1] L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, Third Edition, London 1915.
E. Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, Second Edition, London 1917.
Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, New York 1909, Part One.

Digitized by Google

not pretend to be a substitute for theoretical or philosophical ethics, though it may later give much help to the philosophy of ethics.

In earlier papers I have given philosophical or analytical arguments to show that all values are relational.[2] All facts about value are really facts about the relation of better or worse. The relation of better or worse is the fundamental value category or universal. So moral values, if this theory is true, must be comparative values. If moral values are comparative or relational, they might form a series or scale. Such a series or scale might be something to be discovered by investigation of moral facts unknown to popular opinion of the present day, or this series or scale might be definitely embodied in the popular opinion of to-day. The present paper will throw some light on this question. The important task of comparative ethics is to study moral attitudes about this scale. A philosopher may argue that the popular attitude about this moral scale is misleading or inadequate. But the task of comparative ethics is simply to make a dispassionate study of the actual prevailing attitudes. If we are to make a study of popular opinion to see what moral scale it contains, we must have some statistical tool or method. It happens that such a tool or method has been worked out very carefully in recent years. It is called the statistics of "correlation." This method gives a way of measuring the amount of similarity or dissimilarity among different scales or rankings.[3]

---

[2] The Fundamental Value Universal, *The Journal of Philosophy*, 1919, Vol. 16, page 96.

Urban's Axiological System, *The Journal of Philosophy*, 1921, Vol. 18, page 197.

Abstract, *The Journal of Philosophy*, 1915, Vol. 12, page 105.

[3] W. I. King, *Elements of Statistical Method*, New York 1919, chapter 17.

Scott Company Laboratory, tables etc., *The Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 4, page 115.

E. L. Thorndike, *An Introduction to the Theory of Mental and Social Measurements*, Second Edition, New York 1913, chapter 11.

G. U. Yule, *An Introduction to the Theory of Statistics*, Fourth Edition, London 1917, chapter 9.

Digitized by Google

I have not been able to find any anticipation of this line of approach to ethical study. Professor L. T. Hobhouse gives an example of correlation in his *Morals in Evolution*, but for a quite different purpose.[4] Professor F. C. Sharp and others have collected statistical answers to questions about morality, but I have not found any use of correlation in these writers.[5] The greatest anticipation is in the work of G. G. Fernald.[6] He used a form of correlation for the sake of comparing the moral rankings made by normal persons with the rankings made by defective or delinquent persons. His selection of topics was made by himself, and is clearly of more interest to abnormal psychology than to ethics. Other studies in Fernald's footsteps have been made by F. L. Wells, L. Jacobsohn-Lask, S. C. Kohs, and others.[7] But none of these men has used correlational statistics as an aid to the study of ethics.

As an example of the nature of statistical ethics and as evidence of the value of its results, I give below a statistical study of one phase of popular morality. By popular morality is meant especially the moral opinions of those who have never had any set training in systematic ethics. The purpose is to see if there is among such people a definite scale of moral values in some fairly uniform order of better and worse.

II.

The first step in the study of popular morality is the selection of some definite list of topics to be ranked by the public. This list should be made by the public itself. If the

[4] L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, Third Edition, London 1915, page 106.

[5] F. C. Sharp, *A Study of the Influence of Custom on the Moral Judgment*, Madison, Wisconsin, 1908.

[6] G. G. Fernald, The Defective Delinquent Class Differentiating Test, *American Journal of Insanity*, 1912, Vol. 68, pages 523–594.

[7] F. L. Wells, *Mental Adjustments*, New York 1917, chapter 7.

L. Jacobsohn-Lask, Ueber die Fernald'sche Methode zur Pruefung des sittlichen Fuehlens, *Beihefte zur Zeitschrift fuer angewandte Psychologie*, No. 24, Leipzig 1920.

S. C. Kohs, Ethical Discrimination Test, *Journal of Delinquency*, 1922, Vol. 7, pages 1–15.

Digitized by Google

investigator makes his own list, popular opinion may not have a fair chance to express what it has "on its mind."

For the present experiment, the list of topics was made by men and women students at the University of Texas. The list was made at the very start of a beginning course in ethics in the Spring of 1919. Each student was asked to make a list of the "ten worst practices" among students in the university. Lists of best practices were asked for, but they were disregarded for the present study because they were more difficult to arrange. When these names of worst practices were compiled, it was found that sixteen practices stood out as being mentioned most frequently. These practices were put in alphabetical order as follows: Cheating, Dancing, Drinking, Extravagance, Gambling, Gossip, Idleness, Lying, Sabbath Breaking, Selfishness, Sex Irregularity, Smoking, Snobbishness, Stealing, Swearing, Vulgar Talk. For the home community only eight practices stood out as having ten or more votes. Each of the eight was in the first list, so no use was made of them.

The making of this list has been repeated more than a dozen times during the past three years. The practices listed were very nearly the same, though there was considerable difference in the order of frequency of mention. In the university list, cheating, idling, and gambling were usually the ones most frequently mentioned. In the list for the home community, stealing, drinking, and sex irregularity were most frequently mentioned. The list of sixteen practices was repeated year after year with only slight variations. Vulgar talk and sabbath breaking were omitted more frequently than any other topics. In the university list, the most frequent additions were disrespect, criticism, and aimlessness. In the list for the home community, the additions were speeding, profiteering, and bootlegging. However, the first list was kept unchanged, so that exact comparisons could be made with one list during several years.

If the limits of this article did not forbid, it would be interesting to make a study of those practices which were

Digitized by Google

named by less than ten persons. Over a hundred of these practices were compiled. Many of them are as interesting to study as those which were more frequently mentioned by the students. It would have taken too much time and energy to get all of these ranked. Perhaps later a study can be made of some of them. Naturally the practices for the home community are usually more serious than the university practices.

The reader may naturally wonder why "practices" were ranked rather than specific or individual actions. The answer is that popular morality seems to give a readier response concerning practices than concerning more individualized items. Moreover it is very difficult to describe an action so as to make it purely specific or individual; it tends to be "that sort of an action." It would be almost impossible to get public opinion to make such descriptions. The aim of the present article made it necessary to use the more general notion of practice. More individualized items must be left to later studies.

III.

This list of worst practices was put in alphabetical order and given to about a thousand students at the University of Texas. For the present study use was made of the answers of 242 men and 292 women who were in the introductory ethics course during the first week of each term from the Spring of 1919 to the Spring of 1921 inclusive. Students in other courses, in Summer School, in advanced ethics courses, and late registrations were all omitted. The introductory ethics courses have no freshmen, many sophomores, and a moderate number of juniors and seniors.

The instructions read as follows: "After considering all aspects, which of these practices do you consider worst? Place the number 1 opposite this. Mark the next worst 2, and so for all the rest." No further explanations or instructions were given, except that students were asked to give their own opinions. The student was told not to sign his name but to indicate his or her sex. The papers for the two sexes were tabulated separately. It was hoped that having

Digitized by Google

the papers unsigned would give more honest and sincere answers. The students were not timed, but were made to complete the ranking before they left the room.

Reasons have been given above for having these practices ranked in order of "better and worse." Of course if my theory were false, and if all these practices were considered wrong but equally wrong, then no definite ranking could have been given. On the other hand, if we find a very definite ranking, that will be a partial verification of my theory about "betterness." The students might have been asked to rank the practices according to some other standard, such as blameworthiness. But I think that such a standard is less fundamental, so I have left it for later investigation.

IV.

A careful examination of Table A will enlighten the curious reader more than any of my paragraphs could do. But I add some short descriptions and explanations.

The reader will observe that the practices in column 1 are listed in the order of badness given by the women (as numbered in column 3). A study of the men's ranking in column 2 with the women's ranking shows the following results. There is a very definite statistical order. There is less bunching or approximate equality than might have been expected. From a statistical point of view the two rankings are almost incredibly similar. In this phase of popular morality there seems to be no large sex difference.

The rankings given in columns 2 and 3 show that there are only three slight differences between the men's rank and the women's rank. The men rank gambling worse than drinking, but the women rank drinking worse than gambling. The arithmetical averages in columns 4 and 5 show that the difference is primarily about drinking. The women rank sabbath breaking as worse than swearing, but the men reverse the rank. The arithmetical averages for the two practices are nearly the same in both sexes. The last difference concerns gossip, which the men rank as 13 but the women rank somewhat worse as 10. Here it will be

Digitized by Google

TABLE A. WORSE PRACTICES.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Practices in Order of Worseness	Ranks by Arithmetical Averages		Arithmetical Averages		Medians		Average Deviations	
	M. 242	W. 292	M.	W.	M.	W.	M.	W.
Sex Irregularity.....	1	1	3.79	2.44	2	1	2.85	1.96
Stealing.....	2	2	4.05	4.36	3	3	2.01	2.18
Cheating.....	3	3	4.88	5.09	4	5	2.54	2.18
Lying.....	4	4	5.13	5.37	5	5	2.52	2.48
Drinking.....	6	5	7.09	5.88	6	5	3.32	2.95
Gambling.....	5	6	6.82	6.77	7	6	2.81	2.44
Vulgar Talk.....	7	7	7.89	7.71	8	8	2.50	2.64
Sabbath Breaking....	9	8	9.17	8.70	10	9	3.73	3.42
Swearing.....	8	9	8.42	8.86	8	8	2.74	2.23
Gossip.....	13	10	10.09	9.59	11	10	2.83	2.97
Selfishness.....	10	11	9.29	9.85	10	11	3.41	3.14
Idleness.....	11	12	9.53	10.41	10½	11	3.38	3.06
Snobbishness.....	12	13	9.97	11.40	11	12	2.77	2.38
Extravagance.....	14	14	10.75	11.74	11½	12	2.99	2.53
Smoking.....	15	15	13.46	12.99	15	14	2.16	1.96
Dancing.....	16	16	14.23	14.51	15	16	2.07	1.87

noticed that the arithmetical averages differ by only one half of a point. This displacement of gossip naturally causes a displacement of one point in the rank of each of the following practices, selfishness, idleness, and snobbishness.

Although these three slight differences are the only ones in the rankings given by the two sexes, there are some other facts to be noticed concerning the arithmetical averages in columns 4 and 5. Both men and women place sex irregularity as the worst of the sixteen practices, but the women

Digitized by Google

are more nearly unanimous than the men and so their average is smaller. While both men and women rank idleness, snobbishness, and extravagance in the same order, the women give larger averages for all of them. This would seem to indicate that the women thought these practices relatively less objectionable. In the men's ranking, smoking is naturally given a larger average as being less objectionable.

The facts noticed above are very minor divergences. The general impression, just from an ordinary inspection, is that of overwhelming uniformity and agreement. Let us now turn to a definite statistical formulation of the correlation between the rankings given by the men and by the women. For the benefit of a few of my readers who may not be familiar with some recent developments in the statistics of correlation, I give in the following paragraph a brief and elementary explanation of coefficients of correlation.

There are several methods of obtaining correlation coefficients (symbolized by r), but I shall use the Spearman rank-difference method. The other methods have been used on the same data, but they have not given a figure differing by more than one per cent from this method. When we compare the different possible rankings for our sixteen practices, we notice that the extreme cases would be that the rankings might exactly coincide or they might be exactly reversed. If they were exactly reversed, the sum of the squares of the differences between the two rankings would be 1360. If they coincided, this sum would be zero. If the two rankings were merely connected haphazardly by independent shufflings of cards, the sum of the squares of the differences would tend to be about 680. This haphazard point is called zero correlation, and other correlations are measured up or down from this point. For our present purposes we are concerned only with the positive correlations between zero and identity. When the sum of the squares of the differences equals 680, we say that r equals zero. When the sum equals zero we say that r equals 1. Intermediate sums are represented as percentages of 1. Thus when the sum is

Digitized by Google

about 340 we say that r equals .50. The mathematical formulæ used here may be found in any recent book on statistics.[8]

When the sum of the squares of the differences between column 2 and column 3 is calculated, it is found to be 16. This means that r, the coefficient of correlation, is equal to .98. In other words, the two rankings lack only two per cent of being identical. They are 98 per cent of the distance from a chance correlation to a coinciding correlation. As correlations go, this correlation is very high. Usually a correlation of .70 is considered high.

V.

When we calculate the measure of unreliability for the correlation between column 2 and column 3 in Table A, we find that it is very low. Since r is .98, the standard error for r is .01. This means that if such tabulations were repeated a large number of times under the same circumstances, two-thirds of the correlations would fall between .97 and .99. The probable error of our coefficient of correlation is approximately .007. So our correlation has an extremely high degree of reliability.

VI.

In columns 8 and 9 of Table A, an account is given of dispersion. I have given the average deviation rather than the standard error, because the latter seemed inappropriate for anonymous votes. Some apparently erratic votes are merely careless or mischievous. The standard error, by squaring all deviations from the arithmetical average, might be unduly influenced by a few such votes.

The average deviations for the men average 2.78. For the women the average deviation is 2.51. The average deviations are large for drinking, sabbath breaking, selfishness, and idleness.

---

[8] *References above* in note 3.

Digitized by Google

VII.

In Table B, I give the more important correlations obtained at the University of Texas in securing the results which are condensed in Table A. Unfortunately there is not room here for all of the original rankings. The correlations are all monotonously high, even among the smaller sub-classes on which the totals are based. As all correlations here are positive, I have omitted the positive sign. Notice the similarity between the freshmen (at the beginning of the school year) and the juniors and seniors.

TABLE B. COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION.

THE TWO GROUPS COMPARED.	r.
1. Totals for men and for women	.98
2. Total for men and signed answers by men	.95
3. Total for women and signed answers by women	.98
4. Total for men and men in Summer School of 1919	.93
5. Total for men and men in Summer School 1920	.98
6. Total for men and men in Summer School 1921	.93
7. Total for women and women in Summer School 1919	.96
8. Total for women and women in Summer School 1920	.95
9. Total for women and women in Summer School 1921	.99
10. Total for men and freshmen men in 1920	.96
11. Total for women and freshmen women in 1920	.98
12. Total for men and junior-senior men in 1920	.97
13. Total for women and junior-senior women in 1920	.95
14. Total for men and men in class of Spring 1919	.97
15. Total for men and men in class of Fall 1919	.98
16. Total for men and men in class of Winter 1920	.91
17. Total for men and men in class of Spring 1920	.95
18. Total for men and men in class of Fall 1920	.99
19. Total for men and men in class of Winter 1921	.89
20. Total for men and men in class of Spring 1921	.93
21. Total for women and women in class of Spring 1919	.98
22. Total for women and women in class of Fall 1919	.99
23. Total for women and women in class of Winter 1920	.99
24. Total for women and women in class of Spring 1920	.97
25. Total for women and women in class of Fall 1920	.99
26. Total for women and women in class of Winter 1921	.99
27. Total for women and women in class of Spring 1921	.97
28. Men and women in the class of Spring 1919	.97
29. Men and women in the class of Fall 1919	.93
30. Men and women in the class of Winter 1920	.91
31. Men and women in the class of Spring 1920	.93
32. Men and women in the class of Fall 1920	.96
33. Men and women in the class of Winter 1921	.85
34. Men and women in the class of Spring 1921	.85

Digitized by Google

TABLE C. DIFFERENT STATES.

University Groups Compared	r.
University of Texas and University of Wisconsin	.93
University of Texas and University of Kansas	.93
University of Texas and University of Chicago	.95
University of Wisconsin and University of Kansas	.96
University of Wisconsin and University of Chicago	.97
University of Kansas and University of Chicago	.95

VIII.

In Table C, I give the results of comparing students' rankings for the same sixteen practices in different states. The same blanks were given to students at the University of Chicago, the University of Kansas, and the University of Wisconsin. These were compared among themselves and with the University of Texas. For convenience in comparison and because of the small sex difference, the men and women were tabulated together instead of separately as before. The correlations are again all positive and very high. As a matter of fact the only practice about which real disagreement seems to prevail is sabbath breaking. At Texas this is ranked 8 or 9. At all the Northern universities, sabbath breaking is ranked 14. This difference is probably a general difference between the North and the South. Perhaps it might be called more religious or ecclesiastical than purely ethical. With sabbath breaking omitted, the women at Texas and at Chicago have a correlation of .99. This is virtual identity. But even with the difference about sabbath breaking, all correlations are very high.

The four universities here studied are probably good representatives of American popular morality. I hope that I can later secure figures from other universities in the far East and the far West. But I suspect that only a large element of foreign-born students could keep the correlations from being very high. I have not yet secured any data on popular morality outside of America.

IX.

Before we consider some of the ethical and philosophical interpretations of the above statistics, let us briefly outline

Digitized by Google

certain of the future developments of statistical ethics. Some of the lines of investigation listed below have been begun by the present writer, but he has no desire to monopolize either the method or any part of the field of statistical ethics. Such a method obviously requires the collaboration of many different workers. Since it is a scientific method, it will give the same result for all careful workers with the same data.

There is much work still to be done with this same list of sixteen worst practices. Many different localities should be studied both in America and in other parts of the world. In future years, both near and remote, these statistics should be repeated, so as to see if popular morality is changing. It is interesting but useless to wish that we could have such statistics for the different civilizations which have flourished during the past few thousands of years. But we can see that future generations know both the popular morality and the philosophical ethics of the present day.

The present study has been confined to university students. Obviously similar studies should be made of all the different classes in each community. Special attention can profitably be given to the different professions.

The present study has been concerned with what may be called "general worseness." A separate study should be made of double standards, to see which actions are judged to be worse when done by men and which are judged to be worse when done by women.

It might be thought that while groups will agree as to which actions are worse than others, they might not have any uniformity of opinion as to which are more frequently practiced. But this is not the case. There is a uniformity about frequency at the University of Texas which is fully as marked as the uniformity about comparative badness.

A more difficult but very important study is the investigation of what standards public opinion is using in making such rankings as have been given in the present article. There are two ways of doing this. One way is to ask each student why he put each practice in the given rank. The

Digitized by Google

other and more scientific method is to make a correlation between the rank for comparative badness and other ranks which definitely use different moral standards. All the different standards could be used, sentimental and teleological, egoistic and altruistic and universalistic, hedonistic and non-hedonistic, and so forth.

Then other topics could be ranked, some lists made by other groups and some lists made by the investigator for special purposes. More specific or individual acts should be studied. Good actions or practices should be studied, as well as all sorts of experiences, ambitions and ideals.

I should regret any hasty attempt to use statistical ethics for the purpose of giving mental or moral tests to individuals, until we have a much larger and more accurate set of facts for a foundation. But it is obvious that in time some such use will come. Some will regret such a possibility. It would certainly be undesirable in the wrong hands, but there is no reason why such tests cannot some day be handled wisely.

There are many other future uses, such as the securing of more deliberate and critical rankings from persons who have studied or are studying ethics. The Thorndike-Hillegas "order-of-merit method" might be used for a precise measurement of values.[9] But perhaps we have listed enough possibilities to show that there is a large field for profitable work.

X.

Let us turn now to a short consideration of some of the philosophical results and interpretations both of the special study made in this article and also of the general use of statistical ethics.

We talk much about public opinion and the group mind. Some valuable studies have been made in this field. But public opinion should be studied in its factual detail more than has been done. Public opinion is the result of many

[9] M. B. Hillegas, A Scale for the Measurement of Quality in English Composition by Young People, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York 1913.

Digitized by Google

minds, whose similarities and differences must be studied statistically.

It should be stated most emphatically that it is not the purpose of this article to set up public opinion or popular morality as a standard or norm to be obeyed. We have studied the scale of moral values found in popular opinion. This has been mere description of actual facts. How far this popular opinion is to be followed by enlightened minds is a totally different and separate question. The scale which we have discovered is "mediocrity" in the strictest sense of that word. It expresses the average or middle opinion of a group. Perhaps some persons have more enlightened and more reasonable views. But those who differ too much from the average need to be sure that they are more reasonable than their fellows rather than less reasonable.

Whether public opinion is correct or normative always or usually, the fact remains that public opinion is very influential. It is so influential that it must be known, and it can be known accurately only by such methods as we have been studying in this article.

Even if public opinion were always false, it would still demand study so that it could be efficiently corrected or improved. You cannot cure what you do not understand. This applies to all persons who deal with public opinion. Teachers of ethics, especially, are beginning to realize that they need to know what their students think when they first come to the classroom. In this connection statistical ethics is helpful and interesting both to students and teachers.

XI.

The study of ethics may be made empirical in many ways. One way is historical or genetic study; another way is the study of consequences of actions. Both of these ways are very helpful. But the statistical method can give help to empiricism which no other method can give. History relies upon the unverifiable past, consequences run off into the inaccessible future, but statistical ethics gives us an un-

Digitized by Google

questionable confrontation with present-day fact. Interpretations of the facts may differ, but the facts are there to be studied.

Some philosophers seem to pride themselves on having a philosophical method which is distinct from the method of the sciences. The difference seems to be that two independent philosophers seldom hold the same theory and that there is no method of controlling and "checking up" their theorizing. Statistical ethics cannot be a substitute for necessary theories, explanations, and interpretations. But statistical ethics can give a factual basis from which to start and to which to return. It can give a method by which we can "control" our theories. So we may expect statistical ethics to be rejected by those who object to all use of scientific method. Statistical ethics will be objectionable to those who exalt the dogmatic or apologetic spirit in philosophy. Statistical correlations obviously demand the investigative point of view.

XII.

These statistics suggest a discussion of many topics in ethical theory, but our space is used. The remarkable uniformity discovered calls for explanation, and raises anew the old problem about the objectivity or subjectivity of value. A sceptic will naturally wonder how sincere these rankings were, even though they were anonymous. Psychologists will be curious about the relation of these conscious attitudes and standards to the actual motivation of conduct. But all these problems and many others must be left to later discussions.

There is just one point in ethical theory which I cannot resist discussing very briefly. This is the question as to the fundamental value concept or category. I have referred above to the "melioristic" theory that all values are ultimately concerned with the better and the worse. According to this theory valuables are not to be classified as right or wrong, good or bad, except incidentally. Fundamentally valuables are in a scale of better and worse. Does not

Digitized by Google

our study of popular morality indicate a structure in accord with the theory of "meliorism?" Elsewhere I have given philosophical arguments to prove this theory. But surely the inductive and statistical study of the facts of human valuation gives some empirical verification to the theory of the better and the worse.

A. P. BROGAN.

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS.

Digitized by Google

PRESENT-DAY TENDENCIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

R. F. A. HOERNLÉ.

EVERY age achieves through its philosophy, or philosophies, some measure of reflective self-consciousness. It is the function of philosophy to answer for each age the question, *Quo vadis?* It makes us reflectively aware of the directions in which our civilization tends in its dominant movements of thought, scientific and political, æsthetic and religious. If on any great topic the mind of an age is divided, its philosophy cannot but mirror that division, even in the very attempt to overcome it. Our age is manifestly and notoriously divided against itself in its attitude towards, and its estimate of, religion. Hence, in their reading of religion our philosophers, too, fall broadly into two schools. There are the philosophical "defenders of the faith" who, however critical they may be of churches and dogmas, yet endorse and justify religion in principle. And there are those who, in intellectual and moral revolt against churches and dogmas, regard it as the duty of philosophy to lend its aid to the crusade of "science" against "superstition."

The aim of this paper is to take stock of recent contributions to this debate, and, more particularly, to draw attention to the way in which, from several different angles, present-day philosophy is rallying to the defence of religion.

But the philosophical defence of religion is a peculiar thing, and frequently takes forms which may make a zealous churchman and theologian wish to be delivered from such friends: *non tali auxilio!* Hence, it is essential to a just appreciation of current philosophy of religion, that we should make quite clear to ourselves the point of view from which philosophy approaches religion.

In the first place, it is almost inevitable that to us, brought up as most of us are in the tradition of Christianity,

Digitized by Google

the word "religion" should suggest exclusively the Christian religion. Whatever is most vivid in the meaning of "religion" for each of us must needs be drawn from that religion with the creed and ritual of which we are, by education and participation, in some degree familiar. Yet the philosopher of religion, though in a Christian *milieu* he will draw his readiest illustrations from Christianity, cannot accept any limitation of religion to Christianity. Even though he may agree that Christianity is the highest and truest of religions, he cannot identify himself with the theological ardor which would divide humanity into believers and unbelievers, Christians and heathens. He cannot make it his business to take sides in the quarrels about orthodoxy and heterodoxy which have disrupted Christendom into hostile sects and denominations. It is not even part of his task to prove to the world at large that Christianity, in some one or other form of it, is the only true religion, and that all other religions are false and their votaries destined to eternal damnation. It is not in any such sense as this that the philosopher comes forward as a "defender of the faith." What, then, is the relation of philosophy to religion and, further, to theology? Briefly, we must answer that philosophy, with the help of anthropology, psychology, and the history of religions, takes a comparative survey and recognizes in religion a phenomenon that is universal in the human race at every stage of its civilization and in every period of its history. At the same time, philosophy recognizes also that religion occurs in different types or forms, and that each type occurs in manifold degrees of completeness. And, lastly, such a survey, guided by the clue of evolution, enables the student also to distinguish more primitive from more advanced, cruder from more refined, types. The facts supply their own standard for grading; they exhibit the essence of religion more or less perfectly, and the most perfect examples, here as elsewhere, must guide the philosopher in his interpretation of the whole range of the phenomenon. The one thing that a philosopher cannot do is to estimate, or rank, religion by a non-religious standard.

Digitized by Google

Every religion has as its centre a creed, and this is true even of those religions in which much more importance is attached to the due performance of ritual than to the performer's belief in the creed. Even though the community may not exact from the individual more than conformity in ritual, yet the ritual, in the last resort, presupposes the creed; and "every creed," as a recent writer has put it, "is a view of the universe, a theory of man and the world, a theory of God." In short, religion always includes theology, in however rudimentary a form, and all the more developed theologies owe much to philosophy, are indeed philosophical systems on a religious basis. But, for this very reason, there is a clear difference between theology and philosophy of religion. Although theology might be, and occasionally has been, studied in an attitude of detached and unbelieving curiosity, it is normally the central point of the professional training for the ministry or priesthood of a given religion. The theologian stands on a particular denominational basis. He is not only religious, but the member of a particular religious community, or church, and it is the tradition and doctrine of his church which he sets himself systematically to expound and defend, accepting it sincerely as the truth with which his religion stands or falls.

Philosophy of religion, by contrast, is not tied to a particular religion, but takes religion *as such* for its province. It tries to understand religion in all its varied forms and degrees, to appreciate its place and function in human civilization, and in the individual. Above all, it tries to *evaluate* religion, to justify it as a reasonable attitude for reasonable beings. In this general sense, philosophy has been, and still is, a "defender of the faith."

This last statement may well provoke objection. And this is, perhaps, our best opportunity for considering shortly the diverse tendencies in modern life and thought which are hostile to religion in any form in which it is more than morality tinged with emotion. As a statement of fact, indeed, our assertion is fairly secure. Most of the great philosophers of modern times have taken religion seriously. With-

Digitized by Google

out necessarily defending all the details of the Christian, or of any other theology, they have yet defended religion as such. They have tried to show that the nature of the universe sustains and justifies, in principle, the religious attitude. But as a statement of how philosophy ought to deal with religion, our assertion will be challenged by all who hold that, so far from justifying religion, it is the function of philosophy to emancipate the human mind from its bondage to religion. There has been growing, throughout the nineteenth century, a steady counter-current of revolt against religion, which has reflected itself in sharp criticism of every philosophy of religion which does not either identify religion with morality or, else, treat it as a superstition to be overcome by the advance of civilization and science. The roots of this movement are spread so widely through every province of human thought and activity, that its advocates have some excuse for their claim to be the heralds of the future, the leaders of "progress." The philosophically most powerful representative of this tendency is "positivism," and in Comte's law of the three stages of human thought—theological, metaphysical, positive—it has found the classical formula for its interpretation of history and for its gospel of progress. The emancipation of science from theology, of which we took note throughout the preceding lectures, though its beginnings date back beyond positivism, yet received from it a fresh impetus. Everywhere positivism stands for the rejection of all beliefs in the supernatural as mere survivals of pre-scientific modes of thought. History, anthropology, psychology are studied from a naturalistic angle, and then in turn invoked to re-enforce the positivistic conclusion about religion. The very fact that to the anthropologist the beliefs of primitive peoples which he studies are nothing but superstitions and myths, and their ritual full of magic, opens his eyes to many survivals of myth and magic in the symbols and language of his own religion. Thus a process of detachment and scepticism has set in. Religion in all its forms is approached, not as something which is being believed, accepted, lived, by the stu-

Digitized by Google

dent, but as an object for aloof intellectual curiosity. All human beliefs, it appears, can be studied as facts, in entire abstraction from the question of their truth. *Die Wissenschaft kennt keine Werturteile* is the classic maxim for this attitude. Indeed, if the student begins by regarding primitive forms of religion as obviously false, this judgment will inevitably extend to the higher forms, too. If religion began as superstition, why should it not end as such? Similarly psychology, working on Mr. A. J. Balfour's principle, "Scratch a reason and you will find a cause," shows that beliefs are commonly induced by a variety of non-rational causes, and may persist, not only in the absence of objective reasons for them, but in the fact of patent counter-evidence or inherent improbability. Even one of the greatest living metaphysicians has remarked that "metaphysics is nothing but the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct." True, he went on, at once, to add that "to find these reasons is itself an instinct," nor does its origin in instinct necessarily imply that a belief is false. Still, the reaction against religion persists, gaining no little strength from the ill-judged insistence of the orthodox on the literal acceptance of much in the traditional doctrine which deserves to give way to better knowledge or finer feeling. The cause of religion has suffered at the hands of its friends by their attempt to retain much bad science in the bible, and much bad logic in theology.

That the positivists themselves should have founded a church of the "religion of humanity," which enlisted the enthusiasm of some of the finest spirits of the age, like John Stuart Mill, is no doubt a tribute to the strength of the demand for religion in human nature. But what is most significant about the new religion is the point of its challenge to the old. For the ineffective love of a supernatural and non-existent God it seeks to substitute the effective love of actual men and women. From preoccupation with the salvation of his soul in a life after death it seeks to turn man to the service of his kind in this life. It aims at making the energy of religion available in the cause of human progress,

Digitized by Google

for the fight against disease, poverty, ignorance, crime. It preaches a crusade against remediable ills in the cause of a better future for the human race on this earth. Thus, positivism in its opposition to the supernatural is as characteristically the philosophy of a scientific age, as in its moral fervour for the amelioration of the human lot it is the philosophy of a philanthropic age. The "meliorism" of William James and the pragmatists echoes the similar attitude of Mill. Both point to the existence of evil as incompatible with the perfection of the universe, be that perfection predicated in the name of the God of theology or of the Absolute of philosophy. Both declare that the belief in perfection must corrupt the moral effort at its source. Is it not illogical to try to better a world which is already as good as it can be? If this is the best of all possible worlds, morality is meaningless, and either resignation, or the taking of "moral holidays," is the only logical course. On the traditional view, the existence of evil presents an insoluble theoretical problem. On the meliorist view, there is no problem of evil except the practical one, how best to do away with it. This moralistic strain of thought has exercised an influence upon religious thought far beyond the borders of positivism proper. It has revived the old problem of whether God's goodness and wisdom are compatible with his omnipotence, and a philosopher like James Ward, a theologian like Dean Rashdall, are found inclining to a "limited" Deity—finite in power, infinite in goodness—as the most reasonable escape from the horns of the dilemma.

This is undoubtedly one of the gravest problems which the philosophy of religion has to face. Without attempting a full discussion, the outline of an answer to the melioristic view may be briefly sketched.

In the first place, the evidence of religious experience is decisively against the attempt of meliorists to shrink religion to a moralistic pattern, or to fix the attitude of uncompromising hostility to evil as the exclusive attitude of religion. The saintliest of men have, as a rule, risen beyond the antagonism of good and evil, and yet there has been no

Digitized by Google

weakening of their efforts or their influence for righteousness, as the records of their lives abundantly show. To quote but one recent example. The Bengali saint and mystic, Ramakrishna, said towards the end of his life: "I have now come to a stage of realization in which I see that God is walking in every human form and manifesting Himself alike through the saint and the sinner, the virtuous and the vicious. Therefore, when I meet different people, I say to myself: 'God in the form of the saint, God in the form of the sinner, God in the form of the unrighteous and God in the form of the righteous!' He who has attained to such realization goes beyond good and evil, above virtue and vice, and realizes that the Divine is working everywhere."[1] Examples such as these might be multiplied indefinitely. They show that the moralists in religion commonly ignore the *mystical* attitude altogether.

Further, the concepts of God's love, of redemption, atonement, forgiveness of sins, take us, not indeed towards any condonation, still less towards any encouragement, of evil, yet in a direction very different from the meliorist's hope. They do not weaken the springs of moral effort, but they warn us not to overestimate their strength. They teach us—and here, surely, they are at one with common experience—not to expect the complete disappearance of evil through the complete perfecting of human nature by human effort. The roots of good and evil lie very deep in human nature and also very close together. The moral problem presents itself afresh to each generation, and in terms which change with every new development in civilization with new powers and new opportunities giving rise to new desires and altered human relationships. For all a parent's efforts to hand on the hard-won moral heritage to his children by precept and example, he knows well enough that in the main they must acquire the knowledge of good and evil by which they will actually live, through their own trial and error.

[1] *Gospel of Ramakrishna*, p. 88. See also Max Muller, *The Life and Sayings of Ramakrishna*. I owe quotation and reference to J. B. Pratt's *The Religious Consciousness* (MacMillan & Co., 1920), pp. 132 f.

Digitized by Google

Eritis sicut deus, scientes bonum et malum. Self-control comes only with self-knowledge, and self-knowledge is never complete so long as we constantly find ourselves in new situations to which in temperament, judgment, and purpose may prove unequal. These hazards seem inherent in human life, and no meliorist has yet shown a way to eliminate them. And even if they could be eliminated, how many of us would, with Huxley, be willing to surrender the management of our own lives and be regulated like a clock, on condition of never going wrong?

It is not to be forgotten that this whole reaction against religion is, as a movement in the Christian world, a reaction against Christianity. But the meaning of "Christianity" is not simple or single. It may, *e.g.*, mean the teaching of Christ; it may mean the whole body of doctrine built upon that foundation by the Church; it may mean the Church as an organization, the acts and policies of which, quite apart from its spiritual teachings, make it a force in human affairs. If the positivist reaction was provoked in part by certain metaphysical and moral features of Christian theology, it was also directed against the Church as a powerful instrument of dominion over the lives and minds of men. Symptomatic of this is the fact that the word "laique" has taken on in the sociological theories of religion of the Durkheim school the meaning of "anti-clerical," reflecting the antagonism of church and state in the political life of France.

At the same time, the trial of the war has made it clear that perhaps the profoundest reaction of men against the Christianity of the churches is due to the perception of the fact that the churches have, on the whole, failed to make the teaching of Christ an effective force in the lives of Christian communities. The most obvious criticism which an intelligent non-European will invariably make upon the white man's civilization is that, by and large, Christians do not practise what they preach, and do not seriously try to. And who will confidently deny the charge? Religion, whatever else it may be, is not departmental. It claims to control and pervade the whole of life. It is not an affair of

Digitized by Google

special moods or exceptional moments. It is not intended to be shelved on weekdays and exhibited on Sundays by going through a conventional routine. It is a thing to live by, always. Now, this being so, it is a simple question to ask: How far are our policies and institutions, political or economic, ordered with any definite reference to the Christian ideals which we profess? The facts, surely, are rather that since we have abandoned the medieval ideal of a theocratic state on earth, both politics and economics in their public or communal aspects have emancipated themselves from the control of religious ideals, the sphere of which in consequence has shrunk to the individual's private conduct. Religion is, no doubt, the direct relation of the individual to God, yet it does not follow that the social order which so largely determines the individual's aims, duties, and standards of judgment, is indifferent and negligible. Yet, this is exactly what the social order is all too often treated by the churches as being. The most vital and burning problems which at the present day divide men's minds centre precisely round the values for which the existing order stands. Yet, in the main, the churches, which claim to be our guides and guardians in questions of value affecting the whole conduct of our lives, stand timidly aloof and their leaders but too often utter only benevolent exhortations from which neither they nor their hearers trouble to draw the practical consequences.

That the churches should, as is commonly acknowledged, be losing their hold, and that much genuinely religious life should be alienated from them and seek an outlet through other channels or languish for lack of an outlet, is in the circumstances not a matter for wonder. But, in spite of this, the philosopher, taking a comprehensive survey of human experience and thought, has little difficulty in discerning the central place which religion—which in this assertion means something more fundamental than assent to this or that theology, or membership of this or that church—holds in normal human life. Whatever the fluctuations in the fortunes of churches may be, or, again, the quickenings and

Digitized by Google

slackenings in the energy of men's religious life itself, philosophy renders to religion the service of making the need of it and the justification for it clear to reflective consciousness.

But how, positively, does philosophy proceed in its defence of religion?

We said above that philosophy has to "evaluate" religion. The phrase may have suggested philosophy sitting in the judgment-seat, and religion coming before it to assert its own value and accept philosophy's verdict on its claim. But whence is the supposed philosophical judge to take his own standard for measuring the justice of that claim? Philosophy has nothing to philosophize with except what human experience offers to it as material for reflective synthesis or synopsis. There is, indeed, a *formal* principle by which philosophy is guided, viz., the principle of consistency or coherence. But the *matter* to be moulded in this form consists of all the wealth which experience presents to him who would "think things together." This implies at once that the existence of religion is one of the cardinal data for a philosophical synopsis. Whatever choice philosophy may have in the way in which it will fit religion into its edifice, it has no choice between accepting and rejecting it. Philosophy is not free to omit religion; it simply cannot leave religion out.

But more: not only must it include religion among its data, but it must do so substantially on religion's own terms, and at its own valuation. It must concede the central place of religion. Its synopsis would be untrue to the proportions of the data, if it did not put in the centre the things which are in the centre. That religion is thus central or local is a commonplace among all students of it. Psychologically, it is admitted on all hands, that it is not "departmental." It is not an affair of the intellect alone, or the will alone, or the feelings alone, though any one of these three may be dominant in the religion of a given individual or a given age. In principle, religion involves the *whole* man: at its best, it is itself a synthesis, a unification, a harmonious stabilization of all sides of his nature. And for

Digitized by Google

this reason again it is, in principle, not one departmental interest or activity among others: at its best it pervades all interests and sweeps them into its orbit. This being its nature, it is best, perhaps, to follow those writers who speak of religion as an "attitude" rather than as an "experience." For "experience" suggests too much that religion is merely "subjective," mere inward feeling, mere thought without an objective basis. "Attitude," without ceasing to connote the subjective side, yet suggests also activity, response, and thus implies the objective side, the universe, to which religion is the response. Moreover, "attitude" brings out, too, that religion is more than a theory: it is a way of life. It includes, indeed, always a theory, or theology, more or less reasoned and explicit, but it is first and always more than merely intellectual assent to a theory. And, again, whilst, no doubt, the theory aims at being true as tested by logical canons, and must be recast if it fails to meet that test, yet the truth of religious theory is not really separable from the success of the religious attitude. Religion claims to "work," to be known by its fruits. This "pragmatic" character of religion, too, is nowadays conceded by most of the students of it. Fruitfulness and moral effect are vouchers of truth. Or, perhaps, we should rather, with W. E. Hocking, use the pragmatic principle negatively: *that which does not work is not true*, and say of any theory which "lowers the capacity of men to meet the stress of existence, or diminishes the worth to them of what existence they have," that it is somehow false, and that we have no peace until it is remedied. That religion works in the way here suggested by Hocking cannot well be doubted by anyone who honestly looks at the facts. Here is the verdict of the most recent student of the religious consciousness, Professor J. B. Pratt:

"When one compares the deeply religious and spiritual person with the best and bravest of those who are not religious, one sees, it must be confessed, that the former possesses something which the others lack. It is not that he is any better morally than his non-religious brother, nor any more appreciative of beauty and love nor any braver. It is, rather, that he has a confidence in the universe and an inner joy which the other does not know. He is, perhaps, no more at home in this world than the other (per-

Digitized by Google

haps he is not so much at home here), but he seems more at home in the universe as a whole. He feels himself in touch, and he acts as if he were in touch, with a larger environment. He either has a more cosmic sense or his attitude towards the cosmos is one of larger hope and greater confidence. Besides this, or as a result of this, he has an inner source of joy and strength which does not seem dependent on outer circumstance, and which in fact seems greatest at times when outer sources of strength and promise fail. He is, therefore, able to shed a kind of peace around him which no argument and no mere animal spirits and no mere courage can produce."

We see now more clearly in what sense philosophy defends and justifies religion and accepts it at its own valuation. But we may throw light upon the same point from another side. If philosophy, it may be said, defends religion, it should at least define what it is that it defends. Now this problem of defining religion has given no end of trouble. Pratt quotes no less than forty-eight definitions from as many different writers, and rounds off the list by adding two fresh ones of his own. The reason for the difficulty is very obviously that religion is so multiform in type and degree, that a formula which would adequately reflect its variations, would be intolerably complex. On the other hand, any compact formula will, in proportion to its compactness, fit part of the facts only, and compel us to reject as irreligious whatever it does not include. And there is a deeper difficulty which has induced one of the foremost English writers on religion at the present day, Professor C. C. J. Webb, to declare that any definition of religion is impossible, for any definition will always be either circular or irrelevant: the defining phrase will either surreptitiously slip in the term to be defined, or else miss out precisely what differentiates religion from other human attitudes. But, if religion is thus indefinable and unique, a consequence follows which has not always been observed. It is this, that the philosopher who sets out to discuss religion must himself be religious. For else, to put it bluntly, he will simply not know what he is talking about. The outsider's point of view alone is here clearly inadequate. Whether a definition of religion be possible or not, no definition can enable anyone to understand what religion is who is not acquainted

Digitized by Google

with it to some extent by being religious. Unless the student knows what the term "religion" means by being religious, there is no other attitude in which he can stand to religious language, belief, and cult, than the external attitude in which we all commonly stand to religions other than our own. Let a Protestant, brought up in ignorant contempt of "popish idolatry," watch a Roman Catholic service—the candles, bells, beads, incense, genuflexions and other ministrations, the repetition of lengthy formulæ in unintelligible Latin, the appeals to saints, etc.—and as he stands there, detached, aloof, unsharing, he may find it utterly unintelligible that the worshippers take part with reverence and gain obvious peace and comfort. *A fortiori*, the mental distance is even greater when a European watches the ceremonies of savages, involving, it may be, animal sacrifices, grotesque dances, self-torture, or indecent rites. If it is hard for those brought up in one religion to understand another, it is doubly hard for those who are irreligious to understand those who are religious. Religion, then, cannot be intelligently discussed except by those who are acquainted with it from within, though this acquaintance must needs be with some particular type of religion, in conformity with the student's whole intellectual outlook and social heritage. And this brings us back to our point: if being religious is the only basis on which we can philosophize about religion with genuine insight, and if being religious means living in a definite attitude towards the universe—an attitude engaging all sides of our nature, pervading all our activities, and including a core of belief or theory about the character of the universe and its disposition towards us—then we can understand why philosophy, so far from seeking to destroy religion as being unreasonable, has sought to defend its reasonableness by exhibiting reflectively its central position in man's life as a "life of reason." Whoever knows "from within" what religion is, cannot thereafter either build his philosophy without it or treat it as anything but central. Negatively, this appears even in the attitude of pessimism which is essentially an inverted

Digitized by Google

type of religion, the *cri du cœur* of those who have failed to find or to maintain the attitude of confidence and trust in the universe, and who thence proclaim either that human existence has nothing of value to justify it, or else that our values, in a universe indifferent to them, are not destined to endure. For the pessimist this negative result is as central in his whole scheme of thinking as is the opposite estimate for any philosophy which bases itself on religion triumphant. In either case, as Webb says, it is "with Religion that the interest in Reality as a whole, which is the characteristic interest of philosophy, first takes shape in the human mind."

In the technical language of philosophy, the position which we have now reached, has been acknowledged and expressed in one of two ways. One way is to assert that religion is metaphysical, *i.e.*, that metaphysics, as the explicit effort to frame a reflective theory of the universe as a whole by the thinking together of all sides of human experience, must take from the religious experience, or attitude, its most important clue to the nature of the whole. Religious feeling and thought must be accepted as, in principle, not fancy, or make-believe, but *bona fide* discovery or revelation of the real character of the real world. The other way, which leads to the same goal, is to be found in the handling by modern philosophers of the old arguments for the existence of God. The lesson which we have learnt from the destructive criticisms of the traditional arguments by Hume and Kant is that these arguments failed precisely because they tried to demonstrate the existence of God without appealing to the evidence of the religious attitude itself. The tactics of the traditional arguments were undoubtedly due to the distinction between revelation and reason. Religion being regarded as fundamentally based on revelation, *i.e.*, on the self-revelation of God, the problem took the form of reaching the same assurance of God's existence by the road of reasoning, either from the evidence of design in nature, or from the existence of the world as requiring a cause, or from the assumed perfection of the Supreme Being. None

Digitized by Google

of these three arguments was free, in consequence, to appeal to religion itself, for that would have been an appeal to revelation, narrowly interpreted as an appeal to the Holy Scriptures and the authoritative teaching of the church. By contrast, the argument of modern philosophy of religion does not assume, as its basis, this distinction between revelation and reason (or, in another form of it, between revealed and natural religion). Hence it does not attempt to prove—if "proof" is the proper word—the existence of God without an appeal to religious experience. And, whilst appealing to this experience, and, indeed, regarding it as the only really relevant evidence, it also enlarges the scope of it far beyond "revelation," so as to include, in effect, all that is valuable in the old appeal to "reason." The modern argument has learned much from the methods of Kant's "postulates of the moral reason," for a postulate is essentially a belief held, or a theory affirmed, as implicit in the maintenance of an "attitude" towards the universe in the sense which we have above given to the term "attitude." To put it in a nutshell: we know God through religion, and there is no other way of knowing him. It is not that we are religious because we have become convinced antecedently, from other sources, that there is a God. Nor do we gain our conviction by an exercise of the "will to believe," if that means, Pascal-wise, taking a gambler's chance on the possibility of there being a God. If there is a "venture of faith" which outruns demonstration and yet is not sapped by doubt, it is because in religion we live by a conviction which the very habit of living by it re-enforces and sustains, and which justifies itself by a stability of outlook and response unshaken by the vicissitudes of human fortune.

The result of this re-orientation of the philosophy of religion, in respect of the problem of God's existence, is far-reaching. It means, as Webb puts it, that "the great question for the thinker about religion is not *whether God exists*, but rather *what God is*." Or, to put it differently, to doubt God's existence is, at bottom, nothing but to doubt

Digitized by Google

whether the universe, in its real nature, is such as to justify the religious attitude towards it: whether it deserves to be worshipped. Even more strikingly the new technique appears in Hocking's attempt to exhibit what it is in our experience of the universe that we mean by "God." In the very form in which he thus puts the problem, it is taken for granted that "experience is essentially metaphysical," that it consists in the "discovery" and "recognition" of a real object. Proof of God's existence is, thus, not a process of building a precarious speculative bridge from the world we see to its unseen author, but a making plain what, in a sense, is there and possessed by us all the time, but what, for all its presence, we may fail securely to grasp or clearly to discern. We need argument because our hold on reality is variable. We live, we feel, we think, now on the surface lightly, now seriously and strenuously in the depths. This is why the assurance which religion as a living attitude carries with it and demonstrates in deeds, needs also to be raised to the level of reflective certainty, at least by, and for, those minds who, having once begun to think things together, are consumed by a cognitive restlessness which only the success of their synoptic endeavors can still. Thus, the argument does not start with a definition of God and then search the world of experience for an object which conforms to the definition: it starts with the world of experience and, pushing through half-truths and partial impressions to its real nature, finds there the meaning of "God."

But we have anticipated in thus focusing our attention upon the problem of the existence of God. This problem is symptomatic of the revival of theism which is the most recent, as it is also the most striking, movement in philosophy of religion. Among its literature, W. E. Hocking's *The Meaning of God in Human Experience* is written fresh from the life, as it were: the record of the philosophical pilgrimage of a deeply religious mind. C. C. J. Webb's Gifford Lectures, especially Vol. I, on *God and Personality* develop a theistic philosophy in closest contact with the detailed structure of Christian theology. Professor A. S.

Digitized by Google

Pringle-Pattison's Gifford Lectures on *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy* reach a theistic conclusion, not so much through an interpretation of theological thought, as through a criticism, on the one hand, of naturalistic and agnostic tendencies in modern philosophy, and of pantheistic tendencies on the other. The significance of this movement will be the more readily appreciated when we recall that, not quite 30 years ago, F. H. Bradley, in *Appearance and Reality*, whilst declaring that nothing could be more certain than religion, yet also proclaimed the God of theology to be "riddled with contradictions." Nor did Bradley hold out any hope that by further, and better, thinking we might remove these contradictions, for the chief of his theses was that all thinking is from its very nature bound to be self-contradictory; bound to pursue a consistency which it must ever fail to attain.

The effect of this doctrine might well have been to discourage all philosophical effort, had not Bradley qualified it by saying also that we cannot help thinking and, indeed, that we can think, satisfactorily enough for all "practical" purposes. At any rate, since Bradley's book appeared, philosophical activity in all directions has been singularly varied and vigorous, and not least so on the subject of religion. There are at least three distinct tendencies: (1) There is the theistic tendency, already noted, which attempts a philosophical defence of belief in a *personal* God. (2) There is the tendency to emphasize, not so much God and personality, as the perfection, or value, of the universe. Höffding's definition of religion as "faith in the conservation of value" is a typical expression of this view, which for us is best represented by Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures on *The Principle of Individuality and Value* and *The Value and Destiny of the Individual.* (3) And there is the curious doctrine of "Deity" which S. Alexander has recently put forward, as part of his "realistic" system, in *Space, Time and Deity*, and which presents familiar *motifs* in a highly original combination.

Let us glance at each of these three tendencies, remember-

Digitized by Google

ing that within the time at our disposal we can do no more than pick out a central point or two:

(1) The strength of theism, as also its difficulties, lie in its interpretation of religion by *social* analogies and, consequently, its emphasis on the *personality* of the worshipper and the *personality* of God. The chief reason why metaphysicians of our second group shrink from the theistic position is just that they feel unable either to rank human personality so high, or to conceive God so anthropomorphically. For God as a person must needs be pictured to the imagination as a man writ large, and as we ascribe to him such human attributes as love, knowledge, will, power, we are ever conscious of alternative dangers, both equally fatal. For, on the one hand, we feel driven to assert that all these attributes exist in God in a perfection utterly beyond anything we know in man. Yet, the more we stress this transcendent perfection, the more do our terms threaten to become meaningless. On the other hand, the more vividly concrete we seek to make their meaning, the more do we shrink God to the dimensions of the human patterns with which we are familiar. However, we do not wish now to exploit these dialectics. The fact stands that, in proportion as the worshipper feels himself responding to a power which responds to him, his religion takes on the theistic form, even though it acknowledge more than one God, or a devil as well as a god. Almost all the higher religions employ the language of social intercourse at its most intimate to render the worshipper's sense of his closeness to, and trust in, God. To know God, and to be known by Him; to love God, and to be loved by Him—is not the best of Christianity summed up in these simple and familiar phrases? God as father, God as judge, God as king—always a social relationship supplies the pattern on which the worshipper's attitude is moulded. Webb admits that the concept of God as a person is of very recent origin even in Christian thought, and that Christianity is the only one of the great historical religions the theology of which culminates in that concept. But he also argues that this is

Digitized by Google

"the natural culmination of a tendency traceable in all Religion," and with skill and sympathy he sets himself to show that the chief concepts of the Christian religion—sin, forgiveness, justice, sacrifice, union with God—gain both in intelligibility and in moral power when God is conceived as a person. Thus, *e.g.*, "to regard Sin as an offence against a personal authority, and still more to regard it as an affront to a loving Father, is a more intelligible and a more ethically significant way of thinking about it than it is to conceive it after the analogy of a physical defilement or an automatic mechanism." And both love and knowledge, when applied to religion, suggest an intimacy of union in which the distinction of persons adds richness of content and is so little an obstacle to union that we may well come near to Spinoza's language about our love towards God being the very love with which God loves himself. For "God in us" is as essential to the full religious attitude as "God above, or beyond, us."

The same social character of theism is developed in a very different and strikingly interesting way by Hocking.[2] After emphasizing that religion in its higher forms grows into a sense of God as the "intimate, infallible, associate," the "companion" whose constant presence brings peace of mind and happiness, he describes the "original source of the knowledge of God" as "an experience of *not being alone in knowing the world*, and especially the world of Nature." This clue he follows up into an analysis of our knowledge of Nature as a world actually, or potentially, common to ourselves and others, and of our knowledge of other minds as minds also knowing or interested in, just these objects which we know and are interested in ourselves. And over this bridge of the social character of knowledge he seeks to travel to the conclusion that in knowing Nature we are in social

[2] Perhaps Hocking's argument owes something to a position which Royce outlined in his early work on *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*. But, if so, Hocking has re-thought and re-stated the argument in a thoroughly original way, and the direct affiliation to Berkeley which it had in Royce, has dropped wholly into the background in Hocking.

Digitized by Google

contact with the great Other Mind which communicates itself to us through Nature, and which to religion reveals itself in the character of God.

(2) The second type of philosophy of religion does occasionally express itself in language which, torn from its context, may seem to identify it with straightforward theism. Thus Bosanquet ends his chapter on "The Religious Consciousness" with the words:

> "Religion establishes the infinite spirit because it is continuous with and present in the finite—in love and in the will for perfection. It does not need to appeal to facts of separate being, or to endeavor to demonstrate them. It is an experience of God, not a proof of him."

This last sentence illustrates admirably the change in the point of view of modern philosophy of religion which we had pointed out above. But "God" for Bosanquet in this passage is not the personal Spirit of the theist, but rather the impersonal, or super-personal, Reality in its character of perfection. The theist's God is characterised by Bosanquet, in a passage immediately preceding the one just quoted, as "an appearance of reality, as distinct from being the whole and ultimate reality." When we translate this statement out of the technical language of philosophy into the language of everyday life, it means (a) that the social analogies and metaphors through which ordinary religious thought expresses itself cannot be taken literally, as if they were either plain statements of fact or ultimate philosophical truths. And (b) it means, more especially, that the theist's concept of God, as the will for good against evil, is still too much colored by this antithesis of good and evil to be adequate to a Reality which, as a whole, is perfect. Thus there is a subtle change in this reading of religion. This comes out clearly in that Bosanquet does not regard religion as specially connected with the supernatural, or even the divine (scil., as conceived by theists). It is for him, the attitude to whatever one at once fears and approves, *i.e.*, worships. "Whatever makes us seem to ourselves worthless in our mere private selves, although or because attaching ourselves in the spirit to a reality of transcendent

Digitized by Google

value, cannot be distinguished from religion." This view is explicitly intended to provide for *false* religions, *i.e.*, it allows that this attitude of self-surrendering attachment and worship may be directed to an object undeserving of such devotion.[3] What object, then, is deserving? The answer gives us Bosanquet's meaning of "God," or rather what he would mean by "God," if he did not on the whole avoid the terms because of its theistic associations. His own strict language is studiously impersonal: he means by "God" Reality as a whole, conceived as perfect, and as transcending and transforming within itself the opposition of good and evil. In this perfection man participates, and religion in his sense of this participation, of his fragmentariness made whole, of the evil in him overcome, of his life, for all its failures and blemishes, filled with value. "Every satisfaction and achievement—every self-transcendence in which we become united with something which was beyond us—may be religiously felt, if it is taken as involving recognition of a higher perfection, that is, as coming to us not in our own strength, but as a pledge of our absorption in the greater world."

Compared with the concrete imagery of current theology, such a rendering of religion will inevitably seem pale. The theist's language has the advantage there. But it is to be noticed that the pallor of the language reflects not thinness of experience, but a fullness and intensity to which the more familiar terms of religious speech seem inadequate.

(3) Our third type of philosophy of religion—Alexander's—shares the modern approach: "Religion is not the sentiment which is directed upon God, but God is that upon which the religious sentiment is directed. The datum of experience is that sentiment, and what God is is known only by examining its deliverances." "What we worship, that is God." But it takes a highly original turn by treating "deity" or "divine quality" as a term more fundamental than God. "God" is the name for any being (there may

[3] Patriotism, for example, will be religious by this formula, and it would be an interesting question, whether, or under what conditions, it is a "false" religion.

Digitized by Google

be more than one) which possesses "deity." Deity, moreover, is a metaphysical term; in other words, it belongs to philosophy to show, by an examination of the whole system of things, that what religion worships as God really has the quality which alone justifies the religious passion. The metaphysical argument by which Alexander tries to establish the locus, so to speak, of deity in the scheme of things may be briefly outlined as follows: He conceives the universe as in process of evolution, creatively bringing forth qualities which are not only new, but form a hierarchy, an ascending scale of perfection. Not to go back to the beginnings in "Space-time," which, for all Alexander's skill in exposition, are very obscure, we may enumerate, first the secondary qualities, next life, then mind as, to date, the latest stages in this evolution towards greater perfection. "Deity" is the next level of perfection, in the birth-throes of which the world is now travailing. It follows that "God," as the possessor of the quality of deity, does not yet exist. He is only about to be.

"God is the whole world as possessing the quality of deity. . . . But this possessor of deity is not actual but ideal. As an actual existent, God is the infinite world with its nisus towards deity, or, to adapt a phrase of Leibniz, as big or in travail with deity."

Religion is our sense of participating in this creative nisus of the world towards becoming God. In us, in fact, this nisus is at its intensest. Mind is, so to speak, the growing-point towards God. There lies the solid certainty and significance of religion.

Fascinating as is in many ways this essay in theology, and concordant, too, in its emphasis on the reality of time, on creative evolution, on progress towards perfection, with marked tendencies of modern thought, yet most critics have been puzzled whether to take it seriously. And rightly—for it breaks, in effect, with every great historical religion. It satisfies neither the theist nor the absolutist. For, the one holds that God is real here and now, and the other says the same of the perfection of the universe. In this, both of them seem truer than Alexander to the deliverances of the

Digitized by Google

actual religious consciousness, which is fundamentally an attitude, not towards a reality about to be, but towards a reality which endures and is, in truth, "eternal." True wisdom bids us, rather than fix our hopes upon the future beyond the grave or upon the course of history yet to be on this earth, to remember that we are mortal and to seize our opportunity here and now of filling our lives with the things that are eternal.

R. F. A. HOERNLÉ.

ARMSTRONG COLLEGE,
NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE.

Digitized by Google

THE NATURE OF THE KNOWLEDGE THAT CONDITIONS GOODNESS.

LOUIS ARNAUD REID.

IN the following paper we shall attempt to show that morality, if it is to be more than mere obedience to codes and conventions, must have an inspiration, the dynamic force of which is grounded in the experience through one channel or another, of universal values. Man is, just as truly as he is a member of a particular society, also a member of the wider cosmos, in relation to which he must always, if he is to be a man, stand as a discoverer and an adventurer and creator, not in any exclusively practical, or intellectual, or artistic sense, but through every human activity in which man is able to realise himself at all. Morally great men are just those who, whether in thought, or in practical life, are able to know and to discern universal values. The moral life, if it is to be vital, must bear upon it the stamp of a personality which is lit by contact with these values.

"Value experience" means here simply that discernment through concrete things, in nature or elsewhere, through the lives and conduct of persons, including ourselves, or through intellectual pursuit, of a universal good, which, for want of a better name, we can only call value. We can with justification use the term "value" (as opposed to the term "good") only because the latter is inclined to have an exclusively ethical connotation, whilst "value" must be regarded in a much wider sense than that in which goodness and morality are often thought of. "That there is value in the universe" must mean not only that in the universe is to be found the great home of the morally good life, but that in the universe there is also to be found satisfaction for the lives of truth and beauty. We must approach the thing called Universal Value by the roads of the intellect and æsthetic feeling as well as through our lives and conduct

Digitized by Google

in a more narrowly "moral" sense. It must also be accepted as an ultimate fact that the three values of truth, beauty, goodness, are cognate and, whilst clearly distinguishable from the human end, are from the side of the universe a complete complex unity, becoming therein so transfused that statements about any one of them must involve infinitely ramifying statements about the others. Further, the experience of Universal Value, although it is a knowledge, is not merely a "knowledge that" but must be a felt experience, involving the affective and conative sides of our nature as well as the cognitive. In the pursuit of truth we feel "exalted" and we strive strenuously; in beauty we strive and know.

It is important to notice that this is just the subjective side of that which we referred to above as a universal truth, namely the transfusion in the end of values into Value. In any supreme human experience, whether of goodness or beauty or truth, we realise, in the fusion of an intense consciousness, not merely one value, though one is dominant, but all values. In the ordinary everyday moments of life the values may be very clearly canalised; in moments of exaltation we are able through feeling to visualise them in their universality.

So far we have stated shortly the fact of the experience of Value, and have assumed dogmatically that the experience has reference to something which is really objective, a Value which really does reside in the Cosmos. Our task now is to show briefly the nature of this experience, regarded as *knowledge*, and later, to suggest the fundamental importance of this experience for morality.

It is significant as it is natural that Reason, or Rationality, should have been regarded by many great thinkers, both ancient and modern, as the supreme principle in man's mental polity. In our paper we shall not be concerned with reason, regarded in any historically ethical sense, but shall rather, taking the cognitive element of man's nature in its broader aspect (as opposed to "reason" in any narrow sense), try to determine the importance of that element in

Digitized by Google

affecting the content of the moral life. Reason, in abstracto, is a thing largely of logical procedure, it is a method of knowledge, a way of knowledge, and not in its purity the whole method or way, and its value resides in its ability to help us to understand reality. It is, in a word, instrumental. And it is partly, perhaps, because philosophy has been in the hands of men to whom reason seemed a supremely important thing in their lives, that reason has, sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly, as in Plato, been identified with knowledge; that intellectual analysis and synthesis have been regarded as the same thing—as the true full awareness of reality. Yet when Socrates said "Virtue is knowledge," although he may have been thinking of intellectual analysis, his true meaning was something very much deeper. Knowledge to him was an apprehension by the whole being, and it was an apprehension of essences. Without discussing the Socratic dictum, but accepting (what the ordinary man accepts) that knowledge can somehow effect moral conduct, let us examine this knowledge, and how it works. Knowledge for us must here mean something such as Socrates meant, a grasping by the whole being, a prehension in which intellect, affection and will are organically concerned, and it must mean a prehension of essences, not in the Socratic sense of logical entities, but in the sense of values that appear through, but are more than, particular objects, and in the last instance, the essence of value itself. To put it more plainly, we mean by knowledge, the knowledge which is involved in the apprehension or experience of Value, and it is our task to show the nature of this knowledge, which is, generally speaking, receptive, and afterwards to suggest its relation to the life of conduct and action which is in its nature opposed to it, being expressive. The relation of impression to expression, then, is our problem.

Perhaps the use of the term knowledge in this way may be criticised as confusing. Psychology has reserved for the term "cognition," the meaning of an aspect, a mode, of any complete experience, which contains as well affection and

Digitized by Google

conation. The same objective holds when we talk of a "feeling," a "pleasure," an "action," or a "strife." We may regard cognition, feeling, conation, simply as aspects of a complete experience, or we may think of them concretely as words naming experiences where either knowledge, or feeling, or action, is predominant. It is in the latter concrete sense that we are using the word "knowledge" when we say that knowledge is the supreme determining principle in the moral life. We call the complete experience, "knowledge," because knowing is its most outstanding characteristic. Knowing may either be predominant in the particular mode of the value-experience itself, as in intellectual endeavour (although that involves feeling and striving; indeed, to be a complete value-experience, the feeling element which accompanies that clarity which is sometimes the outcome of strenuous thinking, must be very pronounced, or it may follow upon reflection after an experience in which feeling is very marked, if not predominant; as when we are thrilled by the account of some noble deed; or where feeling is decidedly predominant, as in æsthetic experience. We call the complete experience "knowing," then, either because the cognition element is directly predominant, or because reflection must follow if the experience is to ripen fully into one of Universal Value (over and above particular types of value). We call it so because reflection is the principle mode by which man developes all sides of his nature. But, that strong feeling is equally essential if such knowledge is to affect the moral life, we shall endeavour to show shortly. The two are, in fact, complementary: cognition gives content and matter to feeling and so enriches it: feeling brands deep upon the consciousness and memory that which cognition gives it, giving rise, sooner or later, no doubt in conjunction with other factors, to action in one form or another.

The impulse to knowledge may be derived from instinct and may involve striving, but it is not reducible thereto. The essence of knowledge is not activity at all, but passivity. The attempt to know something without us, any object

Digitized by Google

which can be the object of knowledge, is the attempt, in crude language, to get that object as it really is, "inside the mind." The process of "getting things inside the mind" (or, if we wish to be particularly vulgar, "inside the head") may involve activity and every kind of adaptation of the mind and body to its object, but it always just *is* adaptation to its object, and any assertion by mind of its own particular peculiarities and proclivities is nothing but a hindrance to true knowledge as such. Prejudice and truth are contradictory. Perception may involve all kinds of motor activity, may affect directly or indirectly the whole body and mind, but it is adaptive activity. Ideation and Conception may again involve organic activity as well as comparison and construction, analysis and synthesis, but all these processes are, in order that the mind may receive things as they are. Aristotle's phrase, "it thinks in us," is very expressive of what we mean. It may not be a precise account of what actually happens, or under any conditions of knowledge could happen, but it is at least a picture symbolising an ideal characteristic of knowledge which can never be completely attained.

It can never be completely attained just because in addition to the passive side of knowledge there is an active, selective side also. We are finite centres of consciousness set in particular places, having set hereditary characteristics, a definite environment, a "character" formed out of these and certain dominant purposes about which are ranged sentiments. The purposive, teleological character of knowledge has often been commented upon. The things which we know are determined by our interest, our interest and purposes stress certain sides of them, and we are inclined to take the part for the whole.

The same things are true of the knowledge which is a dominant characteristic of the value experience. Value is a something to which the mind must be passive, and if it strives, must adapt itself, and again it is something which will have different meaning for everyone who experiences it, that meaning being dependent upon factors of heredity,

Digitized by Google

environment, purposes, etc. It is no doubt one object which is known, but it is *I* and *you* who know it.

The experience of value itself brings out clearly these two-fold, equally fundamental aspects of experience knowledge, not because this double character is any more a fact here than in other knowledge, but because it is more self-consciously realised in the value experience; because the feeling element is more pronounced than in knowledge which is more nearly what we may call, loosely, "pure" cognition. In "pure" cognition, which is true cognition, the ideal is a complete receptiveness and passivity, as we said; and any psychological or mental activity is directed towards this end of adaptation to the object. In so far as is possible, "it thinks in us" must be a picture of the ideal, a somewhat unattainable ideal, of pure cognition. In the value experience, which is not merely abstract cognition (not that such a literally abstract cognition ever really exists), but knowledge that penetrates into all corners of man's nature —that takes hold of the soul, as it were—the receptiveness to outward influences is no less a fact, but it is a fact supplemented by the intense consciousness that it is *we* who have the experience. The oneness of object and subject, and the twoness of them, become self-consciously realised at one and the same time. It is *I* who think, as well as *reality* which "thinks in me."

Let us take one side of the paradox: that which is without us bears in upon the consciousness, during such moments when value becomes a vision, with an intensity which seems not of our own making, though no doubt previous physiological and mental processes have prepared for it. In the æsthetic experience the beautiful object, by stirring the senses to rhythmic, harmonious, or other response, produces an organic condition which has as its mental counterpart a characteristic emotion. We are absorbed in the object. Even the emotion itself seems to come from without (though that is not to say that it *does*) and so we objectify beauty. But more important still is the nature of the emotion itself. It is not simply that we see a physical object (I am thinking

Digitized by Google

at present of visual beauty) which is pleasing, there and then, in a particular place and time, but that the perception of such an object stimulates an emotion in which we seem to be carried altogether beyond the limits of time and place. The value of something which could itself reside in no mere physical object, appears to bear itself in from without, upon our awaiting body and mind. The value is what we call beauty; it is an intrinsic value, and being an intrinsic value must be a universal one, having its sources deep in the cosmic hills. Our attitude is one of reception, and if the receiving is one which shakes the whole being, it is receiving no less. So, likewise, when on perceiving and being thrilled by goodness, great in whatever way, we say we are humbled, that is only another way of expressing, negatively, that consciousness that we are in the presence of something greater, that is outside ourselves, and to which we must and do yield ourselves willingly. When the value of human goodness "strikes" us, as we often say, it is the attitude of passivity that we are expressing. And furthermore, just as in the case of beauty, it is not a particular instance at a particular time and place that can contain all goodness value; so it is a universal value from beyond which shows itself in this or that particular instance. It is not human goodness that can be self-contained; such goodness must itself be the expression of a sense of value which is universal. To show that, will be the conclusion of this essay. We admire this humanity because of the divinity which we can perceive shining through it. And such divinity, when we perceive it, is shining upon us too; we receive it as a gift from without and rejoice in its warmth. So also in the intellectual life, we say that truth is "borne in" upon us, at the moments when what seems (but is of course never literally) a complete clarity, "descends" upon us after strenuous intellectual endeavour, we feel that in our previous endeavours we have only been preparing the way for receptivity. Again, this truth-experience has its emotional counterpart; at such times we feel the dignity of knowledge, truth, for its own sake; we feel the value of

Digitized by Google

truth when the vision of things as they really are rewards our long sustained efforts. We know then that the universe is worth knowing, that to pursue truth is infinitely worth while. The triumph over difficulties, when we have climbed, and the mist for a moment rises, is a sufficient reward for the intellectual honesty and strenuous control of bias which is so hard. The value of truth may ordinarily be but a cold thing in moments when we experience its universal value we can see how worth while it is to try to let "it think in us." The value of reality makes the honest attempt to understand it, itself a partaking of universal value.

On the other hand, taking the contrary side of the paradox, these experiences are *our* experiences as individuals. A very essential part of any value experience may be impression from outside us, but that is not the whole tale. A value experience to be mature must be more than a cognition abstractly regarded, we said. It must touch all sides of our nature, from whichever side of our nature it may come primarily; it must suffuse feeling, it must initiate striving; expression is the complement of impression. We are beings who feel and strive as well as know, and to say that value experience is uniquely *ours*, is to say that what we receive from without us must be assimilated into *our* previous knowledge, by our characters, which influences in the past (innate, hereditary, acquired, external, etc.) have moulded into sentiments and tendencies in a system of more or less definitely marked complexes.

The psychological, and later the ethical significance of what may appear an irrelevant digression, lies in the fact that when you and I discover something in *common*, and discover the common thing *for ourselves*, we are moved thereby to various degrees of an emotion of pleasurable effect, which may have important ethical consequences. The thing which we discover may vary from the most trifling object to some fundamental value, the emotion stirred thereby varying accordingly. But in the fact that it is in common, and is realised by two or more individuals,

Digitized by Google

is contained the fundamental twofold truth that a "common interest is the basis of society," and that "the true good is the common good." The common interests which are the basis of any society are themselves but the concrete signs of still more ultimate and universal values, and the desire, sometimes manifest, more often hidden, for these ultimate values is that which unites men most powerfully of all in that deepest unity which is the unity of the spirit. It is not, however, our purpose here to enter further into an ethical discussion about the common good.

Nevertheless, the supreme significance of the value experience is that, though it is so markedly a private thing, it can never, if it is a real experience of value, stop short in the subjective, but must be a realisation of the value of a reality beyond, and bigger than, the conscious self. In fact, its chief characteristic is, as we say, its receptivity, its sensitiveness to impression from without. It is a taking in, inspiration, which has its far-reaching, far-penetrating effects, of the value that is in the world we live in, of the intrinsic worth of the cosmos. Although the individual self may be exalted in such an experience, this is no petty self-assertion, in the ordinary sense of the word, but rather a new appreciation of the infinite meaning there is in the human self because that self is an organic part, an organic function, we might almost say, of a cosmos, itself of infinite worth. Dig deep enough into what the self reveals, and you find the universe there; know the universe truly, and you find there a reality atune to the inmost self. The object of knowledge and the knower are two, in so far as they are known and knower; in so far as they are of a single source, the universe, they are one.

It is upon this fact that our whole ethical view must be based. It is our endeavour to show that ethics must be interpreted in the light of this metaphysical truth, that our moral world "is set in the midst of an infinite universe," that goodness is to be at one, not with any particular environment, but with the universe itself; that it is a throwing

Digitized by Google

open of the windows of the soul that the soul may thereby realise itself more fully. The inspiration of all goodness must be a looking to the hills and to the stars, not of beautiful nature only, but of men's lives and men's thoughts. It must be a finding out, there at the top of things, beyond perceptual facts at all, the supreme guiding beacons of value which in our own inmost souls we had been seeking.

This paradox, that to realise goodness in the self we must go beyond it, is very familiar, though because of its familiarity it is no less fundamentally true and it has its parallels in every side of life. We have remarked how, in order that the self may be possessed of true knowledge, the self must suppress itself, in order more truly to grasp the object of knowledge.

In T. H. Green the development of the finite consciousness is (perhaps too exclusively) a development of knowledge; a growing consciousness, that is, of the world in which the finite being lives. The truth that is in such conceptions can be seen at once when we remember another moral truth, that the self is really rich according to the depths of its understanding, or that a man is great or broad according to the greatness or breadth of his interests, that he is big if he is enthralled by really big things. "Seek ye first the kingdom of God . . . and all these things shall be added unto you." Psychology, again, finds it impossible to draw any hard and fast line between the empirical me and the external world. William James' words are well known:

"Between what a man calls *me* and what he simply calls *mine* the line is difficult to draw. We feel and act about certain things that are ours, very much as we feel and act about ourselves. Our fame, our children, the work of our hands, may be as dear to us as our bodies are. . . . There is the material me, the social me, and the spiritual me, and all seem to be continuous with one another."

The "I," indeed, whatever its metaphysical nature may be, is certainly something whose home is the universe, whose activity is ever reaching out to grasp wider and wider realities: it is a thing which would be killed if these activities were cut off, because its very life is in them. So, too, in

Digitized by Google

ethics we have such paradoxes as that of hedonism, "To attain pleasure forget it and seek objects," or the profounder dictum of Christ, "He that findeth his life shall lose it: and he that loseth his life . . . shall find it." In art, again, though personality and mastery of technique, may be essential, the real source of greatness is the universal: if it does not stir in us the feeling of universal values it is somewhere wanting: its form may be perfect, its sensuous charm may be great, we may feel the presence of individuality in the work, and yet it will certainly be limited, and in the end perhaps nauseating, if it has not captured within it something of the universal spirit. Without that it is either conventional or decadent.

This necessity of the finite for the universal, in order that the finite may realise itself; the apparent purpose in evolution that the universal should realise itself through finite beings; the emotional value of realising in ourself the purpose, namely this essential relation between finite and universal—these facts for us must be the groundwork of all ethics. They are the base upon which any morality which is to be more than conformity to past custom, whether of family, tribe, nation, empire, or even world, must be built. Our spiritual home is not to be any ready-made, standardised dwelling house made for us by contract, it is rather a palace in the building; we are the builders, and our life would be gone if our life-work were to cease from a continually new realisation of the plan.

Of the building we can here say nothing. We have spoken only of the foundation of living morality, or to use a now more suitable metaphor, its inspiration. Yet that is only half the story: inspiration is for a task, the task is to make something, to do, to live. We can only say here that the inspiration of that morality which must be thought of as a creation, is the experience, felt and lived, of the value which is in the Cosmos.

LOUIS ARNAUD REID.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF WALES,
ABERYSTWYTH.

Digitized by Google

SIR HENRY JONES: 1852–1922.

H. J. W. HETHERINGTON.

WE have the high authority of Professor Burnet for the view that "No one will ever succeed in writing a history of philosophy; for philosophies, like works of art, are intensely personal things." Sir Henry Jones would have laid a lighter accent on this aspect of philosophical reflexion. But his own power in the world of philosophy is apt enough confirmation of it. Certainly his genius found its most characteristic expression in that immediate and kindling contact of mind with mind which is the most fruitful method of philosophical teaching and discussion. He was a great philosophical teacher, less by virtue of what he taught,—though much of his strength came from his conviction of the essential truth of his general doctrine,—than by reason of the way in which he spent the whole endowment of a rich and most attractive personality on his teaching work. It was in his teaching, I am sure, that he did his best, and perhaps his most enduring work. He himself had no doubt that teaching was his main business in life, and he gave himself earnestly to it. Of his power in it there is no sort of doubt. Few of his students left his class unchanged in mind and character: and to his best students he was a continual inspiration. In every English-speaking country in the world, old students of his occupy philosophical chairs: and, however far some of them may have travelled from the doctrine which he taught, there is none of them but would acknowledge with gratitude and with affection the refreshment and encouragement that came from every contact with his ardent spirit.

It could hardly be said that Nature predestined him to philosophy; though perhaps she brought as near to success as might be the experiment of grafting a reflective disposition on the buoyant imaginative temperament of the Kelt. But nurture settled the course of his life. Henry Jones

Digitized by Google

left his village school in North Wales at an early age: but his education never stopped. Welsh Nonconformity takes its theology seriously: and the young shoemaker, learning from his father the mysteries of his craft, was inducted also into the discussion of religious doctrine. The desire for learning burst into a consuming flame: and he began, before and after his day's work at the bench, to study for a college career. How he achieved his ambition, first at the North Wales Training College, and later, after a period of schoolmastering, at the University of Glasgow, is a romantic story of which, happily, he has himself left a record. The recreation of the last year of his life was to write his *Old Memories:* and that little volume will, I hope, soon be given to the world.

In Glasgow, whither he came in 1876, at the age of 24, he met the great intellectual influence of his life in the person of Edward Caird. His destiny was settled when after his graduation, Caird hearing that he had accepted the pastorate of a Church sent for him and said "Jones, I mean you to be a professor of philosophy." He at once resigned his church, and all thoughts of a preacher's life. For a time, he was Caird's assistant in Glasgow. He returned to Wales first as Lecturer in Philosophy at Aberystwyth, and then in 1884 as the first Professor of Philosophy in the new University College of North Wales, Bangor. After seven years of strenuous service there, he became Professor of Logic in St. Andrews; and finally in 1894, on Caird's election to the Mastership of Balliol, he was called to Glasgow to occupy for twenty-eight years the Chair of Moral Philosophy.

During his Glasgow professorship, he held many other offices. He was, for six years, Hibbert Lecturer in Metaphysics in Manchester College, Oxford. He visited Australia and lectured in most of the universities of that continent. He went to America on three occasions, and travelled extensively in the United States. He greatly enjoyed America and the American universities, and took every chance that came his way of speaking to students and teachers.

He was deeply interested in the application of his philoso-

Digitized by Google

phy to religious problems on the one hand, and to social conditions and concerns on the other. Most of his numerous casual addresses were devoted to these topics. And the practical activities which most engaged him were of the same kind. He spent much energy in urging on the universities the need for a larger provision for social studies: and in pleading for the wider public recognition of the importance of a scientific treatment of social problems.

All his life long, he lived up to the limit of his physical capacity. He did an immense amount of work in all kinds of public affairs. And especially he could seldom bring himself to resist any kind of call from his native country. He played a great, and in some ways a decisive part, in Welsh secondary and university education: and in the last decade, on the deeper issues of Welsh national life, his words carried greater authority than those of any other of his countrymen.

But years and honours and the happiness which he had in seeing the fruition of many hopes brought with them heavy private sorrows and personal sufferings. Bereavement and illness took tragic toll of the family circle in which he found his greatest joy. And for the last nine years of his life, he himself suffered from a malignant and painful disease. Severe operations prolonged his life, but were powerless to cure. During the last two years, he had constant and often terrible pain, with the knowledge that there could be no release except by death. His endurance and his courage were unfailing: and his work went on till the end. The honour which he himself prized most highly of the many that came to him—his election in 1919 to the Gifford Lectureship in Glasgow—imposed on him the duty of preparing and delivering two series of public lectures on Natural Theology. In great and growing pain, he wrote his lectures. The University was very willing that he should interpret his obligations lightly. But he was eager to fulfil them to the utmost of his power. He broke down in the effort to deliver the first series, in the winter of 1920. But in November and December 1921 he was able to give the greater part of

Digitized by Google

his second series. He lived just long enough to pass his proofs through the press: and died early in February 1922, some weeks before the publication of his book. No teacher of his generation knew more than he the sting of sorrow and pain. If he found, as he did, in his own experience ground for an ever-growing confidence in his hypothesis that all things are rooted and grounded in Love, he knew also, far better than most men, how Love can try and be tried to the uttermost.

I can do little more in this notice than catalogue his earlier writings. His published works, as a whole are less than the man, though they are highly characteristic of him. Unconquerable as his spirit was, he was not able to set down in his Gifford Lectures all the ideas and suggestions that were working in his mind; and he gave far more freely and more daringly in discussion than he did on paper. With all his mastery of phrase and form, he found writing difficult; and he was never quite happy without the stimulus of an adversary in debate. Caird once asked him: "Can ye no' philosophise without fechtin'"? And surely enough he liked "fechtin' " best.

The first and most widely known of his books was on Browning. It remains the best study of the most consciously philosophical of our poets. All his life long Sir Henry lived with Browning and Wordsworth, almost as much as with the Bible. He had an extraordinary knowledge of all three: and perhaps he would not have dissented from the view that his main philosophical effort was to put into systematic and critical form the ideas that inspired the great romantic poets. His *Lotze* followed in 1895. It is a careful and penetrating criticism of Lotze's doctrine of thought, by means of which Sir Henry expounds his own logical theory. The book is notable for its anticipation of certain lines of subsequent Realist criticism of Idealist epistemology, and for the clear and emphatic way in which Sir Henry dissociates Idealism from the suspicion of subjectivism. He was then, as in his last book, anxious to insist on the directness of contact between mind and its world,

Digitized by Google

and their "partnership" (as he later expressed it) in the enterprise of knowledge.

His *Idealism as a Practical Creed* contains his Australian Lectures. This book, and the subsequent *Working Faith of the Social Reformer*, are concerned mainly with the applications of his general philosophical theory to ethical and political problems. Two smaller volumes, *Social Powers* and *The Principles of Citizenship* continue the same theme,—the former being three delightful essays addressed to different professions, the latter mainly a treatment of the theory of political obligation, and of the relations of the individual to society. 1920 saw the publication of the *Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird*, in which, though the greater part of it was the work of Professor J. H. Muirhead, Sir Henry had an important share.

There are other writings,—some essays and addresses in Welsh, even, I think, some translations of philosophical classics into Welsh, some controversial papers in various philosophical journals, and contributions to co-operative volumes on different subjects. But the most substantial as well as the most interesting of his books is the recent *Gifford Lectures*[1] and I may perhaps be allowed to devote the remainder of this notice to a summary of its argument. I have described the circumstances in which it was written. There is no hint of them in the book: and Sir Henry would not have wished for abatement of criticism because of them. Nor indeed does the book invite any leniency of judgment. It is a firm, consistent and vigorous handling of its theme. Its essential doctrine is defined with complete precision; and leaves no doubt either as to its import or as to the arguments by which it is sustained. It is incomplete only in the sense that he had more to say than he was able to say here; though, no doubt, a fuller revision would have altered the balance of exposition on several points.

The book moves within a definite and limited field: and the limitation is significant enough of the writer's point of view. Its problem is to enquire how far it is possible to

[1] A Faith that Enquires. Macmillan & Co. 18/-net.

Digitized by Google

justify philosophically a religious interpretation of human experience. And by a philosophical justification, Sir Henry means a justification in terms of Idealist metaphysics. Nowhere in the book does he raise the question whether the general doctrine of Idealism is itself sound. He has some important things to say about that doctrine, and some important modifications to propose. But he does not question the validity of its standpoint: and he takes it as the only type of philosophical theory that is seriously tenable. As a matter of fact, that was his view: and he was very willing to avow it. What little he thought it worth while to say in defence of the general Idealist position he had said in his earlier books. But he had comparatively little to say upon it, mainly because he did not think that anything had been produced by Realist or other critics which disturbed the main results of Kant's enquiry. With much of the detail of Realist criticism, he was largely in agreement: and he always believed that its effect upon Idealism, in compelling it to a less subjectivist statement of its own theory, had been throughly healthy. But he would never admit that it touched anything essential to Idealism; and at no time in his life, sensitive as he was to currents of opinion, did he think it necessary to alter the Idealist foundation of his own philosophy. Hence the argument of this book moves wholly within the field of Idealism: and its main philosophical significance will be found to consist in its attempt to free Idealism from some of the ambiguities and defects which Sir Henry thought to be discoverable in certain contemporary statements of it.

It will be found also that with Pragmatism, in spite of his criticism of its logic, he had more sympathy than with modern Realism. Its emphasis on the status of the finite individual, and its desire to make his moral gains a genuine contribution to the cosmic scheme seemed to touch precisely those points in which current Idealist Absolutism was defective. On the other hand, its general metaphysical theory involved a refusal of the demand for rational coherence, and appeared to him to be sceptical in its implications:

Digitized by Google

and such a result was incompatible with the Rationalism which was a cardinal article of Sir Henry's philosophic creed.

It is this Rationalism, this unqualified assertion of the sufficiency of Reason, that sets the scheme and note of the Gifford Lectures. The book falls into three parts. First the writer considers the obstacles to the application of methods of scientific or philosophic enquiry (he did not distinguish the two *methods*, except that philosophy pushed its enquiries further than science) to matters of religious belief; and shows the loss that accrues to the security and the power of religion by its withdrawal from this test. Then he asks what kind of construction of the world religion requires; and finally raises the crucial issue as to whether or not such a construction can be philosophically justified.

It is possible, of course, to argue that this is a dangerous method of procedure. It looks as if one ascertained first what one wanted to prove, and then tried to prove it. And it is at first sight curious to find this method of approach alongside the severe rationalism which is dominant in the book. But it is characteristic enough not only of the writer himself, but of the school to which he belongs. There is throughout the book the clearest recognition of the impropriety of the "argument from desire": and a rejection of the claim that a proposition must be true merely because its truth would seem to meet a demand that man is apt to make upon the world. On the other hand, it is no less clear that the writer does not limit Reason to the purely intellectual operations of the mind. Morality, Art, the Social Consciousness which creates and is created by the apparatus and institutions of civic society, Religion itself are all of them expressions of Reason: and the acceptance of the rule of Reason does not preclude, but indeed requires the acceptance of the authenticity and authority of all these regions of human experience. Neither in the case of knowledge nor of any other of these activities can such acceptance be uncritical. The judgments and demands of the ordinary consciousness in every sphere are marked by inconsistency

Digitized by Google

and often by contradiction. But freed from such imperfection, they claim to be equally authentic forms of the soul's apprehension of Reality; and our final account of the Universe must reckon with the constructions of all of them, so far at least as they have stood the test of rational examination.

Hence it was, in his view, almost a matter of indifference from what precise region of human experience our investigation sets out. No serious examination of any activity of the human spirit, whether in science or art or morality, could fail to raise the issue of its relation to other activities: and the critical understanding of any one of them throws us back on questions of the ultimate character of the world and of man's destiny in it.

It is, indeed, not wholly, but something of an accident that in these Lectures, his own construction starts from the side of Morality. It happens so, because Sir Henry's main criticism of Mr. Bosanquet's massive handling of Idealism was just that it seemed to him to invade the rights of Morality, and to misconstrue the nature of moral experience. He accepted, as I have said, without qualification the main principle and conclusion of every form of modern Idealism, —that recognised theoretical or practical contradiction is intolerable to the mind; and that mind, itself the product of the world, finds satisfaction only in the apprehension of a whole Reality. The validity of every form of human experience, therefore, requires the conception of an Absolute, a complete, self-consistent and self-sustaining Reality, within which falls every particular fact and form of experience, and of which all these are the partial manifestations. "Per realitatem et perfectionem idem intelligo." He accepted also the Hegelian account of that Absolute as "Spirit": conceiving the world as the self-expression of Spirit, going out, as Hegel put it, into its "other" in the world of space and time, and coming to itself in the ascent of life through its various forms to the level of self-conscious mind. With all this general framework of Idealist doctrine, he had small quarrel. His differences may be said all to

Digitized by Google

have centred round perhaps one major point in the further working out of this theory. It was the familiar point of cardinal dispute since the time of Spinoza,—the relation of the Absolute to its differentiations. Bradley was almost confessedly Spinozistic; Bosanquet's theory of the self-transcendence of the individual, and the ultimate self-contradiction both of morality and of religion led very much in the same direction. Both alike seemed to him unduly to minimise the significance of finite selfhood; in their condemnation of the whole sphere of finite moral endeavour to the realm of "appearance," they seemed, in the interests of a static and narrowly logical interpretation of the principle of self-consistency, to eliminate from human life elements which he conceived to have absolute and unconditional value.

His theory sets out, therefore, as he himself clearly recognises, from an insistence, more Kantian than Hegelian, on the rights of the practical reason. His conclusions, he says, "are based from beginning to end, upon an assumption which I have made no attempt to justify, and which, if false, deprives our attempt of all value. The assumption is that the moral life has a value which is final, unlimited, and absolute" (p. 350). His problem is to define that Absolute Reality which is the postulate of all science and philosophy, and indeed of any intelligent thought whatever, so that within it there are maintained, so to say, visibly and intact, the moral values achieved in finite experience. The difficulty is set fairly in the centre of the stage. Moral values appear to be realisable only under conditions of finitude. How can they, then, be preserved in and characterise the Absolute? The moral act implies in its setting the possibility, indeed the reality of evil. If moral progress is to be genuine, the evil which is overcome must be real evil. The moral agent must have in himself such imperfection that the evil act is to him a genuine alternative to the good. If then the moral life is in any sense "final," surely that implies the equal finality of those conditions of finitude and imperfection in which alone morality is possible. Morality,

Digitized by Google

indeed, is essentially a process,—a process of "overcoming" evil. It seems to be, therefore, as Bradley holds, a process which in working to the extinction of evil, works to its own extinction. The dilemma looks to be sufficiently complete.

The same kind of dialectic can be brought against other forms of human experience—against even knowledge itself. But the antimony which it yields is more stubborn in the case of morality than of any other form: for in morality, we seem to be in the presence, not merely of defect and of difference, but of something positively antagonistic to the perfection and completion of the Absolute. How then are we to hold both to the Absolute and to the ultimacy of moral values? This, I think, is the heart of the problem which he set himself to discuss in the *Gifford Lectures*.

Sir Henry's general line of solution involves a reinterpretation both of the nature of the Absolute, and of the character of moral experience. He raises these two allied issues by a consideration of the relation between morality and religion.

In the first place, he identifies, as he puts it, the Absolute of Philosophy with the God of Religion. The ground for belief in both is the same. It is the mind's demand for wholeness. The religious consciousness is as incapable of accepting a partial or limited or finite God as is the intellect of resting content with an incomplete or self-contradictory Reality. It is true that men have given the name of God to strange creatures, and that many undeveloped religions are polytheistic. "But," writes Sir Henry, "so far as I can see, the religious history of man gives no ground for believing that man *consciously* worships a *recognised* imperfect God. *For the moment*, even the God of the polytheist, whom at any instant he may toss aside, stands for the perfection he needs" (p. 58). And the witness of the developed religious consciousness is clear enough. However men may have conceived or misconceived the nature of God, at least they have taken him to be not merely Highest but Supreme: and they have supposed this completeness of being to be the

Digitized by Google

very essence of Deity. A partial or limited God would not be God: and where, in the name of religion, God has been conceived as limited, it is only because it has seemed impossible to reconcile with the perfection and omnipotence of God his participation in certain of the facts and experiences of the world.

Religion, therefore, sets the same problem as philosophy. The problem of the relation of the Absolute to its differentiations, is that of the relation of God to man. And the crux of it is the relation of the Infinite to those phases and facts of finite experience which seem most to resist inclusion within the whole. For it is clear that if God is perfect, and if the world is God's, then the world must also be in its own way and degree also perfect: and no final defect or failure is tolerable in it. Sir Henry states this demand without compromise. The hypothesis of a perfect God (which is, in his view, the hypothesis of the Absolute) requires the perfection of the world in all its details. It requires not only that the world should be good "on the whole," more good than evil, but that in every strand and corner of it, good should predominate. Any failure of good anywhere in the Universe, disproves the hypothesis of a perfect God.

How then are we to meet this challenge in the face of the plain facts of the world? For that, at first look, the circumstances and achievements of finite life are far from showing the fulfilment of Good is plain enough. The answer turns on the attempt to define the kind of "good" that is realised in the world; or so to put it, to understand what kind of perfection God means the world to attain. It is only if we know that, that we are in possession of a criterion by which to judge whether God's purposes are finally defeated.

To this central question Sir Henry's answer,— reminiscent in its own way of the "Timaeus,"—is that "the world appears to have one supreme purpose; that is to furnish mankind with the opportunity for learning goodness" (p. 213). "Should it happen that the present world, abandoned to itself as it seems to be, and full of inequalities,— wealth, health, the respect of men, and every form of pros-

Digitized by Google

perity and their opposites, distributed without any reference to the deserts of men,—should it happen that it furnishes to mankind as a whole the best opportunity for learning goodness, then the sceptical condemnation of it, and the denial of the existence and perfection of God are wrong" (p. 206). If it is true that moral values are supreme, that to learn and to practice the good life is the best thing that man can achieve, and that the moralised human spirit is God's most complete expression of himself, then it follows that the gift of the opportunity so to learn and so to practise is the best, indeed the only gift that God can make to man. Nothing that is essential to the freedom of men in this endeavour, nothing that men must have if they are to learn goodness, can thwart God's purpose or limit his perfection. The possibility of the moral life *requires* as one of its conditions the reality of evil. Evil stands in finite experience, therefore, not as a limitation of God, but as a condition of the achievement of his highest purpose.

That, I think, in the simplest terms, is the main answer which the writer gives to what he takes to be the central problem of Idealism. Evil is real,—without its reality moral progress is a sham. But it is justified in the world order because moral progress is the best thing there can be: and the existence of evil is a necessary condition of it. Sir Henry gives a long analysis of the various forms of evil both natural and moral. He distinguishes between these two forms, and reaches a point of view from which, it seems to him, the problems raised by both and by their relation to one another is soluble. It is fundamental in his analysis that the test by which the status of evil is to be tried must be *spiritual*. The criterion is the effect of experience on *character:* and on that alone.

"Everything that contributes to the spiritual progress of man I would call good; everything that tends to hinder it, I would call bad. And evidently, if moral values verily are absolute, then no price at which moral progress is secured can be too high. If pain and suffering, poverty and need, and the contempt of men contribute to this end more than

Digitized by Google

their opposites could, then they are better than good health and plenty and the honour of men" (p. 218).

Many interesting and important lines of reflexion are opened up by this treatment of the problem. But it is hard to escape the question whether this solution does not simply suggest again in another form, the self-contradiction which Bradley and Bosanquet found in moral experience. We might put it thus. Is it not a self-contradiction to suppose that God's final purpose in the world is one which can take shape only by postulating a condition which is hostile to its attainment? And if we answer that the very opposition of evil to good is necessary in order that evil should be a condition of the achievement of good, is not that simply another way of implying that the contradiction is inherent in the very notion of moral good? Is not good, by its very nature, since it implies the reality of evil, for ever unattainable? And is that the kind of purpose which we can intelligibly suppose God to set before himself?

The difficulty would, I think, be insoluble if it were held that evil and good are real in the same degree. If we are to maintain that man's winning of goodness is God's purpose in human life, we must have ground for supposing that that purpose is attainable; and that good finally is achieved and evil is finally overcome. Can we hold this? In one sense, obviously, we can. Every good action, whatever its material consequences, produces at once its spiritual fruit. The gain to the moral quality of the agent is immediate and unquestionable. And perhaps, too, it is possible to hold that the slower and indirect consequences of any action, including its material results, are always such as make for the triumph of good.[1] But even if we accept this line of argument, we are left still with a final difficulty on our hands. It may be true that man's growth in goodness, when he makes it, is direct, and of absolute worth: and that the evil which

[1] There is an interesting passage (p. 231 et. seq.), too long for discussion here, in which Sir Henry argues that "the natural scheme is favourable to morality," that even the indirectness of the material consequences of an action is an appeal to, though not a coercion of, man's moral nature.

Digitized by Google

must exist if man is to grow to goodness is at once justified and overcome in his attainment of good. And it may be true that the scheme of things, though respecting man's freedom and securing that his good is won by his own act, yet favours the good, shows that the good is self-attainment and evil self-refutation. But it is still indisputable that this evil, which by hypothesis, exists as a condition of good, does sometimes overbear the good: that man uses his freedom to choose good as an opportunity to choose evil. There are lives in which to all seeming the good is never attained, where a man "dies in his sins," unrepentant and obdurate to the call of the better. Is that failure not final? Has not God failed here to achieve his purpose? True, others may learn from one man's failure: and one result of such a life might be the strengthening of others in the resolve towards good. But in this instance, in this expression of itself, God's nature is defeated. The broken life is a final failure of God's goodness.

Sir Henry accepts the conclusion: "*One* genuine failure of the good, in any one single life, deprives us of the right to be convinced of the divine perfection" (p. 337). Indeed if we can establish the finality of one such failure, our whole hypothesis is not merely unconvincing, it is discredited. Is there then such a failure? On the scale of finite life, difficult though it is to understand and to judge so complex a thing as the human soul, it seems certain that we must allow it. But we have still to determine whether finite life is the sphere in which the issue can be settled. We have no right to assume that it is.

The implication, therefore, of this whole religious and philosophical system is belief in immortality of individual souls. There are, Sir Henry believes, many indications in the accepted facts of natural and spiritual life which point in the direction of immortality. But no proof on these grounds is yet conclusive. Immortality remains,—as Kant called it, a postulate, not of the natural man, for affection, desire and friendship do not count, "except as elements in a moral system," but of his moral and religious nature.

Digitized by Google

"Immortality extends man's spiritual chances. Sometime, somewhere, in some life, under some new circumstances and conditions, the soul, one would say, will awake and apprehend its true nature and destiny" (p. 344). Unless, therefore, the belief in immortality is true, the religious construction of the world seems to be impossible.

There is one further point which must be added to the outline of this doctrine. We can hardly but put before ourselves the question as to how we are to conceive the character of the whole which articulates itself in such a world as has been suggested. We have been shown a world in which God realises through the moral growth of finite selves the highest good. But does even this permit us to accept the full reality of finite selves? If the achievement of the good is secure, if here or hereafter men do attain to possession of themselves in conformity with God's will and nature, does not this very security, this certainty that there can be no other issue, diminish the reality of their effort and progress? Is not the independence which God confers on men something of a pretence, and the whole struggle, as James once called it, a sham fight?

So far as this criticism rests on the predetermination of the issue of the world process, it is, I think, unanswerable. If this general theory is sound, the good cannot finally be defeated: and God's relation to the world leaves no possibility that it could. This, I take, is explicitly recognised by the writer. "As absolute self-consciousness, and as knowing the end from the beginning, God is more than the world process. That process fulfils his purpose. But God, as having purposed the process from the beginning, or as not acting blindly, not knowing what he doeth, is greater than and transcends the Universe. He is already perfect and possesses the future, for it is his Will which is being realized in the world" (p. 271). But perhaps the heart of the difficulty is not in the certainty of the triumph of good, so much as in the fear that in that triumph, nothing has been added to the world. Foreordained and inevitable, is it insignificant? Is God's expression of himself no enrichment

Digitized by Google

but only repetition? Perhaps if it could be held that through the experience of finite souls here and hereafter something was won for the nature of things that could not otherwise be won, the reproach thus levelled at Absolutism would lose its effect. What men fear and suspect in the block-Universe, is not that it is a Universe (*i.e.*, an orderly cosmos with all its facts and events determined by the law of its own nature) but that it "blocks," that it denies the reality of change or movement or progress. Man's life matters nothing at all. All is as if he had never been. This is precisely the implication which Sir Henry is most anxious to challenge. He suggests first of all (p. 299) that even "in the transition from cognitive or intellectual foresight and anticipation of events on the one side to the experience of them on the other," there may be enrichment. "There may be in the actual participation of the Absolute in finite processes or of the God of Love in the doings and destiny of his children more than there can be in the mere foresight of them." But, in Sir Henry's view, the gain goes deeper than that. He holds that man's moral life *is* a real contribution to the nature of things, and a genuine addition to the sum of good in the world. His work is no ripple on the surface of the waters, that leaves unmoved the great deeps below. On the contrary, through him the Absolute moves to a higher perfection of its own being, which without him, it could not reach. Through his progress, God himself progresses.

This perhaps, is the central metaphysical issue of these Lectures. But it is clearly involved in Sir Henry's view as to what is required in order to reconcile the demands of morality and religion and to justify the claim that both these forms of experience lay hold upon the Absolute. God as the completely real, must be perfect: but that perfection must not imply that he cannot change. He moves from perfection to perfection; so that each stage in his development looks to be imperfect when it is overpast. This principle of a moving Absolute, of God as eternally "radiating" new perfections from his own nature, is hard to

Digitized by Google

formulate and perhaps harder still to justify. There is no long treatment of it in the book. In the main, Sir Henry is content to argue that there is no inherent contradiction in the idea; and to suggest that its warrant is that nowhere in the world do we find anything static. Even in "matter" we are in the presence of forces. Science discovers nothing in nature but process. The same is true, as we have noted, of man's moral life. It is process: it is a process of attainment all the way,—a movement from good to better, "from purpose to fulfilment or from possibility to actuality, and the perfection of the instant may be the condition and inspiration of the new perfect" (p. 272). In this way may it not be an ectype of the Divine or Absolute experience itself? In any case, Sir Henry himself does not hesitate to identify the Absolute with the world process; and to maintain that there is no God or Absolute except in this process; nor any process except the self-expression of God.

I have thought it better to give this fairly full outline of the argument of this book rather than to find room for discussion. It represents the position which at the end of his life Sir Henry Jones was prepared to defend: and it is plainly of the highest interest. It invites, of course, two quite different types of criticism. It may be challenged on the ground that by the very way in which it shapes its problem it assumes almost without discussion the general truth of Idealism. As was said at the outset, its only reply to this criticism is the contention that the Idealist hypothesis is the only one which fairly meets all the facts of the higher ranges of human experience, especially of religion and morality, with which a philosophy of human life has to deal. Except in this large and fundamental sense,—that it insists on the relevance of all aspects of human experience and claims that it can be overthrown only by a more comprehensive synthesis of all these aspects,—I do not think that the book attempts any new defence of Idealism. It is rather a restatement of the theory. But there is a further and narrower line of criticism. It may be argued that in the interests of this Idealist solution, it claims not only the rele-

Digitized by Google

vance, but the priority of moral values; and that certain of its metaphysical constructions are inconsistent with the theoretical basis of the general Idealist doctrine. These, I think, are the two issues which are decisive as to the success of the attempted restatement. I can here say no more than a dogmatic word on each of them. As to the first, though it is clear that throughout the book the accent is thrown on moral experience, and though it is expressly claimed that moral values are final and unconditional, it does not seem that this involves the subordination to moral values of other values, such as those of truth and beauty. They also may have the same status: and unless it can be shown that the metaphysical construction which appears to be necessitated by the recognition of the finality of moral values involves the denial of similar finality to intellectual and æsthetic values, this line of criticism is not destructive. The important issue, therefore, is whether this metaphysical theory, and in particular the theory of a moving Absolute, is really consistent with its basis. That the phrase involves a verbal contradiction may be admitted. But it is hardly possible to describe the Absolute in any way without some verbal contradiction; and it would not be a bad thing for philosophy to get rid of Absolutist terminology altogether. But is it possible without abandoning the theoretical basis of Absolute Idealism to regard the Universe as a whole as developing? That general doctrine, as has been emphasised, rests upon the mind's demand for wholeness, and upon the postulate that reality is, through and through, a self-consistent whole. In what sense, then, can that which changes be rightly conceived as a "whole?" Clearly, there is involved a critical extension of the notion of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, and there are other points of difficulty. But it is not without significance that from an entirely different group of Idealist thinkers, with some of whose work in other directions Sir Henry Jones would not have had much sympathy, there comes the suggestion of a similar synthesis.

But, however this final principle may stand the test of the

Digitized by Google

analysis which it invites, it is clear enough that this book is a confident, direct and courageous piece of philosophical writing. There is no half-heartedness about its handling of philosophical issues: and in that respect, it is worthy of its writer. In nothing was he a Laodicean. He knew life at its best, and at its most tragic worst, and found it only a growing revelation of good. And the faith that he has written in this book is one which sustained through the heaviest trials a life that never failed, even in its lighter phases, to carry in it something of the stature of heroism.

H. J. W. HETHERINGTON.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE,
EXETER.

Digitized by Google

REVOLUTION AS TAUGHT BY CONFUCIANISM.

GILBERT REID.

AMID the frequent use of the word revolution and the divergence of opinion as to its being right or wrong, even among teachers of ethics and theology, it may be instructive to go back to the dim and distant past and learn what the founders of the great religious Faiths taught their disciples concerning this ever-prevalent condition of social and political development. Of these I place first the great exponents of Confucianism, namely, Confucius himself and Mencius.

Confucianism more than any other religion of the world contains minute instructions on political science. At the same time its classics are more than discussions of politics; it applies moral and religious principles both to social and civil life, and in that way has spoken with tremendous force. Confucianism is the commingling of religion, of philosophy, of ethics, and of the science of politics.

Dealing, as it does, with political questions, and the science of good government, Confucianism naturally alludes to revolution and teaches us when it is right, and still more how it may be avoided.

Dr. Ernest Faber, the learned scholar of things Chinese, has made the following statement: "Confucius himself appears to have regarded with favor rebellious movements in the hope of bringing a sage to the throne. Mencius is certainly very outspoken in this respect. He justifies the dethroning and even the murder of a bad ruler. No wonder, then, that rebellions have occurred on a large scale, over fifty times in about 2,000 years, and local rebellions are almost yearly events. . . . Confucianism is to blame for it." This is the verdict of one who evidently does not believe in revolutions. One who espouses revolutions would give a different verdict; he would say, "Confucianism is to be given the credit for China's revolution." Pro-

Digitized by Google

fessor Legge, an Englishman with conservative tendencies like this German, Dr. Faber, has also written: "Probably there is no country in the world which has drunk in so much blood from its battles, sieges and massacres as China."

It is extremely difficult to gauge correctly the teachings of Confucianism on this matter, which so divides the opinions of men. Old-time conservative Chinese were accustomed to speak of Confucius, and to a less degree Mencius, as those who supported existing governments. The modern revolutionist classes both of these Holy Men as friends of revolution. All that I can do is to quote their sayings, and deduce therefrom their manifest teachings.

In former days one almost trembled to utter the Chinese words for revolution, namely, "Ko ming." Strange to say, they were first used by Confucius in his Notes on the Book of Changes, where he said, "Tang and Wu in their revolutions were following Heaven and ratifying the wishes of the people." Tang was the founder of the Shang dynasty and overthrew the degenerate king of the Hsia dynasty; and King Wu overthrew the Shang dynasty and established the dynasty of Chou, which lasted nearly 1,000 years through the times of Confucius and Mencius. In all other places in the classics, the words used are for rebellions, uprisings, downfall or destruction.

We will first give the views of Confucius. First of all he may be said to be the great teacher concerning the duties of rulers. He exhorts them to righteousness that their kingdoms may be preserved. This is sound teaching for all time and all countries. Only a few quotations need to be made. One saying is: "He who exercises government by means of virtue is like the Pole-star, which keeps its place, while all the other stars revolve around it."

A noble asked Confucius what should be done to inspire a feeling of respect and loyalty in the people, in order to make them exert themselves to right conduct, and Confucius replied: "Treat them with seriousness, and they will respect you. Be filial and kind to all and they will be loyal to you. Advance the good and instruct the ignorant, and

Digitized by Google

the people will be nerved to righteous conduct." According to this, the good conduct of the king inspires loyalty among the people, and thus does away with any necessity for revolution. The positive and negative side of this teaching comes out in another answer given to a question asked by the prince of the kingdom of Lu, where Confucius lived. The prince asked what should be done to secure the submission of the people, and Confucius said, "Advance the upright and set aside the crooked, then the people will submit. Advance the crooked and set aside the upright, then the people will not submit." In other words the people's revolt comes from the bad management of the ruler and his lack of conscience in discriminating men.

Confucius places all the emphasis on the character of the ruler. To have peace in the country, the people must be loyal, but to be loyal, they must first of all have confidence in their king, and this confidence depends entirely on the worth of the king. Hence when Confucius was asked what was essential to a government, he replied. "There must be sufficient food for the people, an efficient army, and the confidence of the people in their ruler." When asked which of these three could be dispensed with, he said, "the army," and next "the food," and then added: "From of old men have died, but without the confidence of the people, there can be no government."

The importance of moral character in the ruler comes out in another question asked of Confucius, namely, "What do you say to putting to death the wicked in the interests of the good?" Confucius replied, "In carrying on your government why should you depend on the death penalty? If your own desire is for goodness, the people will be good. The moral power of the rulers is as the wind, and that of the people as the grass. Whithersoever the wind blows, the grass is sure to bend." There have been those who misconstrued these words, claiming that the power was all with the ruler, while it means that the moral character of the ruler has a sure and inevitable effect on the people. Still more emphatic is another saying of Confucius: "If a man is cor-

Digitized by Google

rect in his personal conduct, there is no need to issue orders in order to secure allegiance to government. If he is not correct in his personal conduct, he may issue orders, but they will not be obeyed."

This is the basal principle of Confucius' teaching concerning governments, and to it no one can well object. Taken by itself there is no hint at revolution. Its observance assures peace and prosperity. The guarantee against revolution is found in good government and a good ruler. In the mind of Confucius the main thought is uprightness, virtue, goodness. Questions of progress, material advancement, and even wealth, are either subsidiary or not mentioned at all. Hence, if revolution arises, it must be by good men against bad men, with the purpose of superseding an impure government by a pure government.

A slight check to revolution is the exhortation given to the people as well as to the ruler, as where he quotes in his Analects a saying of his disciple Yu, who says, "One who is filial and fraternal will seldom be found to offend against those in authority over him, while never has it been known that one who did not offend against authority would stir up insurrection." But it must be said that the duties of the people are not emphasized like those of rulers.

If Confucius lays more stress on the moral conduct of the ruler than on that of the people, so it is the failure of the ruler to do his duty, rather than failure on the part of individuals in the country that may result in revolutions. The prince who ruled over the kingdom of Lu asked if Confucius could state in one sentence how a country could become prosperous, and in another sentence how it could be ruined. In answer to the second part, which is more closely connected with our subject, he said, "There is a saying among the people, 'I find no pleasure in being a ruler of men, except that whatsoever I order, no one will oppose.' Now if what is ordered is right, it is well that no one oppose, but if what is ordered is not right, and no one opposes, is not that alone enough to ruin a country?" Here he plainly teaches that the people should be so honest and upright that

Digitized by Google

they will resist bad government. And it is here that men separate on the question of revolution. While all may believe in overturning bad rulers some believe that it can be done by legal processes and moral agitation and methods of reform. Others believe that the overturn and the opposition can only come through war and bloodshed—through revolution. Thus far Confucius only teaches that bad rulers and bad government should be opposed. How opposed, he does not say.

In another passage Confucius points out the possibility of uprisings and also the positive way to prevent them. "I have heard," he says, "that those who have kingdoms and possessions are not troubled lest they do not have enough, but lest there be no equal distribution; they are not troubled lest there be poverty, but lest there be discontent. If there is equality, there will be no poverty; if there is harmony, there will be enough for all; and if there is contentment, there will be no overthrow of the government." Thus Confucius cites the possibility of revolution as a warning to rulers. He shows how they are inevitable, but he hopes wise methods will be adopted for their prevention.

In two other passages he seems to show sympathy with revolution. In the native kingdom of Confucius, a noble held possession of an important town and was in rebellion. He invited Confucius to visit him, and Confucius was inclined to go. One of his disciples was displeased and said, "Indeed you cannot go; why should you think of visiting such a man?" Confucius then replied, "It cannot be for nothing that he has invited me. If anyone would use me, might it not be that I would establish an eastern Chou?" The second passage is where a certain noble who was in revolt against the ruler also invited Confucius, who was inclined to go. The same disciple just mentioned said to Confucius, "I have heard you say at one time that the Superior Man will not associate with one who is guilty of wrong doing, even though he be one's relative. Now this man is in rebellion; what will be said if you go to see him?" Confucius replied: "Yes, I have said these words. But is it

Digitized by Google

not also said that if a thing is hard, you may pound it and yet it will not crack; if a thing is white, you may smirch it, and yet it will not become black. Am I only a bitter gourd to be hung up and not eaten at all?"

In these two passages Confucius plainly shows his sympathy with revolutionary movements, when directed against bad rulers and corrupt governments which existed then as they do now; but he never went to the extent of actually taking part in any revolt against authority in itself or against forms of State. Rather he tried to bring about a better state of affairs in different kingdoms by preaching righteousness to rulers even more than to the people.

A few other references may be made to other teachings of Confucius, outside of the collection of Confucian Analects, which show that he was a believer in popular rights, just as Mencius was after him. He taught the duties of rulers and the rights of the people. As between ruler and people, the latter were the more precious and more important. In a book written after the time of Confucius he is quoted as having said: "The ruler is like the cup, and the people like the water." By this comparison he teaches that rulers must seek the convenience and welfare of the people, just as the cup is made for the use of water.

In the Book of Rites Confucius says: "If rulers have love to the people, they will be preserved; if they despise and wrong the people, they will perish."

In still another book Confucius compares the ruler to a boat and the people to the water. "Water," he says, "can carry the boat, and it can upset the boat. If the ruler takes warning by this, his danger will turn to safety, and no harm will come to him." In other words the position of the ruler depends on the people. He cannot act apart from them, neither should he seek their injury.

These quotations from the writings of China's great Sage cannot but impress one with his moderation and equitable spirit in discussing the problems of government. He relies on positive rather than on negative instruction. He again and again urges rulers to save themselves and their king-

Digitized by Google

doms by safeguarding their personal character and the righteousness of their rule. He warns them of destruction, if righteousness is neglected. He teaches that the natural consequence of such remissness in the ruler will be disaffection among the people, and probably uprisings and even revolution. *Revolt against wickedness*, not against a form of government, or against a government capable of improvement, commands his approval. The countenance he gives to revolution is with limitations. There is no license and lawlessness, but a new and larger effort to maintain law, order, peace, prosperity, and, above all, goodness and justice.

Having ascertained the views of the Confucian Analects, it remains for us to complete the survey of the teachings of Confucianism by an examination of the words of Tseng tsze as found in *The Great Learning*, and of Mencius as found in the classic which is named after him. The other of the Four Books, *The Doctrine of the Mean*, is not quoted, as its teachings on good government are practically the same as that more fully taught in those Books which are the subject of our investigation.

The Great Learning is a brief exposition by Tseng tsze of a still briefer text by Confucius. The little book may be called a Hand-Book on Good Governments or Instructions to Rulers. Its general purport is to make clear the predominant influence of rulers, either for good or evil. Through the power of their example nations rise or fall, prosper or decay. In the influence that is exerted over the people, that which is most essential is personal character. Not only government must be permeated with just principles, but the emperor, the king, and every officer of the government, must shape his own life according to the two cardinal virtues of righteousness and benevolence. According to this little book, which is to the Chinese as the Sermon on the Mount is to the Christian, it is useless to expect good government through the medium of a depraved and immoral ruler. Kingdoms to endure are built on virtue and goodness, and these have their source in the Supreme Ruler

Digitized by Google

of the Universe. By forgetting the source of all good one's personal character degenerates, and any kingdom which is cursed with such rule will perish; the people will suffer the faults of the ruler; as is the one above, so are they that are below. Such ideas might almost be called axiomatic truths. Whether the work of destruction will come in the form of revolution or not is not here stated. How revolutions may be avoided, not how revolutions may be brought about, this is the indirect teaching. What is directly taught is that which is undeniable. What is clearly said, anyone can say and ought to say, with no fear of being accused as a rebel or being tried for high treason. Men who are rulers may resent their utterance, but their truth no one will deny, and their force is all the greater because they are the message of these ancient preachers of righteousness, whose righteousness is accompanied by the highest intelligence. China's preachers in the olden time were men who outranked all others in point of scholarship, as well as in point of character.

The first quotation is as follows: "Yao and Shun led the Empire by means of benevolence, and the people followed them. Chieh and Chou led the Empire by violence, and the people also followed them. They issued orders which were the opposite of what they really loved, but the orders were not followed. Hence, what a ruler has in himself, he may ask the people to have. He who in himself does not carry out feelings of generosity, but commands others to have them—this is an absurdity." The two bad rulers who are here cited were the last of the Hsia and the Shang Dynasties. It was their overthrow by revolution that Confucius declared to be the will of Heaven. Again: "If one in authority treats the aged in the proper spirit, the people will become filial, if he treats his seniors in the proper spirit, the people will learn the qualities of brotherliness; if he shows compassion to the young and helpless, the people will show the same spirit." In another place he quotes from the Book of Odes the following sentence: "Very distinguished art thou, oh teacher Yin; how the people all

Digitized by Google

look up to thee," and then adds: "He who is over a country must not neglect to be careful. If he deviates from the path, the people in the Empire will arise and kill him." This surely is revolution. Whether right or wrong, is not stated. It is inevitable. He immediately makes another quotation from the Book of Odes referring to the Yin or Shang Dynasty, as follows: "Before the sovereigns of Yin had lost the people, they were worthy to appear before God." And then the philosopher adds: "Take warning from Yin. The lofty mandate must not be easily changed." The rule is: Get the people, and the country is retained; lose the people, and the country is lost. Therefore the sovereign must first of all be careful about his own virtue. "Virtue is first, and then the people; after the people there comes territory, and after territory, wealth; and with wealth there comes revenue. Virtue is the root, wealth is the result." Or we may further say, "Personal virtue in the ruler brings wealth to the nation."

One other quotation may be taken from the *Great Learning* as follows: "It has never been known of a sovereign loving to practice benevolence and the people failing to love righteousness. Neither has it been known of a sovereign loving righteousness, and his affairs failing of completion."

By these quotations we discern excellencies in Confucianism, first, that the instruction is direct, positive and clear; secondly, that it is most important that he who is highest should be led aright; and thirdly, that uprightness in the ruler, and all who are in authority, is a sure guarantee of national preservation and will ward off all danger of revolutions.

We next turn to the teachings of Mencius, who was the greatest of the disciples of Confucius, and whose home was near to that of the great Teacher. Mencius was a practical man of affairs, with a touch of humor. Besides teaching the principles of Political Science he added the rudiments of Political Economy. He therefore defended the rights of the people, and sought their welfare along various lines not found in the teachings of Confucius. Farming, forestry, the

Digitized by Google

various handicrafts, equitable taxation, prevention of famine, schools and education, and other forms of social well-being, are all touched upon in the words of Mencius, and reveal him as a social as well as political reformer. In the main he has more to say of the rights of the people than of their duties. Such teachings have a natural drift in the direction of revolution, as will be seen by a more minute examination.

Mencius like Confucius emphasizes the duties of rulers, especially the essential requirement of moral character. If a ruler is a good man, and rules according to righteousness and benevolence, his country will prosper, and he will be held in respect. If he is a bad ruler, his country will perish and he will be overthrown. This is the one fundamental idea which by reiteration is ground into the life of the Chinese nation and particularly of her rulers and officials.

At the very beginning of the Works of Mencius occurs a conversation between Mencius and King Hui of the little kingdom of Liang. The king wished to know how profit could come to his kingdom. Mencius replied: "Why ask about profit? Benevolence and righteousness are in themselves sufficient. If the king, the high and lower officials, and even the people all talk of profit, then there will be a scramble for profit between those above and those below, and the kingdom will be in danger. . . . When righteousness is put last, and profit first, no one will be satisfied till he has snatched all."

Mencius here uses the two words, benevolence and righteousness, while Confucius was more accustomed to use only the word righteousness, or the more general term for virtue, or what may be translated moral character. In combining the two words, benevolence and righteousness, Mencius follows the scriptural expressions, justice and mercy, truth and grace, righteousness and forgiveness.

In conversation with the head of the kingdom of Chi, Mencius makes use of the one word, benevolence, and shows its effects in bringing about good government. "If the king," he says, "exercises government by the application

Digitized by Google

of benevolence, all officials in the whole Empire will want to serve in this king's palace, the farmers will want to plough in the king's fields, the merchants will want to store their harvests in the king's markets, travellers will want to travel on the king's highways, and all throughout the whole Empire those who have grievances against their rulers will want to find redress at this king's Court. If they are thus inclined, who will be able to stop them?" Here is a revolution brought about by the superior attraction of the spirit of love, a benevolent ruler of one of the small kingdoms in the whole Empire winning to his rule and sway the people of all the kingdoms, even those who serve the Emperor. Mencius then goes on to show that benevolent rule helps to secure livelihood for all the people, and that loyal obedience need not be looked for, if daily livelihood is either uncertain or impossible.

Mencius states the principle in a few words addressed to Duke Muh of the district where Mencius was born. "If the ruler will exercise a benevolent government, all the people will hold him and all above them in affection, and will die for their officers."

On another occasion Mencius said: "Only the man who possesses benevolence ought to be placed in high office. A man without benevolence in high office will disseminate wickedness among all the people. If those above do not regulate themselves according to fixed principle, and if those below have no laws to follow, then those at court will cease to believe in principle, official employees will cease to believe in rules, the ruler will transgress righteousness, and inferiors will violate the penal laws. It will only be good luck, if such a country lasts."

This quality of benevolence, of kindness, of humane feelings, is sometimes emphasized by a warning against its opposite. On the one side is the kind ruler and humane government; on the other, oppression, tyranny, violence, cruelty. While Confucius traced the downfall of nations, of petty kingdoms, and even of the empire or of a dynasty, to neglect of righteousness, Mencius particularizes cruelty

Digitized by Google

and oppression. He first quotes a saying of Confucius: "There are only two ways, the one of benevolence, and the other without benevolence." He then illustrates: "He who is cruel to the last degree to the people will himself be killed, and his kingdom will perish. Even if he does not go to extremes, his life will be in danger, and his kingdom will be weakened." And again: "Three dynasties, Hsia, Shang and Chou, gained imperial rule through benevolence; and they lost it through lack of benevolence. It is in this way that nations decay or flourish, are preserved or perish."

Mencius makes frequent reference to one special element in the benevolent disposition, namely, pity or sympathetic interest in the lot of others. In one place he says: "All men have hearts which feel for others' woes. Ancient kings had this commiserating mind, and so a commiserating government. With a commiserating mind and government, to rule the whole Empire was as if the Empire moved around in the palm of the hand."

The preservation or downfall of nations and their rulers is illustrated by appeal to history, first to Yao and Shun and after, and then to King Wen and King Wu and after. The lamentable end of centuries of rule is thus stated: "The world fell into decay, and the truth grew less and less. Perverse speaking and oppressive deeds waxed rife. Ministers murdered their sovereigns, and sons slew their fathers." Of another period he used this language: "Holy Kings ceased to rule, and the rulers of small kingdoms gave themselves over to lusts."

In all this no use is made of the word revolution, but the fact stands forth with fierce and menacing look on the pages of history, and in the prophecies of the prophet. Mencius takes it for granted that revolutions will arise; he believes that their coming is only the carrying out of a law of nature, and, being inevitable, that they are right. On the ruler must be placed the blame for revolution. Mencius knows of no revolution that springs forth from good government. Secondary causes of revolution may be found elsewhere, but the primary cause is in the ruler. A revolution due to

Digitized by Google

wickedness, to cruelty and oppression, is the only revolution of which Mencius takes note. By implication, it may be said, that if the personal character of a ruler is not bad nor his rule oppressive, the appearance of revolution is contrary to the immutable laws of the universe.

Another teaching, found in Mencius more than in Confucius, is that the destiny of nations rests with Heaven, and is revealed through the voice of the people. Besides teaching the rights of man, he teaches the democratic idea that sovereign rule comes from the people.

First may be quoted the familiar expression: "To follow Heaven is to be preserved; to act contrary to Heaven is to perish." This is religion brought into politics.

Mencius makes mention of the Emperor Shun succeeding Yao, rather than Yao's son. Mencius is asked, "What is the case that Yao bestowed the Empire on Shun?" and the reply is, "No, the Son of Heaven cannot bestow the Empire on anyone." "Still," it is then said to Mencius, "Shun had the Empire; who gave it to him?" and he replies, "Heaven bestowed it upon him." "What! Heaven bestowed it? Was the decree made known in a definite manner?" "No, Heaven does not speak. Its will revealed itself in his conduct and his deeds." "You say, revealed by his conduct and deeds? How could this be?" Mencius replied, "The Son of Heaven may recommend a man to Heaven, but cannot make Heaven to bestow the Empire upon him. Yao recommended Shun to Heaven, and Heaven accepted him; he presented him to the people, and the people accepted him." When asked how this was done, Mencius replied: "He caused Shun to preside at the sacrifices, and all the spirits showed their pleasure; thus Heaven accepted him. He caused Shun to preside over the affairs, which were well managed, and the people were at peace and contented; thus the people accepted him." A few sentences further on comes the well-known expression quoted from the Book of History, "Heaven sees as my people see; Heaven hears as my people hear." In another place, Mencius says: "The people are the most precious and impor-

Digitized by Google

tant of all; next come the tutelary spirits; and the least of all is the ruler. Therefore, to get possession of the peasant people is to become the Son of Heaven."

This completes our examination of the teachings of Confucianism concerning revolutions. According to the Chinese Sages revolution is directed against wickedness, especially oppression, in ruler and government, never against good rulers and good governments, still less against a mere form of government. All the cases cited of revolution show the deep degeneracy of king or emperor, and the hopeless corruption of his rule.

Viewed in this light one may well doubt whether Confucius, Mencius and Tseng tsze, who certainly taught the revolutionary idea, would have given their blessing to the revolution against the Manchu Dynasty in 1911. A revolution after 1898 or 1900 might have been based on Confucian principles, but what about the Prince Regent and the last Empress Dowager, whose personal character was above that of many of their enemies, and whose rule was tending safely towards greater rights for the people, and the safeguarding of their lives and property, in the peaceful development of the whole nation? Where dishonesty, avarice, impurity, cruelty, tyranny, existed, whoever the official, opposition should have been raised, and the demands of conscience should have been heard, but all this was far different from the revolution as it actually was.

Since the first revolution, the overthrow of the Manchu House or the Monarchy, China has had five other revolutions, and is still deranged by a revolutionary fever. But China is no worse than the Western world; the revolutionary spirit in Europe is to be more condemned than that in Asia, for it is far more disastrous. It would be well for Europeans as well as Chinese to ponder on the real teachings of Confucianism—when to resort to revolution, and when to hold aloof.

GILBERT REID.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHINA,
NEW YORK.

Digitized by Google

THE RÔLE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL.

NORMAN BOARDMAN.

THAT *there is nothing fundamental* is now regarded as such a truism that fundamentals have ceased to have even respectable standing in the sphere of "enlightened" action. It is no longer necessary to prove the assertion; to mention it is quite sufficient. The proposition meets with ready assent among intelligent people. Nevertheless, the statement needs interpretation.

That there is no absolute fundamental is true but it does not follow from this that nothing is fundamental. There may be something that is fundamental even though there is nothing that is absolutely fundamental. The fundamental is not necessarily an antiquated ethical term because of the present logical status of absolutes. Thus it is still legitimate to talk about Good, Right, Virtue and Justice, recognizing the fact that their absolutes have been thrown out of court. It will be a sorry day for the world when these moral concepts are no longer a fit subject for inquiry and so with the Fundamental.

The fundamental occupied a most important place in systems of absolute ethics. To believe in God and to obey the Ten Commandments were once fundamental. They were fundamental to salvation. Salvation having become an obsolete goal for humanity from the standpoint of the "intellectuals," these fundamentals have been thrown overboard and with them have perished all fundamentals in many instances.

With the relegation of absolutism in ethics along with absolutism in politics to the scrap heap has gone the banishment of fundamentals. The fundamental born of absolutism has no place in democratic morals. But was not democracy itself born of absolutism? Why reject the fundamental because of its ancestry and proclaim democracy as the only legitimate heir to the throne of absolutism?

Digitized by Google

The fundamental was once the pillar of the temple of absolutism; it may now become the pilot of the ship of democracy. Democracy needs the fundamental. It is not to be rejected; it is to be re-defined.

One cannot discuss fundamentals in a vacuum. The necessary re-definition is that *the fundamental is relative to the end sought*, and the end sought is relative to desire. It is the abstraction of fundamentals from concrete situations and setting them up as entities that has given rise to the notion that there is nothing fundamental. Ideas and things *become fundamental* with reference to certain ends and purposes.

If there is any one thing that the study of ethics teaches us it is that the quest for the Ultimate Good is more or less of a "wild goose chase." Moralists throughout the ages have sought it but none has found it. If it were possible to gain this quest, then should we have a fundamental goal. With the introduction of relative standards in ethics, this quest has been abandoned. It is only natural that the fundamental goal should go with it. Since there is no fundamental goal there can therefore be nothing that is really fundamental. This is the so-called logic of relativism as applied to the fundamental.

Because there is no absolute goal it does not follow that there is no goal; nor does it follow that nothing is fundamental as a means to that goal. It is only a two-by-four intelligence that can find no place to go in a throbbing, needy world such as that in which we live. The trouble seems not to be that there is no place to go but rather that there are too many places to go. But if someone should still insist that there is no *real* place to go despite all of the apparent ones, the fundamental thing for him to do is to find a place.

In the opinion of a certain sophisticated type of folk one cannot assume a scientific attitude toward morals and talk in terms of fundamentals. The fundamental, they hold, precludes a scientific attitude from the start; how naïve to regard fundamentals as having anything to do with a

Digitized by Google

problem! Nevertheless, these people are usually the first to "object to principle" and to "stand up for rights" as if, after all, there were some fundamentals. The difficulty is not due to the fact that the attitude in question is too scientific but rather that it is not scientific enough. Our critics fail to see the rôle of the fundamental in the scientific method.

Whether or not the fundamental is incompatible with science depends upon our conception of fundamentals. Science does not start with fundamentals; it discovers them. To start with fundamentals in ethics is not only unscientific but may also be unethical. To discover the fundamental is both scientific and ethical. Indeed it is the business of ethics to discover fundamentals. The fundamental as such is neither scientific nor unscientific; it is non-scientific. It becomes either scientific or unscientific according to the function it performs in judgment.

The discarding of fundamentals serves as an easy justification for moral laxness. It may also justify much loose thinking and readily commends itself as a very acceptable lazy man's philosophy. No matter what his conduct may be, a man may always excuse himself on the basis that after all there is nothing that is fundamental. This savors of intelligence and intelligence is a highly esteemed trait in the species homo. But is this a manifestation of intelligence or does it not indicate rather a superficial view of intelligence?

We hear much to-day about the fundamental rights of property but very little about the fundamental duties of property from some circles. The fundamental rights become an easy shelter for privilege while the ignoring of fundamentals on the side of obligations becomes a very helpful tool in the protection of the "respectable" fundamentals. Thus the rôle of the fundamental in thinking about fundamentals is doctored up to meet the interest at stake with no reference to the logical function of the fundamental. The interest is not in the fundamental, *qua* fundamental, but rather as to how the fundamental may

Digitized by Google

serve interest. Where interest is served, the fundamental is all fundamental but where interest is defeated, the fundamental is of no account, for there is no fundamental. Here we have a clear case of *reasoning* as an attempt to justify what we already believe or would like to believe instead of showing us what we ought to believe.

The confusion is due to the fact that we have not located the function of the fundamental. In the case of rights we started with fundamentals while in the case of duties we ignored them. In both instances our problem is that of discovering the fundamental. *The fundamental thing is to be able to discover the fundamental.* It is not a mark of intelligence to ignore fundamentals any more than it is such a mark to accept them. The problem is that of discovery, and it is the business of intelligence to find out what is fundamental in each and every concrete situation.

We make our own fundamentals. The fundamental is a construction of intelligence. It is what thought sets up as the *better* in a given situation. Like the good, it is unique. It gets its meaning in a problematic situation. It is out of this type of situation that the fundamental arises. It becomes a tool for reconstruction. It points the way to the better that is conceived. It is the better itself. It is both an end and a means. Its logical status is that of hypothesis; its moral status is that of value. Like the ideal, it is the meeting place of logic and ethics.

To start with ready-made fundamentals that just are or ought to be gives rise to the conception of the fundamental as something that exists apart from concrete, social situations. It is a base or foundation that exists independent of the structure that is to be reared upon it. It is a universal foundation that must precede all architectural designs. The art of architecture knows no such foundation and the science of ethics has found no such fundamentals. As the foundation of an edifice is determined by the kind of structure that is to be reared upon it, so is the fundamental determined by the situation that makes it fundamental. It is not fundamental that a man should marry if he prefers

Digitized by Google

the state of single blessedness. If he does marry and abandons his family for no reason except that he happens to be tired of them, it hardly seems fair to them that he should be upheld in his act because he believes there is nothing fundamental. New relations bring new obligations and duties and the fundamentals of the relation are determined by the type of relations into which we enter. The doctrine of Natural Rights set forth the most fundamental of fundamentals among which was the right to life, but society reserves the right to take life when it becomes a menace to better life. The taking of life then becomes fundamental. This may be true in the case of dangerous criminals.

The fundamental is not given; it is created. It is a product of intelligence and appears in the efforts of intelligence to perform its function of control. Intelligence sets up its own fundamentals and things become fundamental with reference to the problem at hand. If the gasoline tank is empty and a man desires to use his car, it seems absurd to say that there is nothing fundamental with reference to that situation. Of course it may not be fundamental that he use the car but if he does use it, the gasoline is quite fundamental to such use, the decease of the fundamental notwithstanding. Just as the essence has had its day except for its revival in Critical Realism, so the static fundamental has been buried with it and the present discussion is no attempt to revive it. But things still do become essential in certain situations and it is not unlike this with the fundamental.

A given fundamental either ignores a problem or is a palpable begging of the question. A case in point is that of loyalty. This may be regarded as fundamental to good citizenship. To start with a fixed conception of loyalty is obviously a begging of the question. The problem is that of finding out what is fundamental to loyalty and to assume that a man is disloyal because he does not sympathize with the foreign policy of the present administration is beside the point. It solves the problem by ignoring

Digitized by Google

it, which is no solution at all. There are those who see in Decatur's maxim [1] the essence of good citizenship and the fundamentals of loyalty while others see in it a most effective instrument by means of which vested interests are able to gain moral support for exploitation projects. The problem is that of knowing when to be loyal and in what loyalty consists. The maxim in question ignores the problem by setting up a ready-made fundamental.

Moltke says: "Permanent peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful one. But war is an essential element of God's scheme of the world." If this be true the present writer for one would regard it as fundamental that the Will of God be quietly set aside at this point as has been done in so many other cases. Of course it is quite possible to argue that peace is not fundamental to society just as it is possible to maintain that self-respect is not fundamental to an individual. Peace may not be fundamental to society, but it is fundamental to civilized society. With the progress of science and its continued devotion to devising new means and implements of destruction, it is quite possible to argue that peace is fundamental to the very existence of society.

We cannot expect to obtain peace and continue both to think and to act in terms of war. It is not even true that there is nothing fundamental to the jungle; much less is it true that there is nothing fundamental to peace. At least one fundamental would be that of learning to think and to act in terms of peace rather than those of war. "America First" may have been fundamental to the success of a presidential campaign, but is it fundamental to progress? It may be fundamental to progress with reference to the "public-be-damned" attitude of both labor and capital, but it does not follow from this that it is fundamental to progress in international relations. When

[1] The *Chicago Tribune's* defense for using this maxim as its slogan is to the effect that no individual ought to regard his judgment as so infallible that he has a right to set it over against that of an entire nation. Granted that such a situation ever existed, the maxim is a very unhappy expression of the idea.

Digitized by Google

brought to bear upon the problem of reconstruction it operated as a static fundamental and precluded the possibility of assuming a scientific attitude toward the problem. America First is no more fundamental as an idea for promoting the peace of the world than was *Deutschland über Alles*. It is true that it is not quite so positive in its assertion as is the German statement, but since there is no hard and fast line between defense and aggression, the spectator sees nothing about the idea that is fundamentally different from the German idea. Both ideas may be made to function in very much the same sort of way. They are alike in that they both are survivals of an outgrown conception of patriotism and represent a mythical and mystical entitative and sovereign state.

An effective League of Nations is not fundamental as an abstraction; it may prove fundamental to promoting the peace of the world. It is quite true that a league of nations is not fundamental to imperialism. In fact it might prove quite an obstacle to that end. An attempt to make the world safe for imperialism could hardly regard a league as fundamental. "Association with Nations" rather than an "Association of Nations" is quite sufficient. This is a skilful begging of the question but makes no contribution to the issue involved in the discussion of the problem.

Americanization is no more fundamental to good citizenship than was "Kulturization." In so far as both represent the process of socialization they might be regarded as fundamental, but in so far as they represent a reversion to tribalism they are not fundamental to progress. Progress itself may not be regarded as fundamental but if so regarded it is of course subject to determination in each and every situation out of which it gets its meaning. "Socialization" is a better term than "Americanization" for the process of educating for citizenship. The former does not have about it the same controversial connotation as does the latter term.

An attitude may be fundamental to the discovery of the fundamental. It is that of co-operation. It involves a

Digitized by Google

mutual give and take relationship. Compromise is not an adequate statement of the process. It represents only the negative aspect of adjustment. The resultant fundamental is not a mere process of knocking a piece off this idea and knocking a piece off that idea, so to speak. It has a positive aspect; it is that of creation and synthesis. Out of the complex a new idea is born. It is not a mere fusion of ideas but a making of an idea. The point is well stated by Miss Follett [2] in her description of what is wanted in a committee meeting. If you come to dominate the situation we do not want you; if you come to be a mere passive absorbent we do not want you; if, on the other hand, you come to make your contribution to the total complex of the situation we do want you. It is in this sense, *i.e.*, the attitude into which the discussion is entered, "that the only fundamental thing there is, is to be able to see that there is no one thing that is fundamental" is true. The resultant fundamental that arises out of a non-fundamental situation becomes the "Practical Absolute" with reference to that situation.

NORMAN BOARDMAN.

NEW RICHMOND, WISCONSIN.

[2] Cf. *The New State*, p. 29 ff.

Digitized by Google

BOOK REVIEWS.

PUBLIC OPINION. By Walter Lippmann. Pp. 427. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922.

From the *Naturrecht* philosophy of the 17th and 18th centuries, culminating in the political logic of Mill and the metapolitics of the German transcendentalists, the study of government shifted to the field of historical inquiry and later to the observation and comparative study of political institutions, the latter so well exemplified in the works of the late Lord Bryce. In more recent years the emphasis in political inquiry has been transferred to the more intimate analysis of actual political processes, with some attention to the psychological factors involved in political phenomena. Mr. Lippmann's study is typical of the change that is taking place in the character of political science in later years.

The central feature of the volume is the belief that the democratic fallacy has been its preoccupation with the origin of government rather than with the process and results. More important than the original consent upon which government is assumed to rest, is the continuing process of government and the means by which consent is created. In general, social control depends upon devising standards of living and methods of audit by which the acts of public officials and industrial directors are measured. It is not so much self-government that interests men as the desire for a certain minimum of health, of decent housing, of material necessities, of education, freedom, pleasures, beauty. To the extent that criteria may be found for the measurement of these conditions, political decisions may be linked up with the vital and continuing interest of the community.

Mr. Lippmann's volume is concerned, therefore, with an attempt, first to show how opinions are commonly formed, and secondly with an attempt to formulate a more adequate organization of public intelligence. His first problem, then, is to show the influence of "stereotypes" and "symbols" in determining the attitudes of men in regard to the system of political control—the ineffectiveness in short of the customary judgment upon men and affairs. As he points out, the symbol is not only a mechanism

Digitized by Google

of solidarity but also a mechanism of exploitation, and may readily become a means of propaganda and control. This leads the author to a discussion of the relations between leader and the rank and file. It leads also to an analysis of the nature of propaganda, and especially to the nature and influence of our news-gathering and dissemination agencies in shaping public opinion.

Mr. Lippmann believes that the fundamental problem is after all that of "inventing, creating and organizing a machinery of knowledge" by means of which a self-governing people may have a reliable picture of the world in which they are and in which they must make political decisions. This brings him to Part VIII of his volume in which he discusses "Organized Intelligence." Here the writer analyzes acutely the difficulties that confront the social scientist, as compared with the physical scientist. He directs attention to the significant "entering wedge" in the form of various associations for the purpose of aiding in the organization of public intelligence and further suggests that in the Federal government, each department should be equipped with an intelligence bureau, and that there should be a central clearing house for the interchange of intelligence. Political scientists might be placed in contact with this material, and there might be built up an elaborate organization of intelligence. The same thing might be done for other areas of government, as the states and the cities.

The citizen cannot master all of these facts, but may insist upon "principles of procedure," upon the facts being presented and considered, upon having the "fat boiled out of the argument" before it is presented to him. It may then be possible through re-education to bring our public opinions into grip with the environment as it really is, and perhaps "the enormous censoring, stereotyping, and dramatizing apparatus can be liquidated."

In the last chapter the author is plainly nonplussed, for having cited the authorities, from Plato to Wells and Shaw, and having searched his own scientific conscience, doubt seems to seize him. The number of problems upon which reason is prepared to dictate is still small, says Mr. Lippmann, and in most cases we must still "gamble with fate as intuition prompts." There is a "noble counterfeit" in that "charity which comes from self-knowledge" and the belief in the possibilities of human nature and the hopes of a friendlier and finer world.

This brilliant study is indispensable to any serious student of

Digitized by Google

politics and of great value to the citizen without special interest in scholarship. It points the way toward the new politics and the new social science that are now slowly taking shape.

CHARLES E. MERRIAM.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW. By Pierre De Tourtoulon. Translated by Martha McC. Read. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922. Pp. lxi, 653.

This volume, by the Professor of Legal History in the University of Lausanne, constitutes Volume XIII of *The Modern Legal Philosophy Series*, published under the auspices of the Association of American Law Schools. Although the reviewer is nominally a member of the committee on publication, he feels free to comment upon this book, because the entire credit for its selection and translation belongs to others.

This is an interesting and important book, and fills a place not occupied by any other in this series. It is not a treatise on the Science of Law, like that by Gareis, or a history of legal philosophies like that by Berolzheimer. It is not the exposition of a particular legal philosophy like that by Kohler. It is not written to support a particular thesis like the well-known volume of Ihering, translated in this series under the title of *Law as a Means to an End*. It is rather an effort to deal historically with the philosophical and psychological causes which have operated in the development of law. It is divided into three books: the first deals with Teleology in the History of Law; the second with Causality in the History of Law; and the third with certain special subjects, like Determinism and the Idea of Law, Evolution, and Chance.

The second book, which comprises the greater part of the volume, opens with a discussion of the idea of Cause, and then proceeds to deal with such questions as Biology and Law, Race and the Law, Social Psychology and the Law, Law and the Emotional Life, Law and the Intellectual Life, the Diseases of Legal Thinking, and then with the Rational Elements of Law, such as analysis, definition, analogy, construction, and fiction; then with scientific or "pure" law; and finally with the metaphysical element in law, and herein of the conception of Justice.

Professor Tourtoulon has no thesis to establish, no cause to

Digitized by Google

advocate, no reforms to urge. He is neither a prophet nor a propagandist. His method is to take up a certain legal idea or situation, examine it historically and impartially, with a view to discover the philosophical or psychological cause which lies behind it, make such comment upon it as seems pertinent, and then to pass on to another. His comment is always illuminating and usually wise. It impresses the reader as being inspired by a wide range of experience and reading. His chapter entitled The Diseases of Legal Thinking is especially valuable, and exposes with great keenness the part played in legal thinking by credulity, myth, fashion, and fiction. His chapter on the conception of Justice accepts, as the criterion, the principle of *suum cuique*, but it must be confessed that this is not a very satisfactory or certain principle when confronted by many of the complicated situations of actual life. In the theory of contracts, he asserts, there is a marked conflict between the requirements of "metaphysical law," *i.e.*, justice, and the majority of positive laws. "According to the idea of justice, no one is ever 'obligated' to another." "The principle that promise or consent creates obligation is foreign to the idea of justice." Only where there is a substantially equal exchange of values, would it be just. Nevertheless, a law enforcing the performance of promises may practically be justified. "In practical life, it is very difficult to maintain strictly the principles of justice in matters involving contracts, and especially in commercial dealings. The order, the welfare, the material prosperity, and above all, the security of transactions are quite clearly opposed to ideal justice in transactions."

Space will not permit a more detailed statement of the contents of this book. It is well worth the attention of all those who are interested in clear thinking about law and its development.

FLOYD R. MECHEM.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

THE THEORY OF MIND AS PURE ACT. By Giovanni Gentile. Translated from the third edition with an introduction by H. Wildon Carr. London: Macmillan and Co., New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922. Pp. xxvii, 280. Price, 15s. net.

New philosophies are not to be hoped for, but the fresh developments of a great philosophical tradition are living philosophy itself. The new idealism in modern Italy—*actual idealism* as it

Digitized by Google

calls itself—is precisely a development of this kind. Nourished in the classical and continental traditions, it continues to philosophise in the grand manner, and it counts itself to have apprehended what Hegel missed. What is more, although there is a distinctively national flavour in much of it (for what Italian could forget Bruno and Vico not to mention Gioberti, de Sanctis or Spaventa?) it is coming to be regarded, and rapidly, as something far too big for Alpine barriers. If proof be needed for this statement, Mr. Bosanquet's *Contemporary Philosophy* may convince the laggards.

It is plain, then, that English-speaking philosophers who are diffident of their Italian have ample reason to be grateful to Professor Carr for this lucid and most readable translation of Gentile's principal book. He tells us in his preface that "it is doubtful if there is a more influential teacher in the intellectual world to-day" than the present Professor of the History of Philosophy in the University of Rome; and now we have no excuse for neglecting his influence.

"Actual idealism" claims the actuality of the Ego for its foundation. This Ego is thinking in act, not something contemplated or contemplable; and in appreciating (not observing) this spiritual act, we gain an unchallengeable insight into the nullity of mere empiricism, and come to grasp the paramount necessity of a transcendental point of view. The unity of actual self-consciousness, it is claimed, carries us beyond the empirical self of psychology, beyond facts that are merely thought, to the thinking that sustains the whole, beyond multiplicity to the unity which controls and determines it, beyond abstraction to concrete reality. Plato's dialectic, we are further informed, dealt only with thoughts that are thought, and so, in principle, annulled development, and Hegel, too, overlooked the meaning of true dialectic, and mistook a pattern of motionless concepts for active process itself. "Actual idealism" is a dialectic of development. It is the fountain of process and of history, living eternally in the fulness of its creative omnipotence. Renouncing the abstract individual and the abstract universal, it reaches the true positive and the true concrete. It attains actual Egoity whose essence is to be a doing, never a *factum*, or a *res gesta*, or a mere *idea mentis*. This self-positing of absolute spirit is reality itself. Its unity is the ground and determiner of empirical space and empirical time (for the "past facts" of professional historians have worked them-

Digitized by Google

selves loose, to their own destruction, from the transcendental "I" which is spirit itself).

Since the "I" dominates space and time it is immortal *ex vi terminorum*. Again, being dominant, it must be free; and while nature *is*, mind *becomes*. Unless we "historicise," then, and torture the world-process into a series of sham arrestings, the "I" is the reality of history itself. Perfectibility, indeed, is but the empirical image of Nature's immanence in mind, and this is what progress means. It would seem, however, that the "I" suffers from a sort of minor insufficiency generated from within itself. It has to conquer evil and error, its own inner enemies, and although these are nothing but its own non-being, it requires an eternal supply of these non-entities as fuel to its sacred flames.

I have chosen to present the reader with this hasty and imperfect survey of an ambitious enterprise, generously conceived and pursued with fervour and conviction, in the hope that he may know what he has to expect, and I think this is the best I can do for him. Where everything is so magnificently contentious, it seems foolishness to discuss anything in particular. Some of Gentile's readers, to be sure (to parody what Hume said of Berkeley) may think that he has entered cloudland before ever he set out from his ærodrome. Others, again, who are weary of straining after gnats in the name of philosophical analysis, may clear their throats with a premonitory relish at the sight of something which is—well—"backed like a camel."

The beginnings of this high argument, it is clear, follow the prevailing fashion. There is only a minority of philosophers who believe that the mind can be contemplated. *Per contra*, this minority may be right, and in that case it is downright scepticism to maintain that anything which is "made an object" is thereby altered in any way. Again, there may be grounds for supposing that the theory is too transcendental to have more than a formal connection with what we really believe ourselves to be. It is arguable, at least, that the difference between different selves is more radical and profound than Gentile thinks, and that it is *not* a lapse into naturalism, or an illusion of false perspective, or an Absolute misunderstood. And a host of readers may be pardoned if they find very serious difficulties in the doctrine of time and of history to which Gentile commits himself. History as a whole, they may say, may very well be God's "specious present," for the "specious present" is defined by its relation to a single act, and

Digitized by Google

there seems no good reason in theory (not to speak of orthodoxy) why an act of God's mind should have a lesser scope than this infinite one. Such an admission, however, does not destroy the distinction between earlier and later, for this distinction is found *within* the specious present. And as regards mere mortals, it is quite precisely wrong to hold that everything, from every point of view, is just what it is at present. The reality of our present discontents is not the reality of the Cro-Magnon period, and it is not identical with the future memories of future sufferers. History, in a word, does not grow in *our* eternal present.

JOHN LAIRD.

BELFAST, IRELAND.

THE ETHICAL THEORY OF HEGEL: A Study of the Philosophy of Right. By Hugh A. Reyburn, M.A., D.Phil., Professor of Logic and Psychology at the University of Cape Town. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921. Pp. xx, 271. Price, 8s. 6d. net.

The scope of this book is somewhat wider than its title indicates, for it deals not only with Hegel's ethical theory, as contained in the *Philosophy of Right*, but also with the relation of that theory to his philosophical system as a whole. As Professor Reyburn himself tells us (p. xii) "it endeavours to develop the main content of that section of the philosophy in such a manner that its relation to the whole and the principles on which it rests may become apparent." The proportions of the parts will be most easily seen if I quote Professor Reyburn's own summary of the chapters: "I have tried to show at the beginning the standpoint of Hegel's philosophy as a whole, and the first chapter contains a brief account of his Logic with special reference to the dialectic. . . . The second chapter considers certain topics of the Logic in order to make clear the nature of the principles with which we have to deal in ethical philosophy. The third chapter is occupied with the philosophic attitude and has a special reference to the standpoint of ethics. The fourth chapter is continuous with this and sets forth Hegel's general conception of mind. The fifth considers the analysis of these categories of mind which are dialectically prior to ethics and presupposed in it. The next two chapters, the sixth and the seventh, deal with abstract right, the first division of the world of right; in the succeeding two, eight and nine, the principles of morality are expounded and examined.

Digitized by Google

Chapters ten, eleven, and twelve discuss the third main section of the subject, the ethical world proper. And I have concluded with a chapter which indicates very briefly the limits of the ethical world" (p. xix).

Thus some five chapters out of thirteen are occupied with introductory matter, while the exposition of the *Philosophy of Right* practically starts at Chapter VI. The author probably had in view students interested not only in ethics but in philosophy generally, and such students will find much that is helpful for the study of Hegel in the introductory chapters, but there is also a question of principle involved. Professor Reyburn appears to hold that the introductory matter is necessary for an understanding of the ethical theory: in Hegel's logical theory, he says, "the roots of his ethical doctrines are to be found" (p. 1). The question is hardly one to be argued in this JOURNAL, so I shall be content to state my opinion that this view is a mistaken one and that the ethical theory is quite able to stand on its own feet. The fact, indeed, that Hegel published his *Philosophy of Right* as an independent work is perhaps argument enough. Of course it is true that if you want to understand the relation of the ethical theory to the rest of the system you must take the other parts of the system into account, but this truism does not affect the question whether an understanding of the theory of moral institutions and the moral life essentially presupposes an understanding of abstract logical theory, *e.g.*, an understanding of the relationship of such categories as substance, causality, and reciprocity. The author's introductory matter is admirable in itself, but it will be apt to produce in the student the impression that the difficulties of the *Philosophy of Right*—which are often great enough —are far greater and of another kind than they really are. I am inclined to think, too, that Professor Reyburn's view to some extent affects his own treatment. Into his account, for instance, of the transition from "morality" to "the ethical order" he introduces a metaphysical passage about the relation of mind to nature which seems uncalled for and therefore confusing. Again, he seems in some places to exaggerate the element of logical necessity in the ethical subject matter; there is surely no such necessity, *e.g.*, as regards fraud and crime in their distinction from civil wrong. True, he warns us that the logical necessity is one of categories and not of actual processes. But the point is precisely that fraud and crime are facts which have no warrant in,

Digitized by Google

or logical connection with, right, although as actual facts they have a relation to it which theory can formulate.

The ethical chapters proper are almost wholly expository, and, like the introductory chapters, have the merit of always trying to state the meaning of Hegel's technical language as clearly as possible. The chapters dealing with the first and third parts of the treatise seem to me the best, but the second part is no doubt the most difficult. Professor Reyburn tells us that he has kept criticism to a minimum, for he is in fact in substantial agreement with Hegel's treatment (pp. vii, xvii). Almost the only place in which criticism plays any part is in the chapters on the State. The first of these chapters, by the way, is prefaced by some excellent critical remarks on recent phases of political theory. I am not very clear as to Professor Reyburn's logical criticism of Hegel's treatment at this point, and imagine that the exaggeration of abstract logic may have something to do with it; Hegel's own invocation of logic in connection with hereditary monarchy is of a kind to make us distrustful. The most important substantive criticism is that Hegel does not develop the conception of "right" adequately in the international sphere. The relations of States to each other are left subject to a mere "ought," an ideal requirement which is not embodied in any authoritative organization. Hegel, we are told, tends here "to cling to face against the ideal . . . he does not point out clearly enough that the good of the State is not something private to it, and that it can be secured in the long run only if a still more general good is kept in mind, namely, the good of the whole system of States" (pp. 257–8). Professor Reyburn seems not to realise sufficiently how great an assumption is involved in the phrase "the whole system of States." It is surely a merit, rather than a defect, of Hegel's treatment that he seeks to interpret the actual political facts instead of constructing castles in the air.

H. BARKER.

EDINBURGH.

SOCIAL DECAY AND REGENERATION. By R. Austin Freeman, with an Introduction by Havelock Ellis. London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1921. Pp. xx, 345. Price, 12s. 2d. net.

The book, which is sincere to the point of ingenuousness, has the audacity of a strong and well-defined personality which is not afraid of appearing ridiculous. The author aims at a synthetic

Digitized by Google

view of the evils of our existing society, and proposes at the end of the book a scheme of social regeneration to be effected by the voluntary segregation of "fit" individuals (who, I am afraid, for all their fitness, would, for reasons which I shall try to indicate, prove unequal to their mission). His main lines of criticism may be distinguished as (a) biological and (b) economic or industrial. The biological method consists of an analysis of the social organism leading to a predominantly individualist or anti-governmental ideal of human society and of a more empirical demonstration of the existence of large numbers of the unfit or of "sub-men" in the present-day population of modern industrial countries. These lines of argument are consistently enough, so far as the author's considerable dialectical resources and experience allow, combined into a harmonious demonstration. He aims at showing that a society organised industrially like ours must diverge more and more from the organic ideal proper to a human society and become afflicted with an increasing proportion of unfit members. The conditions of work and livelihood, under which so large a part of our population exists, are shown to propagate an increasing helplessness, to lead to the atrophy of the attributes which are most essential (1) to the happiness and perfection of individuals and (2) to the continuance of the society constituted by them.

Judgments of a book in which so large a task is undertaken so boldly and thoroughly must vary widely. I find the author's industrial criticism, in spite of some exaggeration in detail, very admirable. His delight in craftsmanship and its products, his insight into some of the conditions of an active and happy life, and into the working of the adverse circumstances in which our own lot is cast capture and impress the reader in a manner which might remind him of the best work of Ruskin, unfair though such a comparison might be in detail, especially to Mr. Freeman; for, with all his limitations, he often thinks much more closely and scientifically than Ruskin commonly did.

I doubt on the other hand whether Mr. Freeman has greatly advanced the more definitely biological questions which he discusses and I should welcome a discussion of his performance from competent biologists. He certainly does not appear to me incompetent in himself; but I should not think that biological science, even including such advances in it as may be due to Mr. Freeman, is able at present to supply much more than analogies and suggestions. His discovery of the sub-man, trying and impressive

Digitized by Google

though some of his experiences must have been, does not inspire deep confidence in his method, but I should like readers of this JOURNAL to reflect on one or two passages (*e.g.*, p. 250) where the author describes his attempts "to lecture" to the later R. A. M. C. units (mostly formed of low category labourers). "No instruction was intelligible. A simple illustration might be grasped but its connection with the truth that it illustrated could not be perceived. An attempt to explain the circulation of the blood by comparison with a system of water pipes left the audience with the belief that the lecture was on the subject of water pipes." Moreover, the sub-man's vocabulary is extremely limited: he is astonishingly ignorant of the meanings of quite ordinary words, and in respect of the words that he does know, his ideas as to their connotations are apt to be extremely nebulous.

The lack of attention to the rural population and to the agrarian question generally seems to be a besetting weakness of Mr. Freeman's social science. His references to the existing rural population are in general very disparaging. It would be idle to dispute Mr. Freeman's impressions, but I should suggest that a social diagnosis which shows itself so independent of so fundamental a social problem as the agrarian problem, which underlies so much of the history of ancient and modern societies, can hardly fail to be very incomplete. It does not appear to me that outside of the industrial inquiries which he has pursued with such vigour and enthusiasm, Mr. Freeman has caught more than a glimpse of any historical problem or of the nature of historical evidence. Further, though he is evidently repelled by the widely prevailing demagogic politics, he betrays only an incidental interest in the all-round causation of political events, and no steady apprehension of the causes which have created and which sustain and operate the existing political system. His fit individuals who should set about segregating themselves from the rest of the community and at the same time submit themselves to the laws of the State might be acting from laudable motives, but they would run the risk of finding themselves in conflict with more powerful habits and motives and even with keener intelligences, within their range than any of which they could dispose. This brings me to Mr. Freeman's scheme of social regeneration. He proposes the voluntary segregation, in part local and where that is not practicable, moral, of individuals who possess certain desirable qualifications and who are not marred by such disqualifications as the following

Digitized by Google

(pp. 318–319): "(a) Persons of intemperate habits or addicted to the taking of drugs. (b) Persons who are, or have been, associated with any movement or propaganda opposed to public policy or the common welfare. (c) Persons of notably bad temper or bad manners or who suffer from any defects of character which would render them inacceptable as members of a small and intimate community. (d) Persons of a confirmed propagandist habit or those who habitually engage in activities which tend to encroach on the liberties of their fellow-citizens. (e) Persons who are members of any society or association the objects of which are antagonistic to those of the league. The members are to be English; 'they should be born of English parents and descended from grandparents of whom at least the majority were English'" (p. 317). The author explains that he uses the word English to denote "members of the indigenous population of the British Islands" (thus I suppose the Irish, for example, are English for this purpose). Certain tests of physical fitness and of intellectual or mental mediocrity as a minimum standard are also to be imposed. Such a community must avoid the conditions which favour mechanical and capitalist industry and contrive social arrangements which would secure its members against undesirable acquaintances and marriages.

Lack of space prevents my enlarging upon certain details many of which do great credit to the author's insight and humanity; but I cannot but feel that the author's community would prove to be unequal to its task. It may be that the author has thought out his problem more thoroughly than I suspect, but I am constantly haunted by the fear that his mainly middle-class eligibles would turn out to be mere clay in the hands of our political potters when a suitable crisis had been engineered. Mr. Freeman has, I think, much to learn as well as something to teach.

W. J. Roberts.

University College,
Cardiff, Wales.

The Settlement Horizon: A National Estimate. By Robert A. Woods and Albert J. Kennedy. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1922. Pp. vi, 499. Price, $3.00 net.

This substantial volume is much more than an account of the settlement movement. It is an outline and interpretation of the changing social, economic, racial and moral conditions of urban

Digitized by Google

life during the past four decades. Not, of course, of all aspects of urban conditions, but of those which have furnished the reason for the establishment of settlements and the changing problems which they have tried to meet. Even the reader who has thought himself familiar in a general way with the life and work of the settlement will be likely to have his vision enlarged by this comprehensive and philosophical survey of its manifold points of contact with the great process of urban growth, complicated as this has been by the rapidly changing character of industry, and by the inflow of multitudes of immigrants of various languages, traditions, and moral loyalties. The authors have profited by their experience as joint secretaries of the National Federation of Settlements, and have included illustrations of various activities from a wide range of localities. But the chief emphasis is not upon statistical material or detail of any kind. It is rather upon the motives, aims, problems, methods, and achievements of settlements. There is also frank recognition of the lack of success in certain lines, as, for example, in producing "a new type of leaders in trade unionism and local politics."

Certain topics suggestive of the general plan are Clubs, Cultural and Educational Work, Problems of Labor, Public Health, Recreation, Law and Order, Common Will, Grasp and Reach. The central impression received from this survey is that which has often been set forth by some of those who have been most prominent in the settlement work, namely: that the great function of the settlement, as contrasted with many of the other agencies of social work, has been that of the watcher and interpreter of the social process, that of the pioneer, to discover new needs and experiment with new methods which may later be organized and applied more comprehensively by other agencies, public or voluntary. One wonders how we should have got on without it. Certainly the outlook upon life which young people in all our educational institutions now receive has been distinctly influenced directly or indirectly by the settlement movement. Other agencies may care for families or for neglected or delinquent children, or for the sick or the aged, or for the improvement of city government, or the securing of justice to the poor; it has been on the whole the settlement, through the contacts which it has made possible, and through the important literature which such writers as Jane Addams, Graham Taylor, Canon and Mrs. Barnett, Lillian Wald, and R. A. Woods—to mention only a few of the con-

Digitized by Google

spicuous names—have put forth on the basis of their experience, which has informed and humanized public opinion. Frequently misunderstood, especially in its earlier years, the settlement, like other institutions, has doubtless learned from critics as well as from friends. One finds no hint of the query which has sometimes been heard in recent years as to whether the settlement is likely to be as important a factor in the future as it has been in its history hitherto. The authors would doubtless say that the issues change, but that this is all the more reason why there should be a kind of living center which is capable of discerning new issues and new methods of dealing with them. "The haunting fear of to-day is not that the dynamic of democracy may in the long run be repressed, but that it may attain its limit with no due regard for the distinguishing values of the higher life, for those finer implications without which above all what is human in American civilization could not continue to exist" (p. 405). If any students of society have felt uncertain as to the future of the settlement, they will perhaps feel more assured if they enter into the spirit of the movement as conceived by the authors of this book.

JAMES H. TUFTS.

SHORTER NOTICES.

MYSTICS AND HERETICS IN ITALY AT THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES. By E. Gebhart. Translated by E. R. Hulme. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1922. Pp. 283. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

This is a translation of *L'Italie Mystique* which was published in 1890. The period dealt with includes the life of Joachim of Flora, St. Francis, Frederick II and Dante: the method is skilful and the presentation of the historical scene most attractive. It was, therefore, well worth while to introduce the book to a wider circle of readers by a translation into English; and the translation has been admirably done. The study of the thirteenth century provides important material for the judgment of many of our contemporary issues. We are, indeed, very much divided from the apocalyptic visions and the extreme evils of those days; but the character of St. Francis and the clarity of the mind of Dante must be within the knowledge of every real student of human nature. Above all, this book is valuable in its rendering of the general social tone of the middle ages. The sketch of Salimhene is especially excellent, and there are many delicate perceptions which illuminate our understanding of mediæval idealism. Indeed our own age is passing through a crisis not unlike that of the thirteenth century. Clearly the commonplace aspirations of the nineteenth century have lost their hold upon society; and no allegiance to them can be extracted from our best thinkers. People still go to church and chapel, and our social reformers are still concerned with better drainage and the distribution of wealth; but there is no real agreement on the fundamental moral issue—what is it all about? The mysticism of the great men who died in Gebhart's book provided the thirteenth century with alternative understand-

Digitized by Google

ings of human life; and small groups were affected by St. Francis if not by Dante. But Italian mysticism of that date was quite obviously a failure. It passed away like the colour on clouds at sunset, and mediæval civilisation expired. To-day again one sees heretics and mystics inveighing against contemporary evils; and small groups have even gone so far as to practice what they preach. But no new vision inspires Society at large or even the dominant personalities in Society. The vast majority of men are hard at work getting what they have neither time nor ability to enjoy; and our leaders in politics and industry, ably echoed by religious preachers, urge us to go on doing even more heartily what we were doing before. The failure of Italian mysticism shows us what happens to a civilisation when the visionaries and the administrators cannot co-operate. C. D. BURNS.

LONDON, ENGLAND.

ÆSTHETIC AS SCIENCE OF EXPRESSION AND GENERAL LINGUISTIC. By Benedetto Croce. Translated by Douglas Ainslie, B.A. Second Edition. London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1922. Pp. xxx, 503. Price, 21s. net.

Croce is perhaps the most outstanding figure in contemporary philosophy. He has a genius both more widely and more strictly philosophical than Bergson, and a brilliant lucidity of style which makes him attractive to many to whom Gentile is an unopened book. Almost alone among philosophers he started from the theory of beauty as his primary interest, and consequently his *Estetica* is his most original work if, even in the fourth edition here translated, it is the least chastened by the exigencies of system.

For all these reasons we must both regret that English readers have had to wait so long for a satisfactory translation, and be grateful that they have now got it. Mr. Ainslie's first effort bore many marks of haste or carelessness. Though the present version is not remarkable either for close accuracy or for elegance it renders the original readably and in the main faithfully. Out of some dozen errors noted particularly in the first edition all have been corrected. There remain, however, a certain number of inaccuracies and ambiguities, some of the latter being due to an odd method of punctuation with too few commas. There are one, or probably two, misprints on page 208.

Of Mr. Ainslie's introduction to his first edition, in which he claims to have "discovered" Croce in 1907, only extracts are retained. This is an improvement, but the result is disconnected and would have been better absent.

The translator is specially to be thanked for having now rendered the much longer historical part as well as the substantive theory. Croce's very originality is based on history, he excels in critical exposition, and the best proof of his theory is to be found in the efforts and failures of previous philosophers to approach it. The version here is not quite so satisfactory as in the earlier part which has been re-worked, but the whole book is now one of great value to all English readers concerned with philosophy in general, with æsthetic in particular or with the theory of literary criticism. It is a pity the price is so high. E. F. CARRITT.

OXFORD.

A STUDY IN MORAL PROBLEMS. By B. M. Laing, Lecturer in Philosophy, Sheffield University. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1922. Pp. 279. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

The moral problems studied in this book are chiefly those fundamental issues which connect the facts of "nature" with those of morality. The author assumes the truth of the common view of reality and its relation to

Digitized by Google

what is called science: and he gives some space to the discussion of Bergson's version of the facts. Human action, it is very well said, whatever its moral character, is one among the empirical events about which casual laws give us information. Unfortunately the statement of the laws is not clear and in many cases the phrasing is unskilful. For example, "empirical event" is said to be "implicating causal laws" (p. 60), and the following sentences occur: "If moral values are not causes they cannot be used to explain or account for phenomena. Yet it is quite common to find their being (*sic!*) so used" (p. 69). The more serious difficulty in the book is that of discovering in it the data or material with which it is concerned. The author seems to take for granted some definitions of moral fact and "natural" fact, but what these definitions are remains somewhat doubtful. The chapter on the nature of morality rejects the view that morality is a rational obligation of instincts, impulses and desires (p. 238), but the author appears to accept the view that the control or perfection of "the environment" is the moral end. But since the copula "is" tends to become the phrase "depends upon," the conclusion may not be in the author's mind what it seems to be in the reader's. The book ends with a short analysis of the idea of progress which, of course, involves the very complex of fact and value that is the author's chief concern. C. D. B.

ETHICS: An Exposition of Principles. By Arthur Lynch. London: Cassell & Co., 1922. Pp. xii, 323. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

Ethics is a subject in which innovations are rare: Mr. Lynch, the author of a highly technical work on Psychology, claims to break new ground and to have established a scientific system of ethics, in contrast to the method of the past, which he terms the "authoritative," and the "empirical or academic method" which has no especial value. As a preliminary to his new building, he surveys the old structures, and demolishes them. The work of the great thinkers and of the past seems to him "tentative, and where not false, insufficient to the purpose." Herbert Spencer is the only one whose comprehension has been wide enough, "for he alone has attempted a solution of the problem on the basis of science," but even Spencer is inadequate: "his doctrine of Evolution is not a principle of nature, nor even, on account of its lack of quantitative definition, a satisfactory guide to classification." The few attempts in the past at veritable scientific systems of Ethics are dismissed as faulty. There is no doubt that Mr. Lynch takes pleasure in laying about him, and he even includes a very fresh and vigorous onslaught on Carlyle, a writer who is unimportant in the discussion of Ethics.

There is something characteristically English in Mr. Lynch's *boutades*. He tilts like Landor, at any mill; he loses himself in byways and subissues, and manifold illustrations. We learn in the course of his many pages what he thinks of Napoleon's physique and Jack Dempsey's. There is a footnote extending nearly a full page which tells of his pilgrimage to the burial place of Rob Roy, his pride in the glory of clan history, and his later disillusion.

At the close, the new structure of his, the tripod of Ethics, Truth, Energy and Sympathy which is the centre of his system leaves us cold.

PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By James Mickel Williams. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1922. Pp. 459. Price, $5.00 net.

The author regards the analysis of economic and social conflicts as the first main problem of social psychology, successive aspects being "the processes of feeling and thought that are involved in adjustment, the develop-

Digitized by Google

ment of personality subserved, and the processes of social suggestion and control in which that development occurs." Beginning with a sound analysis of the essential tendencies of social behavior—in which, happily, "dispositions" rather than "instincts" are discussed—he traces out these conflicts of interests in economic, political, professional, domestic, cultural, and educational relations. Fruitful suggestions for social control are given in chapters dealing with employment management in industry, and the conflict of attitudes of political leaders. Particularly interesting are the sections dealing with professional ethics and the ecclesiastical, academic, literary, and artistic relations. A final section on Social Reactions of Suppressed Impulses indicates the need for intelligent leadership. The author has woven into a very readable book most of the vital social literature of recent times, while his treatment shows an intimate acquaintance with the problems he discusses. The sincerity of his work is attested to by the fact that his insistence on the profundity of the issues involved is not dependent on nor accentuated by muddled thinking or sophisticated terminology.

C. F. T.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

ADAMS, JOHN. Modern Developments in Educational Practice. New York: Harcourt Brace and Co. (Printed in Great Britain.) University of London Press. Pp. vi, 302.

BRADLEY, F. H. The Principles of Logic. 2d Ed. Revised, with complimentary and terminal essays. 2 vol. London: Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1922. Pp. xxviii, 739. Price, $9.35.

CAPPER, ARTHUR. The Agricultural Bloc. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922. Pp. vii, 171. Price, $1.25.

CLARKE, JOHN J. Social Administration including the Poor Laws. London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., 1922. Pp. 364. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

DRURY, AUBREY, Comp. World Metric Standardization. An urgent issue. San Francisco: World Metric Standardization Council, 1922. Pp. 524. Price, cloth $5.00, paper $4.00.

ENDARA, JULIO. José Ingenieros y el Porvenir de la Filosofia. 2d ed. Buenos Aires: Agencie General de Libreria. Pp. 100.

FIELDING, WILLIAM J. The Caveman Within Us. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1922. Pp. xv, 372. Price, $3.00.

FRANKLIN, FABIAN. What Prohibition Has Done to America. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1922. Pp. iv, 129.

GAMMON, SAMUEL RHEA. The Presidential Campaign of 1832. Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series XL, No. 1. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1922. Pp. xii, 180.

GEBHART, E. Mystics and Heretics in Italy. Translated by E. R. Hulme. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1922. Pp. 283. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

GREENWOOD, G. A. England To-day. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1922. Pp. 185. Price, 5s. net.

HART, HASTINGS H. Plans and Illustrations of Prisons and Reformatories. Presented at the Fifty-second Congress of the Association. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1922. Pp. 62. Price, $2.50 net.

JACKSON, HENRY E. Robinson Crusoe, Social Engineer. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1922. Pp. x, 301. Price, $3.00.

KADISON, ALEXANDER. Immortality. An agnostic view. New York: The Truth Seeker Co., 1922. Pp. 47. Price, $.75 postpaid.

LAING, B. M. A Study in Moral Problems. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1922. Pp. 279. Price, 10s. 6d. net. New York: The Macmillan Co.

Digitized by Google

LAWSON, LEONARD AXEL. The Relation of British Policy to the Declaration of the Monroe Doctrine. Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Vol. CIII, No. 1, Whole No. 233. New York: Columbia University, 1922. Pp. 153. Price, $1.50.

LI, CHUAN SHIH. Central and Local Finance in China. Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Vol. XCIX, No. 2, Whole No. 226. New York: Columbia University, 1922. Pp. 187.

LINDSAY, JAMES. Great Philosophical Problems. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1922. Pp. vi, 281. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

LLOYD, ALFRED H. Leadership and Progress. And other essays of progress. . . . Boston: The Stratford Co., 1922. Pp. 171.

LULL, RICHARD SWANN, AND OTHERS. The Evolution of Man. A Series of lectures delivered before the Yale Chapter of the Sigma Xi, 1921–22. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1922. Pp. x, 202. Price, $3.00.

MACASSEY, SIR LYNDEN. Labour Policy, False and True. London: Thornton Butterworth, Ltd., 1922. Pp. 320. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

MCCONNELL, S. D. Confessions of an Old Priest. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922. Pp. 125. Price, $1.25.

MCDOUGALL, WILLIAM. An Introduction to Social Psychology. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 17th ed., 1922. Pp. xxiv, 304. Price, 8s. 6d. net.

MCTAGGART, J. M. E. The Nature of Existence. Vol. 1. Cambridge: The University Press, 1921. Pp. xxii, 310. Price, 22s. net.

PATTEE, FRED LEWIS, Ed. Century Readings for a Course in American Literature. Revised edition. New York: The Century Co., 1922. Pp. xviii, 1012, xliv.

PRATT, JAMES BISSETT. Matter and Spirit. A Study of mind and body in their relation to the spiritual life. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922. Pp. ix, 232. Price, $1.50.

QUEEN, STUART ALFRED. Social Work in the Light of History. Philadelphia and London: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1922. Pp. 327.

ROGERS, ARTHUR KENYON. The Theory of Ethics. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922. Pp. 197.

SANDERS, FREDERIC W. A Reasonable Religion. Boston: James H. West Co. Pp. vii, 183.

SHAFER, ROBERT. Progress and Science. Essays in Criticism. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1922. Pp. x, 243. Price, $2.50.

SNOWDEN, MRS. PHILIP, AND OTHERS. What We Want and Why. London: W. Collins Sons & Co., Ltd., 1922. Pp. 263. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

SOCIETAS SPINOZANAE. Chronicon Spinozanum. Hagae Comitis Curis Societatis Spinozanae. Pp. xxiv, 326.

SOUTHARD, E. E. and JARRETT, MARY C. The Kingdom of Evils. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922. Pp. xx, 708. Price, $5.50.

TANSILL, CHARLES C. The Canadian Reciprocity Treaty of 1854. Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series XL, No. 2. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1922. Pp. 96, xii.

TEN BROEKE, JAMES. The Moral Life and Religion. A Study of moral and religious personality. New York: Macmillan Co., 1922. Pp. 244. Price, $2.00.

THOMPSON, CLIFFORD GRIFFETH. The Ethics of William Wollaston. Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1922. Pp. 235. Price, $2.00 net.

TUCKER, DONALD S. The Evolution of People's Banks. Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Vol. CII, No. 1. Whole No. 231. New York: Columbia University, 1922. Pp. 272. Price, $2.75.

WALSTON, SIR C. Harmonism and Conscious Evolution. London: John Murray, 1922. Pp. xvi, 465. Price, 21s. net.

Digitized by Google

WANINGER, DR. KARL. Social Catholicism in England. N. V. Lecturis, Eindhoven, Holland, 1922. Pp. 184. Price, $.50.

WHITEHEAD, A. N. The Concept of Nature. Cambridge: University Press, 1920. Pp. x, 202. Price, 16s. net.

WHITEHEAD, A. N. An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge. Cambridge: The University Press, 1919. Pp. xii, 200. Price, 16s. net.

NOTES.

SOCIETAS SPINOZANA.

The formation of the above society at the Hague, for the purpose of advancing the study of the philosophy of Spinoza, is announced. Its international character is indicated by the names of the curators, Höffding of Copenhagen, Meijer of the Hague, Pollock of London, Brunschvicg of Paris, and Gebhardt of Frankfurt. The society is publishing an annual of original studies, *Chronicon Spinozanum*, which is not sold in the market, but is available only to members. The publication of a series of books is also contemplated. Membership dues are five dollars per annum, and the Secretary for the United States is A. S. Oko, of the Hebrew Union College Library, Cincinnati.

THE LATE MISS E. E. CONSTANCE JONES, LITT.D.

Miss Constance Jones, who died a few months ago, was one of the pioneers of the higher education of women in England. She lectured on philosophy in Girton College, Cambridge, for a number of years, and afterwards became Mistress of the College. Her published writings were mainly concerned with Logic, to which she made important original contributions; but her work in Ethics was also of considerable value. She was a devoted follower of Henry Sidgwick's ethical teaching. One might almost say that she was his only real disciple; for Sidgwick did not aim at the formation of a school, and most of his pupils followed lines of their own. She was responsible for the editing of the 6th and 7th editions of the *Methods of Ethics* and also of the posthumous work on the Ethics of Green, Spencer and Martineau. She explained and defended Sidgwick's ethical position with great ability in a series of papers that were published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. She also contributed some notes bearing upon the same subject to the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS (Vols. V, IX, XI and XVI), and she wrote a short *Primer of Ethics*. She was also the author of the article on Sidgwick in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* and the translator of Lotze's *Microcosmus*. Her interests were remarkably wide and keen; and she was a fine influence and much beloved in Cambridge and elsewhere. It is gratifying to know that she has written an autobiographical sketch, which will probably be published shortly, giving an account of the interesting educational movements in which she took a prominent share, and of the notable personalities with whom she was associated.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

Digitized by Google

LIBRARY
UNIV. OF

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

A Quarterly Devoted to the Advancement of Ethical Knowledge and Practice

VOL. XXXIII APRIL, 1923 NO. 3

LEADING CONTENTS

SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND THE MORAL SCIENCES — George H. Mead

SPIRITUAL VALUES — J. S. MacKenzie

SELF-EXPRESSION AND HAPPINESS — C. V. Boyer

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ETHICALLY RATIONAL — J. R. Kantor

THE PROBLEM OF LIBERTY — Norman Wilde

THE PROBLEM OF WAR — Milton Harrison

For full Contents see inside page

Published for the editors by THE RUMFORD PRESS, Concord, N. H.

Chicago: JAMES H. TUFTS, University of Chicago, Manager
London: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN, Ltd., 40 Museum Street, W. C.

Yearly Subscription, $3.00 Single Numbers, 75 cents

Entered as second-class matter October 16, 1914, at the post-office at Concord, New Hampshire, under the Act of March 3, 1879

Digitized by Google

The JOURNAL *of* SOCIAL FORCES

Published Bi-Monthly at the University of North Carolina

CHAPEL HILL, N. C.

In the March Number of the JOURNAL among other articles you will want to read:

Marjory Stoneman Douglass, "The University and the Forgotten Curriculum"
Gerald W. Johnson, "Mr. Babbitt Arrives at Erzerum"
Joseph K. Hart, "The Social Responsibility of Education"
Jesse F. Steiner, "Community Organization and the Crowd Spirit"
James Q. Dealey, "Government in Relation to Social Progress"
E. C. Branson, "Farm Tenancy in the South"

The May Number will be outstanding with leading articles by *Professor James H. Tufts, Mrs. Ada Sheffield, Dean Roscoe Pound, Professor Franklin H. Giddings, Mrs. John M. Glenn, Major Robert Moton* and the usual rich departmental contributions.

Teaching and Research in the Social Sciences
Public Welfare and Social Work
Conferences for Social Work
The Church and Social Service
Inter-Racial Coöperation
County and Country Life Programs
Progress in Town and City Programs
The Work of Women's Organizations
The Library and Workshop

The price of the JOURNAL is $2.50 per year. Address the JOURNAL OF SOCIAL FORCES, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C.

SARGENT'S
Handbook of American Private Schools

An Annual Survey and Review critically describing Private Schools of all classifications and Summer Camps.

A Compendium for Educators and all interested in Education.

A Guide Book for Parents, supplying intimate information, which makes possible a discriminating choice.

Comparative Tables give the relative cost, size, age, special features, etc.

Introductory Chapters review interesting developments of the year in education.

Educational Service Bureau will be glad to advise and write you intimately about any school or class of schools in which you are interested. Write for particulars. Consultation by appointment.

Circulars and sample pages on request

PORTER E. SARGENT, 14 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass.

Digitized by Google

THE INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF ETHICS

APRIL, 1923

SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND THE MORAL SCIENCES.

GEORGE H. MEAD.

IT had become a commonplace of the psychologist that there is a structure in our experience which runs out beyond what we ordinarily term our consciousness; that this structure of idea determines to a degree not generally recognized the very manner of our perception as well as that of our thinking, and yet that the structure itself is generally not in the focus of our attention and passes unnoticed in our thought and perceiving. It was this dependence of our field of direct experience upon such an unrecognized part of what we call mind that Freud has made the theme of his doctrines, in a realm that lies on the border of the abnormal or just over it. It is one of the valuable by-products of the Freudian psychology that it has brought many people to recognize that we do not only our thinking but also our perceiving with minds that have already an organized structure which determines in no small degree what the world of our immediate and reflective experience shall be. It is possible to recognize other censors beside those dramatically placed by Freud at the door of so-called consciousness to pass upon the figures that enter our dreams.

It is to one of these that I wish to call attention. It is that the intelligible order of the world implies a determined moral order—and for a moral order we may substitute a

Digitized by Google

social order, for morality has to do with the relations of intelligent beings with each other—and that this determined moral or social order is a world as it should be and will be. We may express this as Kant expressed it as a world in which happiness will be proportioned to worth, or as the Utilitarians expressed it by saying that it will be one in which there will be realized the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or we may give it more concreteness by looking to a New Jerusalem that religious doctrine pictures, or we may find it in a perfect Absolute of which we and our finite universe are but imperfect and inadequate parts and expressions. Whatever the conception of this moral order, definite or vague, it always has implied that the process of the universe in which we live in a real sense is akin to and favorable to the most admirable order in human society.

The most definite form which this belief or faith has taken in the western world is that of the plan of salvation as presented in Christian doctrine. The import of this doctrine was that whatever further purposes a divine providence might have in the conduct of the universe, man's moral regeneration and the growth of a society which this made possible was an end which was always involved in the physical world which was man's habitat. This was most succinctly expressed by St. Augustine, and passed into the form which is perhaps most familiar to us in Milton's "Paradise Lost" and "Paradise Regained." The sharpness of outline of the Plan has faded with the entirely new heavens and new earth which natural science, since the time of Galileo, has unfolded before men's eyes and minds, but the idea that the universe is in some way geared to the intelligence and excellence of our social and moral order has not disappeared from the back of men's minds. Scientists such as Huxley have pointed out the incongruities that lie between this conception and the findings of a physical science, that sees in the whole life of the human race but an inconsiderable moment on an inconsiderable speck within the physical universe, that finds in a civilized moral society an

Digitized by Google

aberration from a biological nature that is red in tooth and claw, and subject to a ruthless law of the survival of the fittest. And yet men, even in moods which were not emotional nor mystical, have rarely regarded their habitat as hostile or indifferent to what was best in their social life and structure.

However, it is very evident that the aspect of this kinship between human society and its secular habitat which belongs to our present scientific age is and must be profoundly different from that of St. Augustine, or St. Thomas Aquinas, or Luther, or Milton. In no one respect is this perhaps more evident than in our attitude toward the evils which the catastrophes of nature, disease and physical suffering entail upon us.

The view that the ordering of the world was primarily for the greater glory of God in the salvation of man, made of every event that affected men a direct action of providence with reference to the members of the human race, and there could be but one intelligent as well as but one pious attitude over against the action of providence, that of acceptance with thanksgiving or with resignation. Suffering and evil came as discipline.

It is hardly necessary to rehearse the steps in the development of the insistent curiosity of recent science, which has refused to accept any given order of nature as final, or to believe that seemingly inevitable events may not conceivably become quite different if we only comprehend what the manner of their happening is, or to forego the hope that human ingenuity may avert misfortunes if we can only understand their causes and conditions.

Here are two quite fundamentally opposed attitudes toward the kinship of the intelligence of men and the order of the world they live in. It is customary to call the one teleological and the other mechanical, to call the one spiritual and the other materialistic. The first attitude takes it pretty definitely for granted that we know what is right and what is wrong, that in certain definite respects we know what the social order should be; that the intelligent man in

Digitized by Google

his moral conduct, and this is social conduct, starts off with certain truths given in his nature or by revelation, and shows his intelligence by shaping his action to these truths; that the path of righteousness is one that he who runs may read and a man though a fool need not err therein. If the moral order, of which these truths are an essential part, is given, then the kinship of men's intelligence to the order of the physical universe will show itself in the triumph of this moral or social order, and men can themselves start off with this order as a presupposition in their conduct in the world. The end is given in advance, this is the meaning of teleology, and if we are confident that the universe is so constituted as to achieve this end, we will be intelligent in acting on this assumption.

We have seen that Huxley quite frankly denies, in the name of science, any justification for this faith. He saw nothing in nature that was akin to the social or moral order. In fact he regarded what he called altruistic conduct as an abandonment of the road along which nature was going. This view of Huxley arose in part out of an interpretation of biological evolution that is seen to be inadequate. Kropotkin could point out that social organization, with just that sort of conduct which Huxley called altruistic, is as legitimately to be considered an outcome of an evolutionary process as is the survival of the fittest individual in the struggle for existence. But Huxley's position is of interest because it so ingenuously assumes that a moral order must be an order which is given in advance, while our knowledge of nature is all drawn from what has happened. In our acquaintance with nature we can never assume a determining idea that fixes the result before it happens, as is the case when our ideas determine what the results of our conduct will be. So we speak of nature as mechanical or materialistic. This is just where the break seems to come between what we consider men's intelligence in moral and social conduct, and in men's understanding of nature. We can still believe, of course, that in the end the process of the universe will further

Digitized by Google

ideals of a morally ordered society, and probably most men who are conversant with the findings of science and committed to its methods of research, still in the back of their minds carry this faith, or attitude of mind, but this attitude can be of no service in understanding objects about us in the everyday life of the scientifically minded. It is reserved for religious moods, when we try to bring together what are in their logic incompatible.

Let us state this incompatibility in its simplest form. In our moral conduct we control our actions in considerable degree, *i.e.*, in proportion as we are intelligent, by our purposes, by the ideas of results not yet attained, that is, our conduct is teleological. In our comprehension of nature the result is controlled entirely by antecedent causes, that is nature proceeds mechanically, and there seems to be no kinship between such a nature and the intelligence of men seeking for a better social order.

I have no intention of broaching the metaphysical problem of the relation of a mind that is spiritual and a nature that is material. The question that I want to ask is this: Can the world of natural science provide objects for the world of social and moral conduct?

If we drop back two or three centuries, whether we measure them historically or in present attitudes of mind, we find a view of the physical world which furnished the objects that purposive social and moral conduct demanded. In the first place the physical cosmos as a whole appeared simply as the stage on which the plans of a divine providence were being enacted. In the second place the separate objects with which men's conduct was engaged found their meaning in this providential plan and led to conduct which this plan for human society demanded. Men's attitudes toward disease, toward events which in present legal phraseology are denominated "acts of God," were those of supplication and resignation. In general those things which engaged human personal interest most acutely and which still had to be regarded from the standpoint of the community to which men belonged could always be

Digitized by Google

conceived of as existing to fulfil the destinies of men in human society. In essence these physical things and occurrences were identical with their import for the success or failure of men's undertakings. They were as physical things and occurrences just what they meant for human conduct. To-day a disease is the history of a bacillus, an earthquake is a shift in surface strata due to gravitational forces, while the incredible vastness of the spread of matter and its inconceivable temporal stretches in comparison with the inconsequential minuteness of humanity and its momentary duration rob the physical universe of any seeming relevancy to the fortunes of our race.

This is the more striking because the period within which this shift of cosmical values has taken place is that within which physical things and their forces have become subservient to men's purposes, to an extent that would have been beyond the imaginational stretch of the medieval or ancient world. The physical universe which by its enormity has crushed the human insect into disappearing insignificance has like a jinn in the Arabian tale shown itself infinitely complaisant in magnifying man's mechanical capacity. In accepting his negligible crevice in the physical whole man has found access to the minute structure of things and by this route has reached both the storehouse and powerhouse of nature. The heraldic device of man's conquering intelligence should be a design blending differential x, the bacillus, and the electron. If humanity has fled shivering from the starry spaces, it has become minutely at home in the interstices of the speck that it inhabits for an instant.

But if we have succeeded in applying science to our mechanical task, and in this have accomplished prodigies, we do not seem to have succeeded in applying scientific method to the formulation of our ends and purposes. Consider the Great War. The ideas that plunged Europe and then dragged the rest of the world into that catastrophe, the imperialisms, national, militaristic and economic, are roughly identical with those that embroiled Christendom

Digitized by Google

in the seventeenth century. It was only the weapons that crashed through those four years that belonged to the intellect of the twentieth century. There attaches to it the grotesquerie of a Yankee at the Court of King Arthur. Or consider the government of a cosmopolitan city, or of a great nation. There is at the disposal of the community for the carrying out of its policies the apparatus of a hundred sciences, but to secure the bare formulation of a policy we are forced to involve ourselves in the factional interests of parties that are psychologically closely parallel to the turbulent politics of an ancient or a medieval commonwealth. We are enormously clever at fashioning our means, but we are still in no small measure dependent for conceiving our ends upon outworn mental structures that our very science has invalidated.

But it would be a mistake to assume that scientific method is applicable only in the fashioning and selection of means, and may not be used where the problem involves conflicting social ends or values. The advance of scientific medicine in dealing with public health amply substantiates this.

In this advance numerous social values embodied or championed by various institutions, government, the church, the school and the family, have sought to maintain themselves against scientific procedure in combating disease and safeguarding health. Individual rights, religious dogmas and cults, family control of children, the economic advantage of cheap child labor for business, and many other accepted social values have been set up as absolute, across the path of progress of scientific public health conservation. But the demonstrated results of the hospital, vaccination, quarantine, and other means of medical service to the health of the community have forced men to bring these values into the field of other public goods and restate them so that public health could be the better preserved.

I imagine that the scientific advance of medicine presents as enlightening an illustration as could be found of

Digitized by Google

the issue that seems to exist between scientific method and our conduct in social and moral affairs. The human community did not wait for a medical science to convince it that health is a community good. Combating disease by its medicine men has been one of the chief common concerns even in primitive societies whose technique was entirely magical. We do not turn to scientific method to determine what is a common good, though we have learned to avail ourselves of it in some of our common efforts and practices in pursuit of the good. However, scientific method is not an agent foreign to the mind, that may be called in and dismissed at will. It is an integral part of human intelligence, and when it has once been set at work it can only be dismissed by dismissing the intelligence itself. Unfortunately men have committed this sin against their intelligence again and again. They have incontinently rejected the very method which human intelligence has learned to employ because its results came in conflict with other social goods which they were unwilling to either sacrifice or restate. But again and again when they have undertaken to use their minds thereafter, they have found that their minds had become committed to the method they had rejected. The past history of and the present struggle with venereal disease illustrate this, chapter for chapter. Scientific method does not undertake to say what the good is, but when it has been employed, it is uncompromising in its demand that that good is no less a good because the scientific pursuit of it brings us within the taboos of institutions that we have regarded as inviolable. Nor does scientific method assert that the family and the church are not goods because its pursuit of public health has trenched upon conceptions of them which men have held to be practically absolute. What scientific method does require, if it is to be consistently used, is that all the conflicting ends, the institutions and their hitherto inviolable values, be brought together and so restated and reconstructed that intelligent conduct may be possible, with reference to *all* of them. Scientific method requires

Digitized by Google

this because it is nothing but a highly developed form of impartial intelligence.

Here, then, is the issue, so far as an issue exists, between scientific method and social and moral conduct. If the community is seeking an end by the intelligent method of science and in doing this runs counter to its habits in attaining and maintaining other ends, these ends are just as subject to restatement and reconstruction as are the means themselves. Nor does science pretend to say what this restatement or reconstruction must be. Its one insistent demand is that all the ends, all the valuable objects, institutions, and practices which are involved, must be taken into account. In other words, its attitude toward conflicting ends is the same as its attitude toward conflicting facts and theories in the field of research. It does not state what hypothesis must be adopted. It does insist that any acceptable hypothesis must take into account all the facts involved.

Now such a method can be in conflict with social conduct only if that conduct sets up certain ends, institutions and their values, which are to be considered as inviolable in the form in which they have been received and are now accepted. There is no issue between scientific method and moral and social conduct that springs from the fact that science deals with the relation of past facts to each other while conduct deals with future ends.

Science does not attempt to formulate the end which social and moral conduct ought to pursue, any more than it pretends to announce what hypothesis will be found by the research scientist to solve his problem. It only insists that the object of our conduct must take into account and do justice to all of the values that prove to be involved in the enterprise, just as it insists that every fact involved in the research problem must be taken into account in an acceptable hypothesis. Scientific method is at war with dogmatism whether it appears in doctrine, or cult, or in social practice. Scientific method is not teleological in the sense of setting up a final cause that should determine

Digitized by Google

our action, but it is as categorical in insisting upon our considering all factors in problems of conduct, as it is in demanding the recognition of all of the data that constitute the research problem.

Scientific method does not insure the satisfactory solution of the problem of conduct, any more than it insures the construction of an adequate hypothesis for the research problem. It is restricted to formulating rigorously the conditions for the solution. And here appears a profound difference between the two situations, that of moral and social conduct, and that of so-called scientific research. In problems of conduct we must act, however inadequate our plan of action may be. The research problem may be left because of our inability to find a satisfactory hypothesis. Furthermore, there are many values involved in our problems of social conduct to which we feel that we are unable to do justice in their whole import, and yet when they are once envisaged they appear too precious to be ignored, so that in our action we do homage to them. We do not do justice to them. They constitute our ideals. They abide in our conduct as prophecies of the day in which we can do them the justice they claim. They take on the form of institutions that presuppose situations which we admit are not realized, but which *demand* realization.

Such an ideal is democracy written into our governmental institutions. It implies a social situation so highly organized that the import of a protective tariff, a minimum wage, or of a League of Nations, to all individuals in the community may be sufficiently evident to them all, to permit the formation of an intelligent public sentiment that will in the end pass decisively upon the issue before the country. This is what democratic government means, for the issue does not actually exist as such, until the members of the community realize something of what it means to them individually and collectively. There cannot be self-government until there can be an intelligent will expressed in the community, growing out of the intelligent attitudes of the individuals and groups in whose experience the com-

Digitized by Google

munity exists. Our institutions are in so far democratic that when a public sentiment is definitely formed and expressed it is authoritative. But an authoritative public sentiment upon a public issue is very infrequent. My guess is that the number of instances of that in the history of the United States of America could be told upon the fingers of two hands, perhaps upon the fingers of one hand. In the meantime, as the then President Taft assured us on an historic occasion, we are governed by minorities, and the relatively intelligent minorities are swayed by the import of the issue to these minorities.

However, we are unwilling to surrender the ideal of such a government, if only for the sake of the exceptional occasions upon which it is realized, but more profoundly because we cherish the hope that the form of the institution in some way helps toward the realization of what it promises. The most grandiose of these community ideals is that which lies behind the structure of what was called Christendom, and found its historic expression in the Sermon on the Mount, in the parable of the Good Samaritan, and in the Golden Rule. These affirm that the interests of all men are so identical, that the man who acts in the interest of his neighbors will act in his own interest. Actually the history of Christendom has been a history of war and strife, and we are forced to admit that in these wars dynastic, national, and civil has arisen the intensive consciousness of the larger communities. It was the horror of the Great War that aroused, perhaps for the first time in the human race, a public sentiment passing all national bounds and demanding some organization that could express this sentiment and avert a still more terrible horror. The history of Christianity is the history of men's refusal to surrender this ideal.

To indicate in what concrete ways, psychological, social, and technological, the presence of these ideals in men's minds may have directly or indirectly favored their realization lies beyond the scope of this paper. What must be indicated is that they have only been kept in men's minds

Digitized by Google

by institutions set up for this specific purpose. An institution should arise and be kept alive by its own function, but in so far as it does not function, the ideal of it can be kept alive only by some cult, whose aim is not the functioning of the institution, but the continued presence of the idea of it in the minds of those that cherish it.

The church is the outstanding illustration of such an institution. Its most important function has been the preservation in the minds of the community of the faith in a social order which did not exist. At the other end of the scale may be placed certain economic institutions, notably that of exchange. The economic man may be an abstraction, but he certainly exists and functions, and we need no cult to keep alive the faith in the functioning of money, though there is hardly an agency that has had more profound effects in bringing all men into association with each other. Between these lie our various institutions. We feel from time to time the necessity of arousing in our souls an emotional appreciation of the value of the family, of democracy, of the common school, of the university, because in their actual operation they do not express that value adequately.

The psychological technique of maintaining such a cult is the presentation by the imagination of a social situation free from the obstacles which forbid the institution being what it should be, and we organize social occasions which in every way favor such a frame of mind. We gather together in a place of worship, where we meet on the single common basis of all being worshippers of one God, or gather at a Thanksgiving, where all the differences and indifferences of family life are ignored, or we turn with affectionate regard to the Little Red School House where all the children were found studying the same books and immersed in the same common school life. Now the emotional and intellectual attitude of these occasions is essentially different from that of any common undertaking to make the institution more effective, to reform it. The attitude implied in the cult of an institution is frankly hostile toward

Digitized by Google

that which seeks its reform. The mental attitude attending a cult is always conservative, and if we are undertaking its reform we consider it reactionary. The emotional attitude in the cult of an institution flows from the very obstacles that defeat its proper functioning. We may become profoundly interested in the reform of an institution for better service, but if we wish to appraise it emotionally we envisage the wrongs, the vice, the ignorance, the selfishness, which the ideal of the institution condemns, and which frustrate its operation.

Now it is just these factors in social and moral conduct which render the application of scientific method, in that field, so profoundly different from its application in the field of the natural sciences. The formula is simple enough. Your conduct must take into account all of the values which are involved in the social or moral problem. But how are we to define these values? They ought to be defined by the conflict out of which the problem has arisen. In many cases they are sufficiently defined to enable us to act intelligently. If it is a question of visiting distant friends we find out how valuable it is to us, by the sacrifice of other things for which we wish to spend the money which the journey would cost. When we have counted up the cost, we may conclude that it isn't worth what we should have to forego. Of course the mere surrender of the contemplated visit is not the whole result. We have found out how much we want it, and have probably prepared to bring it about under more favorable conditions. For purposes of conduct, values define themselves definitely enough when they are brought into conflict with each other. So facts define themselves in scientific problems. The facts in the problem of the prevention of arteriosclerosis are the observations which indicate that none of the causes that have been supposed to conduce to it do actually account for it. The facts in the hunt for a pneumonia serum are that none of those constructed after the fashion of other successful sera give the desired immunity. The facts are determined by conflict.

Digitized by Google

But see how different the situation becomes when the problem is not the prevention of a disease, but the prevention of crime. If the problem were simply the determination of the values involved in terms of loss to the victims and to the community, over against the effort and expense involved in catching and punishing the criminal, the problem would not be a difficult one. No civilized community has ever hesitated to take these steps in view of the danger which the existence of crime entails. The difficulties arise over the methods of so-called criminal justice. It is supposed to prevent crime, but it does not prevent it. At least it does not prevent it as vaccination prevents smallpox epidemics. It has some preventive effect. It is a palliative. But we cannot simply surrender criminal justice as inefficient, to use some other method, nor even to reform it simply from the standpoint of rendering it more efficient. For criminal justice has a cult value. We cherish the attitude of public reprobation of crime, or rather let us say of public vengeance upon the criminal, because of the emotional sanction it gives to a community ordered by a common law. We overlook the fact that we cannot keep up this emotional attitude without branding the criminal as an outcast, without in some sense preserving a criminal class or caste, and we are quite unwilling to estimate the value of this branding simply in terms of its preventive power. It has an absolute value too precious to be surrendered. If our social problem were simply that of prevention, we should have a standard by which we could fairly measure the values involved. We could never treat leprosy scientifically if we retained the older attitude of regarding the leper as unclean. The relatively recent history of the scientific treatment of the mentally diseased is one of passing out of a cult attitude toward the insane. Or consider nationalism. We cannot simply set about the elimination of war by methods which history has amply justified, because of the cult value of patriotism. The time-honored and simplest method of arousing the emotional consciousness of national unity is presentation of the common enemy. It is

Digitized by Google

confessedly most difficult if not impossible to arouse this emotional consciousness out of the common life within the community itself. And at times patriotism seems to have an almost infinite value. The cult values are incommensurable.

And yet these problems are not only real problems, they are insistent problems, and as I have before observed, we cannot defer action with reference to them, although these and most of the other social and moral problems are shot through with these incommensurable cult values. Nor can we take the attitude of the superior person, and affect the pose of one whose higher intelligence has raised himself above these incommensurables. They and what they represent are the most precious part of social heritage. But it is not their incommensurability that constitutes their value, nor should we hesitate to abandon the cult estimate of these institutions if their values can be stated in terms of their functions. The cult value of the institution is legitimate only when the social order for which it stands is hopelessly ideal. In so far as it approaches realization, its functional value must supersede its ideal value in our conduct.

It is to this task that a scientifically trained intelligence must insistently devote itself, that of stating, just as far as possible, our institutions, our social habits and customs, in terms of what they are to do, in terms of their functions. There are no absolute values. There are only values which, on account of incomplete social organization, we cannot as yet estimate, and in face of these the first enterprise should be to complete the organization if only in thought so that some rough sort of estimate in terms of the other values involved becomes conceivable. And there is only one field within which the estimation can be made, and that is within the actual problem. The field within which we can advance our theory of states is that of the effort to avert war. The advance in our doctrine of criminal justice will be found in the undertaking of intelligent crime prevention. The problems of social theory must be

Digitized by Google

research problems. It is to one group of these problems which I wish particularly to refer. These are the problems of practical politics in the nation and especially in our municipalities.

I have already called attention to the chasm that separates the theory and practice of our democracy. The theory calls for the development of an intelligent public sentiment upon the issues before the community. In practice we depend not upon these to bring the voters to polls, but upon the spirit of party politics. The interest in the issues is so slight that any machine in a great city, that can insure by party organization and patronage a relatively small group of partisans who will always vote with the machine, can continue its hold on the city government for a considerable period no matter how corrupt its administration may be. It is perhaps this situation that leads us to overestimate the somewhat rough and clumsy method of registering public sentiment which the ballot box affords in a democracy. And in our heated efforts to reform corrupt administrations we accept the shibboleths of the professional politician that the essence of democracy is in voting on one side or the other. We attach a cult value to these somewhat crude methods of keeping a government of some sort going. The real hope of democracy, of course, lies in making the issues so immediate and practical that they can appear in the minds of the voter as his own problem. The wide spread of the manager instead of the manger or feed box form of city government is perhaps the most heartening sign of the times that this is beginning to take place. It does not seem to be an impossible task to get the average voter to see that the bulk of the administration of his municipality consists in carrying on a set of operations of vital importance to himself in an efficient businesslike fashion, that the question of public ownership of public utilities is simply a phase of this efficient administration, and that it is perfectly possible for a community to get such an efficient administration. The advance in the practice and theory of democracy depends upon the

Digitized by Google

successful translation of questions of public policy into the immediate problems of the citizens. It is the intensive growth of social interrelations and intercommunications that alone renders possible the recognition by the individual of the import for his social life of the corporate activity of the whole community. The task of intelligence is to use this growing consciousness of interdependence to formulate the problems of all, in terms of the problem of every one. In so far as this can be accomplished cult values will pass over into functional values.

Finally I wish to recur to the dictum to which I referred at the opening of this paper: That the intelligible order of the world implies a moral or social order, *i.e.*, a world as it should be and may be. What form does this take if we apply scientific method to social conduct?

We have seen that the earliest formulation of it by Christian theology was that the intelligence of the creator and ruler of the world must show itself in bringing about in this world or the next the perfect society which man's moral and social nature implied and that our intelligence consists in accepting the inspired statement of this order. Scientific method has no vision, given in the mount, of a perfected order of society, but it does carry with it the assumption that the intelligence which exhibits itself in the solution of problems in natural science is of the same character as that which we apply or should apply in dealing with our social and moral problems; that the intelligible order of the world is akin to its moral and social order because it is the same intelligence which enters into and controls the physical order and which deals with the problems of human society. Not only is man as an animal and as an inquirer into nature at home in the world, but the society of men is equally a part of the order of the universe. What is called for in the perfection of this society is the same intelligence which he uses in becoming more completely a part of his physical environment and so controlling that environment. It is this frank acceptance of human society as a part of the natural order that scientific

Digitized by Google

method demands when it is applied to the solution of social problems, and with it comes the demand, that just as far as possible we substitute functional values for cult values in formulating and undertaking to solve our social problems.

The difference in the pictures of the universe presented by these two attitudes is striking enough. The one contemplates a physical world in which man and the society of men are but pilgrims and strangers, seeking an abiding city not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. The goal toward which all creation moves was to be attained through the individual members of the human community becoming good, *i.e.*, living by certain absolute and incommensurable values housed and hallowed by social institutions. This morality or social *dressur* calls for only so much intelligence as is required to recognize these institutions and the claims which their ideals make upon us. Anyone can be good, though but a few can be clever. There is hardly any kinship between this attitude and the age-long struggle of the human community to make itself intelligently at home in the physical habitat in which it finds itself. Man has domesticated the animals now these many centuries. He is but slowly advancing with painful effort in the domestication of the germ, though it is at present much more essential to community life.

The scientific attitude contemplates our physical habitat as primarily the environment of man who is the first cousin once removed of the arboreal anthropoid ape, but it views it as being transformed first through unreflective intelligence and then by reflective intelligence into the environment of a human society, the latest species to appear on the earth. This human society, made up of social individuals that are selves, has been intermittently and slowly digging itself in, burrowing into matter to get to the immediate environment of our cellular structure, and contracting distances and collapsing times to acquire the environment that a self-conscious society of men needs for its distinctive conduct. It is a great secular adventure, that has reached some measure of success, but is still far from accomplish-

Digitized by Google

ment. The important character of this adventure is that society gets ahead, not by fastening its vision upon a clearly outlined distant goal, but by bringing about the immediate adjustment of itself to its surroundings, which the immediate problem demands. It is the only way in which it can proceed, for with every adjustment the environment has changed, and the society and its individuals have changed in like degree. By its own struggles with its insistent difficulties, the human mind is constantly emerging from one chrysalis after another into constantly new worlds which it could not possibly previse. But there is a heartening feature of this social or moral intelligence. It is entirely the same as the intelligence evidenced in the whole upward struggle of life on the earth, with this difference, that the human social animal has acquired a mind, and can bring to bear upon the problem his own past experiences and that of others, and can test the solution that arises in his conduct. He does not know what the solution will be, but he does know the method of the solution. We, none of us, know where we are going, but we do know that we are on the way.

The order of the universe that we live in *is* the moral order. It has become the moral order by becoming the self-conscious method of the members of a human society. We are not pilgrims and strangers. We are at home in our own world, but it is not ours by inheritance but by conquest. The world that comes to us from the past possesses and controls us. We possess and control the world that we discover and invent. And this is the world of the moral order. It is a splendid adventure if we can rise to it.

GEORGE H. MEAD.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

Digitized by Google

SPIRITUAL VALUES.[1]

J. S. MACKENZIE.

THE prominence of the conception of value is one of the most characteristic features of our time. I believe it is true to say that even fifty years ago it was seldom heard of except in connection with economic studies; or, if it was pressed beyond these limits—as it sometimes was by such writers as Carlyle and Ruskin—such an extension was regarded as a somewhat violent metaphor. Now, however, it is quite common to speak of moral and artistic values; it has been maintained by one distinguished writer (Höffding) that the fundamental conception of religion is that of the conservation of values; while another writer of a more revolutionary type (Nietzsche) has urged that all our valuations will have to be reconsidered. More recently some philosophical writers—chiefly Austrians—have studied its wider bearings in a somewhat exhaustive fashion. Yet, although the term has only recently become widely current, its meaning has not been absent from men's thoughts. But, instead of speaking of values, they were in the habit of calling things good or right or again bad or evil or wrong. I suppose Nietzsche's contention, that it was necessary to get "beyond good and bad" (*jenseits von Gut und Böse*), was to a considerable extent responsible for the partial abandonment of these terms. But he only represented the culmination of a way of thinking that had long been developing. It is a way of thinking that is closely connected with what William James called Pragmatism; and indeed James was one of the first to give currency to this use of value. It is also connected with a conception that has recently been brought into prominence by Einstein—that of relativity. When people hesitate to say that any truth is absolutely true or that any line is

[1] Introductory Address to a Conference held in Oxford in August, 1922, on Spiritual Values in Education and Social Life.

Digitized by Google

absolutely straight, they may well be expected to agree also with the saying of Hamlet, that "there is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so." Yet most people still believe that, in a relative sense at least, one line may be said to be straighter or one path shorter or more direct than another; and, in like manner, that one statement may be said to be more correct than another. So too, however much we may agree with the Founder of Christianity, that "there is none good but one, that is God," or with Plato, that nothing is absolutely good or beautiful except an ultimate concept, yet we may still venture to maintain that there are degrees of value in conduct and in art, as well as in food and clothing. There may be some soul of goodness in things evil, and our sweetest songs may be those that tell of saddest thought; yet we can at least distinguish between positive and negative values, and try to secure as much of the former and as little of the latter as possible.

Now, it is not with the general conception of value that we are here concerned, but with its spiritual aspect in education and social life. We have, therefore, to ask what it is that we are to understand by spiritual value; and, as Dr. Steiner is playing the leading part in the present Conference—greatly, I suppose, to the gratification of most of us—it may be well to open up the subject by a reference to his highly suggestive view of the three fundamental aspects of a human Commonwealth—viz., the economic, the political and the spiritual—a view that has recently been further emphasised by Mr. Delisle Burns in his valuable work on *Government and Industry*.

As I have already noted, it was with reference to the economic side that the conception of value first came into prominence. It was to material "goods" that it was first definitely applied, rather than to what is good for the improvement of men's social relations or for the cultivation of their individual souls. Even with regard to economic values, it is probably true to say that the emphasis was for a long time laid too exclusively on the determination of

Digitized by Google

prices by the competition of the market. It was thought by many, according to the old jingle, that "the value of a thing is just as much as it will bring." Yet the air we breathe, which is of the utmost value for our lives, has, in general, no price. I say "in general," for of course it is true that people often have to pay more for an airy room or for a breezy situation than for a close one. It was against this identification of value with the price in the market that Ruskin put forward his famous saying, that "the only wealth is life." No doubt, what he meant by this had never been altogether overlooked. Most economists did speak about "value in use" as well as "value in exchange." No one could well have supposed that food and clothing had any real value for us—still less gold and silver—apart from their vital services; yet the emphasis that Ruskin laid on this, and the inferences that he drew from it, were so startling to many people that the publication of his articles had to be discontinued. It was pretty nearly the same point that Le Play sought to make when he asked "what are the most precious products of the mines?" and insisted they are not the coals but the miners—subdued to what they work in "like the dyer's hand." Comte also had protested against purely economic valuations; and among those who may be regarded more or less definitely as his followers—such as Herbert Spencer and Professor Patrick Geddes—there has been a strong emphasis on *Life* as that which has ultimate value. But Life itself is a somewhat vague expression. It is necessary to inquire further what is to be understood by vital values.

Now, it is well to remember that the science of Economics used—in times that are now almost prehistoric—to be described as *Political* Economy. It was from the study of "the Wealth of Nations" that it took its origin. And it is pretty obvious that the wealth of nations does not consist entirely of things that can be bought and sold. Who can estimate how much of the essential well-being of Great Britain is to be ascribed to the inviolable sea by which it is surrounded? The sea may in time lose some of its value;

Digitized by Google

perhaps some of it has already been lost; but it is probable at least that it will outlast our coal, and will be found to have contributed more to the building up of our national life than either our cotton or our steel. Nor are spiritual forces without their national value. Carlyle thought that we should be poorer as a nation if we had never had our Shakespeare than if we had never had our Indian Empire. Again, though it is an Englishman's privilege to criticise his rulers, yet if we had not a pretty well established system of government, with long traditions of justice and toleration, we should certainly be poor indeed. Such things as the sea, Shakespeare, and good government may be said to have political value, though they could hardly be described as economic goods.

Purely spiritual qualities, such as those that underlie religion and morality, often have a political value. Sometimes they have even an economic value. Such moral qualities as honesty, perseverance, temperance and friendliness, may almost be said to be marketable commodities. The scrupulosity of the Quakers has not on the whole stood in the way of their material prosperity. It is pretty certainly an asset. But it is still more obvious that some spiritual qualities are sources of national strength. Courage, which Sir James Barrie has recently been celebrating as "the lovely virtue," may sometimes be destructive to the individual life, but generally gives security to a State. Even the sayings that the meek inherit the earth and that those who seek first the kingdom of God have other things added, are not altogether disproved by history. That right makes might, as Carlyle maintained, is at least a thesis that is more easy to support than its opposite. Even a comparatively helpless bird is more often than not able to defend its own nest or its young against a powerful aggressor.

But it is not for either their economic or their political uses that good qualities are chiefly valued. Rather it seems true to say that economic goods and political organizations have their chief value as providing some of the

Digitized by Google

means through which spiritual excellences may be developed. An economic or political value is essentially instrumental, while the more spiritual values are intrinsic. Life itself is more than the meat that supports it or the organization that defends it; and even the life of a human being or of a human society counts for less than the spiritual values that it enables us to achieve. Even the State, as Aristotle taught, while it exists in the first instance for the support of life, exists ultimately for the protection of the things that make life worth living.

What are those things? What are the ultimate spiritual values—the intrinsic values to which all things else are only means? This is a question that might well provide opportunities for a long discussion; and we may hope that all that is said and done in the course of this Conference will help to supply the answer. It would hardly be possible to deal with it adequately in such an introductory lecture as this, even if my capacity for dealing with it were greater than it is. It may suffice as a first approximation to note that those who have devoted most attention to the subject, have generally summed up their results by saying that the ultimate spiritual values are found in that great trinity that is expressed by the words Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. It might be well, however, to vary the terms a little. When we speak of truth, we are apt to be reminded that there are such things as "odious truths"; and, though these are sometimes worth emphasising, they can hardly be said to be things that we value for their own sakes. Beauty, again, may suggest what is merely pretty or purely sensuous; and goodness may, as we have already noted, suggest qualities that certain prominent writers are anxious to get "beyond." Hence, instead of Truth, I prefer to say Insight; instead of Goodness, I prefer to say Love, which I take to be its foundation; and instead of Beauty, I prefer to say Loveliness—that which is worthy of Love. These three abide; and the last I should be disposed to say, is the greatest of the three.

The Greeks, as we know, used the term τὸ καλόν, the

Digitized by Google

Beautiful, to express the supreme value; and, if we interpret Beauty as meaning that which is worthy of Love, it may certainly be regarded as what is highest and most ultimate. Beauty is the only thing that is "its own excuse for being." Once we have seen it, we do not ask why it is to be chosen. Goodness means the effort to create and sustain this supreme value. In human life it is certainly necessary to make an effort for this; and any quality that contributes to this effort shares in the loveliness of that at which it aims. Such a quality becomes, in Barrie's fine phrase, a "lovely virtue." In this sense we may certainly hold, with Goethe, that the Beautiful is higher than the Good, and includes it. Anything that is called Good, and that is not of this nature—any good that does not minister to the loveliness of life—is certainly a Good that we ought to get "beyond." As for Truth or Insight, this can be taken as a supreme value only if we accept the saying of Keats, that "Beauty is Truth, Truth Beauty"—in other words, that the real world, when rightly understood, contains supreme loveliness. That is perhaps a faith that we are almost bound to hold—the faith that "the light that never was on sea or land" is not really as fine as the light that is actually on them. This seems to have been, as Dr. Bosanquet has recently urged, what Wordsworth actually meant. And indeed, the more we penetrate into the intimate secrets of nature, the more do we seem to catch glimpses of an Order and Beauty that eye hath not seen nor ear heard, and that have hardly yet entered into the heart of man. If this is true, then we may say that insight into the beauty of the world is an element in the supreme value. But there are great problems involved here—too great to be explored in such a lecture as this. I do not even venture to determine what beauty really is—what is the essential nature of that quality which deserves to be loved. Perhaps it would not be very far wrong to say that it means fullness of life fully apprehended or suggested. But this is a little vague.

Now, it is largely with the educational significance of

Digitized by Google

spiritual values that we are here concerned. And I think we may best approach this subject by noting first how the economic and political values enter into the treatment of education.

That education is very largely influenced, and to a certain extent rightly influenced, by economic values, is sufficiently obvious. When people enter upon any educational course, they generally ask themselves—will it pay? And, though this expression is often used in a colloquial and somewhat metaphorical sense, it often means—will it help towards the satisfaction of the economic needs of the inquirer, and of those who are dependent upon him? And this is certainly a legitimate inquiry. Bread studies, as they have been called, occupy a large place in the preparation for life; and their importance has become more and more apparent as we have learned to think of education, not as a special luxury for the few, nor as the means of acquiring a certain social superiority, but as a necessary preparation for the duties of citizenship. In older days apprenticeship played a larger part than it does now in supplying the training and instruction that are needed for the more purely economic vocations. If the Guild system is introduced again, in a somewhat modified form (as I certainly hope it will be) apprenticeship may regain something of its former significance. In the meantime, preparation for some forms of industry is coming to be recognised as an important part of general education. The economic aspects of education are not likely to be neglected. Instruction in the use of tools for instance, is in many schools encouraged; and, though it is often not easy to foresee what the ultimate vocation of young people will turn out to be, yet it is recognised that there are some studies, such as mathematics and the physical sciences, which are useful as lying at the foundation of very many forms of economic activity in the modern world. With the consideration of this we are not here concerned.

Political values are also not very difficult to discover. It is now very generally recognised that the young have to

Digitized by Google

be trained to play their part as citizens of some kind of organised commonwealth; and citizenship is commonly understood to mean largely, if not mainly, fitness and readiness to take part in the support of the State and of the various political institutions that are connected with its life. It is generally recognised—and often deplored—that this aim has been very thoroughly carried out in the German system of education. It is perhaps not so generally recognised that, in a less obstrusive and self-conscious fashion, it has been perhaps carried out almost, if not quite, as effectively in our own country. The education given in our public schools, whatever its other deficiences may have been, has served to develop a ruling class with strongly marked political instincts and with a deeply implanted sense of loyalty and comradeship. And, in the humbler forms of education, the importance of discipline and obedience has not been overlooked. It is not necessary, therefore, to dwell much upon such values as these. It is more to the purpose now to note that the idea of a ruling class and an obedient one is a conception that is being rapidly superseded; and that we have to put in its place the conception of social service among all classes. But this also is not a new conception, and its importance is becoming more and more generally acknowledged. The Boy Scout and Girl Guide Movement is one of the most obvious forms in which it has recently taken shape—a characteristically English form, introducing the idea of duty under a sort of disguise of sport. But I think it may be added that the success of Great Britain as a nation has been largely due to the fact that the sense of social obligation has always been pretty deeply seated in the general consciousness, though it has not always been very fully enlightened.

The spiritual values, however, are chiefly to be found in what is called Liberal Education or Culture, in which the ideas of Instruction, Training and Discipline tend to give place to that of Development, and the conception of learning to those of discovery and appreciation. Now,

Digitized by Google

it would of course be absurd to say that this kind of education has been wholly disregarded in the past. The great Revival of Learning towards the close of the Middle Ages brought it into a position of prominence and honour which it has never wholly lost. But the fact that the revival led mainly to the study of Latin and Greek literature gave it an exotic and often a somewhat pedantic character, and necessarily confined its direct influence to the few. It is characteristic of the modern movements that they seek to avail themselves of what is best in the more spontaneous expressions of the various living peoples. To confine it to this would of course be ridiculous; but it is generally wise to begin with what is nearest. A poor thing but our own—something that we can in the fullest sense possess—may have more value for us than the richest treasure that is only half unearthed, or that we are not fully able to appropriate.

If we are right in thinking that the central element in spiritual value is Beauty, it would seem right to begin with art, as in the Greek μουσική. It will be evident from some of the features of this Conference that something of the old Platonic conception of education is being revived. We have music here, and it is combined with dancing—which gives it a touch of gymnastic as well—in Dr. Steiner's new method of Eurhythmy. If it is more suitable for girls than for boys, that also is significant of a certain advance that is a welcome characteristic of our age. The newer methods of education seek to adapt themselves to differences of sex as well as to other differences in the outlook upon life. Some artistic forms, however, are available for all. Probably the less purely sensuous the art is, the better is it adapted to convey a spiritual significance. It might be worth while to attempt a classification of artistic forms with reference to their spiritual value, similar to that which was attempted by the Platonic Socrates, but with the advantage of the knowledge and critical theory that has been built up since his time. Probably poetry is the art that has the widest appeal and the

Digitized by Google

most readily intelligible meanings. It speaks directly to the imagination both through the eye and through the ear; and, though at its best, as Milton declared, "sensuous and passionate," it is also intellectual. The emphasis on literal truth need not, at least in early stages, be pressed too closely. Fables and fairy tales may retain their well established position, so long as they are what Plato called "noble lies"—fiction, that is to say, which gives vividness to some true underlying meaning. But they should lead on to reflection, and by degrees inspire to efforts after the realization of great ideals, and from these again to the study of the conditions under which such realization is possible. Thus Beauty would lead us on to Goodness and Truth.

Such a progression would lead us on also from those values that are purely spiritual to those that may be said to be political and economical as well. If we set out from the point of view of spiritual values, we are led to a different conception of politics from that which we are apt to get by setting out from the study of existing modes of government. We are led to see that commonwealths exist for the sake of the good life, and not merely for the protection of bodily life and property. We may continue to regard the latter object as the main function of the State in the narrower sense of the term; but we shall then regard the State in that sense as subordinate to the more cultural and spiritual aspects of social life; and this will also naturally lead us to regard particular nations as trustees for aims that transcend nationality; and our devotion to the State will be limited by the thought of these larger and more final ends. What activities we undertake on its behalf are undertaken with a view to these. If we seek to make the world safe for democracy, it will not be for the sake of democracy (which is sometimes as vile a thing as any tyranny), but for the sake of those spiritual values that require freedom and self-expression for their proper realization.

It can hardly be doubted that the introduction of spirit-

Digitized by Google

ual conceptions into the political life is the one thing on which the salvation of the world at present depends. Nothing could be more disastrous for the life of humanity than such a strife as that in which we were recently involved—unless it be the kind of peace from which we suffered before it and from which we are suffering after it. Can it be denied that these troubles are due to the materialisation of our Western outlook in recent times? The Eastern nations, in which spiritual conceptions of life are more deeply ingrained, have looked on with some astonishment, though not without an uneasy consciousness that they are themselves slipping down into the same abyss. It is not a new discovery. Carlyle, Ruskin, William Morris, and many others, have long been calling, loudly enough, for a return to a more spiritual outlook upon life. More finely in some respects than any of these, Shelley, whose centenary we were recently celebrating,—a beautiful and not altogether ineffectual angel—called us to a more excellent way. His spirit, like that of Keats, still "beacons from the abodes where the eternal are," with its message of love and spiritual beauty. The message, no doubt, has to be interpreted, as President Wilson was trying to do—again not altogether without effect—in terms of practical politics, and it is not too late to hope that it may be made still more effective. "If winter comes, can Spring be far behind?"

The chief roots of our strife are economic. It has recently[2] been pointed out that the early tyrants in Greece and elsewhere derived their influence from something very closely akin to the American dollar. Their power was primarily financial. Now, it is certainly not easy to see how a spiritual significance is to be given to economic goods. But here also the attempt to view them in the light of ultimate ends would help us at least to some degree of transvaluation. The worship that is given to riches does not flow from any very deep recesses of the heart. "We glorify the soldier," according to William James,[3]

[2] *The Origin of Tyranny*, by Professor P. N. Ure.

[3] *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 318.

Digitized by Google

"as the man absolutely unencumbered"—the man who possesses nothing but his life, which he is ready to give away. Ruskin also contrasted the honour that is paid to soldiers with the comparative contempt that is apt to attach to merchants; and ascribed the difference to the fact that the former have an end for which they are prepared to sacrifice their individual lives; and he urged that the true merchant should also be ready to give his life for the maintenance of those particular values with which he is concerned. The distinction is perhaps not quite as sharp as it seemed. We have learned, since Ruskin wrote, that a nation of shop-keepers can be very speedily transformed into a nation of soldiers. And the life of a soldier is not always one of extreme vital peril. Many of the great commanders—such as the Duke of Wellington—have lived to a good old age. Some merchants, especially those who have gone down to the sea in ships, have often had to carry out their work in dangers that were hardly less than those of war. In the Great War itself, the merchant ships *did* bring provisions to us, often with extreme risk. Even in peace time the captain of a ship generally goes down with it when it is wrecked. Peace has its heroisms as well as its victories. Still, it is true in general that the commercial life is not one that readily evokes heroism. The antithesis of *Händler* and *Helden* is not altogether without point. Economic goods would seldom justify the greatest sacrifice. Ruskin's own father, whom he praised as a perfectly honest merchant, was, as we know, a wine merchant. One may doubt whether it would be reasonable for a man to risk his life for the purpose of securing that his fellow countrymen should not have to go without their port or champagne. And perhaps this is even more obvious in the case of some other familiar articles of commerce. Dr. Johnson once rebuked Boswell for seeming to suggest that pickles were not a perfectly legitimate article of commerce. No doubt they are; but one would hardly expect any one to sacrifice his life for the sake of them. Life is, in general, only given for life, or for things that we regard as having

Digitized by Google

a higher value than life itself. It is not for the sake of any particular economic good—hardly even for those that are obviously necessary—that men can be expected to offer a supreme devotion. For the general system of human life, however, they may; and for particular economic ends as contributing to the support of that system. The weakness of our present civilization, as contrasted with many that are older and more primitive, as well as with those more developed ones for which we may reasonably hope, is that so much of men's energies is absorbed in work that is not obviously contributing to the maintenance of the higher ends of humanity. As Emerson said:

> "'Tis the day of the chattel,
> Web to weave and corn to grind;
> Things are in the saddle
> And ride mankind."

The tyranny of machinery is perhaps more to be dreaded in the modern world than that either of monarchs or of mobs. I do not of course mean that machinery is in itself evil. What Carlyle called "beaverism" is an essential element in human life. We have not tails, like beavers; but our hands and brains are capable of much more elaborate constructions. Heine found, on visiting England many years ago, that the machines here were like human beings—and that the human beings were rather like machines. It is quite right that our machines should become men, so long as they are slave men, and enable us, as Aristotle suggested, to dispense with slavery in human life. But J. S. Mill doubted whether machinery had lightened the toil of a single human being. It has helped us to conquer space and time, and has given us wings like a dove; but it has not, as yet, freed us from those forms of work that are slavish, and enabled us to concentrate on what is distinctively human—work that is creative and artistic. I believe that such writers as Carlyle, Ruskin and William Morris were substantially right in urging that one of the most important things to aim at is the restoration of handwork to something of its old dignity—perhaps, as I

Digitized by Google

have already suggested, by the revival of something more or less akin to the old Gilds, at least in those forms of work that may properly be described by the term "mysteries," work requiring highly specialised skill and elaborate training. I think it well, however, to remember also that, among other forms of machinery, the machinery of the State is a source of considerable danger. Probably there has been too much emphasis on nationality in recent times; or at least the time when such emphasis was important and wholesome, is rapidly passing. It is important now to lay stress on the federation of the world, not in the sense of creating a sort of super-state, but rather as the recognition of what is already perceived in what used to be known as the British Empire, that the countries of the world, though having distinct methods of organisation and different national characteristics, are essentially parts of a single Commonwealth, with great human interests that far outweigh their separate rivalries and apparent antagonisms. I am inclined to think also that it is time to direct our attention to the possibility of organizing comparatively small districts and co-operative groups—districts combining, as far as possible, the amenities both of town and country.[4] It is still true for us, as it was for the ancient Greeks, that it is only within comparatively small communities, in which people can really know one another and develop common interests, that an ideal society is possible, in which capital (which means mainly machinery) can be duly subordinated to culture (which means mainly personal development and creative activity). A good deal of ridicule—perhaps not undeserved—was cast upon the Germans for the emphasis that they laid on their *Kultur*. But, if we mean by Culture those liberal arts of life that are most purely human—those arts for which on the whole Oxford, more perhaps than any other place in England, stands—it is certainly worth while to spend and be spent to make the world safe for these. What we have to aim

[4] In this connection, reference may be made to the interesting book on "The New State" by Miss M. P. Follett.

Digitized by Google

at is to keep these always in the forefront of our practical endeavours, treating everything else in life as means to their support and advancement. And this is certainly not easy. The means are constantly obscuring and dragging down the ends—means and ends being so intimately bound together in human life. The spiritual values are indeed free, spontaneous and natural. But genuine freedom is always somewhat strenuous. Even that which we inherit from our fathers, and which is most emphatically our own, we have to earn for ourselves afresh, in order that we may really possess it. The greater values of life, indeed, we seem almost to have to learn again each day, as if we had only just been born. It is largely for that reason that we need such Conferences as this; and it is largely for that reason also that we have to regard education—the education that goes on perpetually throughout our lives—as being our chief concern. We have to begin by making ourselves fit for that better world that we are to try to help to come into being. We develop in order that we may create; and we create in order that we may develop.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

LONDON.

Digitized by Google

SELF-EXPRESSION AND HAPPINESS.

A Study of Matthew Arnold's Idea of Perfection

C. V. BOYER.

I

THE third quarter of the nineteenth century was a period of great commercial prosperity and national self-satisfaction in England. The period of depression had been weathered, the Corn Laws had been repealed, manufactures were flourishing, and the gloomy prospects of the laboring class, which had called forth the factory novels of the '40s, had brightened. The danger that now threatened England was not an uprising of the oppressed classes, but the danger of spiritual stagnation. The prosperity which had put an end to the Chartist Movement and the drift towards socialism had also checked the great outpouring of idealistic literature which flooded the first half-century. The danger was not one likely to be appreciated by the vast majority of citizens; it was felt, however, by the conservators of classical tradition and by others who did not find a complete satisfaction of their desires in money-making or the advance of science. To this group, Arnold's words on the value of culture came as a great refreshment. It seemed for the time being as though, recognizing the necessity and importance of the democratic and industrial movements, yet holding fast to the spiritual ideals of the Greeks, Arnold had effected a harmony between what was best in the ancient and modern civilizations. Certainly no social studies were more widely read and eagerly discussed than his essays on the relation of culture to security and happiness. It has even been remarked that the chief value of his prose lies in its having been absorbed by the age.

Curiously enough, however, those who call themselves his disciples, or so use his language and ideas as to be called disciples by others, are by no means in accord in their own

Digitized by Google

outlook on life. It is not uncommon to find sensitive young men so swayed by his doctrine of the social function of culture that they resolve to devote their lives to the uplift of the masses. Nor is a precisely opposite effect unusual. Numbers are carried away by his ideas concerning self-culture,—the importance of refined manners, of a knowledge of Greek and Latin antiquity, of a taste for art,—and forthwith reject the opportunity to succeed their fathers in the iron-trade in order to take up the study of *belles-lettres*. Perfection is the aim of each, perfection of society in the one case, perfection of self in the other. The conflict is no less marked in mature minds. Publicists of different persuasions seize upon Arnold's ideas to support their various positions as Radicals, Liberals, or Conservatives. "In an age like ours wholly given over to the mission of industrial development," we may imagine one group saying, "we should have centralized schools, supervised by the National Government to give dignity to our education and correct somewhat our natural taste for the bathos." "Not so!" the radical lovers of culture retort. "In an age like ours given over to the worship of machinery and external doing, every one knows the kind of education we should have under such supervision: uniform course, system-made teachers, and parrot-like students. The graduates of our schools would be all of a piece, Philistines every one." Or, it may be, since "conduct is three-fourths of life," some staunch admirer of Arnold finds our present need to be a stricter morality, the stern suppression of the wayward impulses of our ordinary selves, while another aims to loosen the hold of moral conventions because the one thing needful is a "free play of mind." The one group looks to authority for the betterment of man, the other to initiative and responsibility in the individual.

Instead of Arnold's ideas having been absorbed, such confusion suggests that absorption may be impossible, because of a fundamental inconsistency in the ideas themselves. Despite the attention attracted to Arnold's utterances, little consideration has been paid to the philosophy

Digitized by Google

back of them. Mr. Frederick Harrison, alone, so far as I know, has doubted whether there was any systematic body of thought behind these ideas. Arnold himself lightly laughed aside Mr. Harrison's comment as immaterial, and later writers appear to have accepted Arnold's estimate without examining his critic's words. Yet, when we recollect that Arnold was proposing a plan for universal happiness, it does seem that the foundation of his ideas might be worth a moment's thought. Beyond question, Arnold was, and is, a corrective force to many one-sided tendencies of the age. But it is another thing to say that his ideas are harmonious, or soundly democratic, or that they would, if applied, realize the ideal of universal happiness.

The basic idea underlying his social and religious essays is that the good of life is Happiness. In *Literature and Dogma*, he even attempted to show that happiness is the proof as well as the reward of righteousness. Criticized for this, he reasserted his belief in the pages of *God and the Bible*. "That joy and happiness are the magnets to which human life inevitably moves, let not the reader of *Literature and Dogma* for a moment confuse his mind by doubting. The real objection is to low and false views of what constitutes happiness. *Pleasure* and *utility* are bad words to employ, because they have been so used as to suggest such views. But *joy* and *happiness*, on the whole, have not. We may safely say, then, that joy and happiness are the magnets to which human life irresistibly moves."

Happiness is to be attained, according to Arnold, through the study of "perfection." Perfection, rather than happiness, is the term most frequently on his lips in *Culture and Anarchy*. "The best man," he quotes Socrates as saying, "is he who most strives to perfect himself; the happiest man is he who most feels that he is perfecting himself." But Arnold entertained alternately two conceptions of perfection, that is, two conflicting ideas of how to be happy. The one conception makes perfection and obedience to law identical; the other makes perfection identical

Digitized by Google

with full development of personality. The idea of suppression is uppermost in his mind at one time, the idea of expression at another. He tries, indeed, to fuse the two ideas, but not altogether successfully. Since the doctrine that happiness results from full development of personality might conceivably be sound even though the other doctrine were found untenable, the two should be examined separately. Perhaps we shall see Arnold in clearest perspective if we glance first at what he has to say about conformity to law.

II

The law is variously spoken of as the will of God, the law of our being, the universal law, and the law of reason. "The pursuit of perfection is the pursuit of sweetness and light. He who works for sweetness and light works to make reason and the will of God prevail." "To see things as they are," the main object of the lover of perfection, means "to draw towards a knowledge of the universal order which seems to be intended and aimed at in the world, and which it is man's happiness to go along with or his misery to go counter to,—to learn, in short, the will of God." In *Literature and Dogma*, the law of our being, the universal law, and the will of God are identified more painstakingly. "For science, God is simply the stream of tendency by which all things fulfill the law of their being. That all things seem to have what we call a law of their being, and to tend to fulfil it, is certain and admitted; though whether we call this God or not is a matter of choice. Suppose, however, we call it *God*, we then give the name *God* to a certain and admitted reality; this, at least, is an advantage. And the notion does, in fact, enter into the term God, in men's common use of it. To please God, to serve God, to obey God's will, does mean to follow a law of things which is found in conscience, and which is an indication, irrespective of our arbitrary wish and fancy, of what we ought to do. There is, then, a real power which makes for righteousness; and it is the greatest of realities for us."

It must not be forgotten that Arnold's object was prac-

Digitized by Google

tical. He was writing to offer culture "as a help out of our present difficulties." The difficulties to be overcome were the "vulgarity, hideousness, ignorance, violence, and unreasonableness" which prevailed in England. These ills were the result of contempt for authority and of belief in the maxim that happiness comes from a man's being free to do as he likes; whereas, Arnold points out, the truth is that happiness comes only from conforming to the universal law. The existence of hideousness, wretchedness, and violence is just so much evidence that the English have not conformed to the law. The essential thing, then, is "to come as near as we can to the firm, intelligible law of things, and thus get a basis for a less confused action and a more complete perfection than we have at present."

We come to know and obey this law, so essential to well-being, by hearkening to the voice of the "higher self." For Arnold is a believer in the dualistic nature of the self. The doctrine is most clearly set forth in the "Preface" to *Last Essays on Church and Religion.* "It will generally be admitted, too, that all experience as to conduct brings us at last to the fact of the two selves, or instincts, or forces,—name them how we will, and however we may suppose them to have arisen,—contending for the mastery in man; one a movement of first impulse and more involuntary, leading us to gratify any inclination that may solicit us, and called generally a movement of man's ordinary or passing self, of sense, appetite, desire; the other a movement of reflection and more voluntary, leading us to submit inclination to some rule, and called generally a movement of man's higher or enduring self, of reason, spirit, will. The thing is described in different words by different nations and men relating their experience of it, but as to the thing itself, they all, or all the most serious and important among them, agree. This, I think, will be admitted. Nor will it be denied that they all come to the conclusion that for a man to obey the higher self, of reason, or whatever it may be called, is happiness and life for him; to obey the lower is death and misery."

Digitized by Google

That man is a creature of reflection as well as of impulse, and that happiness does not always follow upon impulsive action, is undeniable. But what is the "instinct" or "force" obedience to which *is* followed by happiness? Are certain impulses in themselves high and others low, and does experience teach us to distinguish between them? The history of morality shows that many groups have answered this question affirmatively. Judging from certain of Arnold's writings we might say that he shared their opinion. The essay on Bishop Butler contains a number of passages carrying this suggestion. The self-regarding impulses—Butler's "cool self-love"—are the lower, the other-regarding impulses—Butler's "benevolence"— are the higher. Or, as Arnold elsewhere expresses it, the lower impulses include "every impulse relating to temper, every impulse relating to sensuality." This was not Arnold's unwavering opinion, however; he did not adhere to it when adherence in specific cases would have involved him in obvious nonsense. Consider for a moment the impulse of anger, the giving way to one's temper, which is the impulse the sterner self of the Populace gives way to when it "smashes things." When a bully strikes a child, this display of temper shows him to be of a low order. But when the passer-by loses his temper at sight of the bully's act and strikes the bully,—is the impulse of anger then low? Yet only the object, not the impulse, has changed. And how many, even among the believers in the higher self, thought that their anger against Germany during the recent war was a lower impulse? They called it righteous indignation—a higher impulse—though still temper. The continuation of anger, after the provocation of moral indignation has ceased, becomes once more low, though still the same impulse. Evidently the impulse itself is without moral quality; morality has to do with the circumstances under which the impulse is gratified. Or, consider the sex impulse. It is easy to think of situations in which the following of this instinct has led, or would lead, to evil results; consequently, we readily accept the classification

Digitized by Google

of it as low. To be consistent, then, we should re-establish the monastic ideal and let the human race die out. But Arnold himself favors no such consistency. "Medieval chastity," he says, "is manifestly a misgrowth, however natural,—unworkable and dangerous,—of the idea of purity." On the other hand, the benevolent impulses, or the tendency to pity, would certainly be classed as high; Arnold himself calls them high. Again, to be consistent, we should foster indiscriminate charity. But modern social science is opposed to indiscriminate charity. It deprives the deserving of much needed aid, and encourages those who are lazy and dishonest. The word "benevolent" is an unhappy word to use to describe acts of giving and of pitying. It begs the question. If a person knows that his giving may work harm, yet shuts his eyes to the consequences, the giving is not "well-wishing" at all, but mere selfish yielding to sentimentality or avoidance of the pain of restraint. The act of giving then becomes positively immoral. When the person gives thoughtfully, with an eye to actually beneficial results, the act is moral. But the impulse itself is neither moral nor immoral; it is non-moral. Here again, when it comes to the specific case, Arnold is with us. He says of medieval charity precisely what he said of medieval chastity: "It is manifestly a misgrowth,—unworkable and dangerous."

If the higher self is not an aggregate of impulses, if we cannot consistently call any impulse right or wrong, good or bad, high or low, in itself, what is the sure authority that is to guide us in releasing or repressing our impulses? Does the voice of the higher self speak through conscience or, what with Arnold amounts to the same thing, intuition? Apparently this is the idea which Arnold wishes to convey when he says, "To please God, to serve God, to obey God's will, does mean to follow a law of things which is found in *conscience*." We come upon the same idea, further elaborated, in the following passage from *Literature and Dogma:* "We said of conduct, that it is the simplest thing in the world as far as knowledge is concerned, but the hardest

Digitized by Google

thing in the world as far as doing is concerned. It is an affair, we said, of *conscience*, which speaks plainly enough if we will only listen to it, and then we have to follow it. If we follow it, we shall have the sense of doing right, succeeding in the management of our conduct. We added, that doing right, succeeding in the management of this vast concern, gave naturally the liveliest possible sense of satisfaction and happiness. . . ."

How shall we judge the statement that conduct is simply an affair of conscience? As though conscience itself were the same in all persons at all times; as though a conscientious person never had a struggle as to which of several diverging paths he ought to follow, which of two incompatible courses of action he should pursue, which of two voices giving conflicting advice he should listen to. To be sure, if we follow conscience "we shall have the sense of doing right"; that is why the Germans and the French both thought they were right. Every fanatic has the sense of doing right. But that only weakens a reasonable man's trust in this sense. It is true that, under certain conditions, what we call conscience serves us in good stead; it is the fact that it sometimes misdirects us, sometimes fails to direct us at all, that renders it no sure authority. How can we rely on conscience when conscience sides with persecution, superstition, and prejudice, as well as with truth and justice? But Arnold himself knew better. The exigency of the argument forced him to lower his Hellenistic standard for the time being. When he is contending with persons who make conscience a plea for following a course of action of which he disapproves, he is quick enough to demolish the authority of conscience. Comparing the English Revolution of 1642 with the French Revolution of 1789, he says: "1789 asked of a thing, Is it rational? 1642 asked of a thing, Is it legal? or, when it went furthest, Is it according to conscience? But what is law in one place is not law in another, and what is law here to-day is not law even here to-morrow; and as for conscience, *what is binding on one man's conscience is not binding on another's.*"

Digitized by Google

Evidently Arnold has his doubts about the higher self manifesting itself through a particular group of impulses or through conscience. Had he never written anything that might mislead a reader into thinking that he put his trust in these two forces, it would have been unnecessary to go beyond the passage quoted in which he describes the two selves. For there he makes the higher self and reason one, and no one would mistake reason for conscience or impulse. Certainly he did not insist in *Culture and Anarchy* that conduct is "the simplest thing in the world," an "affair of conscience," which we have "only to listen to" to meet with happiness and success. And the reason he did not is obvious. If the statement be true, the pursuit of knowledge has no moral value: we already know what to do. But the thesis of *Culture and Anarchy* is that to learn what to do we must "familiarize ourselves with the best that has been said and thought in the world." The very title of the book, says Herbert Paul, suggests that Arnold meant to convey "that lawlessness was the result of not deferring to the authority of cultivated persons." Presumably, it is their familiarity with the best that has been said and thought that enables them to speak with authority. At any rate, Arnold makes his opinion very clear that no one can be expected to act in accordance with the intelligent law of things who is ignorant of the past. It is to history that we must turn to find the law of reason, the standard of right action.

The appeal to history when a moral situation arises may be for a solution of the problem, or for data with which to help solve it. In consulting history for data, we are exercising common sense in seeking all the factors, past as well as present, that may be of use to reach a decision; but we are not then relying on history as authority, we are not using history as a standard. When the question arises as to how we should treat our foreign possessions, we may study the colonial history of Greece, of Rome, and of England, but if we merely take a hint here and a hint there and modify past methods to suit present conditions, we are not

Digitized by Google

appealing to history for a criterion; we are not conforming to any law. If the practice we find and alter be called law, then we are modifying, not conforming to, law.

We do conform to a standard found in history, however, when we appeal to the past for a *solution* of the problem. We are accepting the practice of the past as a criterion of right reason when we refuse to join a League of Nations because Washington objected to entangling alliances. We are accepting the practice of the past as a criterion if we oppose State-schools because the schools of the eighteenth century were privately supported; or if we favor established churches because the churches of the eighteenth century were supported by the State. If the basis of our belief in capital punishment is historical precedent, then certainly our criterion is taken from history. If we favor slavery because Greece in her prime was a slave-holding nation; or strive to introduce polygamy because Solomon, the wisest man of his time, had a thousand wives, there can be no question that our standard has long roots. Merely to explain what taking our criterion of right reason from history actually means is almost enough to show its unreasonableness.

Certainly Arnold was not so irrational. He cites numerous examples of custom and conduct in the past which are *not* the law, but he does not cite a single instance, so far as I can determine, of past practice which, because it is historical, *is* the law. He does give illustrations of what he regards as reasonable action, but, if I mistake not, he finds his criterion of reason in the present situation. In his examination of the Real Estate Intestacy Bill, in his criticism of the free-trade activities of his liberal friends, in his discussion of the scriptural text, *Be fruitful and multiply*, he is guided in passing judgment, not by precedent, but by present conditions. The law of primogeniture might pass muster in feudal days, but it has led to great inequality of wealth and to-day such inequality "materializes our upper classes, vulgarizes our middle classes, and brutalizes our lower classes." The maxims of free-trade are to be tested

Digitized by Google

by the actual consequences of their application, not otherwise. A large family may have been a blessing and in accordance with the will of God at the resettlement of Jerusalem after the Captivity, "when the Jews of Jerusalem were a handful, an undermanned garrison," but "to bring people into the world when one cannot afford to keep them and oneself decently and not too precariously . . . is just as wrong and just as contrary to reason and the will of God, as for a man to have horses, or carriages, or pictures, when he cannot afford them. . . . God declares the possession of a great many children to be a blessing only when it really is so."

In every instance Arnold takes his criterion from the situation. As a thinking man, sensitive to social well-being, he could not do otherwise. If we go to history for the "stream of tendency" which is the law of our being, we find not one tendency, but several. At one time more freedom, at another time less; at one time monogamy, at another polygamy, at still another celibacy. We are forced to make a choice, and history cannot be our standard in choosing from history. If we ignore the situation and make a choice that is final, we become slaves to a fixed standard, our morality mechanical. It consists in merely checking an impulse instead of liberating intelligence. Anyone who defended this position would come within point-blank range of Arnold's whole artillery. If ever leader made a No Man's Land of the defences of mechanical action, that leader was Arnold. It was the Philistine's "staunch adherence to some *fixed* law of doing," the tendency to give certain sayings the force of a "mechanical absolute law" and so to interfere with the free play of mind necessary to development, that drew his sharpest fire.

There can be no doubt that Arnold refused to accept any concrete law or custom of the past as his standard of right reason. There can be no doubt that he denounced in unambiguous terms standards that are absolute. What then can he mean by *law* when he asserts that the law of reason manifests itself in history through what is best in

Digitized by Google

poetry, art, science, religion, and philosophy? What can he mean when he maintains that "the prescriptions of reason are *absolute?*"

He means by law abstractions. Clearly he does. We reach this conclusion not only by eliminating everything else that he could have meant but by attending to his own positive pronouncements. "God," he declares, "is the stream of tendency by which all things fulfil the law of their being." "God is the power, not ourselves, which makes for *righteousness.*" Thus, the universal law, the law of reason, the will of God is that a man should be righteousness. Righteousness is the law of our being; happiness results from righteousness. This is what history proves. But righteousness is an abstraction. And whenever Arnold sets up a standard that is universally applicable that standard proves to be an abstraction. "*Truth* makes us free." "The best man is he who most strives to *perfect* himself." "An intelligent man will prize those studies which result in his soul getting *soberness*, *righteousness*, and *wisdom.*" "What is saving?" he asks in his lecture on *Numbers*, speaking of what will save a State from destruction. And his answer is: "Righteousness and delighting in the law of the Eternal." Recognizing that these terms are rather vague, he quotes a text to show precisely what they mean. " 'Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are elevated, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are amiable, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise; have these in your mind, let your throughts run on these.' That is what both Plato and the prophets mean by loving righteousness and making one's study in the law of the Eternal." But what could be more abstract than truth, justice, elevation, and amiability?

The law to be found in history to which the higher self bids us conform is an abstract law. The control to which we must submit first impulse, if we would be happy, is the control of virtue. The command laid upon us, which we disobey to our sorrow, is: *Be virtuous.* And the virtues

Digitized by Google

which history shows the constant need for are righteousness, justice, and purity. Moreover, the man of culture will try to apply these abstractions to the concrete situation. But so far as yet appears, Arnold has no criterion for applying them. He does not tell us how to determine what is right or what is just. Highly cultivated men will differ radically in their ideas of what justice is in a concrete situation. France and Russia, individualist and socialist, radical and conservative, employer and employed, all believe that justice should prevail; but they can come to no agreement as to what constitutes justice. We may, indeed, call righteousness or any other abstraction a law, but we are not a whit the better off for it. The law for each man then becomes, in practice, his own intelligence; for whatever any man's intellect approves is to that man right and just. No standard for gauging justice or righteousness being agreed upon, strife and confusion will proceed as merrily as ever. So long as the meaning or content of an abstraction is not the same to all, the abstraction will not help us to solve our problems. In short, an abstraction is not a criterion but needs a criterion to become applicable. We commence to see why Arnold felt the need of conscience. Conscience could do us a good turn in the pass to which we are now come, if it were only dependable. The voice of the higher self having told us that righteousness is the law, we could wish that conscience were another voice able to tell us what is righteous. But, alas, "what is binding on one man's conscience is not binding on another's," and conscience may be dumb as a stone just when we long most for its reassuring voice. The higher self seems to have played us a trick and sent us a circuitous journey which has brought us back to the point from which we started. Whether we say that the law of reason is that we obey right reason; or say that righteousness consists in obeying the law of reason, and the law of reason consists in being righteous; whichever way we put it, we are arguing in a circle. And it makes no difference if we substitute all the abstract virtues for righteousness; the fallacy remains.

Digitized by Google

The advice to conform to universal law, or the law of reason, if we would be happy, is, then, no advice. As it does not tell us in what reasonableness consists, it is no guide to happiness. In so far as it emphasizes suppression, it actually makes for unhappiness.

III

But Arnold takes another view of happiness and perfection in working out his theory of culture which may be examined apart from his doctrine of law. Seen from this second point of view, perfection is "a harmonious expansion of all the powers which make the beauty and worth of human nature, and is not consistent with the over-development of any one power at the expense of the rest." It is the expansion "of all sides of a man's nature." We cannot be absolutely certain as to what Arnold meant by "powers." The word was used synonymously with "faculties" in the now exploded "faculty psychology" connected with the soul-substance theory. If Arnold meant to use the word in this sense, his assumptions sink with the psychology on which they rested. But it was not his wont to ally himself closely with systems; he preferred to rest his claims on manifestations of human nature which the general observer could verify. His substitution of "sides of a man's nature" for "powers" would indicate that he was following the same practice in this case. And the fact that his words do seem to have a basis in experience to persons who never heard of "faculty psychology" suggests that we ought to seek the most natural explanation of them. I take it that by powers he means a man's capacities, using the word capacities sometimes in the sense of desires, or interests, sometimes in the sense of capabilities. For what is the artistic power, or artistic side of a man's nature, but a man's capacity for creating or appreciating beauty? If Arnold really means that happiness proceeds from the harmonious development of all a man's capacities, his analysis of the source of happiness is correct. But if this is his meaning, he makes happiness in this second view

Digitized by Google

depend, not upon conformity and suppression, but upon expansion and expression. This is at once the simplest and the most scientific explanation of the origin of happiness. Precisely what most men are trying to do is to express themselves, and to be blocked in their efforts is to be made unhappy. Arnold's observations recorded in the "Preface" to the volume of *Mixed Essays* show how important he thought it was to recognize this tendency in men.

"First and foremost of the necessary means towards man's civilisation we must name *expansion*. The need of expansion is as genuine an instinct in man as the need in plants for the light, or the need in man himself for going upright. All the conveniences of life by which man has enlarged and secured his existence—railroads and the penny post among the number—are due to the working in man of this force or instinct of expansion. But the manifestation of it which we English know best, and prize most, is the love of liberty.

"The love of liberty is simply the instinct in man for expansion. Not only to find oneself tyrannised over and outraged is a defeat of this instinct, but in general, to feel oneself over-tutored, over-governed, *sate upon* (as the popular phrase is) by authority, is a defeat of it. . . . And man is not to be civilised or humanised, call it what you will, by thwarting his vital instincts. . . .

"The other great manifestation of the instinct of expansion is the love of equality. . . . Undoubtedly, immense inequality of conditions and property is a defeat to the instinct of expansion. . . . On the one side, inequality harms by pampering; on the other, by vulgarising and depressing. A system founded on it is against nature, and in the long run breaks down."

These observations are in accord with the drift of contemporary science. Modern thinkers recognize the conflict between impulse and reason which Arnold, in that part of his writings which we first examined, attributed to the dualistic nature of the self, but the development of biological and psychological science has rendered recourse

Digitized by Google

to dualism, to explain the phenomenon, unnecessary. Though the impulses may conflict, there is no need to call some high and others low. What Arnold calls the desires of the lower self are simply appetites and instincts which exist for the preservation of the organism. If they were not satisfied, the organism would die. Actually, they are states of lack in the organism which, when felt, impel the organism to some activity that will supply the lack. Thus, hunger is a state of want in the organism which impels it to seek food. If pleasure accompany the activity, the thought of the object when the state of want again manifests itself will be accompanied by the idea of the pleasure formerly experienced, and so will lead the organism to more persistent efforts that make the preservation of life doubly sure. Other primitive instincts make for the preservation of the race. Such is the maternal instinct, which drives the mother to take care of the young, even at the sacrifice of her own life. And out of this maternal instinct—possibly from some of the other instincts, as well—have grown the benevolent impulses, which Arnold calls the instincts of the higher self. These so-called higher instincts are just as firmly rooted in the animal self, however, as the lower impulses. The mother finds pleasure in satisfying and pain in denying the maternal instinct, as in satisfying and denying the appetite for food. But it is not the desire for pleasure that leads her to seek food or to suckle her young. The animal acts to preserve itself and its young because it has natural impulses which make it so act. As society develops, the original impulses do not split into better and worse, but become more complex, and reason,[1] developed by experience, enters as a guide to their gratification. The impulses themselves, however, remain the moving force. As we have seen, pity is as much an impulsive reaction as aversion or fear. If we call it good and satisfy it without regard to results, we may create

[1] By *reason*, I mean simply knowledge of the relation of the consequences of the several desires that arise in the situation. *Intelligence* would be as good a word.

Digitized by Google

parasitism or fraud in the pitied, and sentimentality or something worse in the pitiful.

What men actually desire, then, are objects. Certain objects, or the idea of them, excite a craving, set in operation an instinct, appetite, or impulse, which remains unsatisfied until the object is attained. If the object when attained proves to be what it was thought to be in anticipation, the result is pleasure. If it turns to ashes in the mouth, it soon ceases to be desired. Pleasure is the result of the satisfaction of the desires. Or, since, as Arnold says, the word *pleasure* is a bad word to employ because of ugly associations, and since the same objection might be urged against the word *desire*, we may substitute for them the words *happiness* and *capacity*. We may say, then, that happiness is no more than the effective exercise of a person's capacities. It follows that not all persons attain happiness through the same activities, for not all persons have the same likes or aptitudes. A man who has a capacity for rhythm enjoys music, and if the capacity be strong may become a musician; and the man who has a genius for mechanical things enjoys working with tools. A man who has only an average, or less than average, capacity for a given thing is not made happy by being forced to devote himself exclusively to the cultivation of that capacity. To have forced Darwin to spend his life in the study of poetry and Arnold in the study of science would have been to make them both miserable. The leading capacity of each would have remained insufficiently developed.

But though an object may appeal to a man, that is, awaken desire, or liberate capacity, the satisfaction of that particular desire, even though it give temporary pleasure, may not be productive of lasting happiness. In other words, that which is impulsively desired may, after a man has reflected upon it, appear not to be a good at all, not to be really desirable, all capacities considered. A singer may have a sudden desire to smoke, but after due thought decide that, as smoking will injure his capacity for singing,

Digitized by Google

the satisfaction of the impulse is not really a good; it is not to his advantage. There is a certain satisfaction, likewise, in giving way to one's temper, but a person who gives way frequently to anger contracts a habit of irritability which alienates friends, and so prevents him from satisfying many other capacities which give him more pleasure than venting his anger. A man may desire great wealth because of the position and leisure it will give him, and yet so neglect his other capacities in pursuing his object that when he attains it he is unable either to make use of his position or enjoy his leisure. The satisfaction of one capacity to the exclusion of others has proved not to be his good. The experience of the business man may prove to be the experience of the scientist, the artist, or anyone who concentrates upon a single capacity. The mere impulse, however, to smoke, to speak sharply, or to make money, is not bad or low in itself; nor is the self from which it springs any different from the self that checks it. Whether it is right or wrong to satisfy the impulse all depends upon the situation.

The development and satisfaction of any capacity is a temporary good, but man is a creature of many capacities, and the satisfaction of one at the expense of others leaves much to be desired. The rational good, that which reflection stamps as good, is the *harmonious* development of capacities. The suppression of an impulse is sometimes advisable, not because the impulse itself has any moral quality, but because harmony is the end to be attained. The function of reason, *i.e.*, intelligence, is not to suppress some capacities and to give others full swing, but to guide them all. Hence harmonious development means the same thing as maximum expression. Righteousness itself, if happiness is the test of righteousness, as Arnold says it is, simply means cultivating the conditions of maximum expression. Arnold is in accord with experience, then, in saying that happiness results from the perfecting, that is, the developing and satisfying, of all the powers that make the beauty and worth of human nature.

Digitized by Google

But just as we are about to clasp hands with Arnold in token of satisfaction with his explanation of the source of happiness, we are restrained by the thought that we may be poles apart in our understanding of the meaning of his restrictive clause. He limits the powers whose exercise makes for happiness to those "which make the beauty and worth of human nature," an implication that not all capacities are worthy, and hence that there are some whose perfecting does not make for human happiness. That this implication was intended we learn from reading the "Preface" to *Mixed Essays*, in which he enumerates the powers that are worth cultivating. After pointing out that expansion, which we have already discussed, is the basis of all the rest, he proceeds: "The basis being given, we may rapidly enumerate the powers which, upon this basis, contribute to build up human civilisation. They are the power of conduct, the power of intellect and knowledge, the power of beauty, the power of social life and manners. Expansion, conduct, science, beauty, manners,—here are the conditions of civilisation, the claimants which man must satisfy before he can be humanised." But this is civilisation with industry left out. Arnold saw no cultural value in industry. He never conceded that industry was a good like science—and he was chary of conceding much liberal quality to science—or that industrial capacity was a capacity like music demanding satisfaction. He regarded industry and industrial efficiency—though manifestations of the instinct of expansion—as only means to an end, never as ends in themselves. His satirical comments on railroads and coal can be explained in no other way.

"Now almost every voice in England," he writes in *Culture and Anarchy*, "is accustomed to speak of these things (coal, railroads, industrialism in general) as if they were precious ends in themselves and therefore had some of the characters of perfection indisputably joined to them." Whereas, really, he adds, they are only a means to an end. "Mr. Gladstone well pointed out . . . how necessary is the present great movement towards wealth and indus-

Digitized by Google

trialism, in order to lay broad foundations for the material well-being of the society of the future. . . . Culture admits the necessity of the movement . . . readily allows that the future may derive benefit from it; but insists, at the same time, that the present generation of industrialists . . . are sacrificed to it." ". . . man, after he has made himself perfectly comfortable and has now to determine what to do with himself next, may begin to remember that he has a mind, and that the mind may be made the source of great pleasure."

The value of knowing that Arnold did really take a stand on this position is that we are now able to tell whether his ideal is soundly democratic or not, whether if realized it would make for universal happiness. Granting that happiness does not manifest itself if a persistent capacity is neglected, then a man with a capacity for industrial efficiency, who has to suppress it, will not be happy. And if a great many men have such a capacity, the society which tends to bring about its suppression by holding in low esteem those who exercise it may be humanized from an aristocratic point of view, but can hardly be called humanized from a democratic point of view. Yet it was precisely this aristocratic notion of culture—the notion that some capacities are worthy and some unworthy—that Arnold held. He was democratic in making a desire for the happiness of all one of the characters of culture, but, by promulgating the idea that some capacities which make for happiness are low, he himself furnished an obstacle to the fulfillment of that desire.

That this is so, becomes clear if we pause to consider the significance of his remarks on education. His view of the powers which make for civilization is the Greek view. Aristotle and Plato believed in complete development of personality but did not believe that industrial activities contributed to personality. Arnold told his American audience, in lecturing to them on *Literature and Science*, that "Plato's scorn of trade and handicraft was fantastic," but, though Arnold freed himself from the idea that a

Digitized by Google

tradesman is one who by nature lacks the faculties which make for complete development, he continued to believe that the faculties called forth by trade were not of this type; they lacked intrinsic worth. The faculties that enable us to enjoy leisure and to grasp concepts are the ones that are an end in themselves, and only a literary education, he says, will develop them. No other education is truly liberal. But this conclusion has unfortunate consequences. If true, then the enjoyment which the business man without such literary education derives from his business is of a low type, not up to the level of that of a reasonable being; while, if he has such an education and sees his business in its proper light, his business will become drudgery, for an activity which is only a means to an end, never an end in itself, can be nothing but drudgery.

And, though Arnold fearlessly seized one horn of the dilemma and strove to liberate the middle class from their bondage to the lower delights of industry by proposing for their benefit State secondary schools, he did not propose giving the same liberal education to the masses. In his address to the Ipswich working men (*Ecce, Convertimur Ad Gentes*), he stated that he came before them not to talk of their education, for they were fairly well taken care of by elementary schools, but to urge them to lend their support to the movement in behalf of the establishment of State secondary schools for the middle class, because the middle class, which he pronounced the ruling class of the future, could not rule well unless decently educated. There were and are, of course, obvious practical difficulties in the way of a working class sharing the higher classical education which alone, in Arnold's estimation, makes for culture and true happiness. The masses do not have the time or the money for such an education. So it would seem that if they are to enjoy the blessings of culture, the useful studies which necessity forces them to pursue in the schools should be so taught as to liberate their minds as well as to develop technical skill. But, as we have seen, Arnold believed that useful studies possessed no such liberal possibilities. If

Digitized by Google

his belief is well founded, the outlook for the working class is dark. Neither the studies which they must master to fit them for their necessary occupations, nor the occupations themselves, which they must follow all their lives, have any power to expand their minds or to bring them happiness.

It is doubtful, however, whether this belief, despite its antiquity, really is well founded. Studies or activities are liberal which enlarge a man's world by supplying his environment with new meanings and incentives; which enable him to utilize his environment to satisfy desires; which liberate capacity, in short. When Arnold stated that expansion is a genuine need, that there can be no progress without it, he might better have stopped there. We should then have identified expansion with growth, an adequate enough word to express the process of perfection. The desire for liberty and equality, the development of railroads and the penny post, he points out, are but manifestations of the tendency to expand. Quite true. But what more can be said of art and science? Science and art are not things to be added unto expansion; they are simply forms which expansion takes. Expansion itself is but another word for the freeing of capacity. What reason, other than an arbitrary one, is there for saying that the freeing of artistic capacity is a good in itself, and the freeing of industrial capacity only a means to a good?

Railroads and coal are, to be sure, a means to the end Arnold had in mind, *i.e.*, the establishment of material wealth as a basis upon which to erect the superstructure of civilization. But they are the means to another end which he did not have in mind, and they are even an end in themselves. They call into existence capacities which without them would remain undeveloped, which is to say that the lives of those who exercise those capacities become richer. The vocation of railroading (if I may use the expression) may be in itself a form of living. As Arnold said in defending culture that he did not mean by culture a mere smattering of Greek and Latin, so I do not mean by railroads and railroading the number of miles of track, the speed of

Digitized by Google

trains, the luxuriance of Pullman cars, or the dividends paid the stockholders. I mean the mental occupation of planning a road, the cultivation of the imagination and æsthetic sense, to some degree, by viewing the whole in relation to its parts, and, to a much greater degree, by contemplating the significance of steam transit in human experience; I mean the development of engineering knowledge and the satisfaction of a bent for engineering by putting the road through, the satisfaction of the capacity of the trainmen who in a less complex age would have fewer choices of occupation, the satisfaction of capacity of men in the workshops who find an outlet for mechanical genius,—an outlet not open to them in the days of Plato; I mean the calling forth of other industrial capacities, and with them artistic and scientific capacities, in thousands of individuals in hundred of towns and cities built up by the railroads; the transformation of sluggish villagers with narrow interests into alert civilians with hundreds of interests and human contacts that enrich their lives. I mean also the moral and intellectual problems involved in the conflict between capital and labor, the alteration of the national life and ideals through the organization of capital on the one hand and the organization of labor on the other. The vocation of railroading, or mining, or any one of the numerous industrial callings, is a centre around which is built up the whole life of the person following the vocation. Considering only a single group of men affected by railroads,—the Brotherhood of Railway Engineers, for example,—we find loyalty, co-operation, knowledge of Parliamentary procedure, knowledge of the value of restraint and clear thinking, an increased sense of responsibility, insight into politics and economics, recognition of the value of education, expansion along dozens of lines all leading towards fulness of life, where no expansion, or a much more limited expansion, would be possible in a simpler civilization. Considered from this point of view, railroads are an end as well as a means. They are objects created by the capacities of men as a direct end which, when created, also serve

Digitized by Google

to develop other capacities. What is true of art is true of railroads, and what is true of railroads is true of industry as a whole. Art has a social function; so has industry. Art satisfies a desire of man; so does industry. Industry does not serve simply as a means to food, clothing, and shelter; it satisfies a craving for workmanship, for creation, just as art does.

That Arnold had good reason for condemning industry *as conducted* is not to be denied. If his representations are reliable, men were so absorbed in business that they were insensible to everything else. Beauty made such a slight appeal to them that they lived surrounded by hideousness with no indication of dissatisfaction; they had lost their taste for reading and with it their capacity for interpreting what they thought they ought to read; they had become "of all persons the most inaccessible to ideas." Even in the matter of conduct, they were growing lax; commercial immorality was becoming a byword. Moreover, they conducted their business in a manner regardless of the effect upon wage-earners, with the result that whole masses of people, but poorly provided for in good times, were left destitute when times were slack.

These unfortunate results, however, flowed not from gratifying a capacity which had no cultural value in itself, but from making the material product of that capacity — the end and the sole end of activity. It is the exercise of the capacity merely for wealth's sake and to the suppression of other capacities that is anti-social. Its exercise for its own sake and harmoniously with other capacities is social. For the development of all the powers necessitates the development of sympathy. The critical reader, while following my argument, a moment ago, that expression meant happiness, was doubtless ready with the objection that though self-expression spelled happiness for the individual, it did not necessarily mean happiness in which others shared. For the career of the artist might be selfish, and even the captain of industry who so far expanded as to cultivate his taste for fine pictures, wide reading, and scien-

Digitized by Google

tific investigation, might yet remain callous to the welfare of society. It might even be urged that the successful cultivation of business talent necessitated his trampling upon the desires of workman and consumer. But in taking this stand, which amounts to a contention that full development of capacity as an aim produces an irreconcilable conflict between the happiness of the individual and the happiness of the many, we completely overlook the sympathetic impulses. Sympathy is a natural tendency calling for expression like any other, and expression cannot be said to have reached its maximum while this power remains undeveloped. Developing all the powers harmoniously means exercising all the capacities as a sympathetic man would exercise them, that is, so as to bring about results that are social. The mere impulsive yielding to a wave of tender emotion may, it is true, do as much harm as good. Nevertheless, sympathy, rational sympathy, is essential to the general welfare. Without it, man lacks both the power to put himself in another's place and the inner motive to act for another's good. With it, he possesses both motive and power. For true sympathy includes both sensitiveness to the wants of others and a desire for their welfare. When we are sensitive to the wants of others, our understanding is quickened; we see through their eyes; we realize that their welfare is not to be brought about by officious meddling or mere alms-giving, but by the removal of conditions which impede expression. And when we desire the welfare of others we strive to satisfy that desire as we would any other. It is not enough, however, to create a well-spring of benevolence isolated from the other springs of action. When we develop sympathetic capacity as a thing removed from the rest of our lives, as a separate department of activity, we conduct our ordinary affairs with no sensitiveness whatever to the rights of others, while we attempt to satisfy the benevolent side of our nature by giving. We inflict an injury with one hand and offer a salve with the other. Such separation tends, also, to crystallize the error that some capacities are high and others low, that charity,

Digitized by Google

for example, is intrinsically more moral than business. To effect the desired result, sympathy must be *blended* with the other capacities. Disposition must be socialized. All a person's activities must be carried on with reference to their effect in the social context. When this fusion has taken place, all the capacities become harmonized, maximum expression becomes possible, and any activity—artistic, industrial, scientific—may be carried on as an end in itself to the advantage of both the individual and the public. A person who is sincerely and understandingly sympathetic will regulate all his acts by the criterion of their effect in liberating capacity and will experience happiness from acting socially because he has satisfied a desire.

Taking happiness to consist, then, in harmonious expansion of capacity, we have a criterion for reason to apply to all the situations which Arnold describes as of great practical importance. On the question of free trade or protection, for example, the determining factor is which policy will bring out the greater number of capacities in all citizens. In a period of "infant industries," a tariff that excludes cheap foreign goods and thus promotes manufacturing may possibly prove the more stimulating. But if—or when—protection creates monopolies and an excessive price for commodities, capacities are suppressed and happiness decreased. Still with an eye on things as they effect expression, we become aware of the importance and the possibility of "seeing things as they are," a state of consciousness not easy to enter into if we think the phrase means seeing the relationship of happiness to conformity to some unchanging reality transcending experience. But to see the significance of things in their social relations is possible, is, in fact, essential to morality, hence essential to the satisfaction of all the capacities and to happiness. A man who has a capacity for something is one who sees the connection between the environment as it is and something he wants to do or create. To create so as to protect all interests, he must be aware of the effects of his acts. The business men who are trying to gain permission to dam the

Digitized by Google

streams in the Yellowstone National Park in order to establish a reservoir of power, see the connection between the Park as an undeveloped natural resource and a bank account in San Francisco and their own pleasure; but they do not see the connection between the National Park, man's sense of beauty, and the happiness of thousands of people for generations to come. That is, they do not see the full social significance of what they are attempting to do. They are not sensitive to all the likes and dislikes of the community.

If we think of maximum expression as the source of happiness, we may even account for the experience of the higher self which Arnold describes but does not explain in a satisfactory manner. Experience as to conduct does bring us to the fact of two forces contending for mastery in man: "one a movement of first impulse . . . and the other a movement of reflection"; but, as we have seen, reflection springs from the same self as impulse, and impulses lack moral quality. The desire, whether impulsive or deliberate, is for an object. If the impulsively desired object is not the highest good, it is because it will satisfy only one capacity at the expense of others, whereas the object that approves itself to reflection is that which will give expression to the maximum number of present and future capacities. If we identify high with complete and low with partial, and think of high and low as descriptive of an attitude, the distinction between a higher and lower self becomes serviceable. Lower is a term descriptive of the attitude of a man who considers only a few of his interests, those served by first impulse, and who refuses to adjust his habits or desires for the sake of the harmony of all interests. Higher designates the attitude of a man who considers all interests in all situations, and who adjusts his desires to serve the maximum number of interests involved. The higher self consists in an interest in conserving all human values.

Arnold was inconsistent because he measured perfection sometimes in terms of one criterion, sometimes in terms of

Digitized by Google

another. A man approaches perfection, measured in terms of the one standard, if he suppresses his own natural impulses and those of his neighbor in accordance with the law of reason. The law of reason having proved to be an abstraction, however, the justification of suppression would appear to rest on mere custom or arbitrary whim. Measured by the other standard, a man approaches perfection if he develops his own capacities and helps his neighbors to develop theirs. Attempting, however, to show that this was true only of some capacities, which he called intrinsically beautiful and worthy, and not of others, Arnold became entangled again in the meshes of dualism. But if we take over this second standard, making no exceptions on the basis of intrinsic worth, but regulating the development of all by the ideal of harmony, we reject only that which is confusing and retain that which is most illuminating in Arnold's criticism.

C. V. Boyer.

University of Illinois.

Digitized by Google

THE PROBLEM OF LIBERTY.

NORMAN WILDE.

THE truth that solutions never solve, and that on each individual and age rests the task of making its own reckoning with life, is evident enough when we consider this problem of liberty. Fourth century Athens experimented with constitutions while Plato and Aristotle looked on and analysed the relation of liberty to democracy, yet, in spite of their labors, nineteenth century Europe was again looking hopefully to democracy for salvation when John Stuart Mill felt called upon to raise the protest of political disillusionment.

A half century has passed, Mill's protest has not been unheeded, democracy is no longer above suspicion—witness Lord Bryce's guarded estimate of its virtues—but hope has found a new object; modified forms of democracy have been developed, and the ideal of political democracy itself is giving way to that of industrial self-government. Our faith in machinery seems indestructible, and we persist in ignoring the essential limitations of any contrivance for external adjustment. It may not be superfluous, therefore, to bring to attention once more, under our modern conditions, some considerations bearing on the relations of liberty and democracy.

The linking of the two terms is natural enough. If democracy is government by the people, it would seem that a self-governing people should be free. But a collective term like people is ambiguous, and there lurks in this identification a logical fallacy of division. It does not follow tha because a people as a whole is free from class domination, that as individuals they are free. It may very well happen that in their joy at the overthrow of privilege, and their desire to guard against its reinstatement, they may impose upon themselves regulations strictly limiting their freedom. The people in their collective action may become the ty-

Digitized by Google

rants of themselves as individuals. Self-government is still government, and if it is true that the people govern, it is also true that it is the people who are governed. A dominant popular majority may prove a disagreeable, even though necessary, exchange for a considerate aristocracy, and freedom may vanish in a dictating proletariat. A democracy is only a people organized in a particular way for government, and whether it is to be free or not will depend, not merely upon the kind of organization, but upon the manner in which it is used. The modern world seems to believe that democratic machinery is best adapted to realize freedom, and perhaps it is right, but it would be a fatal mistake to take this truth for granted and, identifying means and end, assume that we had attained our goal when we had only secured the means for reaching it. The essence of freedom does not consist in a form of government, but in the character of the popular will finding expression through it.

The possibilities of divergence between democracy and liberty become more evident when we distinguish political from social democracy. The former means the equal right of all men to share in government, either directly or through their representatives: the latter implies such a form of social organization that each man shall be recognized for what he is intrinsically worth. A socially democratic society, therefore, is one in which the binding force of conventions is at a minimum, and the individual is given the freest opportunity for self-expression. But to be one's self is not to be someone else, and hence the loosening of social restrictions should tend to the development of originality and difference. Men should cease to be unvarying repetitions of a single type and become uniquely their own personal selves. Quantity would cease to be significant, for there would be no human unit, each individual having his own worth and meaning. In such a society men would mind their own business and cease to trouble themselves over the fact that others were cast in different molds. Opportunity to be different would be freely granted.

To speak of this as a democratic, rather than an aristo-

Digitized by Google

cratic, society may seem to some a bit of pleasant irony, but such is not the intention. It may be morally aristocratic, if you will, in its recognition of personal distinctions, but it is socially democratic in its denial of privilege and of fixity of class distinction. It is a society in which the people, as individual human beings, obtain the largest measure of free expression; in which they are not merely units in a census, but persons in a community. The opportunity for development, in an aristocratic society confined to the few, is here possessed by the many; the expression of human nature in all its many-sidedness being recognized as necessary to the completeness of the common good. In this way alone can the *demos* really come into its own.

Social democracy, when understood in this sense, is thus seen to involve liberty, and it may seem that political democracy should have the same implication and be the necessary condition of the former; but when we examine its principles and suggestions the connection seems not so inevitable. It is true that both emphasize the people, but whereas one, as we have seen, recognizes their essential quality as individuals, the other merely counts them as voters. To put it in the old utilitarian formula, political democracy means that every one is to count for one and no one for more than one. The principle is one of equality: as voters, no man is better than any other man, or even different from any other man. Spendthrift and banker, wise man and fool are all alike on election day. Votes are counted, not weighed.

Guild socialism would get away from the obvious disadvantages of this purely quantitative way of regarding men by its system of plural voting, giving to every man a vote in each major association to which he belongs, thus assuring him an influence proportionate to the number of his interests. The intention is good, but, apart from the point as to whether such a plan could be called democratic, it is questionable whether it would prove satisfactory to any save the possessors of the most multiple franchise, presumably its academic authors. Moreover, this conception of

Digitized by Google

man as a kind of politically multi-cellular organism, to be given weight in proportion to the number of his cells, is not itself free from the suspicion of emphasizing quantity rather than quality. It is not the mere multiplicity of interests that gives political value to a man, but rather the depth and social quality of his personality, and this may often be possessed by the man of few external associations in higher degree than by him of many. To give a man votes in proportion to his groups would be to encourage a class of professional "joiners."

Even if we would, therefore, there seems no external device by which in a political democracy we can escape from the principle of numerical equality expressed in the "one man, one vote" maxim. We have to accept all men, as the ultimate units of which society is composed, as having worth in and for themselves, and, therefore, from this point of view, as having an equal stake in the fortunes of the community. His life, however poor, is each man's all, and there is no external common measure by which we can determine officially how great weight it ought to have in the government of the nation. Objective differences in social value have to make themselves felt, not officially through the ballot, but through the subtler channels of social intercourse.

It is this limitation, due to the necessary externality and clumsiness of political machinery, that makes political democracy not merely not synonymous with liberty, but often even antagonistic to it. Men confuse this equality of voting power with equality of worth, and tend to eye with suspicion all those manifestations of social difference, in which, as we saw, a free society tends to eventuate. The necessity of settling political questions by majority vote seems to suggest that mere numbers furnish a standard of right and wrong, and that there must be some moral obliquity in any divergence from the thought or action of the average man. Although every man has a chance to have his will recorded, it is the will of the majority that prevails and gets the prestige of success. *Vox populi, vox dei*, is not a new idea, and

Digitized by Google

the divine right of the majority has a firmer foundation in the popular mind than had ever the divine right of kings. It is true that a government representing the majority has always the wholesome fear before it of finding itself repudiated by its supporters, but for the majority itself this fear has little weight; and it tends to work its will, sustained by the consciousness of its own infallibility, and undisturbed by the dissent of an opposing minority. A small ruling group is forced to maintain itself by preserving the balance between opposing interests, but the majority is itself one of these interests, and, being the strongest for the time, is little troubled about its own security. To secure liberty in a political democracy is not impossible, but it is difficult, since it depends not merely upon a form of government, but upon the spirit of the people.

Granting then that democracy is at best only an external condition of liberty and not its fulfilment, we must examine in somewhat more detail this latter conception and its implications.

Delisle Burns, in his valuable little book on *Political Ideals*, distinguishes two meanings of political liberty. "It involves, first, the independence of the group to which we belong and is opposed to what is popularly known as foreign domination; and in the second place it implies that each individual is able to do what seems best to him." This distinction is an important one, but in view of the many controversies that have been waged about the idea, it needs further elaboration. The division is made upon the basis of the possessor, or subject, of the freedom. From this point of view, we can distinguish national, class, individual and moral liberty; only the first three of which are properly political, though idealists often confuse the issue by including the last in their arguments. Thus we may consider ourselves free so far as we identify ourselves with a country not subject to foreign domination, as when our kinsmen sing, "Britons never shall be slaves." This is the national liberty, about which usually centers patriotism.

But national independence may readily coexist with class

Digitized by Google

subjection, and the fortunes of the state be guided by a narrow group, king, aristocracy, or wealthy oligarchy. Through the Whig Revolution of 1688, a large class of Englishmen obtained a different kind of freedom from that which they had enjoyed merely as members of their independent island state. So too it needed the French Revolution to sweep royalty away, and give internal freedom to the bourgeois class, though the nation as a whole had long been independent. And now the wage-worker, unable to identify himself with the state and therefore dismissing national liberty as insignificant for him, demands the completion of the series of internal liberations through the industrial revolution; as a consequence of which class subjection shall finally be ended through the establishment of the one-class state. With this leveling of society by the abolition of king, aristocracy and capitalist, the common man is to come into the enjoyment of what he believes to be true liberty. The capitalist class will no longer dominate the government and determine the conditions of labor, but the workers will themselves constitute the government and control the conditions of their own lives. The liberty that really matters is not freedom from foreign rule, but this industrial and political freedom from the subjection of class to class. Escape from what is called an industrial slavery, enforced through political dominance, seems to form the social goal of much of our modern agitation.

Whatever may be our views as to the present conditions, there can be no doubt that the abolition of the class struggle and of class tyranny, would mark a distinct advance in the history of liberty. Lines of division would be drawn less sharply in the social body, possibilities of unity would be greater, and the individual could identify himself more easily with the state since its representatives would be men of his own class. He would be self-governed, not merely because his governors would be men of his own nation, but because they would be also of his own kind and station.

But while all this is perhaps true, although there are many considerations that might be urged in modification

Digitized by Google

of it, it is also true that a man can no more be completely identified with his class than he can be with his nation. We have not yet reached the ultimate unit when we have penetrated from the nation to the group. Just as the former may be freed from the control of foreign powers and yet itself form a restricting environment for its included groups, so the latter may succeed in casting off these restrictions but still tyrannize over its component members. The problem of liberty is thus the problem of the discovery of the individual, and the freeing of him from the various concentric social layers that threaten to stifle him and impede his action. He has to be dug out not merely from his national, but also from his class group, and given the chance to be himself. Until this liberty for the individual is attained, we have not yet reached the social goal.

That the coming of the one-class state would not assure this freedom of the individual there can be no doubt. Indeed such freedom seems not to form part even of its ideal. The very meaning of it seems absent from the minds of many of these industrial reformers. Roused by the abuses of the present individualistic industrial system they rush to the opposite extreme, and hope to remove all social ills through scientific organization. Men are not to be allowed to stumble blindly along, preying, or preyed upon, by their fellows: they are to be shown the way they are to take, and, if unwilling, must be made to take it. The emphasis is on social control, not liberty. To quote Mr. Bernard Shaw: "At present we need not compel any one to work, because if he does not he will starve unless he is a man of property. But guarantee him an income from the day of his birth to the day of his death, and hold firmly to the resolve that, whatever else you will allow him to be, you will not allow him to be poor, and you will be forced to find some means of making him work on pain of national bankruptcy. You dare not, under such conditions, tolerate a single able-bodied idler, male or female." Any scheme of social organization which intends to get results must, in the nature of the case, exercise restraint over the conduct of its members.

Digitized by Google

If the root of all evil is to be found, as the socialists say it is, in economic conditions, then it is evident that salvation must lie in the strict control of these conditions. What men are to do, and when, and where, and how—these must be matters of authoritative scientific direction, and not be left to the caprices of the individual. If salvation is to be external, so must be the means to it.

This desire to regiment mankind is, of course, the striking trait of all social reformers from Plato down to Lenin. If only the philosopher could become king he would make all things new, and in his own wise image. It is this that makes all Utopias, in spite of their many ingenious arrangements, suffocating. No man can live in a world of another's creation. Plato, indeed, knew this and presented his ideal as a principle of criticism, rather than as a plan of action. Later constructive socialists may perhaps have realized the same truth, but, at any rate, their ideals were generally such as to evoke no great popular demand for their testing. To-day, however, the reformer is no longer a dreamer, but a man of action; and his ideal is no longer a suggestion, but a working plan for the millennium. Millions of men actually believe in his ideas, and in the desirability of their enforcement through political coercion. The philosopher-king has arrived, incognito perhaps, but with his essentially absolute will. In Russia to-day we find him in the guise of the communist party enforcing his will upon the many millions indifferent or hostile to his ideas. And in every country we have his followers eager to place him on the throne.

It is contended that such absolutism is no greater than that which it has displaced. This can hardly be granted for there is no despotism like that of a philosopher in power, convinced of the truth of his ideas and of their value for mankind. Politicians, doubting their own wisdom and knowing their own corruption, may hesitate in their legislation; but idealists, possessed by their vision of a better world, are bound to push their measures through to completion, undisturbed by doubt or considerations of self-interest.

Digitized by Google

But even though we grant that the one-class state is no more despotic than its rivals, this would not affect the point at issue which is merely that the freeing of a class is not equivalent to the liberation of the individual, so that the political problem is far from solved by the abolition of class subjection.

One reason why this is not as evident as one might expect is to be found in the tendency to confuse moral with individual liberty. It is assumed that the only true freedom is the freedom to act rationally. Any freedom other than this is mere license, and involves the bondage of a man to his own passions. Self-control is control by reason. If the individual happens to be lacking in this reason, and society is called upon to supply it, this is assumed to mean, in the phrase of Rousseau, that the man is forced to be free. Freedom is thus contrasted, not with coercion, but with irrationality. The distinction between the personal reason of the individual and the impersonal reason of society is ignored, and a foolish man is assumed to be free though he be bound hand and foot by a wiser society. The constraint exercised upon his apparent will is really exercised by his deeper self and in the interest of his higher freedom.

Quite apart from the question of the desirability of this constraint, however, it is only confusing the issue to identify this with liberty. In Mill's words, "The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it." And in the same spirit of English liberalism, Sir William Harcourt said: "Liberty does not consist in making others do what you think right. The difference between a free Government and a Government which is not free is principally this—that a Government which is not free interferes with everything it can, and a free Government interferes with nothing except what it must. A despotic Government tries to make everybody do what it wishes, a Liberal Government tries, so far as the safety of society will permit, to allow everybody to do what he wishes." It is true that

Digitized by Google

such liberty will result in a far less trim and tidy world than if men were left to the care of a wise governor. There will be much irrationality, and moral as well as economic waste. Men's ideal selves may remain largely undeveloped and they may be in bondage to their own appetites. Nevertheless, in spite of this failure in moral freedom and self-control, they may be better off than if they were under the care of wiser political shepherds; who, in guarding them from harm, may have deprived them of their personal responsibility. Their going astray in their unshepherded condition is their own action, while their correctness under authority may be that of their shepherds. The inclinations by which we are said to be led astray and alienated from our true selves, are yet recognizably ours, but the political reason to whose guidance we are asked to submit, is sometimes alien beyond power of recognition. But for political self-government the self must be a recognizable self.

Of course, were this moral liberty obtainable through the coercion exercised by the group, there would be no objection to such an arrangement, but experience has proved time and again that this is not the case. The moral liberty of the individual is an end to be wrought out by himself in free relation with his community, and not something to be imposed upon him from without. The reason in his group is not his reason, and its control is not identical with his own self-control. Such an identification is the goal of social development, but it cannot be taken as a present fact and made the basis of the political means by which the attainment of the goal may be furthered.

Turning now to political democracy as the means by which it is hoped to realize social democracy and individual liberty, we find a somewhat doubtful relation between this means and the desired end. The principles involved and suggested seem different. It is true that the people are emphasized both in the political organization and the social ideal, but whereas the latter recognizes their essential quality as individuals, the former merely counts them as voters.

Digitized by Google

No thinker of the nineteenth century was a firmer champion of democracy than John Stuart Mill, but no man saw more clearly its dangers. His classic little book *On Liberty* is the necessary supplement to his work on *Representative Government*. In the former he writes:

"The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active *part* of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; the people, consequently, *may* desire to oppress a part of their number; and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of power. The limitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals loses none of its importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community, that is, to the strongest party therein. This view of things, recommending itself equally to the intelligence of thinkers and to the inclination of those most important classes in European society to whose real or supposed interests democracy is adverse, has had no difficulty in establishing itself; and in political speculations 'the tyranny of the majority' is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard."

It was to guard against this tyranny that Mill, in the second of the books mentioned, urged his plan for the representation of minorities through a system of preferential voting. The idea is finding increasing support in these days, and undoubtedly has value, if only as a way of emphasizing the truth that a minority *has* rights. But as a protection of the ultimate individual against whatever group he may belong to, the plan has obvious limits in the inevitable possibilities of opposition between even the minority group and its component members. The difficulty is inherent in all representative government and is only partially overcome even in a direct democracy, where nothing stands between the citizen and the final action. Yet because of this more immediate apparent influence of the individual upon the group decision in direct democracy, its various forms have also been gaining favor as aids to liberty. The initiative, referendum and recall, all appeal directly to the individual and put upon him the responsibility for the decision. If things do not turn out as he wants them to, it is not because he has not had a voice in the matter, but because

Digitized by Google

others have failed to agree with him, or because he did not himself know how to get what he really wanted. He has at least been free to try to carry out his will.

These two limitations, however, are very real ones. On the relatively few questions involving moral issues, the individual may be fairly competent to make his own decision, but on the many problems of public policy where a knowledge of history, finance, social welfare or law, is necessary, he is likely to be hopelessly at sea and at the mercy of every breath of public or journalistic opinion. He may be exercising a formal freedom in registering his opinion, but he lacks the real freedom resulting from a knowledge of the situation.

And having cast his vote he may find it neutralized by an overwhelming contrary opinion. The result of the referendum may mean public action directly contrary to his most fundamental principles, yet as a good citizen he is bound to accept the decision and play his part in a cause not his own. But this is only the ordinary duty of citizenship, it may be objected, and no real infringement of liberty: it is only being a good sport and playing the game according to the rules. Very true, but the point is just that, that all citizenship, be the democracy representative or direct, does involve subjection of the individual to the will of the majority. No matter how cunningly our political machine is constructed, no mechanical device is able to overcome the possible opposition of the one and the many in group action. Since public action is one, and opinions are many, some of the latter are bound to be constrained.

The only liberty then for which one can hope, even in a democracy, is a moderate and tolerant liberty. It involves the renunciation of our instinctive, passionate wills, and the cultivation of a spirit of compromise and co-operation. Essentials have to be emphasized and non-essentials minimized. There is involved a kind of mystic social faith, that in the yielding of our natural desires to the public will there is involved some greater gain than in their maintenance against the social opposition. Harmony and toleration

Digitized by Google

must be felt as greater goods than the fiercer joys of antagonism and self-assertion.

No one in recent times has expressed more vividly than Mr. Santayana the contrast between this moderate kind of liberty, which he identifies as English, and the more passionate, absolute sort. The whole of his brilliant chapter on *English Liberty in America* ought to be read, but a few sentences will suggest its purport. This English liberty is grounded in co-operation, and the practice of it presupposes

"that all concerned are fundamentally unanimous, and that each has a plastic nature, which he is willing to modify. * * * Every decision that the majority could conceivably arrive at must leave it still possible for the minority to live and prosper, even if not exactly in the way they wished. Were this not the case, a decision by vote would be as alien a fatality to any minority as the decree of a foreign tyrant, and at every election the right of rebellion would come into play."

In contrast to this Anglo-Saxon spirit of compromise, of a willingness to yield a point here for the sake of another there, stands the radically un-English insistence on absolute principle. To such passionate minds, to yield a point is to yield the whole, and thus betray the cause of absolute truth. The liberty they want is liberty to follow the truth, and to make all others follow it.

"So the French revolution and the Russian one of to-day have aimed at establishing society once for all on some eternally just principle, and of abolishing all traditions, interests, faiths, and even words that did not belong to their system. Liberty, for all these pensive or rabid apostles of liberty, meant liberty for themselves to be just so, and to remain just so forever, together with the most vehement defiance of anybody who might ask them, for the sake of harmony, to be a little different."

In these picturesque passages from Santayana, we have the final problem of the relation of democracy and liberty presented with great clearness. Liberty of this second absolute type means either anarchy or despotism, usually both in historical succession. It is anarchy in so far as it involves a fierce rejection of all restrictions and a ruthless carrying through of the purposes of the individual. It is despotism in so far as it means the banding together of the

Digitized by Google

like-minded to impose their passionate truth upon those of a different faith or of a less fervent temper. And historically the freedom of anarchy has always been transformed into the despotism of a great liberator or of a fanatic group.

The only liberty then that is worthy of the name is the moderate English liberty, in which intelligence has taken the place of passion, and a regard for the whole has tempered an absorption in the parts. It is not the natural liberty of an individual in the wilderness, but the social liberty of the citizen among his peers. Its problem is not how to take the individual out of his social relationships and give him a world of his own where his "right there is none to dispute," but how, while remaining in the midst of these relationships, he may still be possessed of himself and his freedom.

When the problem is put in this way it is easy to see that its true solution is social and moral rather than political, depending upon the relation of the will of the individual to that of his fellows, and not merely upon some form of electoral machinery. The secret of liberty is community, for until that is attained there will always be the antagonism between the many and the few that spells constraint, not merely for the few, but also for the many who are antagonized by them. The ideal of social freedom is to be found in a group of friends, aware of one another's differences and interested in their development, but equally aware of an underlying unity of spirit and ready to subordinate their own differences for the maintenance of the common understanding. In such a group individuals are not externally limited by one another, but are interpenetrated by a common spirit that enlarges and enriches their own lives. The personality of each is interpreted by that of his fellows and reflected back upon him in a greater and more sympathetic understanding of life as a whole. Only through such community, sustained by voluntary action, can the individual escape from the constraints of alien wills and achieve true social freedom. Improved democratic machinery may do something to register more accurately men's wills, but

Digitized by Google

until those wills themselves are socialized the result will not be liberty.

And the attainment of this essential unity is not a mere matter of economic readjustment, as most of our present day popular reformers assume. Economic readjustment may be imperative, but by itself it can do no more than mitigate conditions. For the economic interest, as an interest in the getting and holding of material goods, is in itself a selfish and divisive interest, and contains no limit to its own expansion. Public ownership, the abolition of capitalism, these involve only certain restrictions upon the activity of the acquisitive instincts, but not real modifications of the instinct itself. The rules of the contest would be changed, and perhaps some handicaps adjusted, but the contest would itself persist and social unity be threatened. Collective bargaining may help the individual and his group, but it will not ensure economic peace; nor would compulsory equality mean liberty or union. St. James is not usually looked upon as an authority in economics, but he has put his finger on the ultimate source of social strife.

"From whence come wars and fightings among you? Come they not hence, even of your lusts that war in your members? Ye lust, and have not: ye kill, and desire to have, and cannot obtain: ye fight and war, yet ye have not, because ye ask not. Ye ask, and receive not, because ye ask amiss, that ye may consume it upon your lusts."

So long as we are in the sphere of economic rearrangement we are dealing with externals, and so long as we are dealing with externals we can look only for compromise and temporary truce. Labor may be able to wrest from capital a fairer share of the returns and thus improve its status as a group, but there is in such adjustment no guarantee of permanence. The economic interests as such involve a ceaseless urge for more and any limitation can be only temporary. Even though the group absorb all others, the conflict will subside only to break out afresh between its individuals. The victory of the proletariat will no more bring social peace and liberty than the victory of the allies has brought political liberty to Europe. Unless the acquisitive

Digitized by Google

impulses of the individual are moderated by a sincere interest in justice for its own sake, all external control will still leave him a menace to his neighbor's freedom.

To realize this, however, is not to dismiss the economic question as unimportant. The free life is possible only on a basis of generous possession, and the present economic struggle is justifiable and necessary. The good life presupposes life, and life involves appropriation. But we are in present danger of over-emphasizing the needs of the economic man, and of assuming that the social problem can be settled on an economic basis. In economic Self-seeking there is no principle of unity, and therefore no basis for freedom. Out of wealth-seeking individuals we cannot build a free community. As Bertrand Russell puts it, it is only in the development of the creative impulses—industrial, artistic, scientific—that we have the conditions for a sound social organization, since it is only through an interest in these that men are brought into co-operation with their fellows.

NORMAN WILDE.

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.

Digitized by Google

THE PROBLEM OF WAR.

MILTON HARRISON.

THAT the problem of war is one of the most serious with which civilisation is confronted goes without saying. It is also one of the most intricate. Questions of an economic, social, political, ethnological and psychological nature enter into it, while its roots reach down to the most fundamental of all philosophical problems—the problem of conflict. Of these various aspects of the problem, the psychological has probably received most attention up to the present, concerned as it is with the explanation of human behaviour, whether of individuals or of nations. It is true that the importance of the economic factor has been increasingly recognized, but even here the emphasis has still been laid on motives, with the result that the responsibility for war has merely been shifted from the many to the few, and the part played by *economic systems as such* left obscure. Now while the explanation of human behaviour in the terms of psychology may be the ideal to aim at, it is likely that the complex nature of the problem will make necessary the treading of much more tortuous paths than has hitherto been expected before that ideal can be reached. In particular it is clear that a much closer study will have to be made of those social processes and institutions, which form the subject matter of sociology, before it is possible to understand the part played by the mental processes with which psychology is immediately concerned. It is from this point of view that I propose to deal with one or two current assumptions that reflect the attention paid to the psychological aspect of the problem of war.

To take an example: It is commonly assumed that the root cause of war lies in the primitive and savage instincts of man, which instincts under the régime of peace are kept, more or less, in a state of suppression. Hence,

Digitized by Google

those holding this view are mainly concerned with devising means whereby these particular instincts can be sublimated or given opportunity for expression in some form compatible with civilisation. In short, the problem of the abolition of war has come to be regarded chiefly as an ethical one, concerned with the substitution of love for hatred and of altruism for selfishness. The question arises, however, as to how far this view is supported by facts, and how far it is pure assumption. In the first place we may note that the survival of military institutions and the persistence of military traditions afford no proof of the dominance of these assumed instincts. Men find themselves in the fighting services for all kinds of reasons and circumstances, but roughly speaking we may group them, as individuals, under three heads: (1) those compelled to join through either economic or military pressure; (2) those who, while hating war, join from patriotic motives; (3) those who are naturally attracted to military life. With regard to the latter class it by no means follows that it is made up of individuals with a natural liking for bloodshed; in point of fact military life attracts some of the most gentle and least pugnacious of men. The power of military organizations to draw and hold people of this kind is one of the difficulties which those concerned about the abolition of war have to face. Thus a man may fully realize the horror and futility of war, yet at the same time have a strange hankering for activities of a military nature, and while the thought of killing a fellow creature is revolting to him the army or navy may possess attractions of a powerful and often irresistible kind. I am of the opinion that much of the confusion surrounding this issue arises from a failure to distinguish between two quite different aspects of the activities involved in warfare and military life. While on the one hand there is the work of actual slaughter—which is the essential part of warfare—there is on the other hand a wide range of military life which provides opportunities, activities and interests, often of an absorbing kind, and of which many are more or less completely dissociated from the actual business of war.

Digitized by Google

There is little reason to doubt that it is the associations linked up with this secondary aspect of military life which exercise such a compelling influence over so many natures.

Chief among these are the traditions connected with the fighting services, and especially with particular divisions and regiments. The humblest unit feels that he is an active sharer in these traditions and this sentiment is strengthened by the wearing of uniforms, decorations and badges. The disbanding of certain battalions of British regiments, owing to the cutting down of army estimates, has revealed how strong attachments of this character really are. Further, the services provide opportunities for comradeship on a wide scale; they supply an element of adventure, and afford a welcome freedom from economic worries and responsibilities. The very routine and ritual involved in manœuvring and in training together contribute in no small measure to the satisfaction derived from military life: the rank and file gain a satisfaction from co-operating under superior direction; the N. C. O.'s and Commissioned Officers find satisfaction in the opportunities for leadership, and in the work of organising and directing operations. Lastly, we may note that the military machine includes branches such as the Army Service Corps, the Royal Air Force and the various Gunnery Corps, which constitute attractive services in themselves. Broadly speaking, we may say that there is in the natures of the men attracted to the army and navy, something that responds to the call of tradition, and to the call of a hardy, roving life, which although rigidly disciplined, is yet free from the narrow monotonous toil of an industrial occupation.

So much, then, for that side of military li e which undeniably exercises a great fascination over people and around which sentiments have clustered tending to perpetuate military institutions, and to which finally may be added the glamour surrounding actual warfare itself—especially when viewed from a comfortable distance of space or time. But the point to note is that all these things are simply the

Digitized by Google

gaudy trappings of war: constituting, so far as actual warfare is concerned, a huge sideshow, and serving mainly to obscure or to gloss over its true nature. For, stripped of these trappings, the stark, brutal character of war stares us in the face: war is killing; it is also lice and mud and bestiality, and to point out the fine and heroic side of war is to evade the issue. War being a killing match the individual soldier must be trained with the determination to kill. He must get accustomed to the use of the bayonet and other weapons; he must be made to "see red" and acquire the power of putting the "fear of God" into the enemy. But he must also get into the habit of keeping these activities, and the ideas associated with them, in a watertight compartment, so to speak, ready to be called into play when required, but at other times repressed—at least so far as their unpleasant aspects are concerned—by other diversions of military and social life. I am not here concerned with enumerating the lessons to be learned from these considerations, but simply with pointing out how the real nature of warfare is either hidden, or else invested with glamour by sentiments associated with aspects of military life belonging to quite a different order of things from that of the business of murder. It is clear, however, that these sentiments are exploited for all they are worth in order to perpetuate the military spirit and military organisations, and one of the questions facing those desiring to abolish war is whether such sentiments cannot be dissociated from their military setting and given a nobler field of expression. This problem is quite distinct from that of the sublimation of the supposed instincts of aggressive-pugnacity; it is the problem of finding a moral equivalent for military training and activity, rather than of providing a moral equivalent for war. Since however, no nation can afford to dispense with its military institutions so long as the *direct* causes of war remain, it is these latter which are of paramount importance. And whatever these may be it is becoming generally recognised that the part played by individual pugnacity has been greatly overestimated. At any rate the

Digitized by Google

experience of the late war does not tend to support the theory of the primary importance of this instinct, for whatever enthusiasm for fighting existed on either side at the beginning, it quickly evaporated, and was only kept alive by means of processes of artificial stimulation comparable to flogging a dying horse or galvanising a corpse. In their own words, the men simply had "no stomach" for fighting, and they carried on mainly by sheer force of habit or through lack of opportunity for escape. To talk of the sublimation of primitive instincts under such circumstances as these is sheer nonsense: the problem does not really arise.

It is quite true that, under the stress of warfare, certain primitive instincts may display themselves in a terrible fashion, but to assume this outbreak to be the cause rather than the result of war, appears to me a case of putting the cart before the horse. If by our hellish magic we invoke the demoniacal forces in man we must be prepared for ghastly and terrifying consequences. We need, therefore, to inquire into the circumstances under which the dogs of war are unleashed, for it is apparent that once war is declared, events of a complicating and cumulative kind rapidly follow and interact upon each other with disastrous results: modes of procedure and military usages taking the upper hand, whilst ideals and men alike are subordinated to the machinery of organisation. These facts alone indicate the important part played by social customs and traditions so far as the outbreak of war is concerned. If, therefore, the foregoing argument is accepted, even if only tentatively, it follows that, in searching for the deeper causes of war, we cannot rest content with any mere assumption of psychological motives, such as hatred, blood-lust, or aggressive-pugnacity, but must look to the economic, social, and political conditions under which these motives operate. Especially, I think, do we need to inquire into the financial systems under which the industry and commerce of modern nations are carried on, and by which they are thrown into fierce rivalry and competition for markets.

Digitized by Google

The line of argument I am here using has been effectively employed in a similar connection by the late Dr. W. H. R. Rivers, in his lectures on *Kinship and Social Organisation*[1] and in an article on *Sociology and Psychology*.[2] In these articles Dr. Rivers shows how certain psychological processes which have been believed to be the determining factors are wholly inadequate to explain how existing conditions have come into being, and if this is true of the origin of customs, the argument applies with even greater force with respect to their continuation. Taking as an example Professor Westermarck's assumption that the emotion of revenge is a sufficient explanation of the blood-feud among primitive peoples, Dr. Rivers proves by instances from Melanesia that it is only by the study of such social processes as the blood-feud that we can hope to understand the real nature of an emotion like revenge. In short, we are led to the point of view that *customs and usages may play as great a part in determining human behaviour as the psychological motives so commonly assumed to be the prime movers*, and further, that where such motives in the shape of sentiments and opinions appear to be the direct causes, these latter cannot be fully understood apart from the social setting in which they operate.

This argument applies with equal force to the prevailing ideas concerning the origin of industrial and economic strife. Comparable to the assumption that the instinct of aggressive-pugnacity is the root cause of war, there is the similar assumption that the root cause of economic strife lies in selfishness, from which it follows that the only remedy consists in an all-round increase of brotherly feeling and of goodwill. This assumption, however, quite ignores the part played by the existing arrangements in the production of the very selfishness which is assumed to be the root cause of the trouble. That the issue here raised is no academic one may be proved by reference to history.

[1] London, 1914.

[2] *Sociological Review*, vol. IX, Autumn, 1916, also Reprint, Sherrat & Hughes, London, 1916.

Digitized by Google

Macaulay, writing on the evil effects of bad currency, has the following passage, which I quote at length:

"It may be doubted, whether all the misery which had been inflicted on the nation in a quarter of a century by bad kings, bad parliaments and bad judges, was equal to the misery caused in a single year by bad crowns and bad shillings. The evil was felt daily and almost hourly, in almost every place and by almost every class: in the dairy and on the threshing floor, by the anvil and by the loom, on the billows of the ocean and in the depth of the mine. Nothing could be purchased without dispute. Over every counter there was wrangling from morning till night. The workman and his employer had a quarrel as regularly as the Saturday came round. On a fair day or a market day the clamours, the reproaches, the taunts, the curses were incessant; and it was well if no booth was overturned and no head broken. The simple and the careless were pillaged without mercy by extortioners whose demands grew even more rapidly than the money shrank. The labourer found that the bit of metal, which when he received it was called a shilling, would hardly, when he wanted to purchase a pot of beer or a loaf of rye bread, go as far as sixpence. Where artisans of more than usual intelligence were collected in great numbers, as in the dockyards at Chatham, they were able to make complaints heard and obtain some redress, but the ignorant and helpless peasant was cruelly ground between one class which would give money by tale (counting) and another which would only vote it by weight."[3]

The above quotation shows quite plainly how inadequate any explanation of the distress and strife of that time would be, which failed to take into account the state of the currency. In a like way, it is quite possible that a dispassionate analysis of our present-day troubles would show the relative unimportance of many much-vaunted psychological factors as compared with others of a more mechanical order. I do not contend, of course, that factors of the more mechanical order such as social customs, and economic, financial, military and political systems, can fully account for war, but rather that it is only by a study of these factors, along with their influence upon, and interaction with, factors of the psychological order, that we can arrive at a true diagnosis of the problem. In any case we are faced with tremendous difficulties. Brutal murders on a wholesale scale, organised massacres, and the apparent

[3] *History of England*, Longmans' Popular Edition, Vol. II, pp. 544–5.

Digitized by Google

delight with which men and women can witness the torture of animals or of their fellow-men, are all aspects of a truly awful problem we are called upon to consider. It would seem almost impossible to escape the conclusion that such things as these are the direct outcome of primitive hatred and blood-lust, as is commonly assumed. Closer investigation, however, will generally show the problem to be of a much more complex nature. To take a trivial example: a person watching a boxing-match for the first time, and quite unacquainted with anything of the sort, might think that the opponents were actuated by an intense hatred of each other. Again, the awful double murder recorded in *Crime and Punishment* might be ascribed to some brutal motive unless the character of Raskolnikoff, as protrayed by Dostoevsky, were known. Similarly with the problem of war as a whole, the urgent need is for a full and correct diagnosis, since without it our remedies are bound to prove either inadequate or futile. The proposals being put forward at the present time illustrate the need for such a diagnosis. The propaganda behind the League of Nations. for example, seems to be based on the assumption that the prevention of war is mainly a moral and political problem: capable of being solved, so far as the Great Powers are concerned, by agreements arrived at through mutual goodwill, and, so far as the Lesser Powers are concerned, by the application of direct or indirect compulsion. By all means let us strive for mutual understandings between peoples, and for the settlement of international disputes by reason rather than by force. But in desiring this we must not forget the dangers and difficulties ahead. So far the League of Nations appears to be more concerned with arriving at surface agreements than with getting down to fundamental causes. Further, it is possible that such an organisation might prove as advantageous to the financial and governmental classes as it might be disastrous for the common man, in so far as it tended towards the international consolidation of the vested interests, organised for the exploitation of the workers or of the lower races, or of both. The

Digitized by Google

characteristic economic feature of all the great industrial nations is the rapid growth of productive power ahead, and greatly in excess of, the distribution of purchasing power, with the result that either external markets must be found or production slowed down. The former means international rivalry; the latter means unemployment. The struggles for markets, the shipping subsidies and tariff walls are clear indications of underlying tendencies making straight for war, and against which individual, and even international goodwill is quite ineffective. Therefore, failing a radical change in the financial systems of nations, such as will ensure both a greater and a wider distribution of purchasing power within the borders of each country, there seems little hope of anything more than a temporary adjustment of differences. War has been called the safety-valve of the existing economic system since it alone appears able to dispose of surplus production and fully employ productive resources. Whether this particular view is correct or not it is at least certain that these aspects of the problem of war demand as much attention as those of the moral and political order hitherto assumed to be of dominating importance.

MILTON HARRISON.

NELSON, ENGLAND.

Digitized by Google

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ETHICALLY RATIONAL.

J. R. KANTOR.

THINKERS upon moral subjects do not seem to have yet recovered from the great shock following upon the realization that moral conduct is not the outcome of an abstract and immanently rational process. And so to-day we face a situation in which the students of ethics hardly make any attempt to analyze moral conduct in such a way as to discover what is the element of reasoning in moral or human conduct in general, and what are some of the other conditioning factors entering into such behavior. Excellently is the case put by Professor Overstreet when he says that "Rationality as a dependable guide in human affairs seems to have gone out of fashion."[1]

Worse still, so overcome have students of moral conduct been and still are by this discovery of the absence of abstract reason in moral conduct that besides not being interested or studying the place and operation of reasoning in moral action they are unable to protect themselves from rationalists, who in place of a reason impose upon them an instinct, a very simple abstruse human force supposed to make men act as they do.

To quote Professor Overstreet again. "In individual life the instinct has been ruling supreme; and the struggle of instincts for supremacy has become the absorbing indoor sport. In social life, we are now all so sophisticated that we see in the movements of history and in the economic and political developments only the play and interplay of unreasoned interest; and if there is actually an appearance of reasoning about certain situations or outcomes, we smile superiorly and say, 'Only a rationalization.'"[2]

Those who deny rational processes in human conduct

[1] In his review of Hobhouse's *The Rational Good*, *Phil. Rev.*, 31, 408.
[2] *Ibid.*

Digitized by Google

derive significant support from recent conceptions of social psychology, according to which the human mind has been made into a direct and absolute product of a social community. In harmony with such a group social psychology the student of social phenomena will construct his account of moral behavior as described by Professor Ayres. "He will see in domestication the development of fixed tastes and wants and needs for the goods that have become habitual and thus satisfactory, and in the end indispensable. And as the habits that constitute a tradition fit together into a general mode of behavior, so the wants and needs that express the dependence of mankind upon civilization will be seen to group themselves in the minds of men into larger principles of conduct; aspirations and ideals."[3]

Basing their studies upon such a social psychology (we shall call this the group social psychology), which, be it observed, now replaces the one founded upon instincts, students of moral behavior have tended to rule out reason and intelligence from human activity, for reason means a choice of action, a discrimination of stimuli, and in moral conduct the distinction between right and wrong. It has even been denied that there is a right or wrong, unless it be merely a group prescription. Most certainly there is a firm basis for this attitude since true it is that only morals that are group prescriptions could be venerated and fostered with such zeal and fervor as ordinarily moral ideals are. No individual ideal could be so hallowed.

And yet is it possible to get far from the impelling knowledge that moral action must be deliberate, must consist of choice, must be intelligent, must be rational action? Is not this intelligent consideration by the person of his conduct situation under all circumstances a *sine qua non* of moral behavior? There is but one way to avoid this conclusion and that is to look upon behavior situations as moral or immoral regardless of the responsibility and competency of the acting person. But who would care to place

[3] Cf. Proceedings of the 21st Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, *Phil. Rev.*, March, 1922, 31, p. 178.

Digitized by Google

such a cosmic interpretation upon a uniquely human situation? Such rationality as any human situation involves is relative of course for different persons belonging to different levels of social organization. But to assert this is merely to assent to the proposition that our attitude toward moral conduct is empirical and actual, nothing more. Unless indeed we take this attitude to affirm also the explicit rejection of any absolute and universal reason.

And so we have the problem of accounting for intelligent and reasoning conduct in order to have any moral action at all, while still doing justice to the fact that the groups among which we live exert a tremendous influence upon our thought and action. Now if the group social psychology leaves no room for the development by the person of rational behavior and for its employment in his moral conduct, then must we not conclude that such a social psychology is exceedingly faulty? And this in spite of the fact that it points to a great truth when it indicates that the moral standards of particular groups are unthinkingly received by its members and that these individuals inevitably conform to group moral standards.

What is amiss with a group social psychology that leads us to believe that rational conduct which is an essential factor in moral behavior is psychologically impossible? Does not such a situation constitute a fatal *impasse* in moral situations? How is this situation met? Most frequently by divorcing one's ethics from one's psychology. In one's ethics a person allows for all of the intelligence and moral conduct that is necessary, whereas the psychology which is presumably the basis for all action is so conceived that it excludes the possibility of rational conduct. Because we do not believe that this way out of the situation does justice to human facts we assume the task of inquiring whether an accurate social psychology need exclude reasoning from our conduct.

But first let us observe that the group viewpoint, like all seriously submitted theories, possesses a large element of truth. No doubt exists whatever but that one of the most

Digitized by Google

powerful facts in human behavior is that of culturalization. When we analyze what the psychologist calls the human person we find him to consist of a very great number of reaction systems or behavior traits. These represent the behavior equipment of the person which are put into action when he is stimulated. Probably the largest number of these traits are social in character, that is to say, the stimuli for them are common to a number of individuals. In other words, these traits or reactions are responses to institutional stimuli. Now how does the person come to have these traits? We answer by being stimulated in the group where these institutions are found. In short, this is the process of culturalization or domestication. This process it is, which for example, makes it essential if I am bred in an English-speaking group that my language reaction equipment shall be English. Or if I am bi- or trilingual it is the same process which brings about my particular type of personality such that I possess these types of language behavior equipment. What is true of language is of course true of the whole gamut of social conduct or cultural traits. My religious, my esthetic, my moral, commercial and economic traits are all derived and developed in this way.

This culturalization process, be it well observed, constitutes an absolutely natural phenomenon and one just as inevitable as the occurrence of any other natural fact. The social psychologist does not hesitate to declare that this is the most definite and inevitable process with which he deals; so that given the information as to what stimuli a person will come into contact with he can predict with fairly accurate certainty what type of personality will result. Furthermore, the social psychologist unhesitatingly asserts that the culturalization process is so pervasive in the psychological development of the person that the process is responsible for the person's acquisition of by far his largest share of behavior traits. That is to say, it is not impossible that most of the individual's behavior equipment is acquired through the culturalization process and not through uniquely individualistic contact with things.

Digitized by Google

All this that we have been describing as the culturalization process we take to be an accurate description of the facts involved, and yet we see in these facts no reason to exclude rational conduct from the behavior of the person. Apparently the adherents of the group social psychological view have overlooked some essential facts of human behavior. What are these facts? Let us consider them under two headings.

In the first place, whenever institutional stimuli, whether objects or actions, stimulate a person to develop psychological traits, this culturalization process operates in a two-fold manner. In addition to inducing the individual to build up behavior systems, we must observe that the person always in turn operates on the institution by way of modifying it. To take a concrete example: when the infant, born in a particular group in which a certain language exists, say English, or more specifically the New York or Hoosier dialect, takes on that language he modifies it to some degree. The influence of the change the person has on institutions is very subtle but is none the less an active actual process. And so it happens that while we may not notice any change in our language reactions and in the language institutions which have stimulated the building up of the former, yet consider what enormous changes in the English language have taken place in the forty generations from King Alfred's to our own. Is not such a condition strong argument for the fact that persons are not absolutely at the mercy of their institutional stimuli? That is to say, they react upon the stimuli as well as to them.

The interesting question here, however, is how such a modifying reaction upon an institution is possible. The answer is exceedingly significant. The stimulus, in this case an institution, always operates upon a person who already has some behavior equipment. That is, he has already responded to many other and different stimuli. Now in most cases, as is indeed true of our language illustration, the effect produced upon the institution at the

Digitized by Google

time of the person's reaction to it, is very slight, but in other cases the effect is much greater, so great in fact that the person can markedly change the institution. He can do so because he has already acquired reactions: habits, modes of thinking, feelings, etc., which make him able to offset much of the particular institution's influence upon him. Illustrations in abundance of this situation are found in the fields of science and art. Whenever we have an innovation we have an example of the reciprocal influence of the person upon his institutional stimuli. This reciprocal influence, be it observed, is effective in the proportion that the individual has previously developed counteracting behavior equipment. This fact that we have just been pointing to makes possible, we believe, the development and operation by the person of rational behavior. That is, an individual will not inevitably accept certain group facts and act upon them if he has already acquired responses which preclude the acceptance of the above facts. In our most favorable situations, at least, the individual is free to reject his group institutions and does not need to react to them as gross stimuli. He can determine for himself whether particular beliefs, customs, or laws are proper, profitable or otherwise suitable to be reacted to. For instance he can conclude whether divorce for him is an institution to be hallowed and preserved or whether it is an institution to be cursed and banished from society. Such alternatives of evaluation of various sorts are the possible possessions and profits of all mankind.

Our general principle here implies that stimuli meet with resisting responses in the culturalization process operating upon individuals. We need only add then that these responses may have been acquired by the person in two ways, first, through individual or private stimuli and second through common or institutional stimuli. The former case would be illustrated by the person who responds negatively to institutional stimuli because of ways of acting developed in one's private circumstances. Such a situation would perhaps be illustrated by such a protestant as Mary

Digitized by Google

Wollstonecraft. Her refusal to assent to customs and traditions can be traced back fairly clearly to conditions in her personal life.

The latter situation which we have mentioned may be illustrated by the artist who has already accepted an institutional situation in the form of his school's traditions and has developed thereby appropriate techniques and information which later serve as resistant reactions and as bases for judgment and discrimination. Now such selective adaptations to institutional stimuli constitute factual rational conduct. Every martyr and protestant strikingly symbolizes the attempt at least to practice such rational conduct. To argue that protestants are usually wrong does not always mean that they are not behaving rationally, but rather that there is no absolute criterion for right or wrong reasoning, reason being no more than a human form of acting.

Our discussion up to this point has been merely emphasizing a common psychological principle, namely, that we must distinguish between objects and stimuli. Thus the same object can constitute two distinctly different stimuli for different persons. Two behavior facts are expressed by this principle. In the first place, the mere existence of an object in our vicinity is no guarantee that we shall react to it. And in the second place, what an object means to us or the way we react to it depends upon our previously acquired equipment of behavior systems. Up to this point we have been considering the influences upon the individual's reactions to institutional stimuli from the standpoint of his own complex of behavior traits. We will now consider the influences upon a person's reactions from the stimulus angle, in other words, the effect of institutions themselves.

This brings us to the second fact that has been overlooked by students of social behavior and that is that at any particular moment we have an exceedingly large number of institutions to which we react and which influence us to build up reaction systems or cultural traits. Exceed-

Digitized by Google

ingly enlightening is this fact. In the first place, it minimizes the absoluteness of the cultural process. Not that it is not inevitable that we should build up reaction systems according to our stimuli, but these reaction systems that are built up are fairly unique for particular persons and perhaps the specific groups to which they belong.[4] If we had only a limited number of institutions and all individuals were inevitably stimulated by them then the culturalization process would indeed be a very inflexible thing. But as it actually is, the person is constantly surrounded by countless and changing institutional stimuli; and the traits he develops as responses to them are his own individual ways of reacting, and to a great extent neutralize the stimuli. By far the most significant point here is that no individual is limited in the number of available institutional stimuli to which he can react. This is no less true for the so-called primitive peoples than for the persons living in the most complex civilizations.

Consider the religious stimuli of a person in a complex civilization, that is to say, in a civilized community in the everyday use of that term. What does it mean to take on religious traits other than that we are culturalized in religious ways? To what an infinity of contacts this statement refers. Think of all of the different group institutions we find represented by the large number of different sects. Then think of the number of sects within any specific sect, and further the number of different groups within those sects, and then the more specialized groups within the latter.

Possibly our position in this discussion may be favorably furthered by digressing a moment to consider what it is we actually mean by intelligent and rational action. Immediately we suggest that we mean some sort of evaluating and determining process based upon an analysis and judgment of actual behavior situations, situations involving

[4] "Group" for social psychology is nothing but the locus of an institution from the stimulus standpoint, and from the response standpoint the series of individuals who possess particular traits in common.

Digitized by Google

conflicts with other persons, responsibilities of a social, political or economic sort, etc. This rational behavior may be said to comprise in its development a fairly definite though not logically or chronologically rigid hierarchy of reactions. Among such responses we find at the lowest point those actions of the individual stimulated by the many institutions relating to particular phases of life, which institutions stimulate the individual to observe likenesses and differences among them. The next state in developing rational conduct we may consider to be that of classifying and comparing stimuli situations for the various purposes which the individual's needs and living conditions demand. Then comes a level at which the person begins to appreciate the distinctly individual merits and demerits of the stimuli which call for responses. The final stage of such activities we assume to be that in which the person deliberates upon his stimuli, a process of placing individual values upon social institutions. In fact, in moral situations this means actually setting up a moral standard or ideal. This is illustrated by the symbolic event of Socrates standing over against all the Athenians. To obviate any misconception we might add forthwith that certainly in the lower stages of this developmental hierarchy there need not be involved what is ordinarily called self consciousness. The person may merely acquire socially differential and discriminative reactions because of being stimulated by diverse institutions.

Whenever we assume reasoning to be concrete human activity, no matter how we specifically define it, we are convinced that the process of culturalization does not exclude reason from our behavior, and that any social psychology which does exclude it is somehow out of touch with actual psychological facts. And so we might justifiably ask whether the failure of the group social psychology to make a place for reasoning in moral conduct is not owing to the fact that it does not provide for the consideration of moral and other social phenomena as the actual responses of human beings to their particular stimuli. We must therefore

Digitized by Google

inquire into the conditions lying at the basis of such a misplaced emphasis in social psychology.

We account for this faulty conception by the fact that it is merely a protest against one or both of the absolutisms, namely the rational and the instinct doctrines of moral conduct. And so the final positive result is such an overemphasis of an actual fact that the protest view itself becomes a type of absolutism. That this conception of social psychology does amount to a kind of absolutistic idea is manifest in that it is based upon the conception that the mind, or what is presumed to be the psychological datum, is an absolute product of custom. The absolutistic aspect is symbolized by the term social, since in all cases the term signifies some sort of overemphasis of the group as against the individual, the latter being considered in some sense a product of the former. This viewpoint merely balances the two other forms of absolutism, for in them, instead of the group it is the individual who is overstressed in favor of an intellectual individualism and a political and economic *laissez faire*. Instead of accounting for moral conduct on the basis of rational or instinct springs of conduct derived from the inner life of the individual the group social psychology places the springs of action in the customs of the community. But unfortunately because this is still an absolutistic viewpoint it distorts the perspective of human action in the matter of rational conduct and prevents our looking upon the whole process of social conduct as the interaction of persons with institutions. The group social psychology in making moral and other social conduct consist in the operation of habits imposed upon the individual by the customs of the group does not leave room for the intimate stimulus and response conditions which are involved in human behavior.

Differing from the viewpoint just described, an institutional social psychology is not only not encumbered with any kind of abstract absolutism of a rational or an instinct sort (which of course is just as bad a rationalism) but it also does not replace these with any absolutistic domestica-

Digitized by Google

tion conceptions. Our positive gains from such a viewpoint of cultural behavior is that we allow for intelligent and rational action precisely as these operate.

Possibly by far the greatest merit of an institutional social psychology is that because it is based upon particular responses to specific stimuli it can therefore leave room for an empirical or commonsense individualism. For if moral actions are considered as the actual adaptations of persons to their particular problems, and if rational conduct must be the individual evaluation of persons, then the concrete descriptions of moral and rational conduct must be specific and individualistic. The emphasis in the study of human conduct must always be upon the particularity of the person's action in contact with particular stimuli and not upon the universality of the stimuli conditions (group customs) which are presumed to make him act as he does. For in any actual behavior situation the person is stimulated by some specific situation. True enough the person's reaction will be to a great extent the result of acquiring behavior traits through institutional stimulation, but as we have indicated in all cases this process of culturalization will extend over a period of time and will involve the stimulation of the person by a large number of institutions. In studying a moral action not only must we take account of the particular different institutions which act upon the person during his development but also of the specific stimulating situation which demands a moral response, besides the reaction constituting that response. From such a standpoint as this moral and other classes of cultural behavior constitute merely types of reactions to stimuli along with all the other forms of human conduct. Such an empirical individualism automatically excludes all forms of immanent powers such as a moral sense or absolute conscience.

We believe, therefore, that an adequate social psychology makes sufficient room for the development of genuine moral behavior involving rational action. And not only does it allow for rational conduct but it is capable of analyzing the actual process of how this rational conduct is developed.

Digitized by Google

Now we may ask, do individuals as a rule or even frequently meet their moral problems in a rational manner? Or to state the problem otherwise, do we perform much genuine moral behavior? Unfortunately, though unhesitatingly we must make a negative reply, but the fact that we do not frequently enough perform rational action argues no whit for the psychological impossibility of reasoning behavior and genuine moral action.

J. R. KANTOR.

UNIVERSITY OF INDIANA.

Digitized by Google

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE PUBLIC CONSCIENCE: A Case Book in Ethics; Social Judgments in Statute and Common Law. By G. C. Cox. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1922. Pp. xix, 483. Price, $3.00.

Students and teachers of ethics should not be prejudiced against this useful book by the somewhat extravagant claims made for it. The book is neither epoch-making nor the first American example of scientific method in ethics. But it is a book which no alert teacher of ethics can afford to neglect. Dr. Cox has collected and summarized cases on most of the more important aspects of English and American law. These cases are offered as material for the use of the "case method" in courses on ethics. Whatever differences of opinion there may be as to the wisdom of using only the case method in the teaching of ethics, few will deny that our teaching should include a large amount of cases and problems to be studied empirically and inductively. Dr. Cox has given us a very valuable instrument for the inductive study of ethics.

It is to be expected that the first general case book in ethics would have many defects and many debatable characteristics. I suggest a few criticisms, not in a spirit of condemnation, but for the sake of the future editions and imitators which the book fully deserves.

The cases are divided into four main divisions with many subdivisions. The main divisions are Property, Life, Security, and Liberty. This division is apparently based on a slight modification of the Fourteenth Amendment. I doubt whether it was wise to depart so widely from the traditional divisions made by lawyers, such as Contract, Tort, and Criminal Law. Is "false imprisonment" an attack on Security or Liberty? The author gives cases under both of these heads and seems not to have noticed the duplication. It was surely premature for the author to disregard the experts in the science of law. This hasty dogmatism is manifested in many other ways in the book.

There are many signs of hasty preparation and proof-reading. For example, on the first page of the table of contents there is the startling statement, "International Wrong Always Condemned." This would be encouraging if true, but unfortunately "Inter-

Digitized by Google

national" is a misprint for "Intentional." More serious than such slips, is the fact that the references to the sources are needlessly abbreviated, and are frequently omitted or given with a question mark. The work of a very few hours would have done away with such omissions and question marks. The defective references are all the more objectionable on account of the shortness of the cases as given by Dr. Cox. He gives slightly more than 300 words to the average case. To only a few cases are several pages given. As a result of this, students find that most of the cases do not give enough material for an adequate study. It would have been better to have given a tenth as many cases with all the facts and arguments involved; then the students could brief each case competently and interestedly. Unfortunately the author gives no aid to students in the difficult art of briefing. As the book stands, it is more useful to the teacher than to the student. It is not so much a case book for the student, as a descriptive index to cases for the use of the teacher.

A further defect in the book is the almost superstitious reverence which Dr. Cox has for legal decisions. He explains that he never allowed the students to use the word "ought" in class work. They were merely to study the court decisions. The author himself does not live up to this precept in his comments on the cases, but he dwells at much length on that attitude as being scientific. I must confess that it does not seem scientific to me. How authoritative court decisions should be for our moral judgments "ought" itself to be studied scientifically. Cox is purely dogmatic. He would tend to encourage what Wells once called the legalistic as opposed to the legislative mind. Somewhere in our educational system there should be an exposition of the "law for laymen." Cox's book is really an attempt to write a text for such a course. I do not think that law for laymen should occupy an exclusive or even a large part of an ethics course. Ethics should train voters and legislators how to discuss and investigate ethical problems, so they can make better laws. A knowledge of past law is a necessary preliminary but not the most important part of such a course.

This book is a contribution to "comparative ethics." It is similar in content to the books by Hobhouse, Westermark, Sharp, and others. It seldom gives real cases but only descriptions of cases. It confines itself mainly to English and American law. It is one of a dozen tools which every progressive teacher will use in

Digitized by Google

ethics courses. It will give the student much knowledge of law, and some problems for ethical analysis and discussion. But it should be supplemented, even in the field of comparative ethics, by the books of the writers mentioned above, and also by such works as Costigan's case book on "Legal Ethics." (St. Paul 1917), and the volume on "The Ethics of the Professions and of Business" published by the American Academy of Political and Social Science (May, 1922).

A. P. Brogan.

The University of Texas.

Outspoken Essays. By Dr. W. R. Inge (second series). London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1922. Pp. 275. Price, 6s. net.

Of this collection of essays, some are recent lectures (Hibbert, Romanes, and Reid), the longest and most personal, which is new, gives (as the title *confessio fidei* indicates) an exposition of Dr. Inge's faith,—a belief in the reality of absolute values. He admits that the problem of evil cannot be entirely solved, but his acquiescence, which takes the form of supposing that "the eternal world must contain uncrushed evil, illustrating negatively the triumph of the positive values" (p. 23) has far too much the tone of apologist. Is it only our easy-going hedonism which lands us in insoluble difficulties about divine justice? More original is the suggestion that the problem of evil is magnified by our "narrow and excessive moralism," with which we drape the Creator. There is no evidence for the theory that God is merely a moral Being, and "what we observe of His laws and operations here indicates strongly that he is *not*. If we suppose that His interests are about equally divided between the moral, intellectual, and aesthetic aspects of His creation . . . then much which the mere moralist finds a scandal in the government of the world receives a satisfactory explanation."

It is long since such plain words have been spoken by a great churchman of his church. "The worst enemies of Christianity," he writes, "are Christians, and the combination of reactionary theology with crude revolutionary politics, which now seems to be in favour, will win them no respect. The Labour Movement can provide its own hired advocates. . . . The churches have little influence, and if they had more, they would not know what to do with it."

Digitized by Google

The later essays touch upon the position of science, the dilemma of civilization; and lastly, eugenics, of which Dr. Inge is a convinced adherent, standing by "scientific as against emotional ethics." Negative Eugenics (he holds),—the prevention of the multiplication of undesirable types—is more important at present than the positive—"the encouragement of the better stocks to reproduce their kind," and he rightly suggests that certificates of health as a condition of lawful marriage might be required by the state and involve no more "inquisition" than life insurance, to which no one objects.

In reference to scientific thought, in a notable passage Dr. Inge suggests that the tone and temper of public opinion has always reacted upon the progress and direction of scientific discovery. The dreams of human perfectibility which intoxicated the French intellectuals at the end of the eighteenth century, stimulated doctrines of evolution as a law of nature, the reckless competitive industrialism of the next generation found its supposed justification in the doctrine of the survival of the fittest, while at the present day, the popular belief that everything is possible to organised effort appears to correspond to the physics of energy. "Few men free themselves from prejudices coming from without, none, perhaps, from prejudices which have their source within." The pedigree of Dr. Inge's family gives the background of hereditary ability, independence and patient scholarship which would develop a thinker of Dr. Inge's type.

M. J.

WESTERN MYSTICISM, THE TEACHING OF ST. AUGUSTINE, GREGORY AND BERNARD ON CONTEMPLATION AND THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE, NEGLECTED CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGION. By Dom Cuthbert Butler, Benedictine Monk of Downside Abbey. London: Constable & Co., 1922. P. 344. Price, 18s. net.

This is a Roman Catholic book, but the official approvals of the Bishop of the diocese, the Abbot and the Censor, are printed on a fly-leaf at the end, and not, as in books intended for the faithful only, in the fore-front. The aim of the author is the improvement or increase of religious experience as embodied in Catholicism; but the book may be valuable to any student of religion. Dom Cuthbert Butler is known as a scholar whose special subject is the early monastic life. He is one of the small groups of Roman Catholic

Digitized by Google

priests who went up to the Cambridge University in the 1890's, and there came into contact with modern scholarship. He knows all the latest work on mysticism and abnormal psychology and is exceptionally broad-minded and honest. He says, indeed, quite frankly, that he had "never had any such experience, never anything that could be called an experimental perception of God, or His Presence" (page 299); but he puts forward a case for the mysticism of Gregory and Bernard which is both important and interesting.

The main point is this: In the interval between Augustine and the scholastic contemporaries of St. Bernard, Hugh and Richard of St. Victor, a special form of mysticism was developed. This is what the author calls Western Mysticism, in order to distinguish it from the mysticism developed under the influence of the pseudo-Dionysius. This Western Mysticism has no phenomena of vision, trance or bodily abnormality; it is not concerned with diabolical temptations, and it does not imply any philosophy. Again, its language is positive, referring to "greater light" and not to the "Dark Night of the Soul" with St. John of the cross. It does not separate its votaries from the world of action nor put them in opposition to established forms or institutions. Passages are given from Augustine and the other two writers named in the title of the book to show what their experiences were; and these experiences are treated as genuine and admirable. Indeed Dom Butler seems to be right in his argument that the experiences so stated do not appear to be in the least like insanity. The visions and raptures of later saints do seem, by contrast, to lack balance. An extreme form of religious emotion takes different forms at different dates and in different civilisations; and what seems to many to-day most remarkable is the way in which the frank eroticism of the Song of Songs is used by the celibates of the early middle ages as the basis for their expression of religious fervour. The best of St. Bernard's statements are to be found in his commentary on that old Love Poem; but he does not seem to have felt any misgiving as to its possible meanings in a more literal sense.

So Dom Butler and other religious writers do not seem to feel any misgivings when they restate the experiences of earlier ages: and this in itself gives his book its value. It is quite honestly the expression of what the highest form of religion now is for a Roman Catholic; and this is, of course, much more important for the

Digitized by Google

student than speculative reconstruction of the sentiments of savages. Mysticism has, unfortunately, become fashionable, and we can, therefore, agree with Dom Butler that for the genuine article a better name would be contemplation or the contemplative life. That is what Plato and Aristotle called this type of experience. That is what Chinese sages have praised; and the difficulty one finds in reading Roman Catholic mysticism is that, by comparison to these other forms of contemplation, it seems narrow and somewhat childish. But then most of the inhabitants of the world are still at that stage: It is at least a gain if childishness does not lead to fantastic visions and pathological abnormalities.

C. DELISLE BURNS.

London, England.

SHORTER NOTICES

LITTLE ESSAYS OF LOVE AND VIRTUE. By Havelock Ellis. London: A. & C. Black, 1922. Pp. 187. Price, 6s. net.

Mr. Havelock Ellis has written nothing of wider appeal than these essays concerned with the art of making love, and the art of being virtuous; which are a simple summary of certain fundamental principles of his sex philosophy, which were either stated more briefly or technically in his larger *Studies of Sex*, or therein implied, but only to be read within the lines. The distinction between this work and the *Studies* is the broad distinction of treatment; for while the *Studies* is for the specialist, the essays are for youths and girls at the period of adolescence, for "it is in youth that the questions of mature age alone can be settled, and unless we begin to think about adult problems when we are young, all our thinking is likely to be in vain."

The progress of chemico-physiological research during recent years has brought us to new ground for raising the house of Life. Indeed, the image might well be changed altogether, and it might be said with Mr. Ellis, "that science has entirely transferred the drama of reproduction to a new stage with new actors," the sexual protagonists are no longer at the surface but within the most secret recesses of the organism,—hormones or internal secretions, always at work within and never themselves condescending to appear at all. It is obvious that when the light of this new conception is turned upon old ideas of purity or sexual abstinence, those old ideas require radical revision, and (as Mr. Ellis sums it up) "the activity of sex is an activity generated by the complete mechanism of the ductless glands and displayed in the whole organism, physical and psychic, of the individual, who cannot abolish that activity, although, to some extent, able to regulate the forms in which it is manifested, so that purity cannot be the abolition or even the definite suspension of the sexual manifestations; it must be the wise and beautiful control of them. It is becoming clear that the old platitudes can no longer be maintained, and that if we wish to improve our morals we must first improve our knowledge" (p. 43). The strongest chapter is a closely-reasoned plea for birth control for eugenic purposes. Mr. Ellis is in favour of "negative eugenics or the effort to clear all inborn obstacles out of the path of the coming generation

Digitized by Google

by birth control. Many years before the war, birth control was assumed by many to be a method of race-suicide, but the outcry, as Mr. Ellis shows, is far away from the real facts of life; and the prophets of race suicide who resist the evidence of the survival rate are "unable to think, unable to count."

Not only is the race as a whole increasing in number, but even among the separate national groups "there is not even one civilised people anywhere in the world that is decreasing in number." The problem indeed (as is abundantly clear) is whether the population of civilised countries should not be checked, and it is significant that a churchman, Dr. Inge, has expressed a hope that the world would one day realise the advantage of a stationary population—an advantage that has long been recognised by men of science, and expressed by a scientist as careful as Major Leonard Darwin, whose conclusions are thus summed up by Mr. Ellis:

"Increase in numbers means, ultimately, relative reduction of wealth per head, with consequent lowering of the standard of civilisation; it also, under existing conditions, involves the production of a smaller production of men of ability; and further a depreciation of our traditions; he concludes that whatever element in civilisation we regard—wealth or stock or traditions—any increase in the population such as that now taking place will be accompanied by a lowering in the standard of our civilisation."

Real progress in the task of civilisation can best be made by a more or less stationary population in which conditions are more or less stable; for while rapidly increasing, all its energy is directed in adjusting its perpetually shifting equilibrium.

Apart from the contents of the book, the manner is beyond praise. Not only is Mr. Ellis a specialist in the psychology of sex, but an artist whose sensitive instinct and wide humanity render his touch on vital problems of conduct at once sure, delicate and stimulating; the art of writing is evidently to him what the art of living was to the old mystic, Böhme, "harnessing of fiery energies to the service of the light."

THE MISUSE OF MIND. By Karin Stephen, with a prefatory letter by Henri Bergson. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1922. Pp. 107. Price, 6s. 6d. net.

This is a short and very illuminating statement of Bergson's philosophy, especially in so far as Bergson rejects the traditional use of Thought. There is no reference to ethical problems and the thesis, of course, has only a very limited importance for Ethics. It is worth noticing here, however, that Mrs. Stephen, and therefore Bergson, is quite certain that a distinction of objects from their qualities does not "fit the facts." "Qualities are assumptions required . . . in order that we may control." But it is not clear why such assumptions should give us any power to control if they do *not* fit the facts. Perhaps, however, we do not control! On Bergson's showing at least, you never can tell.

C. D. B.

WHAT IS SOCIAL CASE WORK? By Mary E. Richmond. New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 1922. Pp. 268. Price, $1.00 net.

The growing conviction that "we cannot treat people, individually or in groups, as if they were dependent and domesticable animals without crippling them," should find satisfaction in this excellent little book for the social worker. We are introduced to a number of typical cases as material for the concrete references to which the author resorts in her analysis of the

Digitized by Google

two main factors in social work, "human interdependence" and "individual differences." The home, the school, the workshop, the hospital, the court, all are subjected to analysis, with a view to discovering how they contribute to "the development of personality through the conscious and comprehensive adjustment of social relations."

C. F. T.

THREE TYPES OF PRACTICAL ETHICAL MOVEMENTS OF THE LAST HALF CENTURY. By Leo Jacobs. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922. Pp. 183. Price, $1.50.

A lucid account of what the author calls the Religious, Social, and Pure Ethical Movements. The first, initiated by the Christian socialism of Maurice, "rates ethical conduct below religious conformity," and is inclined to emphasize the metaphysics of Jesus, rather than his ethics. The second movement, represented in this country by Jane Addams, involves the danger of confusing function with arrangement of parts; in attempting to "universalize culture and comforts in the interests of human solidarity" there is apt to occur a schism in the family life itself. The author becomes almost querulous in his attack on the "farcical self-government makeshifts in settlements." After debarring religious dogma and physical well-being as ethical factors, Mr. Jacobs rests his case on education as a method of reform, with the development of the ethical person as the aim.

C. F. T.

CONSCRIPTION AND CONSCIENCE. By J. W. Graham. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1922. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

A record of the long and difficult struggle between the conscientious objectors to military service and the English Government, this is a fully detailed and a temperate survey. Yet it is the work of a partial observer, an idealist whose interest is concentrated on a small portion of the field of vision. Mr. Graham seems to forget, in this standard history of the conflict of the government with the conscientious objector from 1916 to 1919, that conscription was a temporary measure, and recognised as such by the mass of the English people to whose spirit it was alien and distasteful in a high degree. Most people are aware that the conscientious objectors were treated with harshness in the army and in the prisons to which they were sent, that there was crass stupidity in certain tribunals, overworked, and from the necessity of the case manned with indifferent personnel (a certain member is said to have believed that Tolstoy was a place-name), but the sufferings of objectors were on the whole the result not of a deliberate policy but of accident, of haste, of miscarriages of justice on the part of a people at death-grips. The emphasis on the personal and the blindness to the wide national issue, robs these "martyrs" and witnesses to the inner light of some radiance.

The book which must be final, as far as the exhaustive marshalling of evidence, the fullest possible details of this ordeal can make it, also sketches the history of the movement in countries besides Britain.

ENGLAND TO-DAY. By George A. Greenwood, with an introduction by A. G. Gardiner. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1922. Pp. 185. Price, 5s. net.

The value of a diagnosis of the condition of the working classes in England depends obviously upon the qualifications of the social student. Mr. Greenwood (who is well equipped) has undoubtedly first-hand knowledge

Digitized by Google

of the West Riding of Yorkshire, and the Welsh coal field, and temperamental sympathy with the working classes, now for the first time expressive and class-conscious. A large number of the workers are now awakened from an age-long slumber and critically or superficially, fitfully or consistently, are thinking. A factor in this change is the great expansion of education which has taken place in our time, which has at least unlocked the mind of the crowd.

England To-day is a picture of a nation in upheaval, surging to and fro with little conscious sense of direction. It is the swift notation of the observed facts of a transitory episode rather than the analysis of a social philosopher disentangling the essential from the accidental, but it gains thereby a vividness, and interest as a contemporary document. The upheaval of the war is not long past, and Mr. Greenwood is dealing, therefore, with tendencies rather than accomplishments in a world where contours of things are still changing with perplexing suddenness.

He is not alone in dwelling on the increase of ostentatious luxury, and "the great aggregation of wealth, socially produced," which is becoming almost completely divorced "from social necessity." Capital is wasted through employment in the manufacture of degrading luxury for the very few, and the apparent benefit accruing to Labour as a result of producing for the demands of super-wealth is illusory because it ought not to be employed in producing luxury. Mr. Greenwood does not see much salvation in Guild Socialism, which has had for years the advantage of the unremitting propaganda of Mr. G. D. H. Cole. But as Mr. Greenwood sees the movement, "Mr. Cole and his friends are engaged largely in beating the air, and they are so engaged because they are attempting to impose something upon the mass, whereas the man in general will support only something springing from itself." In the influence of the Communist party in England, again, he has little belief; the Communists suffered a setback in 1921, first by the notable concessions to Capitalism made by the Soviet Government in Russia, and secondly by the failure of the Triple Alliance to function at what the British Bolshevists had decreed to be the appointed time. They are, in fact, in a hopeless minority and the Revolution tarries. Communism fails and will continue to fail because it is quite alien to the spirit of the people, their stability, and their endurance. His last word is that "the anarchy of England persists where the order and regimentation of Germany fails," and he would be a fatalist indeed who declined to see in the phenomenon some amount of encouragement for England. Whatever disagreements in detail one may have (as Mr. Gardiner writes) "his outlook will win the confidence which clear vision and an honest mind will never fail to command, and though his predilections are obvious they do not warp or colour his record."

M. J.

HARMONISM AND CONSCIOUS EVOLUTION. By Sir Charles Walston. London: John Murray, 1922. Pp. xvi, 465. Price, 21s. net.

The thesis of Sir Charles Walston's Book is the similarity, perhaps the identity, of the incentives of the man of science and of the artist; and therefore the primacy and importance of the æsthetic principle. In his *Aristodemocracy* some of the aspects of this theory were already adumbrated, and he notes in the preface to the second American edition that that work was only a part of the general philosophical system, to the final and complete elaboration of which he had reserved the closing years of his life. It is a theory that has been present in solution in Sir Charles's mind for nearly

Digitized by Google

half a century; the æsthetic perceptions, emotions and principles are, to Sir Charles, objective in character, and "so primary and elemental in the evolution of the activity of the human mind that, ultimately, Truth, utility and goodness must be referred back to them" (p. 5). The æsthetic instinct must have a broad back to carry such a burden. In expanding his theory that the æsthetic principle and instinct is really a fundamental response to an instinct, as well as to all perception, cognition, imagination, reasoning and action, there is a certain obscurity in the terminology which is used. The word art is too narrow and specialised; it is confusing and misleading to make too free an use of the term Beauty; and therefore the too little defined term Harmony is generally substituted for that of Beauty. He avoids, as we see by turning over the pages of this fully documented and interesting book, analysis for illustration and application. The first part of the book treats of the origin and dominance of the æsthetic or harmonistic instinct and principle in the ordinary life of man, and traces its origin back to the earliest organic life in the animal. The second part applies Harmonism to the higher systematic knowledge of man in the domains of science, art, pragmatics, ethics, politics and religion. The section relating to Art, no doubt owing to Sir Charles's prolonged and active study of art and archæology, is of disproportionately great length, and he appears to overrate the value of Harmonism to the man of science.

LABOUR POLICY, FALSE AND TRUE. By Sir Lynden Macassey. London: Thornton Butterworth, Ltd., 1922. Pp. 320. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

Sir Lynden Macassey, whose wide range of experience as a civil engineer, barrister, economist, arbitrator in shipbuilding and engineering disputes and Admiralty Director of shipyard labour is probably unequalled at the present time in England, has done real service in his close analysis of the problem of labour unrest and his modest counter-policy. It is essentially a cool and business-like diagnosis, and the test which he everywhere applies to any solution is whether that solution places the community before section or party, or is one designed to advance sectarian interests political or industrial, either avowed by or speciously, under profession of anxiety for the public good. Everywhere he found sectarian interests dominant, mainly through ignorance on the part of the workers of their membership of a community. "Formerly, men worked to benefit themselves; now they are apt to refrain from working for fear they may benefit other persons." The injury to employers from such an action is obvious, but the detriment to the workers themselves is far less self-evident. The rivalry between certain unions is intense. We have heard a member of the core makers union gravely affirm that a "boiler maker would eat a core maker as soon as look at him" before an industrial court. Suspicion of employers is a ruling sentiment in the workshops, and the failure to treat the operative as a sentient and rational person has borne fruit in what Sir Lynden Macassey terms as "the workers' appalling ignorance of economic matters. Few of the rank and file have a conception of the factors that constitute the type of economic activity known as industry." He finds the British working man hopelessly wrong in his outlook, regarding work as a servitude constituted not for his profit or improvement, but solely for the maintenance of his employer and the swelling of his profits, which he consistently exaggerates. Hence the worker's belief in restricted output as a trade union principle:—"To-day the moral obligation to work seems inverted into a duty to do as little as possible for the wages," and hence his summary belief in the remedy of abolishing the capitalist system, which is considered the

Digitized by Google

only root of evil. In the *Daily Herald* of 2nd February, 1922, the cause of influenza was even discovered in capitalism, and it was argued that unless the latter were destroyed, it would destroy mankind; conversely, a critic suggested we may assume that if capitalism is abolished influenza will disappear.

Nationalisation was, according to programme, to be substituted for capitalist ownership, but as Sir Lynden acutely points out, the Labour party, taught by war-time experience, no longer contends as it used to, that all industries can be nationalised—an admission of which the significance should not be overlooked. It proposes nationalisation and democratic control only in some of the great national industries such as mining. After pointing out the weakness of the official socialist programme, he analyses the vague unrest as due to three main aspirations of the workers—the removal of the threat of unemployment, the recognition of the worker's human status, and the distribution of an equitable share of the product of industry, and shows how far in his opinion these can be satisfied. There can be no division of opinion upon the high value of Sir Lynden Macassey's book as a sober analysis by a great public servant and sympathetic student of the working man.

M. JOURDAIN.

LONDON, ENGLAND.

EARLY CIVILIZATION. By Alexander A. Goldenweiser. New York: Alfred A. Knopf., 1922. Pp. 428. Price, $5.00 net.

The author of this "Introduction to Anthropology" has very happily selected from the wealth of available materials such items as will best illustrate the most important factors in early civilizations. Five tribes—three American, an African, and an Australian—are cited as cases of environmental adjustment, art, socio-political and state organization, and magic, respectively. These factors are then subjected to a most thorough and interesting analysis. Although the author holds that these early civilizations were differentiated from one another, because of their lack of temporal or spatial extent, his main thesis is that later civilization comes to be knit into a "common humanity," continuous with its various contributors. Rejecting the cruder environmental and hereditary theories of social processes, the author traces out the more strictly ethnic heritages—often uniquely developed within a tribe—and then shows how their "diffusion" has brought about not only the unity but also the enrichment of later society. Mr. Goldenweiser's book ranks with the best of scientific works in that he is more concerned with an accurate analysis of early civilization and its contributions to modern society than with the endeavor to organize—and perhaps mutilate—the facts in support of some preconceived theory of "evolution" or "progress."

C. F. T.

WHAT WE WANT AND WHY. By Mrs. Philip Snowden, J. H. Thomas, and others. London: W. Collins, Sons and Co., Ltd., 1922. Pp. 263. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

What is notable in this book is the restraint and sanity of the opinions expressed. On platform and elsewhere the extremist exists, but we are told "he is a little fellow, and though he may make a lot of noise in a corner, he has no weight." This moderation is the more remarkable as some of the writers profess themselves Communists and all are agreed in a desire to abolish the capitalist system.

The wants of organised labour differ from time to time and from place to

Digitized by Google

place. At the present time of unemployment, the workers, abandoning the strike, are becoming politically more class-conscious, and realising that their bargaining power has been seriously influenced by the rise of unemployment. They are concentrating more and more on returning members of their own class to the publicly-elected authorities in order thereby to change radically the government and its legislation. The fact that Mr. Mann thinks that his programme can be realised by "rightly directed organisation is significant when we have the record by Mr. Williams (p. 49) that for a brief period following the armistice the working class might legitimately be said to be truly revolutionary."

The demands, besides the specific demands in each industry, are allied with the desire for the recognition of rights—the right of the worker to recognition as a fact of industry, and so on. "These rights of the worker are predicated upon his being considered and treated as a social being—Labour can no longer be regarded as a mere commodity." Very significant also is the emphasis laid by Mr. Thomas and Mr. Bromley on the worker's share in the management, pointing out, as they do, that their objective is the interest of the industry of the whole.

THE BEHAVIOR OF CROWDS, A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY. By Everett Dean Martin. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1920. Pp. vii, 305.

This book may fairly be described as an attempt to explain crowd formation and behavior on the basis of the concepts and methods of psychoanalysis.

"The crowd," says the author (p. 73–74), "is one of the most naïve devices that can be employed for enhancing one's ego-consciousness. The individual has only to transfer his repressed self-feeling to the idea of the crowd or group of which he is a member; he can then exalt and exhibit himself to almost any extent without shame, oblivious of the fact that the supremacy, power, praise and glory which he claims for his crowd are really claimed for himself."

To explain the egoism of the crowd, however, is it not sufficient, starting with the recognized pre-disposition in all of us of a tendency to exalted self-appraisement and to find satisfaction in the display of self, to account for the conjoint exhibition of these tendencies in the crowd by the release of the customary social pressure and the absence of self-restraint, without resorting to suppressed wishes, compulsion neuroses, fixations, defence mechanisms and all the rest of the more or less hypothetical conceptions of psychoanalysis?

Again, is "libido," with its certainly misleading connotation with respect to sex, superior for explanatory purposes to, or less mystical than, Bergson's *elan vital*, Schopenhauer's "Will," Nietsche's "*Willez ur Macht*," etc., with which we have long been familiar, without being much enlightened. How much better is "wish" than "tendency to act," "desire" or "interest"? We must not mistake a new terminology for a new and independent science.

I. W. HOWERTH.
COLORADO STATE TEACHERS COLLEGE.

THE NEO-ROMANTIC MOVEMENT IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY. By S. K. Maitra. Calcutta: The Book Company, 1922. Pp. vi, 268. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

This book is the result of a thesis for a degree. It shows a wide reading in French, German and English Philosophy: but it unites with what is strictly called philosophy references to Nietzsche and even to Chamberlain

Digitized by Google

and *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*. The book ends with a restatement of Bergson's attitude which is regarded as a culmination of Neo-Romanticism. It is undoubtedly useful to connect in this way the very varied examples in modern times of anti-intellectualism. The author adds some valuable criticism. C. D. BURNS.

A THEORY OF MONADS: OUTLINES OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY. By H. Wildon Carr, Professor of Philosophy in the University of London. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1922. Pp. 347. Price, 15s. net.

Professor Carr says in his Preface that his conception of the Monad has in view "the solipsistic dilemma." His book opens with a statement that a dramatic revolution has occurred in philosophy because of Einstein's theory of relativity. The new view of "modern idealism" is that reality is "concrete"; but there are many orders of reality, one of which is an atomic order and another, fundamental in philosophy, is a mind order of monads. Each of us is a monad and when we refer to this order there are, for us so referring, no atoms. The monad is "windowless," not as suffering from a lack of windows but because the type of relation expressed by having windows is inapplicable to a monad. The relation of this monad to what is not this monad is not similar to the relation of one atom to another; but each monad "mirrors" the universe. That is to say, it has everything real within its perspective, or rather (there is no "within") it is a perspective of the universe; but this perspective is determined by the monad, not by the universe. The whole book is concerned with the explanation of this idea and there are invaluable chapters on body and mind and the intercourse of minds. The references to moral problems are few; but the general analysis of experience is of importance for ethics. C. D. B.

THE MECHANISM OF LIFE, IN RELATION TO MODERN PHYSICAL THEORY. By James Johnstone, Professor of Oceanography in the University of Liverpool. London: E. Arnold and Co., 1922. Pp. ix, 247. Price, 15s. net.

At first sight this book might appear to be outside the purview of those mainly interested in ethics; but the analysis of the activities of life is so essential to psychology that any sane theory of ethics must take account of the modern conceptions of behaviour. This is given a chapter and, at the end of the book there is another chapter on the mechanistic conception of life. Although the book is chiefly concerned with physical science, the author throughout is aware of metaphysical implications. Bergson's "intuition" and Whitehead's "passage of nature" are given their place. There is no attempt to reduce one type of reality to the terms of another; and the statement of the elements of contemplated "nature" which are to be found in life or closely connected with it is made without that philosophical innocence which has been common among scientists.

C. D. B.

SOCIAL ADMINISTRATION AND THE POOR LAWS. By J. J. Clarke (lecturer in Civic Law in the University of Liverpool, etc.). London: Pitman & Sons, 1922. Pp. 364. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

The author of this book has already produced several valuable small books on local government in Great Britain. The present book gives a detailed account of the services performed by the Guardians of the Poor,

Digitized by Google

with an interesting and important summary of their history. For some years there has been a strong feeling in England against the Poor Law System, but in spite of the suggestions of students and of official Committees, the old system continues. During the recent "slump" in industry the impoverishment of industrial workers has been much increased; and the situation would no doubt have been worse if the Poor Law Guardians had not assisted.

In any case many of the functions they now perform would have to be performed by some governmental body; and Mr. Clarke gives in this book an admirable review of the chief problems and of the methods for dealing with them which have been used in Great Britain. A vast moral problem is set to us by the existence in civilised communities of the destitute. The old methods of the state are now felt to be morally crude, and the industrial order seems to make the problems rather worse than better. But general appeals to sympathy or in behalf of a new moral outlook are not so valuable as an exact knowledge of the situation. Mr. Clarke's book will be found to contain useful guidance even for those outside Great Britain, for the problem of destitution must be faced by the whole of Western Civilisation.

C. D. Burns.

The Economics of Unemployment. By J. H. Hobson. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1922. Pp. 157. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

The interest of this book is much wider than its title seems to imply: for it is a discussion of some fundamental moral issues which arise in the present economic system. The economic theory is a restatement of Mr. Hobson's well known argument that under-consumption produces the "slump" from which modern industry periodically suffers. This argument seems to be made even stronger than it was by the restatement with a view to certain objections which have been urged against it. But the central problem, unemployment, on which the author concentrates attention seems to bring out more vividly than any trade figures could the underlying moral difficulties in regard to the distribution of well-being at present. There is a trenchant criticism of wage reduction as a method for meeting the "slump" in trade by making the distribution still more inequitable; and a short review follows of the credit system and of the new theory connected with the name of Major Douglas. Mr. Hobson argues against this theory. A valuable appendix is added to the book, in which the evil effects of Protection and the Limited Market are described.

C. D. B.

La crisi Attuale della Filosofia del diritto. By G. B. Briavaschi (libero docente de filosofia del diritto nella Universita di Padova). Milano: Soc. Vita e Pensiero, 1922. Pp. 322. Price, 40 lire.

This book contains a summary of the various traditional views of the relation of Law to Morality. The ideas of duty and of "Sanctions" are explained in the traditional terms; and the author maintains the evidence of an absolute "natural law" as opposed to what he regards as modern scepticism and agnosticism. His argument against the purely naturalistic view of laws as almost accidental customs seem to be valid, but he hardly gives sufficient weight to the arguments against any given standard.

The whole work is concerned with the books about the subject rather than with the actual problems of ordinary life. It is true that ordinary legal practice or customary standards of morality do not show up the

Digitized by Google

"right" quite so easily as the learned works of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas might lead us to suppose; but the material for a philosophy of Law can hardly lie within the covers of books. The attempt, however, to establish the moral theory upon which law must rest is of the first importance, and it is significant that in most countries, and not least in Italy, thinkers are turning from the analysis of economic facts to the study of moral facts.

C. D. B.

RELIGION AND BIOLOGY. By E. E. Unwin, Science Master at Leighton Park School, Reading. London: The Swarthmore Press, 1922. Pp. 185. Price, 5s. net.

This is the fifteenth volume of a series called the Christian Revolution Series and intended as "a contribution to religious thought." A general statement is made of some of the results of biological science, which is regarded as leading to "doubts and difficulties"; but the difficulties are not scientific. Indeed, the chapter which deals with them includes statements such as "Sin is man-made"; and, although God is the author of the general purpose of evolution which includes man, the evil in sin is not to be attributed to God, whose purpose is altogether good. The book ends with a prayer.

C. D. B.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By William McDougall, F. R. S. (seventeenth edition). London: Methuen & Co., 1922. Pp. 459.

This well-known book was first published in 1908, and the fourteenth edition, revised, was published in December, 1919. There are now three supplementary chapters on Theories of Action, Sex Instinct and the Derived Emotions, all of great importance for Ethics. Shand's discussion of the emotions in his *Foundations of Character* is dealt with fully; but the analysis of psychological facts still remains individualistic and it is significant that there is no reference in the index under such words as co-operation, communication and language.

C. D. B.

THE LABOR MOVEMENT AND THE FARMER. By Hayes Robbins. The Farmer's Bookshelf. Edited by Dr. Kenyon Butterfield. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922. Pp. vi, 195. Price, $1.25; by mail $1.35.

This volume in *The Farmer's Bookshelf* series has nothing directly to do with farming; it is rather intended to give the farmer an understanding and a more sympathetic view of the labor movement. Various aspects of the labor movement in this country and abroad are traced. The author believes that "a rising standard of living for either wage-earner or farmer is not in the long run at the expense of the rest of the community."

THE FARMER AND HIS COMMUNITY. By Dwight Sanderson. The Farmer's Bookshelf. Edited by Dr. Kenyon Butterfield. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922. Pp. viii, 254. Price, $1.25; by mail, $1.35.

This book is one of a series called *The Farmer's Bookshelf*, edited by President Kenyon Butterfield of the Massachusetts College of Agriculture. Professor Sanderson has attempted to indicate what the community movement means to the farmer of America. Early New England life was organ-

Digitized by Google

ized on a community basis. Western settlements were as a rule by families, and various later movements, such as the Grange, have sprung up to remedy in some degree the geographic isolation. Present possibilities of co-operation in marketing, in education, and for other purposes are considered by the author and various methods of organization and of securing the ends which farmers cannot secure individually are presented.

SOCIAL WORK IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORY. By Stuart Alfred Queen. Lippincott Series in Sociology. Edited by Edward Cary Hayes. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1922. Pp. 327.

This is the first volume to appear in a Sociological Series which will be published under the general editorship of Edward Cary Hayes of the University of Illinois. It is appropriate that this first volume should give the historic background of social work. Beginning with a brief survey of present tendencies, the author treats in sequence nineteenth century humanitarianism, the English Poor Law, the mediaeval church and philanthropy, mutual aid in mediaeval communities. The study makes frequent use of source material and thus gives life to the narrative. Lists of readings supplement the text. It should have a wide reading among all interested in social work either as professional social workers or as citizens.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF MORMON GROUP LIFE. By Ephraim Edward Erickson. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1922. Pp. x, 101.

From his life-long associations, the author is enabled to appreciate the inner life of the Mormon group, its sentiments and ideals. On the other hand, his scientific and philosophic training has enabled him to study Mormon life from the ethical and psychological point of view. He seeks to explain the Mormon community life in terms of its conflicts, its struggles, its crises. As with many other groups, conflict with external forces strengthened the inner unity.

The moral standards and conceptions have shown three stages: (1) The group morality of the Mormons as the result of their conflicts with the non-Mormons of Illinois and Missouri. (2) The practical and materialistic ethical conceptions which developed out of the economic struggle in the Great Basin. (3) The present theological ethics considered as the crystallization of older group sentiments and ideals. The attention of the outside world has been largely centered upon the Mormon institution of polygamy. Dr. Erickson's study shows the broader aspects of the Mormon moral evolution in a way which makes them instructive not merely for a better knowledge of the Mormon people but also as a study in group morality. The present situation is one in which the younger Mormons are directing attention to social problems. Education is detracting attention from the creeds of the past.

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES. By G. E. Moore, Litt. D. (International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method). London: Kegan Paul, 1922. Pp. viii, 342. Price, 15s. Od. net.

Two of the papers published in this volume, both on Ethics, have not been published before. The remaining eight papers are reprinted, chiefly from the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Their collection, however, in one volume, adds very greatly to their availability, and also affords an opportunity for a general view of Dr. Moore's philosophical work. The

Digitized by Google

present volume begins with the article on the Refutation of Idealism, which the author says, now appears to him "to be very confused as well as to embody many downright mistakes." It is historically interesting, as leading up to the much later paper on External Relations.

The Realism of Dr. Moore is already so well-known that no summary of it is necessary here. In criticism of his method, it may be said that his analytical exactness often leaves the reader somewhat breathless. Dr. Moore takes out idealistic teeth one by one, and he uses no anaesthetic; and we remain, after the operation doubtful whether we shall be supplied with a false set. The result, however, is undoubtedly beneficial to our philosophical health. The precision of the argument in Dr. Moore's papers is beyond praise. For example, the distinctions and differences observed in the paper on external relations provide a good basis for any further discussion on the connections of what appear to be elements or factors in reality. Again, in the "ethical" discussion of intrinsic value, Dr. Moore very well expresses the distinction between intrinsic properties or the "nature" expressed in such an adjective as "yellow," and those adjectives of value, which do not appear to be intrinsic properties, although they seem to depend solely upon the nature of what "possesses" them. An object is beautiful, as it is yellow, not *because* of our perception; but the way in which it "has" beauty is distinct from the way in which it has yellowness. It would indeed be an advantage, if most of our writers on ethics went through a course of the precise analysis of Dr. Moore. Ethics suffers so much from vague and sentimental phrases.

C. D. Burns.

London, England.

English and American Philosophy Since 1800. A critical survey. By Arthur Kenyon Rogers. New York: Macmillan, 1922. Pp. xiv, 468. Price, $3.50.

This survey of English and American philosophy since 1800 is the most complete available account of what may broadly be called the metaphysical thought of the period. Ethical thought, except for the chapter on the Utilitarians, is given rather slight consideration. This is due to the author's purpose "to deal only with those central and illuminating points of view which constitute a man's 'philosophy' in the distinctive sense." The author further makes a very frank statement at the start that "the tracing of historical affiliation and historical causes has had only a secondary interest for me, and that the book as a whole is frankly propaganda, and designed to recommend one particular attitude as against competing attitudes", and adds, "My real excuse however for writing a book in which criticism plays so large a part is that I wanted to do so."

The leading topics under which a wide range of authors finds treatment are Scottish Realism; The Utilitarians; Authority and Reason in Theology; Naturalism and Evolution; Absolute Idealism; Personal Idealism, Panpsychism, and Realism; Pragmatism; Neo-Realism.

Professor Rogers is a scholarly and acute writer and has performed a valuable service in this critical survey and examination. It will not absolve the student from first hand study but it will set questions and stimulate his thinking.

J. H. T.

Digitized by Google

BOOKS RECEIVED

ARNETT, ALEX MATHEWS. The Populist Movement in Georgia. A View of the "Agrarian Crusade" in the Light of Solid-South Politics. Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, vol. civ, No. 1, whole No. 235. New York: Columbia University, 1922. Pp. 239.

BRIAVASCHI, G. B. La crisi attuale della filosofia del diritto. Milano: Soc. Vita e Pensiero, 1922. Pp. 336. Price, 40 lire.

BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1922–23). London: Henry Frowde, and Hodder and Stoughton, 1922. Pp. vi, 260. Price, 16s. net.

BROWN, WILLIAM ADAMS. The Church in America. A Study of the Present Condition and Future Prospects of American Protestantism. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922. Pp. xv, 378. Price, $3.00.

BUTLER, DOM CUTHBERT. Western Mysticism. London: Constable and Company, 1922. Pp. xiv, 344. Price, 16s. net.

CLAUBERG and DUBISLAV. Systematisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1923. Pp. viii, 564. Price, 9s. 4d. net.

DIX, WILLIAM FREDERICK, and SALISBURY, RANDALL. Man and the Two Worlds. A Layman's Idea of God. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1922. Pp. xiii, 177. Price, $1.50.

DUNAWAY, WAYLAND FULLER. History of the James River and Kanawha Company. Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, vol. civ, No. 2, whole No. 236. New York: Columbia University, 1922. Pp. 251.

ERICKSON, EPHRAIM EDWARD. The Psychological and Ethical Aspects of Mormon Group Life. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1922. Pp. x, 101.

FELL, EDGAR TREMLETT. Recent Problems in Admiralty Jurisdiction. Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series xl, No. 3. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1922. Pp. ix, 136, xii.

FINLEY, JOHN HUSTON, and others. Christianity and Problems of To-day. Lectures delivered before Lake Forest College on the Foundation of the late William Bross. The Bross Library, vol. xi. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922. Pp. 159.

FUETER, EDUARD. World History, 1815–1920. Translated by Sidney Bradshaw Fay. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1922. Pp. v, 490.

FOWKE, GERARD. Archeological Investigations. 1. Cave Explorations in the Ozark Region of Central Missouri. 2. Cave Explorations in other States. 3. Explorations along the Missouri River Bluffs in Kansas and Nebraska. 4. Aboriginal House Mounds. 5. Archeological Work in Hawaii. Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 76. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922. Pp. 204.

GEBHARDT, CARL. Spinoza, Kurze Abbandlung von Gott dem Menschen und seinem Glück. Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1922. Pp. xxviii, 156. Price, 4s. 2d.

HARPER, J. WILSON. The Essentials of Religion. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1923. Pp. 224. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

HILL, CAROLINE MILLS. The World's Great Religious Poetry. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. Pp. xxxix, 836. Price, $5.00.

HODGKIN, H. T. The Christian Revolution. London: E. Swarthmore Press, Ltd., 1923. Pp. 316. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

JOHNSTONE, JAMES. The Mechanism of Life. London: E. Arnold, 1922. Pp. xii, 247. Price, 15s. net.

LEIGHTON, JOSEPH ALEXANDER. Man and the Cosmos. An Introduction to Metaphysics. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1922. Pp. xi, 578. Price, $4.50; by mail, $4.70.

LUCKA, EMIL. The Evolution of Love. Translated by E. Schleussner. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1922. Pp. 303. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

Digitized by Google

LULL, RICHARD SWANN and others. The Evolution of Man. A Series of Lectures Delivered before the Yale Chapter of the Sigma Xi during the Academic Year 1921–22. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1922. Pp. x, 202. Price, $3.00.

MAHABHAGAVAT. The Heart of the Bhagavad-Gita. Baroda, 1918. Pp. x, 230. Price, 2 rupees, 4 annas.

MOREHOUSE, FRANCES, and GRAHAM, SYBIL FLEMING. American Problems. A Textbook in Social Progress. New York: Ginn and Company, 1923. Pp. xii, 567, xxx.

OAKLEY, HILDA D. History and Progress. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1923. Pp. 270. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

ORCHARD, W. E. No More War and Other Sermons. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1922. Pp. 192. Price, 5s. net.

PFISTER, OSKAR. Some Applications of Psycho-analysis. (Trs.) London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1923. Pp. 352. Price, 16s. net.

PRESCOTT, F. C. The Poetic Mood. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922. Pp. xiv, 308. Price, $2.00.

THE RETURN OF CHRISTENDOM. By a group of churchmen. With an Introduction by Bishop Gore and an Epilogue by G. K. Chesterton. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922. Pp. xx, 252. Price, $1.75.

ROBACK, A. A. Behaviorism and Psychology. Cambridge: University Bookstore, Inc., Harvard Square, 1923. Pp. 284.

ROBBINS, HAYES. The Labor Movement and the Farmer. The Farmer's Bookshelf, edited by Kenyon L. Butterfield. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1922. Pp. vi, 195. Price, $1.25; by mail $1.35.

SANDERSON, DWIGHT. The Farmer and His Community. The Farmer's Bookshelf, edited by Kenyon L. Butterfield. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922. Pp. viii, 254. Price, $1.25; by mail, $1.35.

SICKELS, NELSON DWIGHT. The Universal Panacea. Chicago: N. D. Sickels, 1919. Pp. xvi, 314.

SUNAVALA, A. J. Vijaya Dharma Sūri, his Life and Work. Jain Literature Society. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1922. Pp. 85.

THORNDYKE, LYNN. A History of Magic and Experimental Science during the First Thirteen Centuries of our Era. In two volumes. New York: Macmillan Company, 1923. Pp. vol. i, xl, 835; vol. ii, 1036. Price, $10.00.

UNWIN, E. E. Religion and Biology. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1922. Pp. 185. Price, 6s. net.

WALSTON (Waldstein), SIR CHARLES. Harmonism and Conscious Evolution. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922. Pp. xvi, 463. Printed in England.

WHITEHEAD, A. N. The New Principle of Relativity with Applications to Applied Science. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1922. Pp. xii, 190. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. With an Introduction by Bertrand Russell. International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Methods. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company, Ltd., 1922. Pp. 189. Printed in Edinburgh.

Digitized by Google

JUN 28 1923

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

A Quarterly Devoted to the Advancement of Ethical Knowledge and Practice

VOL. XXXIII JULY, 1923 NO. 4

LEADING CONTENTS

SOME ETHICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION — R. Austin Freeman

DEMOCRACY OR WHAT? — Victor S. Yarros

THE DISASSOCIABILITY OF MORALITY AND CONDUCT — Albert K. Weinberg

INDIVIDUALISM AND DEMOCRACY — A. B. WOLFE

ETHICS AND LAW — Gregory Hankin

For full Contents see inside page

Published for the editors by THE RUMFORD PRESS, Concord, N. H.

[Chicago: JAMES H. TUFTS, University of Chicago, Manager
London: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN, Ltd., 40 Museum Street, W. C.

Yearly Subscription, $3.00 Single Numbers, 75 cents

Entered as second-class matter October 16, 1914, at the post-office at Concord, New Hampshire, under the Act of March 3, 1879

Digitized by Google

The JOURNAL *of* SOCIAL FORCES

Published Bi-Monthly at the University of North Carolina

CHAPEL HILL, N. C.

In the March Number of the JOURNAL among other articles you will want to read:

Marjory Stoneman Douglass, "The University and the Forgotten Curriculum"
Gerald W. Johnson, "Mr. Babbitt Arrives at Erzerum"
Joseph K. Hart, "The Social Responsibility of Education"
Jesse F. Steiner, "Community Organization and the Crowd Spirit"
James Q. Dealey, "Government in Relation to Social Progress"
E. C. Branson, "Farm Tenancy in the South"

The May Number will be outstanding with leading articles by *Professor James H. Tufts, Mrs. Ada Sheffield, Dean Roscoe Pound, Professor Franklin H. Giddings, Mrs. John M. Glenn, Major Robert Moton* and the usual rich departmental contributions.

Teaching and Research in the Social Sciences
Public Welfare and Social Work
Conferences for Social Work
The Church and Social Service
Inter-Racial Coöperation
County and Country Life Programs
Progress in Town and City Programs
The Work of Women's Organizations
The Library and Workshop

The price of the JOURNAL is $2.50 per year. Address the JOURNAL OF SOCIAL FORCES, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C.

SARGENT'S
Handbook of American Private Schools

An Annual Survey and Review critically describing Private Schools of all classifications and Summer Camps.

A Compendium for Educators and all interested in Education.

A Guide Book for Parents, supplying intimate information, which makes possible a discriminating choice.

Comparative Tables give the relative cost, size, age, special features, etc.

Introductory Chapters review interesting developments of the year in education.

Educational Service Bureau will be glad to advise and write you intimately about any school or class of schools in which you are interested. Write for particulars. Consultation by appointment.

Circulars and sample pages on request

PORTER E. SARGENT, 14 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass.

Digitized by Google

THE INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF ETHICS

JULY, 1923

SOME ETHICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION.

R. AUSTIN FREEMAN.

WHEN primitive man, or perhaps a pre-human individual, unsatisfied with the direct gifts of his environment, first proceeded to alter and modify natural objects so as to render them more suitable to his needs, the first step was taken in the long march of human culture. Then was initiated a series of changes whereby the adaptation of man to his environment became associated with a corresponding adaptation of the environ to man by the activities of man himself. The process was conscious in detail but unconscious in its larger features. The individual adaptations were made always with the definite purpose of attaining some immediate benefit; but the larger consequences of the sum of the reactions of man on his environment have never been considered or controlled. Hence it has happened that, with the passing millenniums, the successive modifications of the environment have accumulated and produced consequences unintended, unforeseen, and usually unnoted; consequences which often tend to defeat the conscious purpose of the separate activities; and it is conceivable that the further accumulation of the effects of these reactions may at length alter the environment of man to such an extent that he will no longer be able to live in it.

The more profound environmental changes are of recent

Digitized by Google

origin and are associated with the rapid growth of that kind of knowledge which we call scientific, and especially with that form—physical, chemical and mechanical—which has produced automatic machines which generate their own motive power. And of these changes, the most conspicuous is that radical alteration in the nature and conditions of human industry which is known as The Industrial Revolution. Some of the social effects of this remarkable change I have examined at length elsewhere.[1] Here I propose to consider only the effects on conduct and ethical conceptions which have resulted from the change.

Our inquiry into the results of this change involves an examination of the change itself; which again involves a comparison of the conditions of industry or culture before and after the change; and we shall best begin by considering these activities in their earliest and most simplified form and noting their gradual development and elaboration. These rude beginnings of culture may have preceded, or been preceded by, the beginnings of civilization. But though, at first, separate, the two series of changes tended to run concurrently and later to become intimately associated; and since it is a part of our purpose to trace their association, it will be well to define our conception of each.

Civilization, I define as "the sum of those adjustments by which men are enabled to live in large aggregations." These adjustments are mainly ethical. Shortly we may say that the essence of civilization is a rational and systematic recognition by man of his duty towards his neighbour. In the absence of such a recognition, neither justice nor social co-operation is possible; with its complete establishment social life would become capable of development to a degree of perfection at present undreamed of.

Culture I propose to define as the general name of those activities by which man seeks to alter his environment, or some part of it, to his own advantage. In its earliest stages

[1] *Social Decay and Regeneration.* Section 2. The Social Reactions of Mechanism.

Digitized by Google

it is mainly an egoistic activity and it is only later that it begins to make effective contact with civilization. But this will become evident as our comparison proceeds.

The genesis of human industry is a fascinating subject that invites the imagination to expand. It is pleasant, and profitable too, to recall the rude beginnings of arts which were presently to attain to such glorious perfection; to trace their evolution and growth from their earliest, most simplified stages when, stripped of the sophistications which later tended to confuse their real nature, their purpose and place in human life is clearly visible. Their actual beginnings must have been usually the product of chance and developing intelligence. The accidentally-broken flint nodule, yielding sharp-edged flakes which were found to be useful, would be naturally succeeded by the flint nodule intentionally broken for the purpose of obtaining the sharp flakes. And this flaking of flint, chert, volcanic glass or similar material, probably represents the very beginning of culture; for until a cutting tool was available, even that kindliest, most tractable and most universally useful of materials—wood—was relatively refractory; and materials such as skin and fibre were almost impossible to work. But with the discovery of the flint flake (a surprisingly efficient cutting and scraping tool) the whole range of primitive industry became possible. The uprooted sapling, or broken branch, could be trimmed and scraped into a spear, club, throwing-stick or paddle, the broken bone or antler scraped into an efficient knife, awl, bodkin, or needle; the skin neatly stripped from the freshly-slain beast, cleared of adhering flesh and fat, and trimmed into shape for use as a mat or cloak; and the palm-leaves, fibres, or withies, whose interlacement yielded mats and baskets, could be cut off neatly to the required lengths.

Presently the next stage would be ushered in—the stage of specialization and division of labour. In accustomed hands material develops an unsuspected tractability. It is found that the flint nodule need not be merely smashed into chance fragments, but that if struck in a particular

Digitized by Google

way it will yield a flake of a predetermined size and shape. But to strike that particular kind of blow needs long practice and understanding of the material—manual skill and knowledge. And as these increase, the potentialities of the various materials unfold. And the skill and knowledge naturally do increase; for knowledge can be handed on, and even skill can be imparted by instruction. Thus, around each material, there grows up the "mystery" and the "tradition" of a craft; the knowledge of the material itself and of the methods by which experience has shown that it can best be wrought.

The change, however, is gradual. The simpler arts remain for a long time domestic, whereas the more difficult ones, in which developed skill gives a greater return and which demand the use of appliances, specialize early into "trades." There is thus a transitional period during which, while the majority of men work to supply their own personal needs, a small but increasing number of exceptionally skilful individuals, whose products are of exceptional excellence, are called upon to supply their fellows in exchange for goods produced by the industry of the latter.

When I travelled in West Africa some thirty years ago that country exhibited such a transitional stage, particularly in the far interior, where the native arts had not become atrophied by contact with the white man.

There were no totally unskilled individuals. Even the children could take their part in the simple industrial life of the community; for the African conception of education concerned itself merely with making the child into an efficient and useful member of Society—a sordid conception which we seem to have outgrown very completely. The simpler needs of each person were supplied by his own industry. Every man could make the few wooden tools or implements that he wanted; everyone could—and did—spin cotton yarn with the spindle-whorl, could plait the palm leaves into mats, make simple hats or baskets, trim the gourd-shells into calabashes, and fashion the cocoanut shells into cups. The building of a house was still the con-

Digitized by Google

cern of the prospective tenant and his neighbours. The women and children fetched the "swish" or clay from the lagoon-side or clay-pit in baskets and helped to lay the courses of the walls. The men set up the high-pitched roof, skilfully lashing together ridge-pole, rafters, wind-braces, beams, and struts; and the whole party busied themselves in fixing on the grass thatch or layers of overlapping leaves. There were no specialized builders—and no shortage of houses.

The more developed industries, however, had already specialized into trades. While everyone was a spinner, or a spinster, the weaver was a tradesman. For he worked on a loom—a simple affair, weaving a bandage-like web about four inches wide, but still a perfectly efficient appliance, with a proper shedding movement and a reed to consolidate the web. And he could weave an excellent cloth enriched with linear, chequered, or even figured, patterns, and so much superior to European cloth that the natives—even on the coast—readily paid three or four times the price for it; while in the interior I had to give away my stock of Manchester cottons since no one would buy them at any price.

The other crafts were developed in different degrees. The beautiful pottery, built by hand without a wheel, was made very informally, the potter—frequently a woman—sitting in the street or by the roadside with a calabash of clay and no other appliance save, perhaps, a curved stick. The art was just emerging from the domestic into the trade stage. On the other hand, the smith, with his stone anvil, his forge consisting of a buried water-pot with a hole in the bottom, connected by bamboo pipes with a couple of goat-skins that served for bellows, was a full-blown tradesman. So, of course, was the iron-smelter with his clay-walled bloomary. Exceptionally skilful practitioners of the common arts rose to the rank of craftsmen. Any man could hack out a block stool, but the elaborately ornamented examples were the works of regular stool-carvers. So, too, with buildings: anyone could raise a clay wall, but the

Digitized by Google

intricate relief-decoration on the better-class Ashanti houses was executed by professional modellers.

At the great centres, such as Kumasi, some of the arts were surprisingly advanced. The goldsmiths were not only skilful in the processes of embossing and chasing and the ancient art of gold overlay on wood (as practised by Hiram's workmen on the woodwork of Solomon's Temple) but were also well acquainted with the method of casting by the "lost wax" process. And the same is true of the bronze-workers who made the quaint and charming figurines that were used as weights for weighing gold dust. But there is no need to multiply instances. The noteworthy fact is that this stage of transition presented examples ranging from the primitive culture of the remote villages, where the people were clothed in sheets of the fibrous bark of the Honton tree, to a condition of industrial art little below that of Europe in the Middle Ages.

This transitional period is of special interest in connection with our present inquiry; for it is at this stage that industry first acquires an ethical character. So long as the worker is engaged in making things for his own use and benefit; so long as the producer and the consumer of the thing produced are one and the same person; the activity is devoid of any ethical quality. The purpose is purely egoistic. The labour, forethought, care or perseverance expended on the work, brings to the worker its reward in the excellence of the product, of which he is the owner. The benefit of additional effort is his, and his alone; and if his work should be careless or perfunctory, the resulting inferiority of the product is his own loss. His fellows are not concerned at all.

But as soon as the thing which he makes becomes destined to be sold or exchanged for some other thing of equivalent value, the purely egoistic character of the activity disappears and an ethical element comes into existence. The effort which he expends becomes associated with considerations of justice and honesty—of duty towards his neighbour. There is an implied covenant with the purchaser that the

Digitized by Google

thing sold shall be like the thing which the producer would have made for his own use; that the producer shall employ on behalf of the purchaser the same judgment, care, skill and effort that he would have employed in making the thing for himself. And, fortunately for mankind, this conception of industry seems to have been adopted from the beginning and to have been handed down through the ages as the established tradition of craftsmanship. Had it been otherwise; had the primitive craftsman, when first he was employed by his fellows, adopted the principles of the modern commercial producer, human culture could hardly have advanced from its earliest, rudimentary stages.

It is worth while to glance, in passing, at the causes of this persistent tradition of honesty in the crafts; a tradition which we can trace to the earliest period and which has survived into our own time in so far as craftsmanship has survived. In its beginning it was in part merely a phase of the essential honesty of primitive man; but the main reason for the high standard of professional conduct that has always prevailed among craftsmen is to be found in the nature of the activity itself. A craftsman is a man who has got a job that he likes; a job that occupies his attention pleasantly. The thing that he is going to make has first to be conceived in his imagination. It has to be planned and the various stages of its execution thought out in advance. Every stage of its growth presents difficulties which have to be overcome by contrivance or manual dexterity; and as each difficulty is overcome, something definite is achieved. And the more imagination, thought, contrivance, skill and concentrated effort he expands, the more perfect is the final result. At every stage, the thought and labour that he has expended yield a visible reward; and the reward is strictly proportionate to the thought and labour.

Then there is the joy of seeing the thing grow. Consider, for instance, a bookbinder with a "job" lying before him on his bench. A pile of loose sheets, a hank of thread, a tub of paste, a sheet of mill-board, a little book of gold

Digitized by Google

leaf and a goat-skin. Those are his materials; and already in his mind's eye he sees them assembled and transformed into a goodly volume, solid, durable, grateful to the touch, and glittering like a jewel with its gold tooling and its gem-like spots of inlay; a thing of beauty and a delight to generations of book-lovers. And step by step, that imagined masterpiece grows into reality. The loose sheets, folded and pressed, become a solid pile of sections; the sections, sewn on to their cords, are already a rough book—ragged-edged and shapeless, but still a book; and when it has been rounded and backed, its edges cut true with the plough, its head-bands worked, and its boards attached, it begins to look like a volume. It needs but to be clothed in its leather covering and the end-papers stuck down and the "forwarding" is complete. It has become a volume, and for purposes of mere utility, it is a finished work.

But it is a very plain volume, and the binder would be loath to send it forth thus unadorned. Besides the "finishing" is the *bonne bouche* to which the craftsman has been looking forward all through the constructive phases of his labour. It is now that his taste and fancy can find expression, his imagination and inventiveness find play. So the plain cover presently breaks out into golden leaf and flower, the title becomes an ornament and the book, no less useful for its primary purpose, has become a work of art which it is a pleasure merely to look on.

This pleasurable quality of handicraft is a subject of many-sided importance. Here we are concerned only with its effect on conduct. But fully to realize this, it is necessary to understand clearly the satisfaction that the craftsman feels in the most perfect accomplishment of which he is capable; to realize that in keeping his covenant with the consumer of his productions he is giving himself a manifold pleasure; he is satisfying his natural impulse to succeed in his endeavours; he is gratifying his self-esteem—for the thing which he is making is his own creation from beginning to end and the credit of the achievement is his and his alone—and he is giving himself the altruistic pleas-

Digitized by Google

ure of rendering an appreciated service to his neighbour the consumer.

The intensity of the impulse of any individual worker to achieve the best result possible does not appear to be generally realized in these days when individual workers are so few. Yet it is, even now, a matter of daily experience. Did anyone ever meet a surgeon who would willingly fail in an operation (whether he was to be paid for it or not) if he was capable of completing it successfully? Is there any artist who would not, by choice, paint as well as he is able? Even in those unproductive crafts called games, is not the player ready to take endless thought and pains to achieve success without a thought of any ulterior benefit? When we consider the earnest endeavour of the golfer or the cricketer for the sake of mere achievement with no further result, we can surely understand the state of mind of those master-craftsmen of old whose pleasurable labours resulted in enduring monuments of their skill; who seemed ingeniously to devise difficulties for the pleasure of overcoming them; as in the case of the old clock makers who multiplied the complexities of their works far beyond any purposes of utility for the mere pride and satisfaction of supreme achievement.

The interests of the craftsman and the consumer thus march together. The one is impelled to make his product as perfect as he is able. But in doing so he fulfills most completely his contract with the consumer. In this respect there is an impassable gulf between the craftsman and the trader or dealer. The object of the latter is to make a profit. That is the purpose of his activity and it has no other. Take away the profit and nothing remains. Now the craftsman also works for profit—or at least for gain. But in his case the profit is little more than a by-product. He expects to be paid for his work. But it is not the payment that occupies his attention; his faculties are concentrated on the work itself. Many a masterpiece of craftsmanship has been executed at a pecuniary loss—a loss foreseen and accepted for the sake of the achievement. But

Digitized by Google

it is difficult to imagine any motive that would induce a trader consciously to buy dear and sell cheap.

Having considered at some length the conditions of primitive industry and of the crafts that developed from it, and the ethical conceptions that were associated with them, we may now turn to that abrupt change in the methods of production which followed the invention of the steam-engine, which is generally known as The Industrial Revolution. It was a momentous change. By it nearly all of those activities by which from the dawn of human culture to the end of the eighteenth century, the needs of man had been supplied, and which had given acceptable and beneficial employment to the bulk of mankind, were transferred from man to more or less automatic mechanisms driven by power-generating machines. Industry, in its complete and human sense, came to an end and was replaced by mechanical production.

Coincidently with this change came certain other changes. Some of them affected the products of the New Industry and some affected the producers. The former gradually acquired a distinctive character, principally distinguished by progressive deterioration in quality; the latter underwent a rapid change, principally marked by a degradation of ethical conceptions. But since civilization is based upon developed and perfected ideals of conduct, and culture is measurable in terms of the excellence of human work, it would appear that both these secondary changes are retrogressive. The debasement of the products of industry amounts to a decline in culture and the degradation of ideals of conduct to a decline in essential civilization.

Confining our attention principally to the change in the ideals of conduct—though the two changes run concurrently and are closely associated—let us see if we can trace their connection with the primary change—the change in the means and mode of production. And to this end, let us turn back and examine a little more closely the activities of the primitive craftsman.

The motive which impels primitive man to alter and

Digitized by Google

fashion in a particular way some natural object is the desire to satisfy some need of which he is conscious. This is his purpose, and he has no other. The measure of his success is the completeness with which his need is satisfied; and this is proportionate to the suitability of the thing which he is making for the discharge of its intended function. His activity is thus conceived in terms of the suitability of the thing made to its proposed use; that is, of benefit to the consumer, who, in this case, happens to be himself. This, the ultimate, dominating purpose, involves certain conditions of industry which emerge from it in a logical order of precedence. Thus, if the thing made is to be perfectly suitable for its function, it must be made of the most suitable material; that material must be worked by processes most completely adapted to its properties; and if any appliances are used, they must be such as are most appropriate to the method of work dictated by the nature of the material.

To take a simple instance: let us suppose that our barbarian wants a cutting-tool to use upon wood, skin or fibre; a tool that will cut and go on cutting. It must have a sharp edge that will not be readily blunted. The material must therefore be as hard as possible, but it must be capable of being brought to a sharp edge by means available to the worker. Such a material he will find in flint, chert, or obsidian; either of them an intensely hard material, yet one with a peculiar, brittle fracture, which causes it readily to break into flat, sharp-edged fragments. The material having been chosen, the method of working it—the technique—is dictated by its properties. In this case there are two possible methods: percussion and abrasion. Our craftsman chooses the easier and more obvious—percussion; the knocking off of thin, sharp-edged flakes. Then comes the question of appliances. Evidently the instrument of percussion must be hard and preferably heavy; but it should be less brittle than the material to be broken. A rounded lump of quartzite, granite, or some similar stone will be the most efficient and will be chosen if obtainable.

Thus primitive industry presents four conditions which

Digitized by Google

have a definite order of precedence. First—and dominating all the others—use or function, conceived in terms of the consumer's needs; second, material; third, technique; fourth, appliances. These are the natural conditions of industry, and the order in which they are stated is their natural order of relative importance. And when, as culture evolved, the worker laboured no longer merely to supply his own wants, but, as a tradesman, worked to supply his fellow men, these conditions were transferred from primitive industry to the fully developed crafts. They remained valid through all the thousands of years during which man dealt directly with his material and turned out products which were truly the works of his hands; and they are valid to this day wherever craftsmanship survives—wherever it is possible for a man to set his name to a piece of work and say "I made it."

Observing these natural conditions of industry thus handed on through countless generations of workers, we inevitably ask whether, when the great change befell—when man the creator was displaced by the industrial machine—they were transferred unchanged to the new order. And the answer is that they were not. They could not be. A glance at the character of the new agent of production shows that they must necessarily have become inverted in the order of their relative importance and thus have become radically different. For the fundamental condition of machine production is that the thing produced must be capable of being made by a machine, and must be so made. Thus the nature of the appliance used, instead of being the last consideration in order of importance and determined by the rest, becomes the first in order and dominates all the others.

But the nature of the appliance having been adopted as the determining condition, the other conditions are deducible in a logical order which is the reverse of that associated with craftsmanship. Thus it is evident that, the nature of the appliance having been settled, the process or technique must be such as is possible to that appliance; and the

Digitized by Google

material must be one which can be worked by that process. These are the essential conditions of machine production and do not admit of modification. The last in importance, the suitability of the thing produced to the needs of the consumer, is subject to their fulfilment and is the only condition which is modifiable or which may be imperfectly complied with.

Thus, to recapitulate, the conditions of production in their order of precedence are:

A. In manual production or handicraft. 1. Function of the thing produced, conceived in terms of the consumer's needs. 2. Material, conceived in terms of function. 3. Technique, conceived in terms of material. 4. Appliances, conceived in terms of technique.

B. In machine production. 1. Appliance used. 2. Technique, conceived in terms of the capabilities of the appliance. 3. Material, conceived in terms of its suitability to the technique. 4. Function, conceived in terms of the consumer's needs.

Now, it is evident on comparing the two sets of conditions thus contrasted that whereas those in A. are ethically satisfactory, those in B. are not. In both cases the consumer applies to the producer to be supplied with something that he wants, in exchange for a consideration mutually agreed on; and there is clearly an implied covenant that the thing which the producer supplies shall be the thing which the consumer wants, just as the consumer is bound to furnish the consideration agreed on. It will be seen that the handicraftsman is exclusively concerned in carrying out this covenant; his methods are adjusted to the consumer's needs. But the machine-producer's methods are adjusted to the capabilities and limitations of the appliance which he elects to use; his contract with the consumer can be carried out only subject to those capabilities and limitations.

It will be objected that in practice the above-stated order of precedence in the conditions of machine production does not occur; that the consumer is after all the objective

Digitized by Google

of production. And this is, to some extent, true. For the manufacturer must contrive to sell his products, which he could not do if the incongruity between their nature and their proposed function were too extreme. It would clearly be futile for a manufacturer to make boots of glass or even of stamped steel. There has to be some compromise. But the natural order is as I have stated; and if we watch the development of machine production, we shall see that there is a constant "pull" in the one direction; a continual tendency on the part of manufacturers to employ material and processes adapted to the necessities of machine production but unfavourable to the qualities of the things produced from the consumer's point of view.

An amusing, and very illuminating, instance of this tendency was furnished some years ago in a magazine article by a famous American inventor describing some of the great possibilities of modern industrial methods. Among them he mentioned with enthusiasm certain processes by which the production of books and furniture could be revolutionized. Paper could be easily and cheaply replaced by sheets of electrically-deposited nickel about one ten thousandth of an inch thick (so far as I remember). The chief advantage was the saving of space in libraries and warehouses, and the extreme portability of the books. The entire *Encyclopædia Brittanica* could be carried in the waistcoat pocket and *Webster's Dictionary* could be worn on the watch-chain. For furniture, wood—an utterly out-of-date material—was to be replaced by stamped steel, suitably treated to resemble mahogany or other choice woods, richly ornamented with inlay and marquetry; the advantage being that, since the material was perfectly adapted to machine production, chairs, tables, cabinets and the like could be stamped out by the million and at incredible speed.

Now it is obvious that this inventor was thinking entirely in terms of appliances and processes. The consumer had never come into his field of vision. If, in regard to the books of metallic films, he had ever given a thought to the printer or binder, he had certainly given none to the reader.

Digitized by Google

And so with the furniture. To say nothing of the horrible "decoration" suggested, it is clear that it had never occurred to him that wood had been used from time immemorial because it was the most suitable material for the purposes for which furniture is used.

This is an extreme case; but it is nevertheless typical. The whole tendency of progress in machine production is to adjust material to processes and appliances and to disregard the interests of the consumer. The increasing use of stamped sheet-steel—a delightful material to manufacture but an abominable one to use—is a case in point. It is creeping in everywhere, in tools, tool-handles, watch-cases (called "gun-metal"), all kinds of boxes, cases, vessels, and containers, replacing wood, pottery, solid metal and other appropriate materials, sometimes so disguised as to border on fraud. Not long ago boots with stamped sheet-steel soles were put on the market; and it is certain that this cheap and tractable material will be forced on the consumer up to the limit of his endurance. And as with material so is it with processes; the tendency is to employ those which are suited to the machine and to ignore the consumer; as, for instance, in the binding of magazines and books by "stabbing" with wire staples instead of sewing, thereby rendering it impossible completely to open the leaves.

It is necessary here to note a fact which is commonly overlooked, but which has an important bearing on our subject. Machine production is based upon the adoption of a particular appliance. Now that appliance is usually an entirely inappropriate appliance. It is a makeshift substitute for the real appliance. This is completely unrecognized by the majority of persons at the present day, whose memories do not extend back to the age of hand production and whose minds, affected by the suggestion exerted by almost universal machine production, accept the prevailing conditions as the normal conditions. To them machines appear as the normal agents of production, factories as the normal places in which things are made, and handicraft as a sort of eccentric imitation of machine work. The

Digitized by Google

real conditions are inverted in their minds. For the actual fact is that, in the production of commodities, the work of the machine is a lame and clumsy imitation of handicraft, and machine-made goods are debased imitations of hand-made goods.

It will be well to make this point clear. Excluding machines themselves and certain ponderous objects composed of refractory material, which are proper subjects of machine work, the bulk of common, factory-made commodities are simply imitations of things formerly made by hand; and the processes employed in the factories are substitutes for, or imitations of, the processes formerly used by craftsmen. When we consider the limitations of the machine we must admit that anything like a practicable imitation by it of hand-work is a monument of human ingenuity. It is a wonderful achievement to have devised mechanical automata which will execute any kind of imitation of skilled human handiwork. The wonder is, not that the work is done so badly, but that it is possible to do it at all.

Consider that miracle of efficiency and adaptability, the human hand; an instrument at once sensory and motor, tactile and prehensile, combining in a single action perception and executive movement; linked directly to the brain, in structural continuity with it, an appendage—we might almost say an extension—of the consciousness and the will. Think of its infinite versatility, its almost total freedom from limitations, excepting those of speed and force; and then consider the automaton which has displaced it—insensitive, unintelligent, bound rigidly in all directions by the limitations of mechanical movement—and must we not, while we marvel at the ingenuity displayed, marvel still more at the perversity which has allowed the most wonderful and perfect instrument of achievement to fall into disuse and to be superseded by a clumsy automaton whose best efforts are but a fumbling mimicry of actions which the natural agent performs with facility and perfection?

The above considerations cannot but be impressed on us whenever we examine an industrial machine and com-

Digitized by Google

pare its action and its product with the action and product of a skilled hand. Take, as an instance, the ancient and simple art of sewing. To the hand it is perfectly easy. The threaded needle is thrust through the doubled fabric or skin, released, drawn through, turned round, re-inserted and again drawn through. It is a simple action, but it is impossible to a machine; at any rate, it has never been done. The needle cannot be released. It can only be thrust into the fabric and withdrawn on the same side, leaving a loop through which a shuttle shoots a second thread. The result is certainly a colourable imitation of a stitch. But it is a very different thing from a real stitch, which completely encircles and binds together the enclosed portion of fabric. And still more inferior is the substitute for sewing in the case of leather, which the craftsman—shoemaker or saddler—sews from both sides simultaneously, the two waxed cords crossing in each awl-hole and forming an enormously strong and secure stitch. But the machine worker in leather tends to avoid sewing as far as possible and to replace this process, which is the most efficient one in terms of function, by one better suited to the appliance—the use of metal rivets. And so we shall find wherever we examine industrial machines and their products. The difficulty of constructing an automaton which shall be able to imitate perfectly the action of a skilled hand is insurmountable. A compromise has to be made. Whereas the craftsman can select the technique best adapted to the function of the thing made, the machine designer must accept such a technique as the limitations of the mechanism demand.

Thus in machine production the dominating condition is not merely the employment of a particular appliance; commonly it is the employment of an unsuitable and inefficient appliance, the use of which is prejudicial to the functional excellence of the thing produced. And since the technique must be that possible to the appliance, and the material workable by the technique, inferiority of workmanship tends to become associated with unsuitable ma-

Digitized by Google

terial. We have seen how the stamped sheet-steel tends to oust more suitable material, even in machines, where it takes the place of forgings or castings; and where machines are made with an elaborate and costly plant, the cost of the latter precludes the use of hard metal in the things made —since this would strain or injure the producing machine— although the functional value of those things demands the use of such refractory material.

This characteristic of machine production by which the needs and interests of the consumer become a subsidiary matter, to be attended to only when all the necessities of appliances and processes have been satisfied, cannot but have an unfavourable effect on the ethical outlook of those who direct it. And there is abundant evidence that such an effect has been and is being produced. The personal service of the craftsman is disappearing and giving place to the methods of the dealer. To these methods machine production is peculiarly adapted, for the one respect in which the machine is superior in efficiency to the craftsman —speed and quantity of output—is the one that matters to the trader. The multiplication of products means the multiplication of profits. And the persons concerned in production and distribution are practically all dealers. The manufacturer buys his material and labour as cheap as he can and sells his products as dear as he can. With their quality he is not concerned. That is the consumer's affair.

So with the operatives—the "hands"; they, too, are essentially traders engaged in "collective bargaining" through their unions, bartering for the highest wage they can get the smallest quantity and the poorest quality of work that will be accepted. And the retailer, of course, is a dealer, buying and selling to make a profit; and to all— manufacturer, operative and retailer—the commodity is a mere pawn in a transaction the sole purpose of which is to produce a profit. The difference between the old and the new order in the relations of producer and consumer may be well illustrated by a simple example.

Digitized by Google

When I was a child—say some fifty years ago—the process of getting a new pair of shoes involved a visit to a tradesman who measured my feet with callipers and tape-measure and took a tracing on paper of each foot. My mother chose the material, explained any special requirements and arranged the details of the "fashion." Two lasts were prepared in accordance with the measurements, and on these the shoes were made. When delivered they corresponded in all respects to the requirements; the feet slipped into them comfortably and the tradesman took personal responsibility for their quality and durability.

Nowadays a person of moderate means buys his shoes from a retailer. His choice as to material, size, shape and style is limited to the stock on hand. The retailer will suit him if he can; but if he cannot—well, he has bought his stock and he has to sell it. He is ultimately a salesman; and the saleman's motto must be *caveat emptor*—let the buyer look to his own affairs.

The disregard of the consumer's interests which is inherent in machine production easily generates the habit of ignoring them by deliberate choice. The modern practice of newspaper manufacturers of cutting up an item of news into fragments and scattering them throughout the paper, with references from one to the other, is an example. The object is, presumably to ensure to the advertizer that the reader shall be compelled to look at every page. But whatever its object, it is directly opposed to the convenience of the reader and to the ostensible function of the paper. And from the habit of ignoring the consumer's interests it is but a short step to that of consciously opposing them; a step that leads in the direction of actual fraud. This kind of "rake's progress" may be illustrated by three examples from the book trade—a branch of the "Great Industry" that is by no means deficient in such ethical material.

The first is the custom of using thick "feather-weight paper" to bulk out popular books and make them appear large enough to justify their price. This material—a sort of solidified froth of wood-pulp—is so brittle and rotten that

Digitized by Google

it will hardly bear sewing and rapidly breaks away at the folds of the leaves. By its use, the consumer's interests are sacrificed in the one direction—durability—for the purpose of extracting a higher price from him. A second case is an example of the extortion that was practised during and after the war. At that time the prices of books rose progressively to meet the increased costs of production; a perfectly reasonable and equitable adjustment. But in certain cases of cheap reprints labelled 2s., if one soaked off the label there was exposed another label marked 1s.6d.; and if this was removed, there was found yet another marked 1s. In some cases, the removal of the third label revealed a fourth, marked 7d. Now, here was a transaction ominously near to fraud; for the enormous increase of price on this old stock—which had been made cheaply to sell profitably at a low price—was obtained from the buyer on manifestly false pretences.

The third instance is one of undeniable fraud and I hope it is not a common one. It occurs in the case of certain publishers who produce books on a profit-sharing agreement with the authors. Such publishers are accustomed to issue advertisements in the press, each advertisement announcing the works of several authors; but in the accounts the whole cost of the advertisement is charged to each of the authors. It is true that the author is not strictly a consumer; but the transaction illustrates the standard of conduct that prevails among a certain, nominally reputable, class of producers.

It will be said that fraud is not a new thing; and this is true enough. What is new in industry is the frank recognition of a low standard of conduct as the normal standard. The old trade companies, which represented the collective views of craftsmen, constituted themselves the trustees of the consumer. Their strict monoply was all in favour of the quality of commodities. They insisted on full apprenticeship. The craftsman must be a master of his trade before he could be made "free" of his company. The quality of material was rigidly supervised. The pewterer might

Digitized by Google

use so much lead and no more in his pewter; the silversmith was forbidden to add more than a fixed amount of alloy; the goldsmith's gold must be of a certain "fineness" and he must openly state the quantity of alloy introduced. How grievously does this dignified integrity contrast with the conduct of the modern manufacturer who openly sells "copper" bowls, ornaments and utensils which a touch of the file shows to be sheet-iron coated with deposited copper! Doubtless, in the past there were plenty of fraudulent craftsmen; but their fraud was not condoned. When detected, they were dealt with drastically enough. But under the new conditions of industry a low standard of conduct is coming to be accepted as the normal one. The commercial standard is admittedly different from that of the professional man—the gentleman, or man of honour. It is held to be no infamy for a manufacturer to enter a "combine" or other association, which is virtually a conspiracy to extort money from the consumer. Such men grow rich, and growing rich, are admitted to the high places. The lists of those whom the King is pleased to honour with titles are enriched with their names. The English "nobility" is being largely recruited from them. Even in the House of Lords, the peers do not disdain to sit down with "noblemen" who, a century or two ago, would have been nailed by the ear to the posts of their shop-doors for uttering base commodities.

The old partnership between the producer and the consumer is dead. The skilful artificer who loved the offspring of his labour is gone, and his degenerate successor is the salesman whose methods excite no condemnation. In America, I understand, some educational institutions have initiated academic courses in the art of salesmanship; the art of getting rid of commodities, that is, of inducing the consumer to buy what he does not want—for, surely no great art is needed to persuade a man to buy something that he wants, that he can afford and that is worth the money. The ethics of industry are in a state of progressive atrophy; and that atrophy dates from the moment

Digitized by Google

when the natural conditions of industry were reversed in favour of a particular appliance. From that moment the honest service of the consumer has dwindled and given place to mere exploitation.

And this ethical atrophy represents the subsidence to a lower level of essential civilization. For civilization, as we have agreed, is based upon the recognition by man of his duty towards his neighbour; of which none can be more obvious than that of honesty and fair dealing. Truly it is a steep descent from the *Ora et Labora* of the ancient craftsman whose very industry was worship, whose handiwork was a pious offering, to the industrial magnate, sitting in the seats of the mighty and murmuring to himself: "Put money in thy purse; honestly if thou canst, but—put money in thy purse."

R. AUSTIN FREEMAN.

GRAVESEND, ENGLAND.

Digitized by Google

DEMOCRACY, OR WHAT?

Recent Assaults on, and Vindications of, Modern Popular Government.

VICTOR S. YARROS.

IT is the fashion in certain circles, some of them radical, others reactionary, to sneer at the claim that the Allied and Associated powers fought in the great war to "make the world safe for democracy." It is denied that any nation was actuated in that struggle by unselfish or idealistic motives. It is even denied that democracy was an issue in the conflict. It is not my purpose to deal with these controversies directly, though they concern me indirectly. One thing, however, is clear beyond rational dispute—namely, that if Austria and Germany had in 1914 and for some time previous to that terrible year enjoyed genuinely constitutional, responsible, and democratic government, the war would probably have been averted by discussion, parliamentary criticism of diplomatic blunders, strong liberal and labor protests, and unavoidable delays. To admit this is to pay a remarkable tribute to democracy, and I pay it at the outset, without, however, intending to beg any question at all relevant and material to the subject of this paper.

As we all know, the war and its aftermath in Europe and America have led many thinkers to reopen the case for democracy, and to re-examine democracy's claim to success or to superiority to other kinds and forms of government. Books and essays have appeared in which democracy has been assailed and challenged. Some writers have advocated steps backward, in the direction of oligarchical government. Others, and James Bryce among them, have taken up the challenge and filed briefs in defense of democracy. It is my intention to review some of these briefs and arguments, pro and con, and to sum up fairly in accordance with the weight of the evidence and reasoning.

It must be pointed out, to begin with, that the critics and

Digitized by Google

foes of democracy, who regard it as a failure, are not all of the same school or camp. They are, in fact, divisible into three distinct and separate groups—Conservatives, Advanced Liberals, and Radicals. The extremes, the Conservatives and the Radicals, curiously enough, meet both in their negative and positive ideas on the question. The Advanced Liberals have not, as yet, drawn firm or sharp conclusions, and their complaints against democracy are somewhat different from those of the other schools. But they are decidedly pessimistic and discouraged.

Let us take the Liberal indictment first. It resolves itself into this—that modern democracies are not sufficiently jealous of their civil rights or sufficiently vigilant in asserting and preserving them. Thus in time of war they too readily, and without valid reasons, surrender the basic rights, the rights preservative of all other rights, namely, the rights of free speech and free publication. They are told that success in war is impossible without unity and discipline, and that the exercise of the ordinary civil rights of the citizen hampers the government and benefits the enemy. They believe this, and permit the suspension of civil liberties. Thus they create dangerous precedents of which tyrants and usurpers can and do make use in time of domestic strife. In other ways, too, are democracies indifferent to personal rights and liberties. Prohibition is one example, and good-natured acquiescence in bureaucratic despotism and in invasion of the home by brutal and lawless officers is another. If eternal vigilance is the price of liberty, we may as well say farewell to liberty, for the average citizen is politically supine, timorous, and apathetic. He supports crushing burdens of taxation without an effective protest. He allows himself to be deceived by cunning propaganda carried on at his own expense by the governing elements that betray and enslave him. He does not even suspect that information is withheld from him and that his only weapon of defence, discussion, is stolen from him in his civic sleep. Moreover, when his true friends try to arouse him, to sound the note of alarm, he calls them

Digitized by Google

traitors and seditious disturbers. He does not even read the publications that would fain warn and instruct him, and that the government easily suppresses as a menace to the nonexistent democracy.

Now, these points need not detain us long. That too many citizens in modern democracies are indifferent, ignorant and sadly wanting in appreciation of the virtues of personal freedom, is too true. That too many of our sovereign electors are easily deceived by humbugs and charlatans in public life is also painfully true. But what remedies are there for these ills? The sober-minded Liberal can but urge education, more education, still more education. It would, of course, be absurd to argue that because many fail to assert the rights conferred upon them, these rights ought to be taken away from them and others like them. Opportunities may or may not be improved, but when you destroy opportunity, the very possibility of improving it disappears. And suppose we condemn the effete and degenerate democracies to forfeiture and loss of their rights and liberties, and punish them by restoring some form of tyranny. What would happen? Why, the struggle for democracy, for the reconquest of power by the disfranchised and subjugated, would recommence at once. Sooner or later democracy would be re-established. The years of conflict would have been wasted. For democracy would relapse into its former indifference. The permanent remedy is, after all, education, and that remedy we can apply now and are free to apply now. If it be inadequate, then indeed the Liberal critic of democracy is at his wits' end. He has nothing further to suggest. He may surrender to a futile pessimism and indict human nature as such. Some Liberals have done this, and weary us with their lamentations, but most of them believe in the efficacy of trial and error, of slow education, of scientific and technical progress, of economic amelioration and consequent leisure.

In passing let me observe that there is no real evidence for the assumption that modern democracies are less vigilant, less appreciative of the blessings of liberty, opportu-

Digitized by Google

nity, and legal equality than were any earlier democracies. There never was a time when the advanced and aggressive few did not arraign the multitude for indifference, sloth and ignorance. No democracy known to ancient history had a firmer and broader basis than modern democracies enjoy. The number of citizens who consciously and understandingly favor democracy is probably greater than it ever was, both absolutely and relatively. The gloomy indictments of democracy are well-meant but scarcely well-grounded. Democracy is not effete or decadent. Rather is it still immature and unstable—undergraduate.

Turning now to Conservative criticisms of democracy, I can deal with but two tolerably typical and representative specimens. Here is a quotation from Mr. Hilaire Belloc's recent book, entitled *The House of Commons and Monarchy*. Mr. Belloc is an independent thinker and a forceful, if not brilliant, writer. In his own way and in some directions he is a radical, but his philosophy is essentially conservative. For Liberal doctrines and postulates he has the deepest contempt. He writes:

"When the masses in such a state [meaning a modern so-called democratic state] have lost their desire to be ruled by a special class—and this is the loss of the aristocratic spirit—the old feelings are not replaced by any new desire in the masses to govern themselves. They are sometimes replaced by a little envy, more often by forgetfulness; but out of nothing you can make nothing, and out of citizens who have always been passive in their nature, and whose passivity was the very cause of Aristocracy among them, you will never get the democratic spirit of corporate initiative and of what is essential to the functioning of democratic institutions—a permanent individual interest in public affairs. Parliaments, if they are sovereign, are oligarchies,—narrow and highly professional oligarchies at that. They can only work therefore when they are aristocratic and act in an aristocratic community. But once this sham is exposed—and all over civilization this exposure is now thorough—there remains no instrument of government consonant with the conception of strict national unity and greatness combined, save Monarchy."

Mr. Belloc implies in the last sentence of this passage that small, unambitious, unimportant states may possibly prosper under republican and democratic institutions, but that

Digitized by Google

great, progressive, imperial—if we may use the term—democracies are doomed to dismemberment and dissolution. In other words, democracy and progress or expansion are incompatible, and for the British, French, Italian, German, and American democracies the choice lies between anarchy and reversion to monarchy, the monarchy that governs as well as reigns, the monarchy that dominates and controls parliament.

Frankly, I think Mr. Belloc's remedy for the ills of democracy too futile and irrational to deserve serious consideration. The monarchical sham has been even more thoroughly exposed than the parliamentary sham, as Mr. Belloc calls it. There may survive here and there a belief in the Carlyle-Ruskin notion of kingship, but no one has been able to point out a certain method of finding and keeping the right kings, that is, wise, benevolent, unselfish servants of society. Democracy may fail and monarchy may replace it for a time, but only for a short time. For, to repeat, the struggle for popular government must recommence, succeed, and bring society back to the starting point.

Another school of critics of modern democracy is ably represented by Alleyne Ireland, the author of *Democracy and the Human Equation*. Mr. Ireland is an individualist and a champion of a certain form of popular government. But he recognizes and sympathizes with the present distrust of government, is alarmed by the growth of socialism and anarchism, and predicts the breakdown of the American and European political systems—unless we summon sufficient courage and intelligence to do three things—first, to revert to truly and purely representative government as distinguished from direct government, or the delegation of authority to mere tools and puppets denied all discretion or freedom; second, to modify the elective franchise, base it on a qualitative principle, and reimpose educational as well as pecuniary qualifications—specifically, to require a grammar school certificate as well as a tax receipt indicating the possession of property valued at, or the earning of an income amounting to, at least $500 a year; and, third, to

Digitized by Google

elevate the administrative element in government to the status of applied science, and thus do away with the appalling waste and inefficiency characteristic of all governmental activities.

Mr. Ireland's remedies are strangely inadequate and superficial for a malady that he regards as so grave and alarming. If anarchy and class warfare actually menace modern society, we cannot hope to escape the imminent perils by adopting the recommended safeguards or preventives.

Take the first, strictly representative government. We *had* this type of government for decades, and it was found wanting. The representatives had discretion and freedom, which they scandalously abused. They often represented only special interests, fractions, privilege. They often represented nothing save the machine that elected them and promised future favors in return for good behavior—good, that is, from the viewpoint of the machine. Why have our states increasingly resorted to direct legislation, to referendums and initiatives? Because of dogmatic or theoretical fondness for pure democracy? Certainly not. Great political and social changes are brought about not by the propaganda of doctrinaires and bookmen, but by hard and bitter experiences. Evils and abuses had developed under so called representative government, and the people have sought and are seeking to cure them by a little more direct government, or greater control of their representatives. To demand a return to strictly representative government is to fly in the face of human experience. We shall have more direct legislation, not less. We shall have more referendums on bond issues, franchises, tax laws, not fewer. Mr. Ireland and his friends have exhibited the very dogmatism, the very blindness to facts, that they complain of in the radical schools. The representative system faces modification, but reversion to the strictly representative type of government is as out of the question as the revival of monarchy.

As to educational and pecuniary franchise qualifications,

Digitized by Google

those favored by Mr. Ireland are hardly worth discussion. The result of no election I have ever taken part in, or heard or read of, would have been changed had Mr. Ireland's property and educational qualifications been prescribed by law during the last thirty years. The graduate of a grammar school as such is not educated or intelligent, unless he naturally happens to be so. The man or woman who has not received this degree of education is not necessarily ignorant, stupid or unintelligent. Most persons, whether grammar school graduates or not, follow leaders and molders of opinion. How many even of college graduates think independently on, and study and ponder earnestly, the complicated and contentious questions with which states and governments have to deal? Is there ever a time when all educated persons take one side and all ignorant persons the other side of a question? Is there ever a heresy or fallacy launched in politics that lacks the support of educated men? Does truth always command the undivided allegiance of the educated? What is the testimony on these points of human history, the history of theological, metaphysical, philosophical, economic and political controversies?

Finally, as to the elevation of administration to the status of an applied science. Mr. Ireland seems to believe that the distrust and hatred of government now prevalent are attributable to some considerable extent, at least, to the waste and inefficiency of public bodies. There is no basis for this notion. The well-informed man of affairs may complain of governmental waste and inefficiency, but he is not apt to ally himself with revolutionary radicalism on that account. The radical schools care little about such small issues as economy and efficiency in government. What they care about and are preoccupied with are the fundamental questions of property, competition, monopoly, privilege, undeserved poverty. Mr. Ireland is strangely unmindful of the explosive nature of these questions and of their relation to the unrest of our time—an unrest he would heal by such quack remedies as franchise qualifications, grammar school diplomas, and economical administration.

Digitized by Google

It is refreshing to turn now to so judicial and candid a discussion of the faults and virtues of modern democracy as we find in James Bryce's scholarly work on the subject, a work in some respects monumental, although it does not even touch upon the crucial questions which are emphasized in radical and revolutionary treatises on democratic government. In our day a vindication of democracy is not only incomplete but largely irrelevant if it fails to meet the criticisms urged by the economic and Social radicals—the Socialists, Syndicalists, Communists, Single-Taxers. The great complaint is that political freedom is an empty and worthless thing in the absence of economic freedom, of industrial democracy. Many are willing to sacrifice, or to have others sacrifice, political and civil rights for the sake of economic well-being and economic security. In a footnote on page 574 of his second volume Bryce himself remarks:

"It may of course be argued—indeed it is argued—that a society in which men are dependent upon others for the means of subsistence is servitude rather than Liberty, for what does it avail a workman to be uncontrolled if he will starve without work and is thus driven to take work on the terms which the employer prescribes. Thus any such laws as secure him both a livelihood and a fair measure of leisure extend his freedom, and whatever restrictions may be imposed on the individual, there will be, after striking the balance, a credit to the Liberty side of the account. Though it is necessary to call attention to this argument, it is impossible to attempt to discuss it in these pages."

Well, in radical circles this footnote discredits and condemns the entire work. It is adjudged shallow and obsolete.

Even *The New Statesmen* of London, the most temperate and intelligent of Socialist periodicals, in a fairly impartial review of Bryce's work, made these comments:

"He [Bryce] cannot help regarding the State as something entirely different from the administration of Industry. Democracy, to him, means exclusively the substitution of the popular will for that of the throne, or castle, of the altar; it never seems so much as to occur to him that it may mean also the dominion of the popular will in the farm, the factory and the mine. It is this limitation, we suggest, that makes Lord Bryce feel, as he says, that he is speaking rather to a past generation than to that to which the future belongs."

Digitized by Google

I shall deal with the radical case presently, and only note Bryce's omission here with regret.

Bryce admits that democracy has disappointed its more enthusiastic champions, but he thinks that far too much was expected of it in the days of the Utopians, down to the optimistic Manchesterism and Liberalism. He enumerates the failures of democracy as well as its successes, its vices as well as its virtues, but in his summing up he bestows upon it cautious and qualified praise. To quote several pithy passages:

"Democracy has belied the prophecies both of its friends and of its enemies. It has failed to give some benefits which the former expected; it has escaped some of the evils which the latter feared. If the optimists overvalued its moral influence, the pessimists undervalued its practical aptitudes. It has reproduced most of the evils which have belonged to other forms of government, though in different forms, and the few it has added are less serious than those evils of the older governments which it has escaped."

"It has, taken all in all, given better practical results than either the Rule of One Man or the Rule of a Class, for it has at least extinguished many of the evils by which they were defaced."

"Some gains there have been, but they have lain more in the way of destroying what was evil than in the creating of what is good: and the belief that the larger the number of those who share in governing the more will there be of wisdom, of self-control, of a fraternal and peace-loving spirit has been rudely shattered. Yet the rule of Many is safer than the rule of One—as Cavour said that however faulty a legislative chamber may be, an ante-chamber is worse—and the rule of the Multitude is gentler than the rule of a class. However grave the indictment that may be brought against Democracy, its friends can answer, 'What better alternative do you offer?' . . . If the light of Democracy be turned to darkness, how great is that darkness!"

". . . Nothing has happened to destroy the belief that among the citizens of free countries the sense of duty and the love of peace will grow steadily stronger. The experiment has not failed, for the world is after all a better place than it was under other kinds of government, and the faith that it may be made better still survives."

"Individual liberty has a better chance—even if not a complete security—with the People than with a class. There is less room for the insolence of power. The sense of civic duty and the sense of human as well as civic sympathy are more likely to flourish. Government is more just and

Digitized by Google

humane, not because it is wiser, for wisdom does not increase with numbers, but because the aim and purpose of popular government is the common good of all. . . . So long as democracy holds fast to the principle that it exists for the whole people and makes its officials truly responsible to the whole people it will deserve to prevail."

". . . The right way to judge democracy is to try it by a concrete standard, setting it side by side with other governments. If we look back from the world of to-day to the world of the sixteenth century, comfort can be found in seeing how many sources of misery have been reduced under the rule of the people and the recognition of the equal rights of all. If it has not brought all the blessings that were expected, it has in some countries destroyed, in others materially diminished, many of the cruelties and terrors, injustices and oppressions that had darkened the souls of men for many generations."

So much for Bryce. As already indicated, his reasoning and conclusions will not make much of an impression on advanced liberal or radical critics of democracy. Let us, therefore, now attend to these and consider the strongest objections they urge against what we call republican and democratic systems of government.

Some of these objections are fundamental and challenge the very principles of free or popular government, while others imply an acceptance of these principles and quarrel only with representative institutions, or the way in which we choose men to represent and govern the several elements in a modern community. We may, perhaps, formulate these objections in the following epigrammatic sentences:

The majority is always, or at least generally, wrong. Therefore government of the minority by the majority is government of the intelligent by the ignorant, backward and stupid.

Ideas and innovations originate with exceptionally gifted and progressive individuals, whom the crowd or mob ridicules or hates. By the time the majority is converted to a new idea it has ceased to be vital or important. How, then, can we expect progress under majority rule?

As a matter of fact, majorities never *have* governed and the advanced individuals or minorities never *have* waited for the dull and inert majorities. Why should we now be

Digitized by Google

asked or expected to waste time and energy on arousing and educating the majority? Democracy is a sham; oligarchy is the only possible form of efficient and progressive government. Why not honestly face the facts and be guided by them?

Oligarchy being inevitable, the only question is whether selfish and reactionary oligarchies shall govern or altruistic and radical ones. To insist on majority rule is to play into the hands of the selfish, materialistic and callous minorities. Democracy will never get rid of the iniquities of the present economic system. The radical friends of the disinherited masses must overthrow the rule of the plutocratic or bourgeois minority, using violence if necessary, and free the masses in spite of themselves, or of their servility, ignorance, and credulity. Dictatorships of the radicals are necessary and justifiable.

At all events, whether ultimately majorities or minorities govern, the familiar system of representative government is a mockery and a delusion. The representative bodies are incompetent and dishonest. They are composed of mere placemen, demagogues, shifty politicians who are all things to all men and therefore represent nobody having principles to promote or interests to protect. If there are to be representative bodies, let the representatives be so selected and controlled as to insure at all times intelligent and faithful representation of the various interests and groups that make up the community.

This, briefly and roughly, is the case against democracy. Taking the last criticism or objection first, it must be admitted at once that our legislatures and parliaments leave much to be desired and that too many of their members *are* mere politicians, trimmers, and office-seekers. There are few men of affairs, of scientific attainments, of vital experience, of creative power in our representative bodies. Changes that should result in sending more farmers, more manufacturers, more wage workers, more engineers, physicians, and other professional men and women to our local, state and federal legislatures would undoubtedly

Digitized by Google

be beneficial. The Guild Socialists and the admirers of the Russian soviet plan have useful hints—though no more than hints—towards the solution of the problem of raising the standards and improving the quality of our legislative bodies. Proportional representation is a corrective or remedy up to a certain point. Functional representation is another corrective or remedy. The farmers and the wage workers are beginning to apply some of the available remedies, and if the men of affairs in the cities and towns are slow and uncertain in attempting to secure fairer and more effective representation of their ideas and interests, the explanation of that fact lies partly in the greater complexity of the situation they face and partly in the rather important circumstance that the great urban business interests—the manufacturers, merchants, bankers, brokers, etc.—have had no special reason for dissatisfaction with the way in which they have been served and represented by the lawyers and the politicians. Where the shoe does really pinch, we find considerable activity to mend matters. Do we not hear complaints of "the new agrarianism" because of the power and influence of the federated farmers' bureaus and organizations? Is not organized labor going into politics more and more and sending men from the mine, the factory, the shop, the mill, to represent the wage workers?

Thus the secondary problem of democracy is likely to solve itself in the course of time and as a result of various experiments, not at all revolutionary in character, that are being made or discussed.

As to the attacks on the very principle of democracy, attacks based, as we have seen, on the alleged fact that the majority is necessarily wrong and stupid, and cannot really govern, a little analysis of them will show that they are self-destructive. Either the majority does govern, or it does not. If it does, and is capable of resisting, and beating down embattled minorities which deem themselves superior to it intellectually and morally, then, of course, the majority is not stupid or dull, though it may be wrong. Grant, then, that it is generally wrong, but sufficiently powerful and re-

Digitized by Google

sourceful to make opposition to its will futile. What would the revolutionary foes of democracy recommend? Futile warfare, anarchy, vain efforts to substitute minority rule for majority rule? This would be insane. There is simply no choice for the superior minorities but to educate the majority and convert it to their views. This may require patience, but are not patience and slow evolution in peace infinitely preferable to bloodshed, chaos and misery for the sake of quick results and social leaps? Discussion is better than fighting, better in every way. For war brutalizes and dehumanizes men, and civil war is more cruel and terrible than war with a foreign enemy.

Assume now, for the sake of the argument, that the majority cannot and does not govern, and that democracy is a sham. Who does govern? Some crafty minority, of course. But that minority preserves certain forms of democracy, uses smoke screens, as it were, and contrives to make the majority believe that it is actually dominant and sovereign within the prescribed limits. Let us, for example, say with the Marxian Socialists that the capitalists, the owners of the means of production, are the real rulers in modern states. Very well; but these rulers find it necessary to observe the democratic proprieties. They have elections, liberal suffrage laws, safeguards against corrupt practices, secret ballots, what not. Treat all this as camouflage and overthrow the capitalist minority, as Lenin and his associates did in Russia. What will happen? Why, the deluded and deceived majority will fight the revolutionists fiercely and make common cause with the capitalist minority. It will not be neutral. It is, by the hypothesis, too stupid and dull to know where its real interests lie and which minority is its true friend and defender. It is, therefore, because of its inertia, conservatism and ignorance, certain to fight its would-be benefactors of the radical Left. What chance, then, has the revolutionary minority in a physical conflict?

Will it be contended that history refutes this argument, since minorities of the Left have under certain circum-

Digitized by Google

stances triumphed over minorities of the Right? The answer is that the circumstances alluded to have always been highly exceptional, and, moreover, that in almost every instance reaction followed premature revolution. Witness the case of the French Revolution. Witness the fate of Bolshevism in Russia. Something, indeed, survives the reaction that liquidates a revolution, but what is that something? Invariably, an overdue reform that the majority longs for, understands, and is prepared to fight for—the return of the land in the people being, according to all authorities, the one paramount thing which the masses of France demanded at the time of the Great Revolution and which the Russian masses demanded in 1917 and would fight and die for to-day were there any serious danger of an agrarian counter-revolution.

Thus, whichever view the impetuous radical takes of majority government, he soon finds himself entangled in contradictions and absurdities. Now let us be candid, drop mere dialectics, and ask what the facts are and have been in human history respecting the parts played by majorities in government. It is rather strange to note that Bryce agrees with Bernard Shaw that government by the people is impossible, and that democracy is really oligarchy. But Bryce is more judicial and accurate than Shaw. He uses the term oligarchy in its original sense—namely, government by the more capable, educated, and energetic. The masses, he contends, cannot govern themselves directly; they necessarily have to choose representatives, leaders, rulers to govern them. This is true and always will be true, even if we resort freely to such devices as the initiative, referendum, and recall. But what follows? That we might as well give the minority absolute power, abolish what we call free institutions and democratic forms of government? This is what sentimentalists who cannot think straight actually assert. But the conclusion is palpably fallacious. Oligarchy in the original or Bryce sense is compatible with equality of opportunity and of freedom. Under that kind of oligarchy careers are open to all talents.

Digitized by Google

Humble men rise to the highest places in the state and in society. The sons of peasants and wage workers enjoy educational and other opportunities which enable them to fit themselves for membership in the governing oligarchy. On the other hand, under any form of autocracy or class government power is sooner or later monopolized and selfishly abused. Equal opportunity is destroyed. Violence takes the place of primaries, elections, campaign discussions, propaganda. In the one case the majority is led, converted, flattered, if you please; in the other it is driven and suppressed. In the one case the individual has a voice, in the other he is a disfranchised serf.

Finally, let us ask what basis there is in history and contemporary experience for the allegation that, if we are to wait for reforms until the progressive and enlightened minority converts the majority, we shall have to wait forever, or until the reform desired has ceased to be at all adequate. There is no basis for this notion, provided we understand the process of education and conversion aright. That the majority is slow and conservative, is true, but only if we compare its attitude with that of the small revolutionary groups. For example, the majority to-day is not socialistic, or syndicalist, or anarchistic, or single-tax. It is cold and indifferent toward these isms. Can we blame it for this attitude? The revolutionists have not even succeeded in converting the intellectual and superior minority to any particular ism. They are divided, and badly divided, against themselves. The schools of the Left hate one another with deadly hatred and ridicule one another mercilessly. What should the majority do in this situation? Whom should it follow? Which group of would-be benevolent despots should it trust? In Russia, the Bolshevik group of Communists has been steadily and bitterly fought by the Menshevik Communists, by the Socialist-Revolutionists, by the Constitutional Democrats, and by other minority parties. In the United States we have Socialists, Syndicalists, Communists and Single-Tax radicals. Each of these schools is convinced that it has evolved a solution

Digitized by Google

of the great social problem, and each aggressively seeks to realize and apply its theories. What, we may ask again, is the majority to do? Why, common sense tells it to hold fast to that which exists, which works, which is the product of evolution, until one or another of the radical schools wins the debate and secures a sufficient number of converts—some of them convinced converts, others half convinced but sympathetic, and still others indifferent but not unwilling to try the proposed experiment—to be able to put through its constitutional and legislative programme.

Turning to history for instances of majority conversion by minorities, these readily occur to the mind: The conversion of England to free trade; the conversion of England to Irish home rule; the conversion of the civilized world to woman suffrage; the establishment of prohibition in the United States. And here are some instances of progressive or radical triumphs over conservative minorities despite popular indifference or ignorance: The steady extension of manhood suffrage all over the world; the adoption of graduated income taxation; the definite establishment of the principle of compensation for industrial accidents regardless of employes' negligence; direct election of United States senators; the referendum, initiative, and recall.

Who can deny that the last several decades have been decades of social, economic, and political progress? But, if democracy during these decades has not been an obstacle to progress, what folly it is to assert that further progress at any fair rate is barred by the stupidity and inertia of the masses!

One objection must be anticipated at this point. It will doubtless be argued that even the reforms just named were not all achieved peacefully and amicably, and that disorderly strikes, insurrections, riots and other forms of violence contributed in some degree to the success of most of them. The great world war, for example, undoubtedly hastened woman suffrage and American prohibition.

Digitized by Google

This is true and pertinent, but what follows from it? Merely that revolution and strife have been incidents in the evolutionary process, and that in the collision of human wills and human interests it is not always, or often, possible to avoid the use of force. He would be naïve or Utopian indeed who should assert confidently that revolution is a thing of the past, and that under democracy the ways of the reformer henceforth are to be ways of pleasantness and peace. Revolutions and insurrections may be as unavoidable in the future as they have been in the past. Bourbonism of the Right produces fanaticism and violence in certain sections of the Left. But to apprehend revolutionary outbreaks, or even to predict them because of certain traits and tendencies in average human nature, is one thing. To urge and plan revolutionary outbreaks, to make deliberate appeals to class animosities and hatreds, to add fuel to the flame of civil strife, is quite another thing. For my own part, I am not at all sure that the change from capitalism to co-operation, which seems to me inevitable, will take place without those clashes and explosions which we call revolutions. But, on the other hand, so aggressive and irreconcilable a socialist thinker as Karl Marx was led by his English contacts and experiences to admit that in Great Britain and America socialism might be established gradually and peacefully. In the Anglo-Saxon genius for timely compromise he thought there was hope that humanity might escape the horrors of another French Revolution or Commune.

Let us, then, admit that democracy as now understood means the dominion of the popular will in the farm, factory, and mine, as *The New Statesman* and other radicals contend. Let us admit that the present social unrest is the result of autocracy in industry, and that permanent social peace can only be achieved by some form of co-operative management and collective ownership of industry. The question arises, cannot these changes, radical as they are, be brought about by and under democratic government? It is idle to say that the capitalistic and privileged minority controls legisla-

Digitized by Google

tures, executives, organs of opinion, universities, and other educational agencies, and that, therefore, genuine anti-capitalist reforms can never obtain a proper hearing. There are labor parties, socialist parties, reform newspapers, trade unions, agrarian organizations, radical schools, and a hundred other active agencies of radical and semi-radical propaganda. Even the so-called capitalist press, with its many faults, does much to help radicalism. There is no boycott of anti-capitalist doctrines. There is no conspiracy of silence against any school that fights capitalism with intellectual and moral weapons. It is sheer nonsense to pretend that radicalism has not had a fair chance in the press or the forum in the last fifty years. Its advance has in fact been extraordinary. If more men have not been converted, despite books and journals and oratory without end, it is because individualism and capitalism are almost like Kantian forms of thought to all but a few of us. The average farmer, the average wage worker, the average small trader, the average clerk, the average professional man, the average scientist, and the average artist are all individualistic in thought and spontaneous action. This is a fact to be faced. Those radicals who profess to speak for the masses do not know or represent them. Even the so-called scientific Marxian Socialists are in reality Utopians and sentimentalists. They prate solemnly about evolution and elemental processes; but as a rule they talk and write like passionate, hysterical moralists. They are not realists, but romanticists.

I repeat, therefore, in conclusion, that the sane philosophical radical does not evade the larger issues of democracy, and does not deny, but on the contrary affirms, that the democratic principle must and shall be applied to industry as fully as it has been or may be applied to politics. The real question is this: Is democracy in industry to be achieved by violence and class warfare—in other words by the destruction of political democracy—or by democratic means, such as education, the ballot, the legal strike and the legal boycott, and the gradual supersession of competition by

Digitized by Google

co-operation? My answer is that, while revolutions may occur, I regard them as relatively minor incidents, and I expect the co-operative social and economic order to be established mainly and gradually by democratic means. Men have fought and will continue to fight, because it is their nature to; because they are still predatory and intolerant. But social progress will *not* be furthered mainly by fighting, but by taking thought, by heart searching, by free discussion and effective propaganda carried on deliberately by the intellectual and moral oligarchy, the oligarchy which is *not* class conscious, *not* selfish in a narrow sense, *not* inspired by hate; the minority which reads the future aright because it sees things as they are in the present, because it has ideals and principles that are rooted in realities, and believes in the possibility, privilege and duty of preserving and constantly improving our social heritage, our civil liberty, our political rights and democratic government.

VICTOR S. YARROS.

HULL HOUSE, CHICAGO.

Digitized by Google

THE DISASSOCIABILITY OF MORALITY AND CONDUCT.

ALBERT K. WEINBERG.

IN "The Disassociation of Ideas," a wonderfully suggestive essay which places in dramatic relation the associationist psychology and a skeptical method of thought, Remy de Gourmont points out that a great many commonplaces or unquestioned beliefs can be viewed as inappropriate but insistent "associations of ideas,"—associations which live on not because the ideas have an irresistible affinity but on account of the habitualized and conventionalized character of our thought. It is in the terminology of this essay that I speak of the "disassociability" of morality and conduct, two ideas which are linked in the common belief that the sole subject-matter of ethics is the study of men's behavior. We find as the first line of nearly every ethics text-book a definition embodying this association, and we see it writ large in nearly all moral philosophy; yet the implication that the sphere of moral values is coextensive with the sphere of the values of moral conduct seems to accord with neither the most elementary facts of moral psychology nor the most empirical of our moral cogencies.

Reference to the disassociability of morality and conduct has not to do—as might be first supposed—with the time-worn quarrel between subjective and objective moralists, between those who emphasize motive as moral criterion and those who emphasize deed or consequence. The doctrine that intention and attitude are all-important, the Kantian apotheosis of the "Good-Will," rests quite as much as does the utilitarian view upon the assumption that ethical issues are all behavioristic issues. Good attitudes, that is, are used synonymously with good (behavioristic) intentions; the very contrast made by the Kantian between intention and consequence is evidence that they

Digitized by Google

thought only of moods directly precedent to conduct, moods which eventuated in conduct.

If not to the disassociability of moral intention and behavioristic consequence then to what does this antinomian-sounding title refer? To a view that is neither antinomian nor esoteric. Though the Kantian motive-ethics must be kept distinct, its inner meaning affords a good introduction for the presentation of this view. For if attitudes are part of the ethical situation in the judgment of deeds, it would seem a logical development to consider the ethical importance of attitudes *in contexts that are not behavioristic at all.* Let us seek to epitomize in the following formulations the ethico-psychological idea to be here developed: First, attitudes can have moral value without being *intentions*, without having any preparatory or accompanying relation to conduct. Second, as a fact of moral psychology we do ordinarily regard certain states of consciousness as having moral value *per se*—with indifference to the possibility that they may be quite divorced from conduct. Third, among the states of consciousness thus ethically valued are not only the attitudes, feelings and emotions which are conventionally recognized in the study of our moral judgments, but in addition thought itself. Thought as well as love is a desire of our approbative self-consciousness, whether by reason of its vigor and subtlety or as affording the élan of æsthetico-ethical syntheses of experience. Finally, with certain types—those of the greatest ethical and æsthetic sophistication—the predominant aspect of ethical experience is subjective; it has to do with thought—not instead of conduct but more than with conduct. Thus moral experience can be had by Robinson Crusoe even without his Friday. If it were not for the fear of false interpretations—sentimental New-thoughtism, Kantian intentionism, or pietistic literalism, one would have avoided this enumeration by two quotations: "The Kingdom of Heaven is within you" and "As a man thinketh in his heart so he is."

It would seem that the ethical trend intimated is a con-

Digitized by Google

spicuous cultural feature of our age, and that its psychological formulation is all too simple and obvious a matter. Yet in just this fact lies our greatest problem, for we must view in connection with it the strength of the association "morality-conduct." The association, authorized by representative moral philosophy, is contradictory of the ethical subjectivism of Dostoevskys, Romain Rollands, de Gourmonts. Our problem thus becomes the *disassociation* of the ideas of morality and conduct, or an exposé of the delusions and motives of self-interest which together with the momentum of linguistic habit cause these ideas to resist disassociation. "It is seen that there is often an enormous gap between the common meaning of a word and its real significance in the depths of obscure verbal consciousness, whether because several associated ideas are expressed by a single word, or because the primitive idea has been submerged by the invasion of a secondary." Translating these lines of de Gourmont into the terminology of our present study, we may say that the primitive idea in the expression morality is that of *accordance with standards of value:* there is no inherent denotation of what is valuable, any more than *ethics* denotes what is *ethical.* Value is attached equally to decency of conduct, of feeling, of emotion, of attitude, of intention. Now the secondary idea by which the pure meaning of morality has been submerged is that of moral conduct; morality has virtually come to mean moral conduct. We may restore the word to its appropriate purity by indicating the possibility of a divergent association, "morality-thought"; but this is perhaps best done by considering with justified skepticism the specious pretexts and inadequate motives by which the exclusive linkage of morality with conduct was initiated and then maintained. We are told: "Man associates ideas, not at all in accordance with verifiable exactitude, but with his pleasure and his interest." (de Gourmont.)

Doubtless the most obvious motivation in the restriction of the idea of morality to conduct is the fact that for the longest time the moral consciousness was actually only

Digitized by Google

concerned with conduct. It is plain that in the dawn of the moral consciousness moral inhibitions and compulsions attach themselves only to volitional conflicts on the plane of behavior, where volitional tensions occur in sharpest and most poignant emphasis. The origin of pietistic ethical inwardness, which is the first stage in what I call ethical subjectivism, is shown by Professor Lovejoy [1] to be located at a rather late date. Let us also view the fact that even to-day, even among the civilized peoples of to-day, the vast majority of mortals—if they have any morality at all—do not tease themselves with any but the most behavioristic of moral delicacies, and only the most elementary of these.

But if the association "morality-conduct" is quite understandable in reference to the moral psychology of very ordinary people, it is unfortunate that its generalization should obscure the fact that not all people are very ordinary. With the most sensitive and delicately organized we have, it is noteworthy, the developement of the approbative desires from the objective to the subjective, from deed to thought. Moral philosophers, aside from being influenced by ordinary parlance, have been misled through their tendency to concentrate on semi-savages and drab civilized normality, with whom morality *is* conduct, rather than on the geniuses of the moral life.

We have, however, only touched the fringe of our problem. A second great factor in the association of morality and conduct is the vogue of a functionalist psychology, and particularly of that philosophical mode of functionalism known as pragmatism. We are assured by the pragmatist that evaluation as well as thought in general has to do totally with action; there may sometimes be, it is conceded, an interval between the moment of evaluation and the moment of action, but the contention stands that evaluation is always invoked in a crisis of overt adaptation and always views a course of mediating overt action. [2] "*Moral*

[1] "The Origin of Ethical Inwardness in Hebrew Thought." *The American Journal of Theology, 1907.*

[2] Dewey: *Essays in Experimental Logic*, "The Logic of Judgments of Practice."

Digitized by Google

goods and ends exist only when something has to be done."[3] Now if *all* thought and evaluation were truly pragmatic in this sense, there would be nothing unwarranted in treating all ethical experience under the caption of moral conduct, since all ethical experience would then have the objective effectiveness of the moral judgment as its criterion.

But as a matter of fact is evaluation intrinsically concerned with action? This may indeed be conceded as obvious,—that many moral judgments are about action, and that many moral judgments are indeed preparatory for action, evoked by objective incompatibilities of desire or impulse. However, the really distinctive and typical thing about moral experience is not viewed in the pragmatic psychology at all: this is that we most frequently evaluate for the sake of nothing but evaluation itself; that we evaluate because we have to evaluate, just as we breathe because we have to breathe. The truer nature of the moral life is conveyed perhaps not as much by *action* as by æsthetic *reaction*. In the moments when one feels most poignantly conscious of moral values one is really more apt to be in some meditative isolation than a situation calling for a judgment of action. And not only is there no inevitable temporal conjunction between thinking something good and acting upon it, but we evaluate many things *as ideas only*, as intriguing episodes in the play of the intelligence but not to be acted upon. A critical essay on a noted French decadent thus makes much of the fact that his sophistication knew the difference between ideas appropriate for action and ideas appropriate only for thought.

Extremely strong resistances to the disassociation of morality and conduct are also presented by the morality of utilitarianism. The worthy and passionate love of present-day moralists for "Society," a disposition to make the establishment of a great socialistic or liberalistic millennium the *summum bonum* of the moral life, an obsession with "progress" born either of great social optimism or great social pessimism—these all make of ethical subjectivism a

[3] Dewey: *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, "Moral Reconstruction."

Digitized by Google

sort of Neronian decadence. The cult of social devotion, illustrated at its best and most persuasive in Professor Dewey's "Human Nature and Conduct," brings against ethical subjectivism such grave indictments as the following: that the ethical subjectivist would substitute mere meaning well for doing well; that the ethical subjectivist is an egoistic individualist and will lend no hand to the crying tasks of social reform; that the ethical subjectivist is a romantic idealist drugging himself with compensatory dreams of the beautifully impossible.

It seems pertinent to suggest that many of our social-minded moral philosophers have more goodness and vigor than æsthetic sensitivity and ironic intelligence, but I do not wish to develop this thesis here; my concern is to show that no matter with how big a capital S you wish to spell society, the charges against ethical subjectivism are unfounded and the fears unnecessary. In the first place the disassociation of morality and conduct will not bring about the ruin of society that facile good intentions are really capable of; *doing well, on all the occasions when doing well is possible, is taken for granted.* The point is that not saints themselves can be doing well or working for society every hour of the day, and even when one is giving alms to beggars or casting votes one might as well be thinking of something more interesting. Do these reformers insist that the general public be the darling of our heart as well as our ward? The second charge, that the ethical subjectivist perversely withholds himself from movements of social alleviation is disposed of by Oscar Wilde in his essay "The Soul of Man Under Socialism." One cannot of course retain any great tranquillity while the nerves are torn by indecent, miserable social spectacles; and those who bring these to pass are not cerebralist Epicureans and Nietzscheans but bourgeois Christians, respectable exponents of the strenuous life. As for Professor Dewey's apparent identification of ethical subjectivism with an extremely silly social absolutism, one feels that it really misses the whole point. For the absolutistic idealist in Professor Dewey's

Digitized by Google

sense, is one who believes that all morality is conduct, specifically is that part of moral conduct which is the maintenance of ideal social relationships. Not being able to attain these ideal social relationships he has no other moral values to fall back on, and turns his *libido* into their projection in imagination. Now the ethical subjectivist has also an eagerness for social decencies, but precisely because he has other values in addition he will not suffer the frustration of his whole moral nature when these cannot be realized in their entirety. It is in fact one of his premises that since objective conditions are so difficult to control it is unwise to have all one's moral interest bound up in them. And his "compensatory dreams" are not typically of social Utopias.

Let us finally consider behavioristic morality as an expression of fear, partly for oneself and partly for others. Only what can be *done* is physically harmful; and it may be conceived by some moral philosophers that their central duty is to keep harm out of the world. There is enough to do in getting the Ten Commandments observed without going into subjectivistic punctilios. What is of dominating importance, in this view, is the education of children, whether young or adult.

We are brought in this consideration to an issue that is crucial for all moral philosophy—whether it should, as in the view above-mentioned, take on the function of a Sunday-school, or whether it should aim to record the moral experience and wisdom of the type that has gone farthest in moral experience and wisdom. There is no doubt that at the present moment the former course is in vogue, our ethics text-books resembling Sunday-school tracts much more than a *Jean-Christophe* or *Marius the Epicurean*. Or else they are programs of social reform, intelligent, wholehearted and virile, but lacking in any subtle sense of the complexities and maturities of personality. They portray the moral life as though its cogency were that of a syllogism, its technic the efficiency system of a business corporation, and its aim the establishment of a liberalistic millennium, in

Digitized by Google

which, presumably, all traveling salesmen will write fifth-rate free verse and we shall have thousands of Sunday-night open forums discussing books like Arnold Bennet's *The Human Machine* and the novels of Winston Churchill. What the eager ethical didacticists apparently fail to realize is the sad futility of the whole affair; they will reach mainly ruddy-checked Sophomores and these will go their ways of mild ribaldry in all despite. As for the elaborate and erudite treatises on social reform, one may say it seems almost certain that *Human Nature and Conduct* will not be read by the people who really need it—ward-leaders, Congressmen, diplomats and the President of the United States. In this worst of all possible worlds social reforms are not easily accomplished, and moral philosophers can become as wise as Solomon without being able to relieve one jot the common befuddlement.

Whatever be decided as to the function of ethics, it is necessary to realize the true relation between conduct and the totality of our ethical experience: it is that between the peak of the iceberg and the mountain concealed beneath the water. One speaks here of course only for the washed and thinking. The decencies of conduct, for the disciplined and sensitive character of the intelligent modern, have become so facile that they are well-nigh unconscious gestures. It is not, I think, an undue optimism to say that at this stage of mental evolution there are a good many of us for whom murder, theft, incest, the dishonoring of our parents, the betrayal of a social obligation, or the injuring in any tangible way of someone else's happiness have not much possibility. To present these inevitable decencies as our ethical self-realizations is to become enamoured of fifteen-year-old sophistications such as its being wrong to kill our mother and father. It is true that even for the best of us conduct brings up puzzling issues, torturing incompatibilities. However, it is also true that something more than ethics, even something more than "scientific" ethics, is needed to solve them: something which after all does not really exist. Where the values of moral conduct are plainly cogent we

Digitized by Google

let not the right hand know what the left hand doeth; where moral issues are really complex and elusive it is heaven rather than the ethics text-book which must help us.

That worthy conduct has become so largely a matter of ordinary good taste does not mean that ethical struggle no longer goes on. It goes on more poignantly and insistently than ever—as the struggle to maintain the decency of consciousness. It is this which is really the ambitious task, and the more so as there is no normative ethics which can tell us what the decency of consciousness is; not even, in these days of psychoanalyst worship, a psychotherapy. Here there is no danger of smugness from too facile success. To aid us there are needed more discerning spirits than the moralists—oh ineffable tedium!—who compose discussions on the right and wrong of smoking, the right and wrong of alcohol, the need for athletics and personal hygiene. Yet one feels that even the creators of the most execrably dull of ethical discourses must be a thousand times more interesting than the irrevelations of the supreme good. If these people had really set out to reveal to us their secret heart of hearts, the thoughts, prayers and imprecations which they mutter to the moon, we should probably have had something rather suggestive and delightful; we should also have had their most presentable moral experience. It is only to be regretted that an over-sensitive reserve has prevented their personal interestingness from even tinging most of the usual discoveries and surmises which they call their "ethics."

"The process of thinking is a sport, but the sport must be free and harmonious. The more useless one conceives it, the more one feels the need of making it beautiful. Beauty: that is, perhaps, its only possible value." Beauty, de Gourmont tells us, is its only possible value, and yet it is the only possible value of all things. If the free and harmonious exercise of the process of thought is a sport it is also a morality, the highest morality of the spirit which somewhat vulgarly we call modernistic. It is this "ethicalization" of thought which underlies the delicate and fas-

Digitized by Google

tidious attitude of a Henry James, whose fanatical interest in the infinitesmal subtleties of his characters' cerebral experience is only understood in the light of the consideration that it is a moral interest. A Goethe urges: "There is nothing true, no true existence for you but what makes your existence fruitful." It is by thought that Nietzsche would have us "live always on a lofty plane" and Pater teach us to "burn forever with a hard gem-like flame." Is not the prelude to the understanding of these masters, of all those who have reached the higher levels of moral experience, the disassociation of morality and conduct?

ALBERT K. WEINBERG.

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

Digitized by Google

INDIVIDUALISM AND DEMOCRACY.

A. B. WOLFE.

I. INDIVIDUALISM OF ENDS.

THE most fundamental social issues hinge far more on conflicts of ends than upon divergencies of opinion as to method. The real conflicts between conservatism and radicalism, for example, are produced by mutually incompatible purposes. The capitalistic conservative has always regarded his own class as an end and the workers as means; the labor radical regards the workers as the end and the capitalist as a parasite. In these bitter conflicts of class viewpoint lies the issue between aristocracy and democracy.

Now has ethics anything worth saying on this history-old conflict? Is the distribution of opportunity and freedom always to be a matter of force, ruse, and sentiment? Is it merely a matter of taste whether one should prefer a society made up of one set of people who regard themselves as ends and another as means, or a society in which all are recognized as real ends and in which all are productive units in a complex co-operation of means? Or is it possible that we may formulate (at least as a working hypothesis) some objective, scientific standard of "right" and "good" by which we may judge the two points of view?

If an objective standard is possible, it must be based upon a scientific psychology. Metaphysics and figures of speech will have to be ruled out of court. Ethics is essentially a calculus of ends and means. Ends are things desired. In other words, they are motives. A valuation of ends not founded on an objective analysis of human nature can lay no claim to scientific status.

An ethics grounded in a hard-headed objective psychology will have to regard the individual as the only possible end. The moment some metaphysical absolute, or some figurative thing like "social" welfare is set up as end,

Digitized by Google

ethics gets into logical difficulties with the known facts of motivation and breaks company with scientific psychology. Motives have psychological reality only as they determine the activity of individuals; they have ethical significance only as they involve problems of individual conduct in a society of individuals.

When we say that the individual is the only possible end, we must define our terms with some care. What is an individual? What do we mean by "end"? And what makes the individual an end?

By an "individual" we do not mean an independent, self-contained, and self-determining entity, an entirely distinct and discrete something set up out of nothing and sharply outlined against the rest of the universe. Physically, the individual is a discrete and definite unit. Functionally he is not so. Functionally he becomes an individual, gets his growth, and lives, only by virtue of a host of symbiotic relations with other individuals.

Somewhere in the process of adjustment, development, and learning, what we call consciousness, or conscious experience, begins. How consciousness develops and what it is we need not stop to consider. Certainly it is a form of behavior, and has a physical basis in the physical states and responses of the whole organism; indeed, it *is* those states and responses. Whatever it is, consciousness is what defines the human individual. It is a social product in that it is response of a physical organism to stimuli from a social environment. But as no two of us have, or ever could have, exactly the same stimuli from our environment, so the systems of response we develop, while similar, are never the same. We know our own stream of experience as we cannot know that of another person.

It is precisely this fact of differential consciousness or experience that not only defines the individual but constitutes the individual an end, so far as the concept of end has any ethical significance.

An end (from a slightly different angle) is something in the literal sense idealized, imagined. It is a design—some-

Digitized by Google

thing marked out to be accomplished—a purpose. Purpose involves an intellective process, memory, imagination, association, and attention. A simple unideated reflex, or a purely instinctive reaction, can have no purpose, though it may fulfil very essential functions. When we attribute "purpose" to the behavior of lower organisms or to the organization of the universe we simply, like primitive man, read our own consciousness into the external world. Unconscious activity may serve some functional "end" in the biological or physiological sense—which is merely in the sense that certain results flow from it—but hardly in the ethical sense unless its results ultimately in some way become presented in consciousness. If an organism is not conscious of being an end it is difficult to see in what ethical sense it can be one.

To say that the individual is the only possible end amounts to saying, if our thought be confined to ends, that there is no such thing, in the last analysis, as altruism, and that all the paraphernalia of discourse on duty and the elements of "good" character (including truthfulness, loyalty, industry, conscientiousness, self-control, sympathy, charity, honor, etc.) are matters having to do primarily with means rather than ends. It is saying, also, that in the last analysis there is no such thing as self-sacrifice; or rather that all that any man can sacrifice is one or more of his many conceivably possible selves (whether lower or higher) for the self that *must*, from all the forces of the universe, be the one which at the moment obtains realization.[1]

We always act in obedience to the strongest urge or combination of urges—using the term to include unconscious as well as conscious processes—and the strongest urge is, if conscious, that which we believe or feel will give us the greatest happiness or the least unhappiness under the circumstances; and if unconscious, that which is the natural

[1] This is not saying, of course, that the best selves, in uncounted myriads, may not be sacrificed by the stupidities of class, nationalistic, and racial rivalries.

Digitized by Google

and logical expression of our organism and its needs at the time.

It makes little or no difference whether we consider the strongest motive in terms of happiness (utilitarianism) or in terms of self-expression (energism). Whatever an individual does, in a given situation and under given environmental stimuli, whether of freedom or of repression, is the response of a particular psychophysical organism to a particular set of stimuli. Given the stimuli, the nature of the response is determined by the individual's hereditary traits and by all his past experience, that is, by all his past responses. Whatever he does is an expression of self, as conditioned by the environmental situation. All acts not the result of reflex action or spontaneous habit, that is, all premeditated actions, are those which "all things considered," the individual thinks will contribute most to his happiness. They may be either grossly "selfish" or divinely "altruistic."

If we could regard the individual as an independent functional entity, happiness could be defined as that psychophysical tone resultant upon, and accompanying, the full, free, and healthy functioning of those of his powers and capacities which have been trained to function, and also of powers and capacities, hitherto repressed, but now released.[2] But the individual is never alone. As he is a social product, so also is he always a member of society—which means that he never can be "free." An act which, in itself, for him alone, might give happiness, may result in great unhappiness for him because of its effect on other individuals. If he should do certain things he knows other persons would punish him. If he should do certain other things he knows that his sympathetic appreciation of the unhappiness caused others would make him unhappy. Hence, happiness must be defined in a way which takes full account of the fact that every individual is a member

[2] A sort of vicarious release and functioning may take place through day-dreaming, dream symbolization, and anticipation; but into this intricate psycho-analytic aspect of the question we need not enter.

Digitized by Google

of a society of individuals. Happiness, then, is that psycho-physical state or tone which results from, and accompanies, the full, free, and healthy functioning of the individual's powers and capacities, to an extent and intensity and in directions which do not interfere with a like functioning of the powers of other individuals.

Distinction must be made between what have been called respectively "the narrower selfishness" and "the broader selfishness." The narrow egotist acts, so far as he can, as if he himself were the only end. He pursues his own desires and interests with little reference to the happiness of others and with no thought that they too are ends in themselves. It must be admitted that he often succeeds in acquiring certain pachydermous characteristics —the unhappiness of others does not affect his spirits. But it should also be obvious that such an individual also narrows his own capacity for experience, and in limiting that, narrows his own personality; with the result that many types and sources of happiness, available only through sensitive sympathy and co-operation, are closed to him. The broader egotist, on the contrary, because of his quick sympathies, may suffer all the miseries he sees others suffer,[3] but he also vicariously enjoys the happiness of others, and by entering into their experience may live an infinitely larger life than the narrow egotist ever has the capacity to conceive.

We must go even farther. The limitation of the principle of happiness necessitated by the fact that we are all members of society must be put positively as well as negatively. Not only am I in my own interest bound not to use you as a door-mat, but also positively to co-operate in your happiness. Without this positive qualification I may go my own sweet way and let you go yours. There is perhaps something to be said for this, in a world in which

[3] In cases of hypertrophied sympathy, he suffers miseries that others, less sensitive than he is, do not experience, because he reads his own personality into their experience and vicariously suffers what he would feel were he in their place.

Digitized by Google

so many persons are ready to mind everybody's business but their own—so quick to prescribe how you shall live your life. Nevertheless, from a larger point of view, it will not do. So social is the nature of man, so much is happiness and even "self" expression the product of a social process, so much is our life widened by sympathy, and so happy a field for the satisfaction of gregariousness and workmanship do mutual aid and "altruistic" co-operation afford, that my life should be broadened, my self-expression multiplied, and my happiness increased in proportion that I not only refuse to live at your expense (equally refusing to let you live at mine) but that I co-operate with you to widen your sphere of self-expression and to increase your happiness.

If only conscious individuals are to be regarded as ends, it is evident that no group, society, or institution, regarded as distinct from the several individuals who compose it, can be an end. Consciousness has never been observed in disconnection from a nervous system. No group, society, or institution can be an end, because it has no nervous system and no consciousness. To speak of group consciousness, social mind, and the like, or even of public opinion and public sentiment, is to speak in elliptical figures of speech. The only consciousness, mind, opinion, or sentiment there is in any group is the consciousness, etc., of the individual members of the group. Likewise the happiness of the group is the happiness of its individual members.

It should be clear from this that those who set up the state, the family, the race, or any process or attitude, such as parenthood,[4] or loyalty,[5] as end are putting the cart before the horse—confusing means and ends. No institution can be other than means, however much its devotees and beneficiaries may talk and act as if it were an end in itself.

The direction in which we should hope, then, to find the trail to a scientific ethics would lead us through psychology

[4] Cf. C. W. Saleeby, *Parenthood and Race Culture*, 1909.

[5] Cf. Royce's "loyalty to loyalty," in his *Philosophy of Loyalty*, 1908.

Digitized by Google

to a utilitarian doctrine of *individualism of ends*—but not, let us hasten to add, to an individualism of means such as is exemplified in our social inheritance of economic *laissez faire* from the political revolt of the eighteenth century.

II. SOCIALISM OF MEANS.

What now is the means through which the individual realizes himself, lives his life? Whence comes the opportunity for happiness through self-expression?

The amount of opportunity available to the individual, and hence the amplitude and intensity of his life, depend very largely upon the efficiency of the social organization of which he is a part. Whether we take it on the ground of psychology—the nature and variety of stimulation and outlet for self-expression,—or upon economic grounds—the production and distribution of the material conditions for variety and intensity of stimulation and response (briefly the material basis of culture),—the character of the individual's self-expression, the degree of happiness, depends upon the co-operative creation of opportunity.

It is true that an individual motivated by the narrower egotism, as we saw above, may take no part in this co-operative creative workmanship and yet be what is ordinarily regarded as happy. He may take the position that he is not to blame for his existence, and that the world consequently owes him a living. In obedience to this idea a person may become a thief, or a profiteer, always actuated by the acquisitive motive, always scheming how he may get something for nothing, or an idle society woman without a thought as to who pays for her privileges or to her moral right to support in idleness. In the history of the race millions have done so and "prospered." They have "played the game and won," finding joy of self-expression in the sense of power and guile.

But one may perhaps be permitted to aver without being homiletic that they have also lost. To say nothing of sympathy and vicarious experience, they have missed the joy of workmanship. One propensity has been atrophied in

Digitized by Google

the overgrowth of another. Creativeness has been subordinated to acquisitiveness.

Whether creativeness is "higher" than acquisitiveness or not, it is more essential. For if none created, there would be nothing to acquire. Hence without resorting to "moral" postulates, we can easily see that a sharing in the co-operative productive activities of society, if not undertaken voluntarily by the individual, out of joy in work and from a sense of self-respect, will be required of him by other individuals in protection of their own interests. Productively we stand, acquisitively we fall.

A very large part of the individual's life is a vicarious living of the lives of others. For this reason we can rely to a certain extent upon sympathy for the co-operative creation of opportunity. But it is evident that such motivation, in our present degree of culture, is inadequate to our need of social peace and co-operation. We are neither sensitive enough nor intelligent enough to understand the truth intuitively expressed by Jesus in his query, "What shall a man be profited if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" We are still too near our rough ancestors of the German forests, still too much under the spell of the acquisitive individualism of Manchesterism and the frontier scramble for spoils. Yet there is for this doctrine of "super-individualism" a scientific foundation.

That society is a co-operative organization for the production of opportunity may be a truism. It would be so with a race adequately rationalized and socialized, one that had no hold-over instincts of barbarism and had recovered from the *laissez faire* individualism of means of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is noticeable that the nearer one gets to geographical and racial frontiers and perhaps also to the frontier of business, the more people talk of their "rights" and the less of their duties. Considering the hold that narrow acquisitiveness and predatory greed still have on us, we will risk emphasizing what might otherwise be regarded as a platitude.

While a scientific ethics would thus seem to point un-

Digitized by Google

mistakably to an individualism of ends, it points with equal sureness to a *co-operation or sociality of means*. Put in another way, individuals (society) are means in their co-operative power to create opportunity, but opportunity serves an end only for individuals.

III. DEMOCRACY.

If, then, we direct our attention to the fundamental question of ends, and say that only individuals are ends, immediately the query arises, "What individuals?" Democracy will at once answer, "All individuals," while aristocracy or plutocracy will forthwith object, "No, only some!"

Here is the real test of the validity of the principle of individualism of ends and socialism[6] of means. What ground is there for regarding all individuals as ends, or, on the contrary, only some? And if all individuals are to be regarded as ends, are they all equal ends?

Every individual is not only an end, because he is conscious and has power of self-expression and happiness, but he is at the same time a means, because he can live fully only to the extent that he contributes his services and capacities to the general co-operative process of creating the opportunities under which self-expression and happiness are possible. The individual may be regarded as a sort of dynamo, in which center a multitude of lines of social influence, which in him are transformed into currents of energy and personality, and which flow out from him to the external world. The amount and character of his self-expression and happiness depend on two things, (1) the amount and kind of energy of which he is the locus, and (2) the outlet for this energy as transformed and re-co-ordinated by his personality. The first we may summarize under the term *opportunity*, the second, under *service*.[7]

[6] It is needless to state that this term, as here used, in no sense is meant to suggest any particular type of social organization. It is used merely as a somewhat more euphonious term than "sociality," or "mutualism," to denote the essential fact that all means to the fulfillment of individual ends are social and co-operative—that *society* is the means.

[7] Avoiding, however, any narrow or sentimental connotations of the term.

Digitized by Google

But neither as ends nor as means are individuals of equal worth or importance. Actually and potentially, individuals differ, both in capacity for self-expression and happiness and in their power to contribute to the co-operative production of opportunity. They differ actually because of the different opportunities for development they have had. They differ potentially, "naturally," to the extent that their hereditary endowments differ.

To what extent organically inherited capacity differs in different individuals, no one knows, and we are not likely soon to know, because close discrimination between the hereditary and the environmental factors is practically an impossible task.

The dead level theory of democracy holds that individuals are equal in native capacity and hence in "rights." This theory, now held by few informed persons, practically denies any influence to heredity, and is so contrary to the probabilities that it need not detain us. Polemics written against "democracy" by persons who assume that it means this dead level theory simply set up straw men.

While no reasonably informed person to-day holds that individuals are equal by hereditary endowment, there has been on the other hand an immense output of unwarranted conclusion as to natural inequality of hereditary capacity—conclusions drawn from investigations which have purported to isolate and measure hereditary capacity (mental as well as physical) but which in most cases can be shown to be oblivious of the presence of probable environmental influences in the creation of talents or defects taken as hereditary. There is much that goes for hereditary feeblemindedness, for instance, that perhaps is due to poor nutrition and adenoids.

Whatever may be the truth about natural inheritance, thus much should be clear: we cannot on scientific grounds condemn an individual to inferior status and deprive him of opportunity until he has been tried out for a time under opportunities equal to those granted others. Whatever the distribution of hereditary capacity is, opportunity

Digitized by Google

should be distributed to individuals in proportion to that capacity. Distribution of opportunity is a matter of economy as well as of ethics—if indeed the two be not synonymous. Opportunity should be put where it will do the most good. To distribute opportunity according to the dead level theory, as the Communists have attempted, would certainly fall short of ideal economy, and probably by quite as wide a margin as our present distribution by status does.

Opportunity is restricted fundamentally by the limitation of natural resources, secondarily by our limited technological capacity to utilize economically the resources we have. From whatever angle the situation is viewed, we need not only to distribute opportunity (and the material wealth and income on which it is based) economically, but above all to discover, develop, conserve, and utilize every ounce of human capacity we can—barring, of course, those capacities which are wasteful and destructive rather than serviceable.[8]

This means that those who have the greatest hereditary capacity should be given the best education and the greatest opportunity in every way to develop their talents. The only exception to this rule may be that as between two equal potential talents we may have to give preference to the one the services of which society stands in the most need at the time.

To each individual, opportunity in proportion to his capacity, within the limits of the total opportunity available for all; and *from* each individual, service in proportion to his developed capacities. This is the criterion of fundamental democracy. Democracy, instead of meaning *equality* of opportunity, means *equity* of opportunity, together with service proportionate not to material reward but to capacity.

Thus understood, democracy holds (1) that every individual is an end in himself; (2) that no individual is to be regarded primarily as a means to a fulfillment of the pur-

[8] Such, for instance, as Mr. Veblen sees in the modern business man.

Digitized by Google

poses or desires of any other individual; (3) that no class or group of individuals is to be regarded primarily as a means to the interest of another class as end; (4) that opportunity, and, so far as opportunity is dependent upon them, material wealth and income, should be distributed to individuals in proportion to capacity and willingness to use them for the collective good; (5) that the collective good will be highest when opportunity, which at best is limited in quantity and quality, is distributed so that each individual is enabled to develop his potential powers and capacities in like proportion to the development of these potentialities in every other individual; (6) that the means to the utilization of individual happiness can be found only in the willing, fair-minded co-operative work of individuals and groups, all of whom accept and live up to the foregoing principles.[9]

Let us now glance at the position taken by aristocracy with regard to the problem of means and ends.

Practically, the aristocracy theory takes no account of the distinction between hereditary and environmental differences, or if it does seem to do so, merely jumps to the conclusion that those who now enjoy the greatest opportunities have them because they are from hereditarily superior stocks.

The aristocratic theory is one of *status*. The privileged aristocrat simply assumes that he is an end and the "lower orders" means. Essentially this modern master-class attitude is not different from the classical Greek's justification of slavery: My pursuit of happiness, self-expression, culture, requires leisure; if I have leisure, some one else must do the work; the barbarians were provided by the gods for that purpose.

While the trend toward political and economic individualism in the eighteenth century was fundamentally due to a widening conviction that all men are ends, the movement

[9] A. B. Wolfe, "Some Psychological Aspects of Industrial Reconstruction." Publications of the American Sociological Society. Vol. XIV, 1919, pp. 74, 75.

Digitized by Google

worked itself out as a philosophy of means. In effect, to free society from the master-and-servant ethics, the revolutionary philosophers took the extreme position that social control has no other political or economic function than to clear the track and prevent fouling in the race of individual acquisitiveness. The old burden of special privilege, prescriptive rights, and restrictive regulation was so great that men were denied the opportunity to help themselves by their own effort and initiative. The very purpose of a very large amount of this old regulation had been to prevent men from escaping from the quasi-servile status. There was thus abundant justification for the "system of natural liberty" developed by English philosophers from Hobbes and Locke to Adam Smith, and in France by the brilliant pre-revolutionary encyclopædists and *économistes*.

Thus the eighteenth century revolt was an insistence upon rights (natural rights) rather than functions, although at root it grew out of the desire that individuals should be allowed to function freely.

While generally on the Continent, outside of France, the state was made the end and so much emphasis was placed on (authoritatively imposed and enforced) social co-operation that the individual was lost sight of, in England, France, and America the individualistic revolt was so complete that social co-operation was thought of only as a by-product of individual acquisitiveness. Distributive economy, the discovery and conservation of individual capacity and its utilization to the best social advantage, and the organization of social functions for the positive service of the people, were dismissed in pious phrases about the "economic harmonies," or, in America, smothered under a flood of ignorant sentiment and rant about inexhaustible resources, boundless opportunity, room at the top, and the American citizen's superior ability to look out for himself. Even the (relatively) magnificent educational system in America was built up with primary reference to the needs, not of social co-operation, but of acquisitive self-help.

Digitized by Google

All this might have continued to do well enough had the Industrial Revolution not transformed the entire situation, had our free land and other "boundless" natural resources held out and not been appropriated to the exploitative activities of private corporations, and had we not grown from a handful of squabbling but industrious colonists to a population of a hundred million people. Hardly, in fact, had Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Americans acquired the right of individual initiative and self-help when changing technology and industrial organization made that right largely nugatory.

Political "democracy" was thought of as the road to freedom, and adequate expression and evidence of it. Gradually, however, it became clear that manhood, or even universal, suffrage might exist contemporaneously with economic vassalage. The right to work, to freedom of contract, to acquire superior income and property, did not seem to have the old real content after the western world became thoroughly industrialized, when individual entrepreneurship had given way to corporate organization and financial control, and when the "boundless" resources of a new country had nearly all been appropriated by the first comers and handed down in the family. The process of change from "status to contract" seemed somehow to be reversing itself. Differential status was creeping back. Labour began, as capital had from the start, to combine. Freedom of contract was no longer an unquestioned ideal. Discipline and class solidarity seemed necessary to the maintenance of any opportunity above a subsistence level. Trade unionism and then "radicalism" of every hue and color developed—all, with the exception of anarchism, calling for more co-operation and more control as the way to freedom and opportunity.

Traditional American "individualism" and "democracy" had proved in some essential respects a failure. A true democracy of opportunity and an efficient organization of production aim not at freedom of acquisition but at a symmetrical, functional, freedom for all men and full serv-

Digitized by Google

ice from all men. A serious alteration must doubtless take place in the distribution of material income before we can approach the equity of opportunity which constitutes democracy, but if any one propensity is to be freed by democracy it is the "instinct of workmanship" and not that of acquisition.

There are reasons to believe that the attack on "privilege" goes deeper than a contemplation of a reform of our social arrangements to bring about this necessary redistribution of material income. There are indications that the underlying urge to social reform is perhaps not so much to raise the dollar income for its own sake as it is to secure this fuller measure of freedom for the functioning of individual capacities now felt to be atrophied by the acquisitive commercialism inherited from an earlier set of conditions. The revolt is against the unexpected results of the individualistic revolution of the eighteenth century.

It is not strange that a remarkable re-alignment of sentiment has taken place. The privileged aristocrats, who in the eighteenth century fought economic individualism of means (free trade, *laissez faire*, etc.) and opposed the extension of political democracy, now hold self-help and freedom of contract up to the masses as the final embodiment of economic wisdom and social morality, and exhibit surprise when a certain portion of the masses shows a tendency to undervaluate the democratic machinery of politics. On the other hand, those who forced through the program of political democracy and compelled the striking off of many (not all) of the mediæval prescriptive restrictions on self-help and individual energy, now turn their backs on individualism of means, and demand new measures of collective control, surpassing in range and complexity anything in the period prior to the Industrial Revolution. This new demand is made, of course, on the ground that changes in economic technology and financial organization and control have in fact rendered individualism of means—self-help—impossible in practice and dishonest as a theory. Continued attempt to keep up the fiction of self-help indi-

Digitized by Google

vidualism is held simply to cloud the issue in a mist of cant phrases and specious reasoning, and to throw industrial and political control into the hands of vested interests still dominated by the master-and-servant ethics.

If the foregoing attempt to outline the foundations of an ethics, the corner stone of which is individualism of ends, be accepted as valid, it evidently carries some very direct implications as to the ethics of privilege and democracy. From the standpoint of economy—i.e., development, conservation, and efficient utilization of human capacity—there can be no question that democracy as here defined, namely, equity of opportunity, and service according to developed capacity, would give us the ethical ideal of distribution, and, supposing our rational capacity to be equal to the task of co-operative organization, the most productive society possible.

One basic task of a scientific practical ethics lies precisely in finding out, as nearly as is scientifically possible, what the natural capacities of individuals are, and how they are distributed between different individuals. Toward the solution of this problem we have scarcely made a beginning. The biologists can give us little aid, for they are not able to experiment with human heredity, and are handicapped by their inability to isolate the hereditary factors from those due to environment. Much aid may eventually come from the development of the art of psychological tests. But care must be used not to attribute to hereditary talent or deficiency what may very well be due, in part at least, to training, education, and social stimuli in general. There is reason to think that in their enthusiasm over a new method of research many present-day psychologists are somewhat remiss in keeping this necessary caution in mind.

For a long time to come a society which really wished to be fair and economical in its distribution of opportunity would have to proceed by a refined and orderly trial-and-error method. All individuals would have to be given as nearly equal environmental stimulus (education, etc.) as

Digitized by Google

possible clear through the formative years of childhood and adolescence. At the conclusion of such a period—or even earlier in cases of palpable mental deficiency or superiority—the psychological testers could be called in, vocational experts summoned for advice, and the sheep definitely separated from the goats.

Needless to say, it is not likely that society will soon adopt any such Platonic plan of procedure. Nevertheless, every time we enforce a compulsory education law or add a new scholarship in aid of "worthy and indigent" students, or take a child away from unfit parents, we are taking a step along the road which led Plato to his highly democratic suggestion that a child of "golden" constitution, wherever born, should have opportunities equal to the best.

It may be objected, of course, that inasmuch as we know so little from actual, verifiable, scientific observation and measurement, as to the part played by difference in hereditary endowment, and that played by environmental stimulus, we should let things go on as they are. It may even be argued, with considerable show of reason, that in many particulars we now have a sort of inverted democracy—in that we give to inferior hereditary endowment opportunity that could better be devoted to individuals of demonstrated capacity. There can be little question, of course, that many wealthy individuals of the type who cannot or will not use opportunity productively owe the opportunities now thrown away upon them to gambling luck or to the exercise of anti-social acquisitive talents which it would be undesirable to encourage.

Nevertheless, it would probably be the consensus of opinion, among those most entitled by scientific research and observation to hold opinions on the subject, that we do not come now anywhere as near as we could, even with our present limited knowledge of human heredity and social psychology, to distributing opportunity to individuals in proportion to their potential capacities. And whether we do or not, it is patent that the growing masses of radicals do not think we do. If they are wrong, the

Digitized by Google

only proof that will still their clamor is a prolonged experiment under conditions in which special privilege, whether acquired by legal inheritance or otherwise, is reduced to a minimum.

A. B. WOLFE.

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS.

Digitized by Google

ETHICS AND LAW.

GREGORY HANKIN.

I.

LOGICALLY, an infinite number of ethical systems is possible, and if we had a world of logicians, each having his own systems of values, we should probably be confronted with as many systems of ethics as there are individuals. But that is not the method adopted by our world of oft illogical human beings. People do not walk about worrying whether their respective ethical systems are consistent, very few persons worry about ethics at all, and an insignificant number of them attempt to set up systems of ethics to suit themselves. Just as people react toward objects and posit values on them, so do they react to the values of those values (*i.e.*, values of the second order) and perhaps of even higher orders. As a result, in each individual there may be said to be a disorganized bundle of values. The people do not find themselves in the possession of systems of ethics, but of conglomerations of evaluations. These evaluations may be systematized into a very small number of ethical systems, which is greatly aided by the psychology of the people making those evaluations. A number of psychological factors enter to simplify the situation; the most important of which are imitation, fear of social constraint and habit. To discuss at length the functions of these psychological processes is the business of the psychologist. For the sake of elucidation, however, we shall touch on them very briefly.

Imitation plays a great part in childhood. That is the reason why so many people grow up with the evaluations of their social environment, often to a far greater extent than might be reasonably expected. People generally grow up to be of tender feelings, if such are the people about them; some people grow up to value highly matters pertaining to religion; the sons of war veterans are often chauvinistic

Digitized by Google

in their political opinions; many individuals grow up to vote for definite political parties.[1] Imitation is most active in childhood, but it is by no means dormant in the lives of grown persons, even of people who are constantly engaged in thought. There seems to be an aversion against one's own exclusiveness. Each person seeks to be in a class with others. Besides, imitation is the method of least resistance, by far less painful or troublesome than rationalization.[2]

Closely allied with the factor of imitation, is the fear of social disapproval.[3] What the relation is between this factor and imitation, whether it is the cause of imitation or whether it is one of the classes of imitation, is wholly immaterial to our present discussion. We grow up with certain evaluations imposed on us. For example, we are compelled to learn patriotic songs, to go to church, to wear clothes; or if we are not actively compelled to do certain things, sufficient disapproval is shown us, if we do not comply, to make us feel uncomfortable. Thus we are passively compelled to be neat in appearance, to greet our acquaintances; boys feel they ought to play ball; girls feel they ought to dress well, etc. One can go ahead multiplying those instances.[4] Some will be more apparently due to our reaction toward social disapproval, others will be less so apparent, at any rate, the influence of this factor in

---

[1] Professor Munro of Harvard had for a number of years taken a poll of his classes in Government in order to ascertain what proportion of the students intend to affiliate with the same political party as their parents. Save for a temporary lapse during the rise of the Progressive party, the proportion has uniformly proved to be 90 per cent or more. (See his *The Government of the United States*, p. 475.)

[2] Tarde bases the whole concept of "society" on the laws of repetition which he calls "imitation." Under this term he includes more than is generally understood by it, and he attributes too much influence to it. In his Social Philosophy, imitation is almost a Hegelian idea through which all things develop. But whatever be the shortcomings of Tarde's *Les lois de l' imitation*, it can hardly be denied that imitation is a very potent factor influencing the evaluations in society.

[3] Tarde: *Les lois de l'imitation*, p. 146.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 199, 327, 336, 340.

Digitized by Google

making evaluations more uniform in our social groups can hardly be disputed.

The last, although not the least in importance, is the factor of habit. Most of the evaluations we make depend either on our habits connected with the matter evaluated or on our habits of making those specific evaluations. These must be kept distinct, although it is often very difficult to separate them. We value tobacco, to a certain degree, because we are in the habit of smoking. But often we are in the habit of evaluating objects, even if we have not acquired any habits with reference to them, which is often the case with our principles of patriotism, with our attitude toward religious matters, etc. In many cases it is hard to distinguish between the value posited on an object on account of the habits acquired in the use of that object and the habit of evaluating an object in a certain way. An example of these border-line cases is often found in the value we put on prayer. A person in the habit of praying values his relation to the Divinity; but a person may stop praying and still value prayer in the same manner merely because he is in the habit of regarding prayer as valuable; also, a person may continue to pray and value this prayer simply because he always did value it. Most of the cases, however, present little difficulty. Once we have made certain evaluations, we continue to repeat them until something compels us to make a change. Sometimes a trivial matter is sufficient to cause that change, at other times changes in our evaluations are accompanied by catastrophies shattering our lives; sometimes the changes occur through our affective processes; at other times through the cognitive processes,—the person learns more, thinks differently and therefore evaluates differently; generally it comes through a complicated mixture of all psychological processes.

The fact, relevant to our considerations, is that, although the evaluations among the people are not systematized, should the task of their systematization be undertaken, we should expect to find a comparatively very small

Digitized by Google

number of ethical systems, and among these very few having a sufficiently large number of adherents to arrest our attention. All these systems of ethics enter into the formation of an average system for the life of the community.

II.

By the formation of an average system of ethics is not meant a group of ideals for the community as a whole to pray for, in other words, a religion. It means a system of evaluations for the people to act upon in daily life. Such a notion may be an innovation. If so, it is only because the writers on ethics and political science generally differentiate between morals and dynamic society to a far greater extent than is necessary; they stop in that differentiation only in so far as the ethicist recognizes, if he does, the need of law and order, while the jurist and political scientist recognize the force of ideals in society. The reason for the divorce between ethics on the one hand and political and juridical science on the other, may be traced to a generally accepted claim for a one prevailing system of ethics. Somehow people have already learned to recognize the possibility of many different, equally valid systems of law and politics, but they have not yet recognized the many systems of ethics. A system of ethics appears to be regarded by them as a set of eternal principles of righteousness, beside which all other systems of human conduct must roll in dust. Evidently with such a view of ethics there must exist such a division between law and morals.

It is the purpose of this discussion to point out that logically this division between law and ethics does not hold. But before proceeding with the analysis of the distinctions set up between ethics and law, it is highly necessary to make clear what is meant by a system of law. The words "systems of law" and "systems of politics," just as the words "systems of ethics," are employed here in a very limited and technical, mathematical, sense. By a system of ethics is meant an infinite number of principles of evalua-

Digitized by Google

tions of values, reducible to a finite set of consistent propositions, called the postulates of that system. In law we often have to distinguish between principles, standards, rules and conceptions.[5] In primitive law, says Pound, we find only rules,[6]—provisions of law applicable to a set of specific cases. For example, "if any one demand justice before a shire man or other judge and cannot obtain it and a man will not give him pledge, let him make bot with thirty shillings and within seven days do him justice,"[7] or, "if a man destroy the eye of another man, they shall destroy his eye,"[8] or, "a wife, a son, a slave, a pupil, and a (younger) brother of the full blood, who have committed faults, may be beaten with a rope or a split bamboo."[9] As will be readily noticed, the rules are evaluations of things or events, and we shall call these evaluations of the first order. The rules of the modern law are also evaluations of the first order, but differ from the foregoing evaluations in that in most cases[10] they embrace tremendous classes of values. For example, "estates in land may be conveyed only by deed executed and delivered," "he who acts through another, acts through himself," "a common carrier is bound to render reasonable service with reasonable facilities."[11] The ancient legal rules have one common characteristic: their specificity insures certainty. In modern law, this specificity has to give way to the practicability of the law. That is to say, the conditions of our society are so complex and so manifold, that law would become too unwieldy, if the original form were re-

[5] Pound: *Juristic Science and Law.* 31 *Harv. Law Rev.* 1047, 1060 ff. Also, Pound's Address before the American Bar Ass'n, Sept., 1919.

[6] The Dooms of King Edward (901–924); Dooms of King Ethelstan; Dooms of Ine; of Cnut; of Alfred; of Edmund; Salic Law; Laws of Howel the Good; Code of Hammurabi; etc. Interesting portions of these are quoted in Pound's *Readings in Jurisprudence* (not published).

[7] Dooms of King Ine, 8.

[8] Code of Hammurabi, Sect. 196.

[9] Laws of Manu, VIII, 299.

[10] But some of the evaluations in modern law have a primitive character, *e.g.*, the Tariffs of Compensation in the Workman Compensation Acts.

[11] Pound: Address before the American Bar Ass'n, 1919, p. 456.

Digitized by Google

tained. Throughout the development of law various methods were employed to make law certain and at the same time more general than the primitive law. During the period of the strict law, formalism, rigidity, individualism and indifference to moral principles helped the situation for some time, but soon became inadequate. In modern law this certainty is supplied by the "standards" and "conceptions" of law. The conceptions, as Pound indicates, set the materials of law in order. Generally they take the form of definition in law, as *e.g.*, sale, bailment, contract, etc. The standards are the definitions of the qualities of conduct. Here belong "the standard of due care under the circumstances", the "standard of reasonable service in the law of public utilities," the "standard of conduct of a fiduciary in equity," the "standard of reasonableness in the law as to restraint of trade," the "standard of due process of law," etc.[12] The conceptions, standards and rules together yield the evaluations of the first order contained in law. These are sufficient for the practice of law and the administration of justice, *i.e.*, for law as a practical agency.

The development of the *science of law*, however, depends largely on the *principles of law*. "These are the general premises for judicial and juristic reasoning to which we turn to supply new rules, to interpret old rules, to meet new situations, to measure the scope and application of our rules and standards and reconcile them when they conflict." [13] These principles are not given direct application, but are indirectly applied through the rules. They are evaluations of rules, are therefore evaluations of the second order, and each evaluation of the second order implies a number of evaluations of the first order. Thus, the principle that "no man should enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another" implies, among others, the rules as to quasi-contracts; the principle that "liability is a corollary of fault," implies the many rules of torts; and so the principle that every law must be applicable to the

[12] From notes on Pound's lectures in Jurisprudence.

[13] Pound: *Op. cit.*, p. 455.

Digitized by Google

wants and the institutions of the people.[14] A set of consistent principles, subsuming a sufficient number of rules, standards and conceptions of a given body of law, may be termed, a "system of law." Strictly speaking, we have no *systems of law*, for law has not developed entirely as a science. To a great extent it has developed as the art of settling disputes in accordance with certain rules. This function of law is not to be belittled. The great need for the study of the problems of law in "terms of social engineering" has been established beyond dispute by eminent jurists like Rudolf v. Jehring and Roscoe Pound. But we must not forget that this inductive method of law must be at least supplemented by the deductive method, the search for legal principles to make law a science. A system of law for the present is therefore to be treated as an ideal in law, just as a *system of ethics* is an ideal in the field of morals. But the fact that we have not those principles printed in books, or the fact that it might be very difficult to find principles when we seek to establish them will not prevent us from making certain deductions concerning them, as if we had them before us, just as we do in the physical sciences which are not yet mathematically systematized. One of the generalizations that can be made is that all the rules of law are subsumed under some principles which are evaluations of values and as such belong to the province of ethics.

Now that we have defined some of our terms, let us examine the differences set up between morals and law, and see whether these differences are genuine.

"Law is always capable of being digested into rules or logical propositions, morality never," says Amos.[15] Probably Amos himself would modify the position that no moral judgments can be digested into rules and propositions, and therefore we shall turn to the question whether that can be true of some moral systems. Here we must admit that there may be moral principles whose life is

[14] Wagner v. Bissell. 3 Ia. *Reports*, 396.

[15] Amos: *Science of Law*, Ch. III.

Digitized by Google

threatened by logical analysis, for example: "one must feel the good and fear the wrath of the Lord" (although it is really debatable whether even these propositions may not be stated in a logical form). If these propositions do not stand the test of consistency, then they can never become parts of *systems of ethics*. They may be helpful in keeping some persons out of mischief, but they have no place in our discussion. Applied to moral principles in general, the statement has a more direct bearing not on the moral principles themselves, but on the psychological reactions of individuals toward those principles. In that case we should also find analogous reactions toward the legal principles which Amos does recognize within the scope of logic. But whether there are such reactions or not, they do not affect the principles of any given system of ethics, just as they do not affect the principles of law.

Closely allied to the argument reflecting the relation between ethics and logic is an argument proposed by Pound [16] that, in counterdistinction to ethics, "developed law is and must be scientific." That developed law is always scientific, would perhaps be allowing the legal systems too much credit, unless we regard it as an analytic proposition, *i.e.*, cannot be developed unless it is scientific. That the development of law *must* be scientific is true, because otherwise law would be inadequate in making its evaluations. The need for scientific principles in law is felt more and more as we attempt to apply law to the ever growing complexity of our lives. The great task of the science of law is the constant simplification of applicable principles in this very midst of growing complexity. The need, however, is no less present in the science of ethics, although, perhaps, it has not been felt as keenly by the philosophers as it has been felt by the lawyers in their respective fields of practice, because the consequences of ethical judgments are not immediately affective as the legal judgments are.

Pound further maintains that while moral principles

[16] Lectures on Jurisprudence.

Digitized by Google

must be applied with reference to circumstances and individuals, legal principles are typically of general and absolute nature. We must note that moral principles are principles of evaluation of values, hence in application must be general. No moral principle embraces so many qualifications, as to put each individual into a unique class. It is not that such a state of affairs is undesirable, it is that it is impossible for us, with limited capacities, to cover in one judgment all the numerous factors present in our social or individual, physical or mental, etc., lives. Thus we are compelled to isolate a few factors and base our evaluations upon them; irrespective of all the other factors actually present. In other words, we have general principles, each applicable to a class of individuals or circumstances. Is the situation different in law? Here, too, each legal principle is applicable to a class of individuals found in, or entering into, certain circumstances. Whether the classes handled by law are really greater than those handled by the science of ethics is a very debatable and, at the same time, a very fruitless question. Besides, should we maintain the opposite extreme, that law cannot be administered with reference to circumstances and persons, how are we to regard such movements in legal science as the individualization of punishment, the introduction of juvenile courts, etc? Too minute a classification in law will undoubtedly render the legal systems too unwieldy, just as it would be the case in any system of ethics.

Pollock rightly points out that any legal system treats as indifferent certain moral principles, and upholds others. This, however, does not necessarily differentiate law from ethics. All it illustrates is that the legal systems and the other moral systems are by no means mutually inclusive, nor mutually exclusive. There is indeed a great field belonging to both of them. What this field consists of will become apparent when we shall have devoted due attention to some other arguments for the separation of law from ethics.

It is also argued that since resistance to law may be

Digitized by Google

moral, but cannot be legal, law and ethics are distinct. This would be true if there were but one system of morals and one system of law. But the existence of many systems of law is beyond dispute, and what is legal in one of those systems may be either legal or illegal in the other systems. Nor is there any reason for supposing that there is but one system of morals, and therefore what may be moral in one system may be non-moral, or even immoral in some other system. As between the systems of morals and systems of law, whatever may be moral in any given system of ethics, may or may not be legal in any given system of law; and vice versa, whatever may be legal in any given system of law, may be moral, non-moral or immoral in any given system of ethics.

Another distinction set up by Amos is based on æsthetic grounds. He finds that "the region of law is infinitely poor when contrasted" with the regions of morality.[17] Amos recognizes that there are different systems of morality,[18] but unfortunately he recognizes only those systems which have already gained recognition, systems that have forced their entrance into the realms of immortality through the art of printing. But what of the morals maintained by the millions who wield no power with the pen, how about the morals maintained by those who are totally uneducated? Surely, Amos will not insist that their systems of ethics are richer and broader in substance than the systems of law. And even if we limit ourselves to the developed systems of ethics, it is hardly fair to say that the systems of law are so poor as not to deserve a place among them. A critical student of law will certainly recognize that law intentionally disregards many evaluations it might make, but the same will the student of ethics find in the various systems of morals. Taking the problems as they present themselves, the student of law will often develop distinctions hardly dreamt of by the student of morals who regards the problems of law as extraneous to his field. The same will

[17] Amos: *Science of Law*, Ch. II.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 32 (Sec. Ed.).

Digitized by Google

be true with the moral problems raised by the student of ethics,—he will find distinctions unnoticed by the student of law.

Another objection, often raised against the so-called confusion between law and morals, is that the former does not "aim at perfecting the individual character of man, but at regulating the relations of citizens to the commonwealth." [19] It is indeed questionable whether every system of ethics aims directly, and not merely indirectly, to perfect the individual. There is a class of ethical systems, regarding *self-realization* as the summum bonum; on the other hand, every system of ethics may be interpreted as indirectly striving to perfect the individual. As Sir Frederick Pollock himself points out, there are also many instances in law tending to perfect the individual. Besides those indicated by him, there are many such other instances of attempts at perfection, as *e.g.*, legislation concerning education, concerning gambling, spiteful acts, sex morality, etc. This is by no means a defense for the view that law, in order to be a system of morals, must aim to perfect the individual; but that law does perfect the individual in accordance with its standards, although this quality is by no means necessary for law or for a system of ethics.

It is often argued that law relates only to external conduct.[20] This, although generally accepted, is not quite so. Laws may not make direct provisions against thoughts or feelings which tend to subvert the social order. Yet by *implication* law does take cognizance of inner conduct. For example, the law differentiates between murder and homicide. The law also makes other distinctions between subjective intents of one sort and of another sort, *e.g.*, it recognizes the relinquishment of a *bona fide* claim to be good consideration for a contract to forbear suit, some systems of law recognize the subjective test of contracts, etc. It is often the policy of the law to express only what is

[19] Pollock: *First Book of Jurisprudence*, Part I, Ch. II.

[20] Gareis: *Science of Law*, Sect. 6.

Digitized by Google

capable of direct enforcement, but it does not mean that it has no view as to the inclinations, feelings and ideas of the people under its jurisdiction. In fact, legal institutions regulate the social institutions in such a way as to induce the individuals and groups to have definite kinds of thoughts, feelings, etc. To many subjective activities of the individuals or groups just as to many of their external activities, the law remains neutral. But so does any moral system. It is interesting to note that, although the ethics of Socrates clearly stated that knowledge is virtue, and that ignorance is vice, most ethical systems within the past few hundred years have remained neutral to the values of intellectual efficiency. So also modern systems of ethics remain neutral to the values of physical efficiency. Such was not the case with the Spartans who regarded bodily strength as more important than life itself. In fact, there is no reason why any moral system must deal with the internal activities of the individuals, it can limit its evaluations to their external life either entirely or in part, or it can concern itself with values without reference to conduct internal or external.

A similar argument for the separation of ethics from legislation is proposed by Bentham. He regards law and ethics as concentric, the scope of ethics including the field covered by legislation. This notion, though very persuasive, is hardly accurate. He points to the many principles which are concerned with the subjective element of life and have only an insufficiently clear counterpart in objective life. These Bentham puts into the field of ethics, but outside of the field of law. In other words, the systems of law are *neutral* to those principles, that is, the systems are incomplete, they are excluded from the class of ethics. The question is, can there be no system of ethics which is incomplete? If not, then Bentham's own system of morality cannot be called "ethics." Nor can any of those systems we defined as ethical systems be actual systems, since they are all incomplete. The answer to this depends largely on a matter of definition.

Digitized by Google

And it is not illogical to maintain that there can be no system of ethics, unless it is complete. For the sake of expediency, however, it is better to recognize as systems of ethics those which *might* be complete, even if they are not or will never become complete. If we adopt the opposite view, then we have no systems of ethics at all. With this view, we should have within the universe of moral systems, many such systems, some of which will be the legal systems.

A further distinction is suggested by the statement that law does not necessarily approve what it does not condemn. The classes of cases where the law condemns, may be divided into cases where the law condemns and enforces that condemnation and cases where the law condemns, but does not enforce the condemnation. The latter class of cases is usually present where there is a conflict of legal rules or principles. For example, law condemns murder, but the law will not convict when the accused has killed in self defense. But sometimes the law will condemn and not enforce the condemnation, even if it does not appear as an exception to the general rule which is enforced. This is another indication of the incompleteness of the legal systems, and the limitations of legal action [21] will probably keep law forever in its incomplete form. On the other hand, the classes of cases where the law approves is also divided into things which the law encourages, *e.g.*, education of children, growth of forests, the building of good roads, etc., and things to which the law is indifferent, *i.e.*, where the law is again incomplete. The same situation prevails in the province of ethics. The two classes of condemnation are merged into one, because an ordinary system of ethics does not have the problem of enforcement. Take any system of ethics, try to enforce it, and that class of cases will immediately arise. Yet, even so, not all things which a system of ethics condemns are necessarily approved by it, unless that system of ethics is complete, and that is a compliment that can hardly be paid to any

[21] Pound: Limitation of Legal Action. *International Journal of Ethics*, 1918.

Digitized by Google

system of ethics that has ever been constructed from the beginning of the age of learning to the present day, and there are no indications that such a system will be proposed in the near future. At any rate, if it comes to a question of choice between a complete and very complicated system on the one hand, and an incomplete but simple system on the other, there is no doubt we might choose the latter. Since the systems of ethics are not complete, every system has within its scope many principles of evaluations toward which it is indifferent, in other words, no system of ethics necessarily approves where it does not condemn.

Bentham objects to the confusion between law and morals, because laws are enforced, and the use of force is itself an evil.[22] It is true that some legislation, as Bentham points out, is penal, and that law establishes itself largely through the use of force. Yet it is questionable whether moral principles may not be enforced, and it is most doubtful that the enforcement of certain principles is necessarily an evil, or an evil greater than the good attained. It may be so in Bentham's system of ethics, provided he also maintains that the use of force is the greatest of evils. But it cannot be expected that every system of ethics maintain such a position.

Korkunov [23] distinguishes between technical and ethical norms, which on the whole correspond to our distinction between the evaluations of the first and those of the second orders.[24] The difference between the point of view of this discussion and that of Korkunov begins at the obvious point. He maintains that ethical norms are characterized by unity, and "are necessarily the same for all the manifestations of human activity, for all circumstances of life." [25] Essentially that is true, but only *with reference to the particular system of ethics to which these norms belong.* Outside

[22] *Principles of Legislation*, Ch. XII.

[23] *Theory of Law*, Bk. I, Ch. I, Sect. 5–7.

[24] *Theory of Law*, p. 42.

[25] Compare this with Pound's view that moral principles must be applied with reference to circumstances and individuals.

Digitized by Google

of its system any ethical norm may or may not apply in the same manner.

With this distinction between the technical and ethical norms, Korkunov arrives at the correct conclusion that law consists of ethical norms.[26] Yet he would not regard law as one of the ethical systems. The reason Korkunov proposes for the distinction is that ethical systems are individualistic in the sense that they determine the series of values in the life of the individual, incidentally taking into consideration that he is a member of society and that he has certain interests conflicting among themselves and with the interests of others, while systems of law are not so individualistic. Korkunov adds that "the moral criterion cannot give such an indication as to settle the conflict." In practical life this is of course so, *i.e.*, the moral criterion is not sufficient to settle disputes and that is due to the fact that we have a multiplicity of ethical systems in operation. Then arises another system which is accepted as a criterion, this is the legal system. Like every moral system, law limits the individual's conflicting interests and at the same time limits all other interests arising contrary to it. And so when Korkunov distinguishes law from morals by saying that "law is the delimitation of the interests of different persons," he is in effect saying, that law shares in this quality with all other systems of ethics. The difference is that while the delimitations exercised by other systems are rarely effective, the delimitations exercised by the legal systems are very often effective.

III.

Many other arguments have been proposed for the distinction between ethics and law, but they can be met in the same manner in which the foregoing arguments were answered. They are all subject to the criticism that they assume "one and only one system of ethics." Then, finding that the system of law does not wholly fit into that

[26] By legal norms, Korkunov seems to mean only the principles of law. The legal rules can just as well be treated as technical norms.

Digitized by Google

system of ethics, it is straightway excluded. But without this assumption of a unique system of ethics, there is no reason why we should not take sides with the school of natural law, including law among the systems of morals.[27] Yet we cannot wholly agree with the proponents of natural law for the same reason: there the pendulum of juristic thought had swung into the opposite extreme, that of identifying law and ethics, as one and only one system.[28]

Law was regarded as a part of ethics by the Roman prætors. Thus in the Digest (XX, 6, 13, pr.) we find the following provision: "Even a slave may be under a natural obligation; consequently, if anyone should pay a debt on a slave's account, or a slave himself should pay for being manumitted . . . there will be no right of action for return of the money out of the peculium [29] of which he has the free management, and for this reason any surety who has been accepted for the slave will be held liable, and a pledge given in his behalf will be retained; moreover, if the slave, having management of his peculium, should give something by way of pledge for his debt, he must be allowed an utilis actio to redeem." [30] Again, "if a slave-owner owed money to his slave and paid it to him after his manumission, he cannot sue for the return of it, even though he paid under the impression that he was liable in some action to compel him to do so, as he paid in recognition of an obligation good in natural law." [31] Thus if the Roman law did not provide a remedy where the prætor thought a remedy ought to be had, or, if the law allowed a remedy where the prætor thought a natural law would be violated, the prætor adjudicated in accordance with his own system of morals as far as was practicable.

The same was true of the English Chancellors. The

[27] Lorimer: *Institutes of Law* (second edition), p. 353–367.

[28] Holmes: Natural Law, *Harvard Law Rev.*, Vol. 32, p. 40 ff.

[29] Property allowed to the slave for use and management. Legally it is the master's, but in payment of a natural obligation he cannot recover it. (Pound's lectures in Jurisprudence.)

[30] Similar statements are found in the *Digest*, XII, 6, 38, 2; IV, 5, 2, 2.

[31] *Ibid.*, XII, 6, 64.

Digitized by Google

Chancellor was originally a clergyman and the keeper of the King's conscience. The King administered justice through the courts in accordance with definite rules. But while the courts of law insisted that the system of common law was always complete and will allow justice to prevail in every dispute that may ever arise, the King's conscience would not allow some persons to take advantage of their legal rights, if that be contrary to the law of God. And since the Chancellor was both a clergyman and the keeper of the King's conscience, he evidently knew what the law of God was and how the law of the King might be made correlative to it. Any person disregarding the order of the Lord Chancellor was a sinner and was therefore to be sentenced to Hell, but as Hell was out of the reach of the Lord Chancellor, he was sent to the place resembling it most, namely the prison. Such is the humorous side of this question. In reality, the Chancellor's decisions were a recognition of the incompleteness of the English law, and the whole question of the King's conscience and the law of God was a dogmatic fiction that yielded in time an elaborate system of equity. In the meantime, the English Chancellors imposed on the people their own systems of morals. Actually imposed, because the Chancellor was never content with merely issuing an order to one of his officers to obtain from the defendant the value of the judgment, but proceeded to enforce specific obedience on the part of the defendant either by religious or civil punishment.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the schools of natural law made another attempt to make law a part of ethics,[32] but they too could not accomplish much, for the simple reason that each one considered *his* moral system to be the right one. And so strong was the conviction of the prætors, chancellors and seventeenth and eighteenth century jurists that their system of righteousness was the

[32] In England the latest attempt was made at the beginning of the nineteenth century by Lord Mansfield who maintained that a moral obligation is sufficient consideration for a subsequent promise. The doctrine was abandoned at the beginning of the second quarter of the nineteenth century.

Digitized by Google

only one possible, that in each of those cases a reaction had to set in, and law was declared as separate and distinct from the province of ethics. Actually the reason was that the morals of the judges were not always the morals of the community where the law was applied. Then the jurists separated their field of activity from the ideals of the philosophers and devoted themselves to making law more applicable to the state of affairs in society.

But that did not alter the characteristics of the science as a system of evaluations of values, it still remains a system of ethics. The question is whose system of ethics it is to represent. Theoretically law may represent a system of morals imposed on a community by a philosopher,—for example, Plato's Republic; it may represent the will of the absolute sovereign, as proposed by Hobbes. Practically, the system of law always represents a compromise between the ethical systems of the ruler and the ruled. This is the foundation of the principle that law must be applicable to the wants and institutions of the people. The wants are the dynamic evaluations of society, and the institutions are the stabilized evaluations which are the resultants of the conflicting evaluations of the immediate past. Hence any ethical system imposed upon all people would prove ineffective, unless it soon became a sufficient compromise of the ethical systems in the community. By ethical systems in this connection, we mean not only those systematized or admitted in discussion, but also those values acted upon by the people in the community, which (values) might be organized. It is therefore quite evident that the greater the deviation of the system of law from the ethical systems entertained by the members upon whom it is imposed, the greater will be the difficulty in the application of law for the maintenance of justice and peace. The least amount of friction is to be expected where the system of law represents the average of the ethical systems in the community. Since law seeks to maintain peace at the smallest cost to the people, and with the view that community life may be maintained at the smallest cost, it must

Digitized by Google

necessarily assume the form of the average workable ethical system in the community.

This is by no means contrary to the actual development of law. In Anglo-American law this is more apparent than in the other systems. Thus to determine whether a person is negligent, the question is raised as to what an ordinary prudent man (meaning an average man) would do under the circumstances. To determine the meaning of an alleged libel, it is asked how an average man would understand it. When words are used in the making of a contract, not the exact grammatical meaning is taken, but what an ordinary person means when he speaks those words under those circumstances. Almost every legal standard refers to the position of an ordinary man under the circumstances. The juries are picked as average men to insure the application of those standards. "People must not be wiser than the experience of mankind," says Lord Justice Bowen.[33] This statement is to be interpreted to mean that it is dangerous for one to be wiser than the average man, and there is a great deal of truth in it. This is not meant to discourage men from being wise. Quite the contrary, by encouraging men to be wise, the average is thereby raised. It is meant to point out a naked truth that the legal system is made to suit best the average man, and anybody deviating from his standard is liable to suffer. The same therefore holds with the man who is not as wise as the average. It may be hard on the men at both extremes. Yet, let us suppose that law is made to suit the wise man rather than the average man. Then both the average and the subaverage men would have to suffer. We cannot afford to make the average man suffer, there are altogether too many in his class, hence the law must secure his interests or the legal system will not work.

In Roman law and under the Civil Codes, this reference to the average man is not as explicit, but it exists there

[33] Filburn *v.* People's Palace and Aquarium Co., Ltd., 25 Q. B. D., 258. This statement is a paraphrase of Coke's maxim: "Neminem oportet esse sapientiorem legibus."

Digitized by Google

implicitly. Even where there are such distinctions as between *culpa levis* and *culpa lata*, between *actio bonae fidei* and an ordinary *actio*, the actual reference is to the average under the circumstances. The systems of law could not operate smoothly, unless it did take cognizance of the average man ruled by the laws.

The task of the legislator is to determine the evaluations in society. Since those evaluations are constantly changing, and laws are meant to be more or less permanent, legislation must concern itself not merely with the stabilized values of society, *i.e.*, the institutions, but also with the tendencies of the dynamic evaluations of the people. A fair compromise of these would be the nearest approach to what is generally known as "the will of the people." The function of the judge is, from one point of view, different only in degree: he determines what that average evaluation is in a given case in so far as that evaluation can be made consistent with all the other evaluations in the system. In spite of all that has been said and written against the importance of logic in law, this consistency determines the extent to which the law is a guarantee for future action. In other words, the work of the jurist is to systematize these averaged evaluations, so that the law may represent *the average workable ethical system in the given community.*

GREGORY HANKIN.

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY.

Digitized by Google

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE THEORY OF ETHICS. By Arthur Kenyon Rogers. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922. Pp. 197.

This is a notable attempt to construct a thorough-going empirical or naturalistic ethics, based in the "constitution of human nature." While the book is essentially a unit, the first half contains the main structure of the theory; the second is more practical, and presents in broad outline the principles of selection in the pursuit of a good life. The latter part of the book must be passed over entirely in this review, except to say that the whole discussion is richly illuminating and stimulating, without a page that is dull or commonplace, and that it is genuinely based on the theoretical part—which is too seldom the case with our "applied ethics." In the more theoretical part the principal contributions are the conceptions of value and of duty. A bare summary only can be given here, without attempting to do justice to the acute and many-sided analysis.

Human nature is first of all impulsive. "Life means doing things that we find interesting and important." These impulses are rooted in the instinctive nature as an ultimate biological fact, though out of them grow innumerable specific interests of every sort. While the attainment of these impulsive efforts normally gives satisfaction, the feeling of pleasure is very seldom—indeed never originally—before the mind, but rather the action to be performed or the end to be accomplished.

But human nature is not merely impulsive; it is also reflective. Reason is not indeed independent source for the ends and raw materials of conduct, but is the power to anticipate the course of impulses, to integrate and organize them, and to relate temporary to permanent interests. Impulses do not simply lie alongside one another in our make-up, but are subject to comparison and preference, and to adjustment when they conflict. Reflection therefore makes possible, by its correction of partial views, an ideal unity of impulses and a satisfaction "on the whole."

Now it is in the "reflective situation" that the author locates the appreciation of value, which he identifies with "approval," or the "assigning of goodness." Approval then is a judgment, not an immediate impulsive attitude, but it is a judgment which car-

Digitized by Google

ries a special feeling quality of its own. A thing has value not because it is itself an object of desire, but only if, when it is thought about as an object of desire, the thought gives pleasure. But the content of the judgment of approval also involves pleasure. To be approved an object must have a satisfying character. This does not mean that the idea of pleasure must be present as the motive of impulse—hedonism is emphatically repudiated—or even that it is always consciously presented in the judgment of approval, which ordinarily takes account only of the "concrete" activities and results of impulse; but rather that the approval, if it is critically tested, can justify itself only by pointing to satisfaction. Moreover, pleasure is not psychologically the basis of impulse; our impulses are rooted in our native constitution, and pleasure has the biological function of furthering them. But intellectually we use satisfaction as the sign that they are being furthered, and therefore as the critical test of approval.

Nor are all impulses approved. Reflection tends to "spread" from one to others, and to bring them into larger wholes; it may happen therefore that a thing which is pleasant in itself may be thought of in a larger situation which makes the thought of it repulsive. This gives a tool for the rational integration of life, and for the coercing of temporary or conflicting impulses. The good comes to be thought of as a life which is satisfactory as a whole, an ordered system of values.

It is here that the doctrine of duty finds its place. The author acknowledges the empirical difference between balance of desire and sense of obligation, and undertakes to account for the latter in terms of impulse and experience. He accepts so far as it goes the "custom" theory of the origin of conscience, that it is a habitual and subconscious attitude due to social pressure and opinion. But this is insufficient, because such a sanction disintegrates under criticism—it cannot stand up when "found out"—whereas the real sense of moral obligation deepens with increased reflection and sensitiveness to values. The author derives it from the feeling of repression when something is desired and at the same time disliked. Emotional repugnance against something which we actively crave—which as immediate impulse attracts us, but in its broader setting is repulsive—gives the moral feeling of "ought not," and this emotional coloring then extends by comparison to its positive alternatives as the "ought." There are several sources of this moral repulsion, among them the esthetic feeling

Digitized by Google

for the ugly, moral indignation, self-respect, and dislike of the trivial or "unreal." This last is subjected to a thorough and interesting analysis which we cannot follow here. But even this bare summary may serve to suggest the general method. The author believes that a sense of obligation thus rooted may be subjected to reflective criticism without moral loss, and that it is so well based in human nature and in the world we act in that it can fairly be called objective.

This work will probably call out a good deal of discussion. There is space here only for the mention of some possible criticisms. The reviewer agrees heartily in the demand for an empirical basis of ethics, but it seems to him that this attempt shows some serious defects. (1) There is insufficient analysis of the reflective situation, its origins, its technique, and its transforming effect upon impulses. (2) There is no adequate account of how "native impulses" give rise to the rich variety of actual acquired interests. The biological basis is stressed at the expense of the psychological outcome. (3) While all reflection is of course affectively colored by the content of interests to which it relates, it is difficult to see why the judgment of approval is unique in carrying feeling tone. There may be every degree of sophistication in reflection about ends; but why should approval be secondary in any other sense than all thinking? (4) In the early part of the book the author speaks constantly of "objects" of desire and approval; later he uses a vocabulary of activities and results. If the book were rewritten in the later terms it would be clearer, and might be more consonant with a doctrine of "interests" which the author at the beginning rejects, but which might well have strengthened his own essential position. (5) The social interests are too much left out of account. The author is entirely right, it is true, in requiring an individualistic basis of ethics; a good life is always *someone's* life. But the social interests within the personal life are far more significant and constitutive than he allows. (6) A fuller analysis of them would modify considerably the conceptions both of approval and of duty. Particularly in the case of duty some transition must be traced from the customary origin of oughtness—which will not bear reflective scrutiny—*over to* the enlightened conscience which deepens with reflection. The social concept of responsibility would have provided such a transition, without invalidating the factors which the author points out.

Digitized by Google

But in dealing with such a book as this of Professor Rogers, brevity is distortion. The book deserves full reading.

J. F. CRAWFORD.

BELOIT COLLEGE.

SHORTER NOTICES.

THE PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC. Second Edition, revised with commentary and terminal essays. By F. H. Bradley. In two volumes. London: Oxford University Press, 1922. Pp. xxviii, 388; 389–739. Price, 9.35.

The first edition of Bradley's *Logic* marked an epoch in logical study. It might be not unfairly compared with the logical criticism of a Locke, a Kant, or a Mill. It subjected a large number of the ordinary assumptions of the thought of that time to examination which proved their untenability.

The present revised edition is a reprint of the first edition together with certain additional notes and several terminal essays not before published. These are all on logical topics except the twelfth essay which deals with theoretical and practical activity. This essay attempts to defend in general the idealistic position as against the one-sided emphasis upon practice which the author finds in Pragmatism. "If practice is to bring nothing from a higher world into this region of what happens, then, however much it may *do*, its activity and its results will have no practical sense or value." "Everything that is worth our having is (you may say) our own doing, and exists only so far as produced by ourselves. But you must add that, in the whole region of human value, there is nothing that has not come down to us from another world—nothing which fails still to owe its proper being and reality to that which lives and works beyond the level of mere time and existence."

THE GOLDEN BOUGH. By Sir James Frazer, F. R. S., F. B. A. London: Macmillan & Co., 1922 (abridged edition). Pp. xiv, 756. Price, 18s. net.

The Golden Bough, in its own line, is one of the books which have made history. By the compression of the original twelve volumes into one, Sir James Frazer has conferred a real favour upon those whose libraries have no room for the large edition. The language of the original has for the most part been preserved, though, as was necessitated by the present size, the exposition has been somewhat condensed; no new material has been added, for the later evidence which has come to Sir James's knowledge has (as he writes) on the whole served either to "confirm former conclusions, or to furnish fresh illustrations of old principles." In the preface also he reiterates his warning against a misapprehension still current about the relative importance of tree-worship, which is fully treated. So far from regarding the reverence for trees as of supreme importance for the evolution of religion, Sir James considers this "to have been altogether subordinate to other factors, and in particular to the fear of the human dead." (P. vii.)

J. E.

FREEDOM AND CHRISTIAN CONDUCT—AN ETHIC. By John A. W. Haas. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. Pp. vi, 318.

This is a textbook meant for denominational colleges, presenting ethics from a Christian point of view. It is less partisan, however, than this avowed bias would suggest. Writing from what until half a century ago

Digitized by Google

was the accepted standpoint for American and English treatises on ethics, the author reverts to, and makes central, a problem that has all but disappeared from recent attempts to treat ethics scientifically. He regards "freedom as the great ethical question. Its solution is suggested through personality, which is expanded beyond its current meaning." The concrete trend of the discussion is sufficiently indicated by the three division headings—"Fundamentals of Freedom," "The Finding of Freedom," and "The Functioning of Freedom." T. V. S.

THE APOSTLE PAUL AND THE MODERN WORLD. By Francis G. Peabody. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. Pp. x, 285.

This is a simple discussion whose primary interest is for students of religion. From modern researches into "the state of the Roman Empire in Paul's time," and into "the alien faiths which had there gained a hearing," such light has been thrown upon Paul and Paulinism as makes the author feel justified in re-presenting this Christian saint to the modern world. Readers of this Journal will find in Chapter VI the Pauline ethics analyzed into an emphasis upon liberty, a sense of power, and a consciousness of growth. T. V. S.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Robert H. Gault. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1923. Pp. x, 336. Price, $2.00.

In this study we have intelligently reflected the newer influences that are making themselves felt not only among psychologists but in all the social sciences as well. Yielding *instincts* to recent onslaughts, the author feels that "undifferentiated *instinct* is taking their place . . . as a cornerstone of an infinitely complex web of habits." "Mutual acquaintanceship and understanding" become thus the great things in social psychology. Students of ethics will find the entire treatment of interest, but particularly so Chapters VIII and IX on "Convention, Custom and Morale" and "Social Progress." The medium size of the volume, the pleasing appearance to the eye, and the straightforward style recommend this book as an available text for students not too far advanced.

T. V. S.

DUTY TO CIVILIZATION. By Francis Neilson. New York: B. W. Huebsch, Inc., 1923. Pp. 136. Price, $1.00.

These articles first published in an American weekly, now supplemented by one more, are here brought together to constitute a rather penetrating criticism of secret diplomacy as a major factor in bringing on the Great War. No nation involved escapes blame: the complicity of all alike is seen in the common "faking and garbling" of official dispatches that went on just before the war broke out. "Our Duty to Civilization" is to rid ourselves of the system that renders such procedure respectable.

T. V. S.

THE APPEARANCE OF MIND. By James Clark McKerrow. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1923. Pp. vii, 120. Price, $2.00.

The foregoing title is meant to imply not the emergence of mind, but the non-reality of mind. The author sets forth, "in place of the Notion of Mind, that of another Immaterial Principle, which shall adequately perform its functions. And that is all . . ." Students of ethics will be interested in the author's declaration that he has traced the evolution of

Digitized by Google

"Spiritual Values' from Physico-Chemical Action by Natural Law," but will perhaps not be unprepared for his closing confession that in the ordeal he has found himself "at once Atheist and Theist, Necessitarian and Libertarian, Mortal and Immortal." Both the manner and the matter of this epigrammatic booklet are hereby indicated. T. V. S.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

BOOK REVIEW DIGEST. Eighteenth annual cumulation. Reviews of 1922 books. Edited by Marion A. Knight and Mertice M. James. New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1923. Pp. 650.

BURT, CYRIL. Mental and Scholastic Tests. London: P. S. King and Company, Ltd., 1922. Pp. xv, 432. Price, 21s. net.

CAMPION, G. C. Elements in Thought and Emotion. University of London Press, 1923. Pp. xvi, 162. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

CANNON, IDA M. Social Work in Hospitals. A contribution to progressive medicine. New and revised edition. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1923. Pp. xiii, 247. Price, $1.50.

COMISH, NEWEL HOWLAND. The Standard of Living. Elements of Consumption. New York: Macmillan Company, 1923. Pp. xiv, 340. Price, $2.00.

COULTON, G. G. Five Centuries of Religion. Vol. I. St. Bernard, His Predecessors and Successors, 1000–1200 A.D. Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought. Edited by G. G. Coulton. Cambridge, at the University Press; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. Pp. xliii, 578. Price, 30s. net.

DARROW, CLARENCE. Crime, Its Cause and Treatment. London: George G. Harrap and Company, Ltd., 1923. Pp. 292. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

DAS, TARAKNATH. India in World Politics. New York: B. W. Huebsch, Inc., 1923. Pp. xvii, 135. Price, $1.25.

DAWSON, R. MACGREGOR. The Principle of Official Independence. London: P. S. King and Son, Ltd., 1922. Pp. xvi, 268. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

DICKINSON, G. LOWES. War, Its Nature, Cause and Cure. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1923. Pp. 156. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

DOW, G. S. Society and Its Problems. London: George G. Harrap and Company, Ltd., 1923. Pp. xiv, 594. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

EMMETT, E. B. A Short History of Quakerism. London: The Swarthmore Press, Ltd., 1923. Pp. 352. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

FALSIFICATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK. Actual Exchange of Telegrams Between Paris and St. Petersburg at the Outbreak of the War. Edited by Baron G. Von Romberg, with the approval of the German Foreign Office. New York: B. W. Huebsch, Inc., 1923. Pp. xiii, 77. Price, $1.00.

GAULT, ROBERT H. Social Psychology. The bases of behavior called social. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1923. Pp. x, 336. Price, $2.50.

GOITEN, F. Primitive Ordeal and Modern Law. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1923. Pp. xviii, 382. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

HAAS, JOHN A. W. Freedom and Christian Conduct. New York: Macmillan Company, 1923. Pp. ix, 318. Price, $2.25.

HOERNLE, R. F. ALFRED. Matter, Life, Mind, and God. Five lectures on contemporary tendencies of thought. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. Pp. xi, 215. Printed in Great Britain.

HOFLER, ALOIS. Logik. (Second Edition.) Vienna: Holder, Pichler and Company, 1922. Pp. xii, 936.

HOPKINS, E. WASHBURN. Origin and Evolution of Religion. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923. Pp. 370. Price, $3.00.

Digitized by Google

JOAD, C. E. M. Common Sense Theology. London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 1922. Pp. 288. Price, 21s. net.

KLEIN, PHILIP. The Burden of Unemployment. A Study of Unemployment Relief Measures in Fifteen Cities, 1921–22. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1923. Pp. 260. Price, $2.00 net.

KNIGHT, RACHEL. The Founder of Quakerism. London: The Swarthmore Press, Ltd., 1923. Pp. 280. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

LEIGHTON, JOSEPH A. The Field of Philosophy. An introduction to the study of philosophy. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1923. Pp. x, 584. Price, $3.00.

LICHTENBERGER, JAMES P. Development of Social Theory. Century Social Science Series. New York and London: The Century Company, 1923. Pp. xiii, 482. Price, $4.00.

MASTERMAN, C. F. G. England after War. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1923. Pp. xviii, 311.

MCKERROW, JAMES CLARK. The Appearance of Mind. London and New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1923. Pp. xv, 120. Price, $2.00. Printed in England.

MCPHERSON, LOGAN G. Human Effort and Human Wants. An interpretation of economic activity in relation to human life. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1923. Pp. xii, 318.

M. W. A. The Threshold. New York: Macmillan Company, 1923. Pp. 239. Price, $2.00.

NEILSON, FRANCIS. Duty to Civilization. New York: B. W. Huebsch, Inc., 1923. Pp. 136. Price, $1.00.

OGDEN, C. K. and RICHARDS, I. A. The Meaning of Meaning. A study of the influence of language upon thought and of the science of symbolism. With an introduction by J. P. Postgate and supplementary essays by B. Malinowski and F. G. Crookshank. International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company, Ltd., 1923. Pp. xxxi, 544. Printed in Great Britain.

PEABODY, FRANCIS GREENWOOD. The Apostle Paul and the Modern World. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. Pp. x, 284. Price, $2.50.

PEAR, T. H. Remembering and Forgetting. London: Methuen and Company, 1922. Pp. xii, 242. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

REINACH, SALOMON. A Short History of Christianity. Translated by Florence Simmonds. London: W. Heinmann, Ltd., 1923. Pp. 228. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

RIVERS, W. H. R. Conflict and Dream. With an introduction by G. Elliot Smith. International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company, Ltd., 1923 Pp. xi, 194. Price 12s. 6d. net. Printed in Edinburgh.

RIVERS, W. H. R. Psychology and Politics and Other Essays. With a prefatory note by G. Elliot Smith and an appreciation by C. S. Myers. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company, Ltd., 1923. Pp. vii, 180. Printed in Edinburgh.

ROSSITER, WILLIAM S. Increase of Population in the United States, 1910–20. A study of changes in the population of divisions, states, counties, and rural and urban areas, and in sex, color, and nativity, at the fourteenth census. Census Monograph I. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922. Pp. 255.

SINCLAIR, UPTON. The Goose Step. A study of American education. Pasadena, Calif.: Upton Sinclair; Chicago: The Economy Book Shop (wholesale), 1922. Pp. x, 488. Price, $2.00.

Digitized by Google

SMITH, J. M. POWIS. The Moral Life of the Hebrews. Handbooks of Ethics and Religion. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1923. Pp. ix, 337. Price, $2.25, postpaid, $2.35.

SPEARMAN, C. The Nature of Intelligence and Principles of Cognition. London: Macmillan and Company, 1923. Pp. viii, 358. Price, 15s. net.

SPENCER, ANNA GARLIN. The Family and Its Members. Lippincott's Family Life Series, edited by Benjamin R. Andrews. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1923. Pp. 322. Price, $2.00.

THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY TO THE SECRETARY OF THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTE, 1912–13. Accompanying paper by J. Walter Fewkes, A Prehistoric Island Culture Area of America. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922. Pp. 281.

TILLYARD, FRANK. The Worker and the State. London: George Routledge, 1923. Pp. viii, 298. Price, 19s. 6d. net.

TRACH, CHARLES C. The Creation of the Presidency, 1775–1789. A study in constitutional history. Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science. Series XL, No. 4. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1922. Pp. xi, 182.

TSIANG, TINGFU F. Labor and Empire. A study of the reaction of British labor, mainly as represented in Parliament, to British imperialism since 1880. Studies in History, Economics and Public Law. Vol. CVI, No. 1, whole No. 239. New York: Columbia University, 1923. Pp. 220.

TUFTS, JAMES H. Education and Training for Social Work. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1923. Pp. xii, 240. Price $1.50.

VARENDONCK, J. The Evolution of the Conscious Faculties. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1923. Pp. 259. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

WARD, JAMES. Immanuel Kant. Proceedings of the British Academy. Humphrey Milford: The Oxford University Press, 1923. Pp. 22. Price, 1s. 6d. net.

WEBB, SIDNEY AND BEATRICE. The Decay of Capitalist Civilization. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company; London: The Fabian Society and George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1923. Pp. xvii, 242. Price, $2.00 or 4s. 6d. net.

WIDGERY, ALLEN G. A Comparative Study of Religions. London: Williams and Norgate, 1923. Pp. xxiv, 231. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

WOODS, ROBERT A. The Neighborhood in Nation-building. The running comment of thirty years at the South End House. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1923. Pp. viii, 348. Price, $3.00.

IN MEMORIAM: BERNARD BOSANQUET.

Mr. Bernard Bosanquet died at his home at Hampstead on February 8th in his seventy-fifth year. He had come to live in London only a few months before he died. For some fifteen years he had lived in his country house at Oxshott, Surrey, within easy reach of London, from which he used to come up frequently to attend the meetings of the British Academy and the Committee of the London Library. Of late years, however, his health had made these visits increasingly difficult and he had found it necessary to retire from all public engagements. He continued to devote his time to authorship. He maintained his interest in philosophy to the very end, following with keen critical enjoyment the new developments such as the revival of realism in England and the new forms of idealism in Italy. Only last December he completed an essay setting forth his own philosophical development and standpoint for the book on contemporary English philosophy which Professor Muirhead is preparing, and

Digitized by Google

death actually came to interrupt the writing of a new book on "The Nature of Mind."

For a generation the Bradley-Bosanquet philosophy has been one of the dominant influences of British intellectual life, and representative of English speculative thought. It does not stand alone. It has its antithesis in the mathematical philosophy of the Cambridge school of logicians. The close association of Bosanquet with Bradley was due to the principle which each accepted in common. There was no actual collaboration between them. But while Mr. F. H. Bradley is only known by his writings, Mr. Bosanquet was for many years a familiar figure on the platform, and possessed a wonderful power of expounding recondite theory in popular lectures. Also he was a regular attendant at the meetings of the Aristotelian Society, taking part in the discussions, and president of the Society from 1894 to 1898. He was very attractive in discourse, courteous to opponents in discussion, very sympathetic and yet tenacious in argument. He had his antipathies. He was repelled and not attracted by the intuitionist principle of Bergson and he was unable to see any matter of philosophical interest in the Einstein theory.

On the practical side, Mr. Bosanquet was an active worker for the Charity Organization Society and for many years was chairman of the committee of which the late Sir C. S. Loch was the organizing secretary. He was also president of the original Ethical Society which was founded to provide Sunday evening lectures in London. Mr. Bosanquet's ideal for such a Society was to preserve its freedom from any kind of organization which would endanger its unhampered activity. A very difficult situation arose, however, when in response to an appeal for united effort, the Society was induced to amalgamate with another London Ethical Society. The proposal was brought forward which would have had the effect of transforming the free Ethical Society into an ethical church. This was strongly opposed and would have led to serious secession but for the admirable management of Mr. Bosanquet, who arranged a perfectly friendly dissolution of the bond. Mr. Bosanquet's idea was to give a definite aim to the Society's work by specializing in the study of ethical principles, and he had the opportunity shortly after this incident by the gift from one of the members of a substantial sum to found a School of Ethical Studies. The condition of the gift was that it should not be used for endowment but spent in experiment. It was decided to employ the gift in arranging definite courses of lectures on the plan of the University Extension Board, with the hope that the School would become established on a self-supporting basis. The hope was not realized; the arrangements were successfully carried through, but when after two or three years the original money was exhausted the scheme came to an end.

Mr. Bosanquet's first book was *Knowledge and Reality* (Swan Sonnenschim, 1885). His published books number twenty-two volumes, many of them, however, being courses of popular lectures. His important works are *Logic* (Clarendon Press, 1888); *History of Aesthetic* (Swan Sonnenschism, 1892); *Philosophical Theory of the State* (Macmillan, 1899); *Principle of Individuality and Value* (*Macmillan*, 1912); *Value and Destiny of the Individual* (Macmillan, 1913); *Implication and Linear Inference* (Macmillan, 1920); *What Religion Is* (Macmillan, 1920); *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy* (Macmillan, 1921).

H. WILDON CARR.

London, England.

Digitized by Google